FILED United UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ March 25, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk of Court Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 18-5096 (D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00027-GKF-1) TAMEKA DENISE JOHNSON, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MCKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This appeal grew out of Ms. Tameka Johnson’s sentences in federal
and state courts. In federal court, Ms. Johnson moved for a nunc pro tunc
ruling that would retroactively make her federal sentence run concurrently
with her Texas and Oklahoma state sentences. The district court denied the
motion on the merits, and Ms. Johnson appeals. The district court was right
* We conclude that oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of this appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the appeal briefs and the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A). to disallow relief, but it should have dismissed Ms. Johnson’s motion for
lack of jurisdiction rather than rule on the merits.
1. Ms. Johnson seeks modification of her federal sentence to remedy an alleged delay in the start of her federal sentence.
Ms. Johnson pleaded guilty in federal court to receiving stolen
government funds, and the court sentenced her in August 2016 to 47
months’ imprisonment. When imposing the federal sentence, the court
recognized that Ms. Johnson would be sentenced in Texas for another
crime and anticipated that the Texas court would run its sentence
concurrently with the federal sentence. But the federal court expressly
declined to order the federal sentence to run concurrently with the future
Texas sentence. 1
In the Texas case, the court sentenced Ms. Johnson in October 2016
to 36 months’ imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run concurrently
with her federal sentence. She completed the Texas sentence on November
21, 2016, but she remained in Texas jails on other charges until October
2017. Though Ms. Johnson was in a Texas jail, the U.S. Marshals Service
lodged a detainer against her in July 2017. Despite the detainer, however,
Ms. Johnson did not enter federal custody when she completed all of her
1 In contrast, the court ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently with Ms. Johnson’s anticipated sentence in Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
2 Texas sentences. She was instead extradited to Oklahoma, where she stayed
in jail until her release in February 2018. Two months later (April 2018),
federal marshals arrested Ms. Johnson and she started serving her federal
sentence.
Ms. Johnson contends that the U.S. Marshals Service should have
lodged the detainer by the time that she discharged her initial Texas
sentence (November 21, 2016) and that the delay in the detainer extended
her time of incarceration by almost two years. To remedy the alleged delay
in the detainer, Ms. Johnson seeks modification of her federal sentence to
state that it was to also run concurrently with the subsequent incarcerations
in Texas and Oklahoma (which ended in February 2018).
2. The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Ms. Johnson’s motion.
Because the district court’s jurisdiction involves a question of law,
we engage in de novo review. United States v. Luna-Acosta, 715 F.3d 860,
864 (10th Cir. 2013). Applying de novo review, we start by considering
whether Congress has expressly granted jurisdiction to the district court to
modify Ms. Johnson’s sentence on the ground that she had asserted. United
3 States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1996). Without an express
grant of jurisdiction, the district court would lack jurisdiction to modify
the sentence. See United States v. Mendoza, 118 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir.
1997) (“A district court does not have inherent authority to modify a
previously imposed sentence; it may do so only pursuant to statutory
authorization.”).
Congress has provided a source of jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(b), which permits modification of sentences under
§ 3582(c),
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and
18 U.S.C. § 3742.
See United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1121 n.11 (10th Cir. 2015).
Ms. Johnson failed to timely invoke Rule 35, and she did not allege
any circumstances that would support appellate relief under § 3742. Thus,
§ 3582(c) provided the only conceivable basis for modification of Ms.
Johnson’s sentence. This section allows modification: (1) upon motion by
the Bureau of Prisons, (2) upon a change in the sentencing guidelines, or
(3) upon statutory authorization (like that provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and § 2255). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (c)(2); Spaulding,
802 F.3d at 1121 n.12. None of these apply. The Bureau of Prisons has not
filed a motion, and the applicable sentencing guidelines have not changed.
4 Nor has Ms. Johnson invoked § 2241 or § 2255. 2 To obtain relief, Ms.
Johnson instead relies on two opinions, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3584, and
§ 5G1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Ms. Johnson points to Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir.
1990), and Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). Her reliance on
these opinions is misguided.
In Barden, the Third Circuit addressed whether the Bureau of Prisons
could issue a nunc pro tunc order to credit time in state incarceration
against a federal sentence. 921 F.2d at 480–81. But the Third Circuit did
not extend this authority to federal courts. And even if Barden was
applicable, we have never adopted its reasoning. See United States v.
Miller, 594 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that we have
never adopted Barden).
Ms. Johnson also misapplies Setser v.
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FILED United UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ March 25, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk of Court Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 18-5096 (D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00027-GKF-1) TAMEKA DENISE JOHNSON, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MCKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This appeal grew out of Ms. Tameka Johnson’s sentences in federal
and state courts. In federal court, Ms. Johnson moved for a nunc pro tunc
ruling that would retroactively make her federal sentence run concurrently
with her Texas and Oklahoma state sentences. The district court denied the
motion on the merits, and Ms. Johnson appeals. The district court was right
* We conclude that oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of this appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the appeal briefs and the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A). to disallow relief, but it should have dismissed Ms. Johnson’s motion for
lack of jurisdiction rather than rule on the merits.
1. Ms. Johnson seeks modification of her federal sentence to remedy an alleged delay in the start of her federal sentence.
Ms. Johnson pleaded guilty in federal court to receiving stolen
government funds, and the court sentenced her in August 2016 to 47
months’ imprisonment. When imposing the federal sentence, the court
recognized that Ms. Johnson would be sentenced in Texas for another
crime and anticipated that the Texas court would run its sentence
concurrently with the federal sentence. But the federal court expressly
declined to order the federal sentence to run concurrently with the future
Texas sentence. 1
In the Texas case, the court sentenced Ms. Johnson in October 2016
to 36 months’ imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run concurrently
with her federal sentence. She completed the Texas sentence on November
21, 2016, but she remained in Texas jails on other charges until October
2017. Though Ms. Johnson was in a Texas jail, the U.S. Marshals Service
lodged a detainer against her in July 2017. Despite the detainer, however,
Ms. Johnson did not enter federal custody when she completed all of her
1 In contrast, the court ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently with Ms. Johnson’s anticipated sentence in Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
2 Texas sentences. She was instead extradited to Oklahoma, where she stayed
in jail until her release in February 2018. Two months later (April 2018),
federal marshals arrested Ms. Johnson and she started serving her federal
sentence.
Ms. Johnson contends that the U.S. Marshals Service should have
lodged the detainer by the time that she discharged her initial Texas
sentence (November 21, 2016) and that the delay in the detainer extended
her time of incarceration by almost two years. To remedy the alleged delay
in the detainer, Ms. Johnson seeks modification of her federal sentence to
state that it was to also run concurrently with the subsequent incarcerations
in Texas and Oklahoma (which ended in February 2018).
2. The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Ms. Johnson’s motion.
Because the district court’s jurisdiction involves a question of law,
we engage in de novo review. United States v. Luna-Acosta, 715 F.3d 860,
864 (10th Cir. 2013). Applying de novo review, we start by considering
whether Congress has expressly granted jurisdiction to the district court to
modify Ms. Johnson’s sentence on the ground that she had asserted. United
3 States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1996). Without an express
grant of jurisdiction, the district court would lack jurisdiction to modify
the sentence. See United States v. Mendoza, 118 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir.
1997) (“A district court does not have inherent authority to modify a
previously imposed sentence; it may do so only pursuant to statutory
authorization.”).
Congress has provided a source of jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(b), which permits modification of sentences under
§ 3582(c),
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and
18 U.S.C. § 3742.
See United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1121 n.11 (10th Cir. 2015).
Ms. Johnson failed to timely invoke Rule 35, and she did not allege
any circumstances that would support appellate relief under § 3742. Thus,
§ 3582(c) provided the only conceivable basis for modification of Ms.
Johnson’s sentence. This section allows modification: (1) upon motion by
the Bureau of Prisons, (2) upon a change in the sentencing guidelines, or
(3) upon statutory authorization (like that provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and § 2255). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (c)(2); Spaulding,
802 F.3d at 1121 n.12. None of these apply. The Bureau of Prisons has not
filed a motion, and the applicable sentencing guidelines have not changed.
4 Nor has Ms. Johnson invoked § 2241 or § 2255. 2 To obtain relief, Ms.
Johnson instead relies on two opinions, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3584, and
§ 5G1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Ms. Johnson points to Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir.
1990), and Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). Her reliance on
these opinions is misguided.
In Barden, the Third Circuit addressed whether the Bureau of Prisons
could issue a nunc pro tunc order to credit time in state incarceration
against a federal sentence. 921 F.2d at 480–81. But the Third Circuit did
not extend this authority to federal courts. And even if Barden was
applicable, we have never adopted its reasoning. See United States v.
Miller, 594 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that we have
never adopted Barden).
Ms. Johnson also misapplies Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463
(2012). Setser recognized the authority of a federal court at an initial
sentencing to run a sentence concurrently with an anticipated sentence. 132
S. Ct. at 1468–70. But this opinion does not authorize a court to later
2 Courts occasionally recharacterize pro se motions. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003). But a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion would be untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (f)(1)–(4). And a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 would need to be filed in the district where Ms. Johnson is confined (the District of Minnesota). 5 modify a sentence by making it run concurrently with another sentence.
See id.
Ms. Johnson relies not only on Barden and Setser but also on the text
of 18 U.S.C. § 3584. Section 3584 allows for sentences imposed at
different times to be made concurrent. But this section applies only if the
federal court orders the sentences to run concurrently. Here the federal
court didn’t order its sentence to run concurrently with any Texas
sentences; the federal court ordered only that its sentence run concurrently
with the anticipated sentence to be issued in Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
Finally, Ms. Johnson invokes § 5G1.3 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. This guideline generally allows departures; it
doesn’t authorize retroactive modification of a sentence previously
imposed. See United States v. Tetty-Mensah, 665 F. App’x 687, 690 (10th
Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines are not
jurisdiction-conferring statutes permitting [a] court [sic] to modify a
sentence.”).
* * *
Without statutory authority to modify Ms. Johnson’s sentence, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits and should have
dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. White,
765 F.3d 1240, 1250 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that a motion to modify a
6 sentence should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, rather than
denied, when the district court lacked statutory authority to modify the
sentence). We therefore (1) vacate the district court’s denial of Ms.
Johnson’s motion and (2) remand the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction. We also grant
Ms. Johnson’s motion to supplement the record on appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge