GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Following our circuit's binding precedent, we previously held in this case that preindictment plea negotiations are "period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant" that are automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. White , 679 F. App'x 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing *1111United States v. Dunbar , 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds , 543 U.S. 1099, 125 S.Ct. 1029, 160 L.Ed.2d 995 (2005) ; United States v. Bowers , 834 F.2d 607, 609-10 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). Defendant challenged this precedent for the first time in his petition for a writ of certiorari as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Bloate v. United States , 559 U.S. 196, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, White v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 641, 199 L.Ed.2d 522 (2018) ( No. 17-270 ). The government then changed horses in midstream, conceding-also for the first time before the Supreme Court-that our circuit precedent was incorrect and inconsistent with Bloate , and that the roughly two-week continuance to engage in preindictment plea negotiations here did not qualify for automatic exclusion under § 3161(h)(1). Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, White v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 641, 199 L.Ed.2d 522 (2018) ( No. 17-270 ). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case back to us "for further consideration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor General." White v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 641, 641, 199 L.Ed.2d 522 (2018).
On remand, we now hold that Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers . Nevertheless, we deny defendant relief for two independent reasons. First, he cannot overcome plain-error review of his Bloate argument. Second, and alternatively, the time for preindictment plea negotiations was properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial Act. Therefore, we again affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
Our prior opinion sets forth the facts pertinent to this remand:
On April 29, 2013, the government filed a complaint against White charging him with drug distribution and firearm crimes related to the May 14, 2010, search and seizure. White was arrested on those charges, and an order of temporary detention was entered, on May 2, 2013. He made his initial appearance the next day and was released on bond.
After his arrest, the parties engaged in preindictment plea negotiations. To that end, they filed a stipulation with the district court on May 17, 2013, agreeing to adjourn White's preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23, 2013, and June 7, 2013, from White's Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were not successful, and a grand jury indicted White on June 4, 2013.
White , 679 F. App'x at 429. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, thirty-three days passed between White's arrest and indictment.
While he filed a bevy of motions before the district court, pertinent to our inquiry is only White's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because the government violated his speedy trial rights. Defendant's motion simply announced that the government failed to indict him within thirty days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq ., but substantively argued only his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, denied it, a jury convicted White of multiple crimes, and the district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause. See White , 679 F. App'x at 430-33. Following *1112remand from the Supreme Court, we give a fresh look to this issue.
II.
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial." U.S. CONST . amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act strengthens this constitutional mandate by establishing time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 - 3174. Among these limits is an obligation that the government file an indictment within thirty days of arresting a defendant, excepting the time spent on certain events that can be automatically excluded from that calculation and for other events if sufficient reasons are given by the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (h). We typically review de novo the district court's interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Anderson , 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012). And "[w]e review the district court's decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance under an abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v. Williams , 753 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).
The issue on remand is whether the fourteen days spent on preindictment plea negotiations are excludable under that Act. White argues that our precedent holding that preindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) no longer passes muster after the Supreme Court's Bloate decision. The government counters that this court should affirm the district court because (1) White forfeited the argument that Bloate precludes automatic exclusion of preindictment plea negotiations and cannot show plain error, and (2) even if preindictment plea negotiations are not automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1), that time was excludable as an ends-of-justice continuance pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). We address these arguments in turn.
III.
A.
We first hold that Bloate abrogated our prior decisions concluding that preindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under the Act.
Section 3161(h)(1) provides for the automatic exclusion of "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to" eight enumerated subcategories. One of those categories expressly excludes the time "resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government." § 3161(h)(1)(G). Based primarily on that subparagraph and the "including but not limited to" language, we have long held that time spent on preindictment plea negotiations between the parties is automatically excludable. Dunbar , 357 F.3d at 593 ; Bowers , 834 F.2d at 609-10. And yet, in Bloate the Supreme Court held that the time a court grants to a party to prepare pretrial motions was not automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1), notwithstanding § 3161(h)(1)(D) 's express exclusion of the time attributable to "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." 559 U.S. at 203-07, 130 S.Ct. 1345. The Court held that "because a specific provision ... controls one of more general application," id . at 207, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (cleaned up), Congress's express language in subparagraph (h)(1)(D) communicates the decision to make automatically excludable the time for pretrial motions "only from the time a motion is filed through the hearing or disposition point specified in the subparagraph, and that other periods of pretrial motion-related delay are excludable only when accompanied *1113by district court findings," id . at 206, 130 S.Ct. 1345.
Given the above reasoning, the Solicitor General's concession of error in our precedent, and the Supreme Court's order vacating our prior decision and remanding for reconsideration in light of that concession of error, we take this opportunity to revisit our prior precedent. Although it is generally true that one panel cannot overrule the binding precedent of a prior panel, United States v. Ferguson , 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017), that rule yields when the prior panel's reasoning has been undercut or abrogated by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted , 831 F.3d 686, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2016). And, as we have held, such Supreme Court authority need not be exactly on point, so long as the legal reasoning is directly applicable to the issue at hand. Id . at 721 ; see also Barr v. Lafon , 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2008).
Just as the Supreme Court held that the time a court grants to a party to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable, the same is true for preindictment plea negotiations. The parties now agree on this point. Subparagraph (h)(1)(G) expressly excludes the time attributable to "delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government." § 3161(h)(1)(G) (emphasis added). This specific provision caps the time to be excluded as beginning at the moment the proposed plea is given to the court for its consideration. Plea negotiations , which necessarily occur before a proposed plea agreement comes to fruition, are therefore outside the limited universe contemplated by this subparagraph and may not be automatically excluded. See United States v. Mathurin , 690 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012) ("According to the Supreme Court, when the category of delay at issue is 'governed by' one of § 3161(h)(1) 's eight subparagraphs, a court must look only to that subparagraph to see if the delay is automatically excludable. In other words, the 'including but not limited to' clause of § 3161(h)(1) does not modify the contents of the enumerated subcategories themselves." (citations omitted)). Thus, applying Bloate 's reasoning to this analogous subparagraph, we now hold that (1) Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers , and (2) the time spent on preindictment plea negotiations is not automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act.
B.
This conclusion, however, does not end our consideration § 3161(h)(1) 's automatic exclusion in this appeal. The government, though accepting that Bloate abrogated our precedent, now argues that White has at a minimum forfeited the issue by not raising it before the district court.1 I agree.
*1114Before the district court, White specifically challenged the excludability of the fifteen-day delay for plea negotiations, and the validity of the stipulation. However, he now presents a new reason why the district court erroneously concluded that the plea-negotiation time was excludable, arguing for the first time on appeal that Bloate 's reasoning applied to remove preindictment plea negotiations from the automatic excludability provisions of § 3161(h)(1). This is insufficient to preserve the issue for de novo review on appeal. See United States v. Huntington Nat. Bank , 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009) ("To preserve the argument, then, the litigant not only must identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of argumentation in support of it."); United States v. Seals , 450 F. App'x 769, 771 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (declining to review the defendant's new Speedy Trial Act argument because "not only must the defendant seek dismissal prior to trial, but he must do so for the reasons he seeks to press on appeal"); see also United States v. Loughrin , 710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Seals as "persuasive" and declining to consider the defendant's challenge on appeal to an order of continuance he did not challenge in the district court). And generally, an appellant's failure to raise an argument in his appellate brief forfeits that issue on appeal. Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls , 395 F.3d 291, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2005).
Although the Supreme Court's remand order requires this court to "further consider[ ]" the Speedy Trial Act issue, it does not similarly require us to engage in de novo review or to grant White relief. Cf. Bloate , 559 U.S. at 216, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[N]othing in the [Supreme Court's] opinion bars the [circuit court] from considering, on remand, the Government's argument that the indictment, and convictions under it, remain effective"). As White himself acknowledges, forfeiture of a specific Speedy Trial Act claim of error can result in plain-error review, see, e.g. , United States v. Montgomery , 395 F. App'x 177, 181 n.4, 184 n.7 (6th Cir. 2010), and we see no reason why the Supreme Court's remand order would require otherwise. Thus, we are limited to plain-error consideration of the district court's determination that the preindictment plea-negotiation period was automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1). See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (" Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited power to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court.").
Plain error is, as it should be, a difficult hurdle to clear. The burden is on White "to show (1) error that (2) was plain, (3) affected [his] substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Ushery , 785 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 2015) ; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). "An error is 'plain' when, at a minimum, it 'is clear under current law.' " United States v. Al-Maliki , 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Olano , 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ).
We have noted that "[a] 'circuit split precludes a finding of plain error,' for the split is good evidence that the issue is 'subject to reasonable dispute.' " Id . (quoting United States v. Williams , 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995) ; Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) ). And we have also explained that "[a] lack of binding case law that answers the question presented will also preclude our finding of plain error." Id . Here, the district court could not have plainly erred because we are in a realm beyond either a circuit split or lack of *1115binding caselaw-at the time of the district court's decision, the binding precedent of this circuit held that the time for preindictment plea negotiations was automatically excludable. See Dunbar , 357 F.3d at 593 ; Bowers , 834 F.2d at 609-10.
Although we now overrule those decisions in light of their abrogation by Bloate , the analysis supporting that conclusion shows that we had to extend Bloate 's reasoning to an analogous, but different, section of the Speedy Trial Act. See, supra, Section III.A. Our decision today shows that it took no great inferential leap to apply Bloate in this instance, but it still required both an extension of Bloate 's reasoning and the overruling of two of our published decisions. We cannot fault a district court for following our binding caselaw, as it was required to do. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. , 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."). Thus, White cannot show that the district court committed plain error in denying his motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds.
IV.
Finally, we turn to the government's alternate argument-that the district court's order granting the parties' stipulation to exclude the preindictment-plea-negotiation period from Speedy Trial Act calculations satisfied the requirements for an ends-of-justice continuance under the Act. We agree and hold this to be adequate alternative grounds for affirmance.
Regardless of whether a period of time is automatically excludable, the Speedy Trial Act allows for a continuance whenever the judge finds "that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). This is a common ground for excluding time and the Supreme Court has noted that ends-of-justice continuances furnish "[m]uch of the Act's flexibility." Zedner v. United States , 547 U.S. 489, 498, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006).
To exclude time under this exception, the court must consider certain factors, such as whether the failure to grant the continuance would "result in a miscarriage of justice," § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) ; whether due to the nature of the case (or other factors), the case is too complex to reasonably expect adequate preparation within the Act's time limits, § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) ; or whether a refusal to continue the case would deny the defendant "reasonable time to obtain counsel," or would unreasonably deny either party time for "effective preparation," § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Notably, the list of enumerated factors is not exhaustive, § 3161(h)(7)(B) ("The factors, among others , which a judge shall consider...." (emphasis added)), but preindictment plea negotiations are not expressly included. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)-(iv).
The Supreme Court has held that other types of delay that are not excludable under subsection (h)(1) are excludable under the more flexible framework of subsection (h)(7). See Bloate , 559 U.S. at 214, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that the time spent to prepare pretrial motions, while not excludable under subsection (h)(1), is excludable under subsection (h)(7)). And a number of our sister circuits have concluded that time spent negotiating preindictment plea agreements can be excluded under subsection (h)(7)'s ends-of-justice exclusion. See Mathurin , 690 F.3d at 1241-42 ;
*1116United States v. Fields , 39 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.); United States v. Williams , 12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells , 519 U.S. 482, 492, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997). We agree, and hold that the time spent on preindictment plea negotiations may be excludable under subsection (h)(7).2 A conclusion to the contrary would pervert the Speedy Trial Act and ignore the central importance that the plea bargaining process has in our modern system of criminal justice-"[i]t is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system." Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) ("[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.").
Therefore, because the time spent on pretrial plea negotiations may be excludable under subsection (h)(7), we must determine whether the magistrate judge's order provided sufficient explanation for the continuance, as required by the Act. Subsection 3161(h)(7) requires a district court to "show its work," before granting an ends-of-justice continuance:
No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Id . "[T]he Act requires express findings" when granting an ends-of-justice continuance, and "without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion" pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). See Zedner , 547 U.S. at 506-07, 126 S.Ct. 1976.3 The public interest in a speedy trial is also protected by the Act, so a defendant's agreement to waive its protections cannot, by itself, justify an ends-of-justice continuance. See id. at 500-01, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (finding that a defendant cannot prospectively waive or "opt out of the Act" meant to balance the defendant's and the government's interests against those of the public); see also Bloate , 559 U.S. at 211-12, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (noting that a defendant may not opt out of the Act even if he believes it would be in his interest because the Act also "vindicate[s] the public interest in the swift administration of justice").
Given its unique structure and appearance, it is important to discuss exactly what the combined stipulation and order granting the continuance said in this case. The first two pages of the court's filed order was nothing more than the parties' stipulation. There, the parties provided that "the period from May 23, 2013, to June 7, 2013, should be excluded from *1117computing the time within which an information or indictment must be filed because the parties are engaged in plea negotiations, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and because the ends of justice served by such continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)." The third page of the court's order began by noting that the "matter [came] before the court on the stipulation of the parties" and provided, simply, that "the period from May 23, 2013, to the new date of the preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013, should be excluded in calculating the time within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161."
This order sufficiently supports an ends-of-justice exclusion under § 3161(h)(7). First, the order clearly incorporates the parties' two-page stipulation, both by attachment and reference. In the past we've upheld a continuance when the reasons for it are clear from the context or record. United States v. Richardson , 681 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[G]iven the context, the record clearly establishes that a continuance serves the ends of justice."). That the magistrate attached the parties' stipulation to its order only bolsters the conclusion that the parties' proposed justifications for the continuance found their way into the magistrate's determination. Thus, we agree with the district court and the government that the magistrate adopted the parties' stipulation as part of its own reasoning in support of the roughly two-week continuance.
Second, the contents of the order are sufficient to support the continuance. We have previously affirmed a district court's ends-of-justice continuance when it simply held that "the ends of justice served outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Anderson , 695 F.3d at 397. Given the context surrounding the issue in Anderson -the judge was considering a motion to suppress for some, but not all, of the period for which the continuance was granted-this court held that the defendant's challenge to the district court's ends-of-justice continuance was meritless. Id . at 397-98. In a similar vein, here, the magistrate's order and the surrounding context support the continuance. As noted above, time for preindictment plea negotiations may be excluded under subsection (h)(7) as a valid ends-of-justice exception to the Act's strict deadlines. Given the relatively short continuance requested-only approximately two weeks' time-the magistrate did not err in concluding that the parties' efforts to come to a mutually agreeable plea agreement "outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." § 3161(h)(7)(A). And the fact that the magistrate's order did not explicitly say "ends of justice" poses no alternate barrier to this conclusion. "An ends-of-justice continuance can be found even when a delay is not designated as such by the court." United States v. Stone , 461 F. App'x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Spring , 80 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1996) ). The Act does not require such "magic words." United States v. Breen , 243 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2001).
Finally, despite White's arguments to the contrary, this case is distinguishable from Zedner because it does not present the sort of wide-ranging and open-ended error that the Zedner Court sought to remedy. There, the Court was faced with an open-ended stipulation, which prevented the defendant from raising any Speedy Trial Act issues "for all time." Zedner , 547 U.S. at 494, 126 S.Ct. 1976. This universal Speedy Trial Act waiver ultimately led to over seven years passing from the defendant's indictment to his trial. Id . at 496, 126 S.Ct. 1976. Unlike the "waiver for all time" and for all reasons in Zedner , id . at 493-94, 126 S.Ct. 1976, here the magistrate *1118accepted a mere two-week exclusion of time for the express purpose of preindictment plea negotiations.
Sure, an order more fully explaining the magistrate's reasoning would have been well taken by this court, but we cannot forget that the Act does not require a novella of explanation. See Anderson , 695 F.3d at 397. The magistrate's succinct and plain statement here, when combined with the parties' attached stipulation, granted a short and definite continuance (approximately two weeks), for a permissible reason (preindictment plea negotiations), after expressly considering the three-pronged interests relevant to the Act (the interests of defendant, the government, and the public). In short, we cannot, under these facts and given the surrounding context, find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in granting an ends-of-justice continuance. Williams , 753 F.3d at 635.
V.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT
RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.
I concur in the judgment and concur with Judge Griffin's opinion, except as to part III.B. In my view, White did not forfeit his argument about 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) because I fail to see when he was required to raise the argument.
Consider the order of events. Fourteen days after White was arrested, his court-appointed attorney signed the stipulation at issue in this case. The magistrate judge entered the order the next day. A few weeks later, White filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment due to a Speedy Trial Act violation and also moved for a new attorney. The court allowed White to hire a new attorney, denied the pro se motion without prejudice, and invited the new attorney to file a new motion. The new attorney did file a new motion under the Speedy Trial Act and the government filed a response. White declined to file a reply. The court held a hearing and ultimately denied the motion in a written order.
Then consider the content of the briefs. The pro se motion simply pointed out § 3161(b) 's 30-day deadline, while making no reference to the stipulation or the order finding excludable delay. The subsequent attorney-drafted motion was more specific, but it observed only that 33 calendar days elapsed and concluded that there was necessarily a violation of § 3161(b). It too failed to mention the stipulation and order. The government finally brought up the order in its response brief, but with little elaboration. The government merely observed that "the parties agreed, and the court ordered, that the period of delay from May 23, 2013, through June 4, 2013 (in fact June 7, 2013) was excludable delay under the [Speedy Trial Act]." It did not, however, identify how the Speedy Trial Act enabled this exclusion-whether through § 3161(h)(1), (h)(7), or some other means. In all, no brief mentioned automatic exclusion or § 3161(h)(1).
Automatic exclusion never came up at the hearing either. The government never mentioned it and argument about the Speedy Trial Act focused exclusively on the validity of the stipulation. White's new attorney recounted how the old attorney had signed the stipulation and explained:
If that extension is effective to the Defendant, then that would be credited against him; the issue would be moot, he would lose. His claim is that he did not agree to that, had no knowledge of it, that that extension was taking place.... Our argument is very simple: He didn't agree to it.
*1119Ultimately, the district court found that the stipulation was valid and that finding has never been at issue on appeal.
White did not raise the automatic-exclusion issue, but it was not his issue to raise. White did what the Speedy Trial Act requires: he provided proof of a violation (a list of the dates) and moved for dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). The government was then required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient time was excluded. See United States v. Jenkins , 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). It did so by merely pointing to the magistrate judge's order. Notably, though, § 3161(h)(1) -when it does apply-does not require a judicial finding; it is automatic. See Bloate v. United States , 559 U.S. 196, 203, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) ; Henderson v. United States , 476 U.S. 321, 327, 332, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). If the government had argued that even without the order, the time was automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1), it would have behooved White to raise a Bloate -based challenge in a reply brief-but the government did not raise that argument. White therefore had no obligation to argue why the unmentioned provision did not apply to him.
Ultimately, the waiver of the § 3161(h)(1) argument-whether by White or the government-is inconsequential. All now agree that under Bloate , § 3161(h)(1) does not apply here, which leaves us with the matter actually considered and relied upon by the district court: exclusion under § 3161(h)(7). I agree that under the circumstances the magistrate judge's order, which was explicitly premised on the parties' stipulation, satisfied the requirement of an on-the-record finding for an ends-of-justice continuance. I therefore concur in the judgment.
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART