USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4292
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN C. LONG, a/k/a Johnathan C. Long, a/k/a El Jay,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (4:22-cr-00037-RCY-LRL-1)
Submitted: April 19, 2024 Decided: May 31, 2024
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Patricia A. René, THE RENÉ LAW FIRM, Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Brian Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, Grace Bowen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Jonathan C. Long was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to
distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A), possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), and
using or maintaining a premises to manufacture drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(1). Long asserts that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress
evidence and sever the felon-in-possession charge from the other charges. He also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the substantive reasonableness of his 470-
month sentence. We affirm.
“When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, [we review]
conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If, as here, the district court denied the motion to suppress, [we] construe[] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a
district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe
witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
court may not reverse the district court’s factual finding “simply because it would have
decided the case differently. Rather, a reviewing court must ask whether, on the entire
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Consent makes a search reasonable, functioning as an exception to both the warrant
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Perry, 92
F.4th 500, 512 (4th Cir. 2024). Consent can come from anybody with “common authority
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). “That is, as long as the person who
consents has ‘joint access or control for most purposes’ over something, others with an
interest in that effect will be seen to ‘have assumed the risk’ that the consenter might submit
the object to the police to be searched.” Perry, 92 F.4th at 512 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S.
at 171 n.7). We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Long’s now-wife
gave valid consent to law enforcement to enter the apartment to conduct a protective sweep
after both she and Long had exited. She was the lease holder and from all appearances had
joint access or control over the premises. Long’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a district court, on the
defendant’s motion, to “enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence
is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). We review de novo the
district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Smith, 54 F.4th 755, 766 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1097 (2023). In
conducting this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
to determine whether substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. “Substantial evidence
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is evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could accept as adequate and sufficient to support
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
assessing whether substantial evidence is present, we are “not entitled to assess witness
credibility and must assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence in the
prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 404 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Defendants bear a heavy burden under this standard.” Smith,
54 F.4th at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the evidence supports the finding that Long conspired with at least
one other person to possess and distribute fentanyl. We also conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to show that Long possessed the fentanyl with intent to distribute it. The
evidence also supports the jury’s conclusion that Long possessed a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime and that as a felon, he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.
And lastly, we conclude that the evidence supports Long’s conviction for using and
maintaining a residence for manufacturing and distributing fentanyl.
“Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), a single indictment may charge a
defendant with multiple counts if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character,
or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a
common scheme or plan.’” United States v.
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4292
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN C. LONG, a/k/a Johnathan C. Long, a/k/a El Jay,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (4:22-cr-00037-RCY-LRL-1)
Submitted: April 19, 2024 Decided: May 31, 2024
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Patricia A. René, THE RENÉ LAW FIRM, Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Brian Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, Grace Bowen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Jonathan C. Long was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to
distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A), possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), and
using or maintaining a premises to manufacture drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(1). Long asserts that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress
evidence and sever the felon-in-possession charge from the other charges. He also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the substantive reasonableness of his 470-
month sentence. We affirm.
“When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, [we review]
conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If, as here, the district court denied the motion to suppress, [we] construe[] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a
district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe
witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
court may not reverse the district court’s factual finding “simply because it would have
decided the case differently. Rather, a reviewing court must ask whether, on the entire
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Consent makes a search reasonable, functioning as an exception to both the warrant
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Perry, 92
F.4th 500, 512 (4th Cir. 2024). Consent can come from anybody with “common authority
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). “That is, as long as the person who
consents has ‘joint access or control for most purposes’ over something, others with an
interest in that effect will be seen to ‘have assumed the risk’ that the consenter might submit
the object to the police to be searched.” Perry, 92 F.4th at 512 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S.
at 171 n.7). We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Long’s now-wife
gave valid consent to law enforcement to enter the apartment to conduct a protective sweep
after both she and Long had exited. She was the lease holder and from all appearances had
joint access or control over the premises. Long’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a district court, on the
defendant’s motion, to “enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence
is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). We review de novo the
district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Smith, 54 F.4th 755, 766 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1097 (2023). In
conducting this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
to determine whether substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. “Substantial evidence
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4292 Doc: 27 Filed: 05/31/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
is evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could accept as adequate and sufficient to support
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
assessing whether substantial evidence is present, we are “not entitled to assess witness
credibility and must assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence in the
prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 404 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Defendants bear a heavy burden under this standard.” Smith,
54 F.4th at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the evidence supports the finding that Long conspired with at least
one other person to possess and distribute fentanyl. We also conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to show that Long possessed the fentanyl with intent to distribute it. The
evidence also supports the jury’s conclusion that Long possessed a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime and that as a felon, he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.
And lastly, we conclude that the evidence supports Long’s conviction for using and
maintaining a residence for manufacturing and distributing fentanyl.
“Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), a single indictment may charge a
defendant with multiple counts if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character,
or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a
common scheme or plan.’” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a)). “Joinder of related charges is broadly permitted to avoid
needless duplication of judicial proceedings, particularly where evidence of one charge
would be admissible to prove another charge.” Id. (citations omitted). Even if offenses
are properly joined, however, severance is appropriate if the defendant establishes that he
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would be prejudiced by the joinder. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). A defendant moving to sever
counts in an indictment has the burden of making “a strong showing of prejudice,” Branch,
537 F.3d at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted), and “it is not enough to simply show
that joinder makes for a more difficult defense,” United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221,
1225 (4th Cir. 1984). “[T]he district court’s denial of a motion to sever should be left
undisturbed, absent a showing of clear prejudice or abuse of discretion.” Branch, 537 F.3d
at 341. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Long’s
motion to sever.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentence
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the statutory purposes of
sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). We conclude that the district court adequately considered
Long’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence and the sentence is substantively
reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED