NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0013n.06
No. 24-5994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jan 07, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN JARROD SANFORD, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: BOGGS, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
BOGGS, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant Jarrod Sanford of production of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)&(e), possession of child pornography, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and committing a felony offense with a minor while being
required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. He was sentenced to 960
months of imprisonment.
On appeal, Sanford argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence that he had
raped and sexually abused the child victim on other occasions than the ones charged, that it com-
mitted plain error in permitting certain testimony regarding the victim’s out-of-court statements.
He also contends that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and that there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for production of child pornography and com-
mitting that offense while being required to register as a sex offender.
For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety. No. 24-5994, United States v. Sanford
BACKGROUND
In November 2023, Jarrod Sanford was a twice-convicted child-sex offender, required by
the State of Tennessee to register as a child-sex offender. He was also on federal supervised re-
lease. As a condition of his supervised release, Sanford was required to enroll any internet-capable
device he possessed in the probation office’s computer-monitoring program. Sanford had enrolled
one device, a Samsung Android cell phone.
Sanford lived with the thirteen-year-old victim, Anna, in November, 2023 and for several
years earlier.1 Sanford began sexually abusing Anna when she was about ten years old. He first
raped her when she was about eleven years old. He continued to sexually abuse her, including
raping her vaginally, orally, and anally every other day. Anna initially reported the abuse to a
friend and the friend’s father in January, 2023. Police were contacted, came and took Anna’s
phone, and interviewed her, but nothing came of Anna’s report.
Sanford began raping her again six months later. Anna disclosed this abuse to another
friend. That friend reported the disclosure to a school counselor, who called the police. When the
police arrived at Sanford’s home in November, 2023, Sanford gave Anna a silver phone and asked
her to hide it. This phone was not the Samsung Android cell phone that Sanford had enrolled in
the monitoring program.
Anna told responding officers that Sanford had been raping her, that there was a scratch on
her leg from the rape, that he had a phone that the probation officer did not know about, that he
told her to hide the phone, and that there were probably photographs on the phone of Sanford
raping her. Anna also reported that Sanford had raped her the night before, orally and vaginally,
and had ejaculated on her breasts.
1 Anna is a pseudonym.
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The officers seized the phone, took Anna for a sexual-assault examination by a sexual-
assault nurse, and took her for an interview.
The phone contained photographs of the penile-oral rape of Anna by Sanford. Anna iden-
tified herself and Sanford in the photographs. Anna’s mother also identified Sanford and Anna in
the photographs. The photos were taken on a sofa in the living room in the house where Sanford
and Anna lived. A forensic examination of the phone revealed connections to Sanford’s Google
accounts, social media accounts, email address, and phone number. It also contained text messages
in which Sanford identified himself and sent a “selfie”-style photo to another person. The phone
also contained searches and views of simulated child pornography similar to the photographs of
Sanford raping Anna as well as the other instances of rape.
Anna’s sexual-assault exam revealed tears in her vagina, bruising on her left forearm and
upper thighs, and scratches on her leg. The sexual-assault nurse also took swabs for DNA analysis
from Anna’s cervix and breasts. DNA testing revealed those samples were a match to Sanford.
Sanford was charged with production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§2251(a)&(e), possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and
committing the production offense while required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2260A. A jury convicted Sanford of all three charges. The district court also found that
Sanford had violated his supervised release. He was sentenced to 960 months of imprisonment,
with a consecutive two-year sentence for the supervised-release violation. Sanford now appeals.
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ANALYSIS
Sanford argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his
prior rapes of Anna and a limited selection of his pornographic searches, (2) the district court
plainly erred in admitting out-of-court statements between Anna’s friend Bella2 and Anna, in
which Anna disclosed Sanford’s ongoing sexual abuse, (3) his sentence was procedurally and sub-
stantively unreasonable, and (4) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the three of-
fenses.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence related to Sanford’s uncharged conduct.
We review “evidentiary rulings concerning relevance and admissibility for an abuse of
discretion,” taking “a maximal view of the evidence’s probative effect and a minimal view of its
unfairly prejudicial effect.” United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).3 If the evidence was erroneously admitted, we then ask whether
the admission was harmless error or whether it requires reversal of the conviction. United States
v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 312 (6th Cir. 2009).
1. Evidence Regarding Other Rapes of Anna
Sanford first objects to the admission of evidence regarding Sanford’s rapes of Anna other
than those depicted in the child pornography, including Anna’s testimony and physical evidence
2 Bella is also a pseudonym. 3 The appellee appropriately notes that there is an intra-circuit conflict regarding the appropriate standard of review for Rule 404(b). Certain panels have utilized a three-step approach, applying different levels of scrutiny to each of the three steps of the 404(b) analysis. However, this court most appropriately reviews a district court’s rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ray, 549 F. App’x 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has held that “heightened standards [of review], no matter how they are characterized, must be discarded because they ‘fail[] to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review.’” Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997)). Accordingly, abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard.
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of rape. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence of the prior rapes
was intrinsic or background evidence of the crime.4 “This court ‘ha[s] recognized the admissibility
of res gestae, or background evidence, in limited circumstances when the evidence includes con-
duct that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the charged offense.’” United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d
768, 779 (6th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 697
(6th Cir. 2012)). This may include “evidence that is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly
probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an
integral part of the witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” Ibid. (quot-
ing United States v. Grooms, 566 F. App’x 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Since Sanford was charged with production of child pornography for photographing him-
self raping Anna on occasions from July to November of 2023, evidence of his ongoing sexual
abuse of Anna is undoubtedly “a prelude to the charged offense,” “forms an integral part of the
witness’s testimony,” and “completes the story of the charged offense.” Churn, 800 F.3d at 779.
The district court properly held that evidence of the prior rapes “proves a lot about how this par-
ticular photograph or photographs could have been taken, and that [Sanford and Anna] were in-
volved in that photograph.” R. 63, PageID 295. 5 It also did not abuse its discretion when it found
that the evidence was needed to “tell the story” of how the child pornography was produced. R.
52, PageID 188.
Even if the evidence was not admissible as intrinsic evidence, the district court also appro-
priately held that the evidence of rape was admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
4 Sanford attempts to distinguish between intrinsic and background evidence, but this court does not. See United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768, 779 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he distinctions among res gestae, inextricably intertwined evidence, intrinsic evidence, and background evidence [are] far from clear” and “Res gestae is sometimes also known as ‘intrin- sic evidence’.”) 5 All record cites are to the district-court proceedings.
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of Evidence. Other bad acts of a defendant are admissible under Rule 404(b), which provides that
“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or other act . . . may be admissible for another purpose
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2). In evaluating Rule 404(b) evidence, the
district court must employ a three-step process to decide if: (1) The “other act” actually occurred,
(2) the evidence is offered for a permissible purpose, and (3) its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice. United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 2012).
Sanford does not appear to dispute that evidence of his ongoing sexual abuse of Anna goes
to the permissible purposes of opportunity, intent, and identity. However, Sanford alleges that the
district court “never analyzed the prejudicial effect versus the probative value of the alleged acts
of abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. This is contradicted by the record. The district court found that
the probative value of Anna’s testimony about the rapes was “quite high” because “[t]he evidence
that shows the relationship that these two have had over a long period of time goes to explain how
it might have happened as shown in these photographs.” R. 63, PageID 301. Similarly, it held that
the DNA evidence matching Sanford to samples taken from Anna’s cervix and breasts was “highly
probative, same victim, same timing, roughly similar acts to what’s alleged.” Id. at PageID 324.
And the district court explicitly held that “the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.”
Ibid. It additionally gave an appropriate limiting instruction both before the introduction of evi-
dence and when instructing the jury. See Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 646 (2023) (the
law “assum[es] that jurors can be relied upon to follow the trial judge’s instructions,” including
limiting instructions).
The district court appropriately found that the evidence was admissible under Rule 414 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence as well. Rule 414(a) provides: “In a criminal case in which a
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defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant com-
mitted any other child molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is
relevant.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). The district court appropriately held that “the prior rapes, the DNA
test, all of that . . . falls as much under 414 as it does 404.” R. 63, PageID 332.
There was no abuse of discretion.
2. Portions of Sanford’s Pornographic Searches and Views
Sanford next appeals the district court’s admission of limited evidence regarding Sanford’s
internet searches for simulated child pornography to “show the defendant’s intent, identity, and
motive.” R. 67, PageID 379. Sanford argues that the evidence regarding his internet searches was
more prejudicial than probative.
It was not. The district court found that “the 404(b) evidence of identity [was] strong”
because “the same person who typed those searches is more likely than not the person who pos-
sessed those photographs. And the person who possessed those photographs in all likelihood took
those photographs.” Id. at PageID 378. The internet searches show that Sanford was searching for
simulated child pornography that very closely resembled the photographs he was charged with
taking. Similarly, the district court held it was highly probative of motive: “[T]he searches are
really precise in terms of what they’re looking for. And the link between those searches and the
alleged conduct is quite close, and it shows that the defendant, at least arguably, finds that sort of
behavior arousing, and that he would be more likely to go there and engage in that sort of conduct
. . . .” Ibid.
Evidence of child molestation is necessarily prejudicial, but it is only unfairly prejudicial
when it is “‘more lurid and frankly more interesting than the evidence surrounding the actual
charges’ and there is a danger the jury would pay undue attention to proof of the prior acts.” United
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States v. Hough, 385 F. App’x 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d
796, 801 (6th Cir. 2007)). The district court found that admission of this evidence was “prejudicial,
but it’s not overly prejudicial.” R. 67, PageID 378. It found that “the search terms here are certainly
not more lurid than the charged conduct,” and that “any unfair prejudice from the evidence of the
search terms does not substantially outweigh the probative value.” Id. at PageID 379.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the searches as evidence under
Rule 404(b).
B. The district court did not plainly err in admitting out-of-court statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B).
Sanford also objects to the admission of statements and text messages made by Anna to
her friend Bella in 2003, disclosing Sanford’s pattern of sexual abuse. Sanford did not object to
the admission of these statements at trial, so we review for plain error. Sanford “must show that
there is 1) error, 2) that is plain, and 3) that affects substantial rights, and if so, he must persuade
us that 4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial pro-
ceedings.” United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). To show
that an error affects substantial rights, “the defendant ordinarily must show a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-
Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134–135 (2018) (cleaned up).
Sanford alleges that the statements are hearsay that should have been excluded, and that
they were improperly admitted pursuant to the exception for a declarant-witness’s prior statements
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(i). However, contrary to Sanford’s claims, the state-
ments were not admitted under the Rule 801(d) hearsay exception. Instead, the district court ad-
mitted the statements as non-hearsay. The district court stated that “the text messages between the
victim, her friend, and then the friend and the counselor [are] admissible to show why . . . the
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friend did what she did and why the counselor did what she did to get the police involved,” not for
“the truth of the matter asserted.” R. 63, PageID 328–29.
There is no need to rule on whether the district court was correct to do so, because Sanford
clearly fails to satisfy the third prong for plain error relief. Even if the evidence was admitted in
error, there is no evidence that “but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 134–35. Sanford makes the odd argument that without the
statements to Bella, there would be “a diminution of [Anna’s] credibility” so great as to change
the outcome of the proceedings. Appellant’s Br. at 44–45. But this argument is at odds with San-
ford’s (accurate) assertion that “Mr. Sanford’s counsel never attacked [Anna]’s credibility.” Id. at
44. It seems incredibly implausible that Anna’s credibility was so fragile that failing to admit her
prior statements would destroy it while Sanford largely failed to challenge her testimony. Indeed,
the bulk of defense counsel’s closing argument was devoted to arguing not that Sanford did not
rape Anna, or even that the child pornography in evidence did not depict Sanford and Anna, but
that he did not rape Anna “for the purpose of producing child pornography.” See R. 121, PageID
1518–24.
There was no meaningful argument that Anna’s testimony was not true: In addition to her
testimony at trial, the prosecution additionally presented physical evidence of rape, including DNA
evidence, and the jury saw photographic evidence of Sanford raping Anna.
Consequently, even if the prior messages had been admitted in error, any error is harmless
and would have no impact on Sanford’s conviction.
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C. Sanford’s sentence is proportional and not excessive.
The district court sentenced Sanford to 960 months of imprisonment followed by a lifetime
of supervised release. Sanford alleges that his sentence is both procedurally unreasonable and sub-
stantively unreasonable. Neither is true.
This court reviews sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Under this standard, this court considers whether the sentence was reasonable
procedurally and substantively. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 755–57
(6th Cir. 2013). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court committed “significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. A “sentence is substantively unreasonable when it is not proportionate to the serious-
ness of the circumstances of the offense and offender.” United States v. Schrank, 975 F.3d 534,
536 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). A sentence within the Guidelines range is afforded a rebut-
table presumption of substantive reasonableness. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th
Cir. 2008) (en banc). Sanford first argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
the district court improperly applied enhancements to his sentence based on a prior qualifying
conviction without a jury finding of that prior conviction. However, prior convictions are sentenc-
ing factors that do not need to be alleged in the indictment or proven to a jury but instead can be
determined by the sentencing judge. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247
(1998).6 Additionally, and critically, Sanford stipulated to his qualifying conviction and that
6 Sanford attempts to argue that this court should instead follow Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that a sentencing fact that increases the maximum sentence must be pleaded and proved to the jury. 530 U.S. at 490. However, Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on cases
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written stipulation was read to the jury. Sanford admitted that he “was convicted in federal court
of transporting an individual to engage in prostitution” and agreed that it was “proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” R. 120, PageID 1306. Even if Almendarez-Torres didn’t preclude Sanford’s
argument, “no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that would apply
to a contested issue of fact” arises when the defendant admits to the qualifying conviction. Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000). There was no error, and Sanford’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable.
Sanford also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. “Sentences within
a defendant’s Guidelines range are presumptively substantively reasonable.” United States v. Pi-
rosko, 787 F.3d 358, 374 (6th Cir. 2015). The district court correctly calculated Sanford’s Guide-
lines range of 420 months to 840 months based on his offense level of 40 and criminal history
category of V under the statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
The Guidelines range was restricted on both ends by statutory minimums and maximums; without
those restrictions, the Guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. His 18 U.S.C. § 2260A
conviction required a mandatory consecutive sentence of ten years, for a sentencing range of 540
months to 960 months.
The district court appropriately considered the Guidelines range and the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors. It noted that Sanford had raped Anna repeatedly from a young age. It also noted
that Sanford refused to accept responsibility for his conduct, refused to make progress in sex-
offender treatment, had a history of sexual crimes and abuse of women, and that his “repeated
raising the issue. See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201 (2006) (mem.). This court has similarly held that “Almendarez-Torres precludes any argument that a prior conviction used only for sentencing should be considered an ‘element’ of the charged crime,” making Sanford’s argument “dead on arrival.” United States v. Walker, 761 F. App’x. 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2019).
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recidivism shows this Court that a message should be sent in this case. And that message should
be that the high end of the guidelines is reserved for some people who continue to violate the law
no matter what obstacles the courts put in front of them.” R.122, PageID 1597–98. The district
court intended for Sanford to “essentially serve a life sentence and . . . not be released.” Id. at
PageID 1599.
The sentence is presumptively reasonable and “proportionate to the seriousness of the cir-
cumstances of the offense and offender.” Schrank, 975 F.3d at 536 (quoting United States v. Rob-
inson, 778 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2015)).
D. There was sufficient evidence to support Sanford’s conviction for production of child pornography.
Sanford argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for produc-
tion of child pornography, arguing that the government failed to prove that he produced the child
pornography on his seized phone. He does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence for possession
of child pornography.
The court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of each count of convic-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v.
Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 1997). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence
bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (cleaned
up). This is because “[t]he government is given ‘the benefit of all reasonable inferences’ drawn
from the evidence, and [appellate] courts must ‘refrain from independently judging the weight of
the evidence.’” United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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To convict Sanford of the first count, 18 U.S.C. § 2251, the government had to show (A)
that the defendant either employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced a minor to en-
gage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct,
and (B) that the visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that were mailed,
shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means.
Sanford disputes only that there was sufficient evidence to show that he was the individual
depicted in the photographs. However, the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Sanford.
Anna identified Sanford as the person who was depicted in the photographs, as her rapist, and as
the person who took the photos of her rape. Anna’s mother also identified Sanford in the photos.
Sanford’s clothes, furniture, and home were identified in the photos. The phone used to take and
store the photos was attributed to Sanford through his use of the phone, forensic analysis, and
Anna’s testimony, and there was DNA evidence that Sanford had raped Anna.
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanford produced the charged child por-
nography. The evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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