United States v. James Vorley

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 6, 2022
Docket21-2666
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. James Vorley (United States v. James Vorley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. James Vorley, (7th Cir. 2022).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 21‐2242, 21‐2251, 21‐2666 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff‐Appellee, v.

CEDRIC CHANU and JAMES VORLEY, Defendants‐Appellants. ____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18‐cr‐00035 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge. ____________________

ARGUED MARCH 29, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 6, 2022 ____________________

Before FLAUM, ST. EVE, and JACKSON‐AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. FLAUM, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents several ques‐ tions, including whether placing manual “spoofing” orders— here, precious metals orders that two traders, defendants‐ap‐ pellants James Vorley and Cedric Chanu, intended to with‐ draw before being filled—can amount to wire fraud. We ad‐ dress this question, as well as three issues stemming from the trial. 2 Nos. 21‐2242, 21‐2251 & 21‐2666

For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. Background

A. Factual Background Deutsche Bank—a global banking and financial services company—employed Chanu and Vorley as precious metals traders. Vorley traded precious metals futures contracts from May 2007 through March 2015 while based in London. Chanu was similarly a precious metals futures contract trader from March 2008 through May 2011 in London and from May 2011 through December 2013 in Singapore. A futures contract is a legally binding agreement to buy or sell a particular product or financial instrument at an agreed‐ upon price on an agreed‐upon date in the future. Futures con‐ tracts are traded on markets designated and regulated by the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). One such commodities marketplace, the CME Group, Inc., consists of four exchanges—including the New York Mercantile Exchange, where palladium futures con‐ tracts trade, and the Commodity Exchange, Inc. (“COMEX”), where gold and silver futures contracts trade. CME Group ex‐ changes use an electronic trading platform known as Globex to trade futures contracts from anywhere in the globe. During the time relevant to this appeal, the CME Group operated Globex using trading engines in Illinois. Traders using Globex place “bids” to buy or “offers” to sell futures contracts at a specified price or level. Between 2008 and 2013, the Globex system permitted traders to obscure cer‐ tain information about their trades. Instead of displaying all Nos. 21‐2242, 21‐2251 & 21‐2666 3

orders resting on Globex, as the system does now, the “order book” at this time displayed only a subset of bids and offers— the “best ten bids and best ten price levels up and down.” Given this presentation, not all trade details were readily dis‐ cernable from Globex; a trader could, for example, obscure the full size of his or her intended trade order by placing an “iceberg” order—which shows only a preset fraction of the total intended trade order—to mitigate market movement and detrimental price impacts. Illustrating this concept, if a trader intends to buy a thousand contracts, he or she may elect to show only one hundred at a time; once the first hun‐ dred contracts are filled, the next one hundred contracts be‐ come visible to other traders, until the full order quantity is filled. Visible orders impact the market by conveying investors’ “intent to participate” in the market at a particular price; these orders also “communicat[e] something about the liquidity in the market.” Iceberg orders were a permissible way of mini‐ mizing market movement in light of the fact that larger buy orders correlated to larger price responses in the financial market.1 In the words of the government’s expert, “if a buy order arrives, typically the price of the commodity will move

1 The mitigating impact of “iceberg” orders was discussed at trial. For

example, a trader explained that If [a trader is] selling 100 lots or 100 contracts of gold, [the trader] would place an iceberg of one. So in the market … other participants will only see one lot rather than the full hundred‐lot size. And the purpose of that was because if [the trader] showed the full 100, the market would be able to see that there’s a fairly big sell order, and [the trader] might not get as good a price when … trying to sell it. 4 Nos. 21‐2242, 21‐2251 & 21‐2666

higher. And the larger the buy order that is made visible to market participants, the larger … the price response typically [will be] in the financial market.” COMEX traders could also cancel an order, or the unfilled portion of an order, at any time before it was filled. But, gen‐ erally speaking, the CME rules do not permit deception; con‐ sequently, traders are prohibited from placing orders that they intend to cancel before execution. Furthermore, traders at Deutsche Bank, including Chanu and Vorley, received train‐ ing from Deutsche Bank’s compliance department in 2009 ex‐ plaining that “market manipulation” was prohibited.2 Deutsche Bank took the position that “[t]rading should never be designed to give a false or misleading impression as to the supply or demand” and “[t]rades should never be executed at abnormal or artificial levels.” Turning to the conduct underpinning this criminal case, Chanu and Vorley placed orders for precious metals futures contracts on one side of the market that, at the time the orders were placed, they intended to cancel prior to execution. The government alleged that Chanu and Vorley placed such or‐ ders with the intent “to create and communicate false and misleading information regarding supply or demand (i.e., or‐ ders they did not intend to execute) in order to deceive other traders” and entice them to react to the false and misleading

2 The Deutsche Bank training materials noted that “[t]he definition of market manipulation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but for our purposes, it is any transaction or order to trade which gives or is likely to give a false or misleading impression as to the supply, demand for, or price of one or more investments. Dissemination of information by any means which gives or is likely to give a false or misleading impression.” Nos. 21‐2242, 21‐2251 & 21‐2666 5

increase in supply or demand. As noted above, at all times relevant to this case, CME rules prohibited such conduct. Specifically at issue was Chanu and Vorley’s manual “spoofing” conduct, which involved placing “fake bids and offers” to “trick other market participants.” Chanu and Vor‐ leyʹs trading colleague, David Liew, who testified against them at trial pursuant to a plea agreement, explained how manual spoofing worked: In an effort to buy something at the lowest possible price, that trader may use spoofing. Spoofing entails “plac[ing] orders opposite of [the] buy order … [with the] intent to have those offers deceive other market partici‐ pants into thinking that there was more selling than there ac‐ tually was and so hoping to get a better price on [the] original order.” In Liew’s words, a spoofing trader tries “to signal that [certain] trades would go through, but [the trader’s] intent is actually to cancel them shortly after.” Liew testified that, if successful, employing this illusion “would help Deutsche Bank” while “hurt[ing] any other market participants.” Of note, there are times when a trader may “cancel an or‐ der for totally legitimate reasons.” A client may change their wishes or breaking news may “cause[] [the trader] to think differently about whether a buy or sell was a good idea.” Alt‐ hough, as Liew explained, Deutsche Bank had a rule “where there should be only one person active in the market,” and that person would be referred to as the “book runner,” there were times when Chanu and Vorley placed opposite orders (for example, a sell order placed to facilitate a buy order, and vice versa) in violation of this rule.

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