United States v. John Albert Davis

963 F.2d 380, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23674, 1992 WL 103719
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 13, 1992
Docket91-30256
StatusUnpublished

This text of 963 F.2d 380 (United States v. John Albert Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. John Albert Davis, 963 F.2d 380, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23674, 1992 WL 103719 (9th Cir. 1992).

Opinion

963 F.2d 380

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John Albert DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 91-30256.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 1992.*
Decided May 13, 1992.

Before WALLACE, Chief Judge,* GOODWIN, Circuit Judge, and LEVI**, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM***

Davis challenges the district court's failure to specify whether dead marijuana rootballs should be counted toward the applicable offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D), as well as the court's inclusion of dead rootballs in its calculations for assigning Davis a base offense level.

Davis pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At the sentencing hearing, the district court assigned Davis a base offense level of 26 based on 95 growing marijuana plants, 95 marijuana rootballs, a bag containing approximately 8 1/4 pounds of dried marijuana buds, $1,091 in currency, and miscellaneous records and growing apparatus which were seized from Davis's home. Davis filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his base offense level should have been calculated at level 24 because the dead marijuana rootballs should not have been counted under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). After a hearing, the district court determined that an offense level of 26 was appropriate.

The legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 247 (9th Cir.1988). In reviewing a sentence under the sentencing guidelines, we must determine, inter alia, whether the sentence was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines or is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 557 (9th Cir.1989). A district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and due deference is given to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 557.

I. RULE 32

Davis contends that the district court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding whether the rootballs should be considered, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D). Rule 32(c)(3)(D) provides:

If the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.

In arguing to the district court that the marijuana rootballs should not be considered in determining his base offense level, Davis did not challenge any fact set forth in the presentence report. There was no dispute that 95 live marijuana plants were found along with 95 marijuana rootballs. Rather, Davis challenged the legal conclusion concerning the base offense level to be drawn from the facts in the presentence report.

A challenge to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to an uncontested set of facts does not implicate Rule 32(c)(3)(D). The plain language of the rule indicates that it applies when "the comments of the defendant ... allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report". Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) (emphasis added). Because Davis did not challenge any facts found in the report, the district court was not obligated to make Rule 32 findings with regard to the disputed matter.

II. CALCULATION OF DAVIS'S BASE OFFENSE LEVEL

Davis contends that the district court improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines by including the dead marijuana rootballs, the dried marijuana buds, and the currency in calculating his base offense level. He argues that Congress did not intend to include marijuana roots in calculating the amount of marijuana for purposes of sentence enhancement. Consequently, Davis contends that only the 95 live plants should have been counted. This contention is without merit.

According to the drug quantity table set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), for an offense involving 50 or more marijuana plants, each plant is treated as the equivalent of one kilogram of marijuana. Offenses involving between 100 and 400 kilograms of marijuana produce a base level offense of 26. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). In United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962 (1990), we noted that determining the applicable offense level requires a two-step process: "First, the court applies the offense guideline section in Chapter Two most applicable to the offense of conviction. Second, the court determines the applicable range (or offense level) in accordance with the Relevant Conduct section, § 1B1.3." Id. at 710 n. 3 (citations omitted). Guideline section 2D1.1(a)(3) indicates that Davis should receive a base offense level of 24 based on the 95 live marijuana plants. Next, the sentencing court must look to the Relevant Conduct section to ascertain whether the base offense level should be enhanced.

The Relevant Conduct section provides:

[T]he base offense level ... shall be determined on the basis of the following:

.............................................................

...................

* * *

(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction....

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Such relevant conduct includes drug quantities contained in dismissed counts of an indictment, see United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir.1990), aff'd in relevant part, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1564 (1992), and other quantities of drugs involved in the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, see United States v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Laszlo Pomazi
851 F.2d 244 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Dario Restrepo
903 F.2d 648 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Dario Restrepo
946 F.2d 654 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Miller
680 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tennessee, 1988)
United States v. Sanchez-Lopez
879 F.2d 541 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
963 F.2d 380, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23674, 1992 WL 103719, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-john-albert-davis-ca9-1992.