USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 1 of 18
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
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No. 24-10422 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMES PETTWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00138-TFM-B-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 2 of 18
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Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: James Pettway appeals his conviction and 180-month sen- tence for knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Pettway argues that: (1) the district court erred in admitting at trial allegedly irrelevant, prejudicial evidence; (2) the district court erred in calculating his base offense level; (3) his upward-variance sentence was substan- tively unreasonable; and (4) § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, both fa- cially and as applied. After thorough review, we affirm. I. We review the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discre- tion. United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013). However, if we find that a district court abused its discretion in ad- mitting evidence, we review for harmless error. United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986). Under that standard, “[r]eversal is warranted only if [the error] resulted in actual preju- dice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). In making this determination, we consider whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. We review a district court’s fact findings for clear error, and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cenephat, 115 F.4th 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2024). To find clear USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 3 of 18
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error, we must be left with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotations omitted). We re- view the sentence imposed, including those that involve variances, for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Ordinarily, we review the constitutionality of a statute de novo as a question of law. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). The prior-panel-precedent rule requires us to follow a prior binding precedent unless it is overruled by us en banc or by the Su- preme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). “To constitute an overruling for the purposes of this prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point,” and “actually abrogate or directly conflict with, as op- posed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). To abrogate a prior panel decision, “the later Supreme Court decision must demolish and eviscerate each of its fundamen- tal props.” United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 893 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotations omitted). II. First, we are unpersuaded by Pettway’s claim that the dis- trict court abused its discretion in admitting at trial evidence of an alleged attempted robbery. In general, we recognize three tiers of admissible evidence. For starters, “[r]elevant direct evidence of a crime charged is always admissible unless it falls under a rule of exclusion.” Troya, 733 F.3d at 1131. Second, evidence is admissible USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 4 of 18
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as “intrinsic” to the crime itself if it arose from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged crime, it completes the story of the crime, or it is intertwined with evidence of the charged crime. Id. Third, “extrinsic” evidence may be admissible -- pursu- ant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) -- if it is relevant to an issue other than character and if the jury reasonably may conclude that the defendant committed the act at issue. Id. In analyzing whether evidence is “intrinsic,” we’ve said that “[e]vidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an ac- count of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.” United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). Evidence typically consti- tutes a series of transactions if the contested evidence has a tem- poral and factual connection with the charged offense. United States v. Muscatell, 42 F.3d 627, 630 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the evidence implicated the same actors in common roles with the same modus operandi). Regardless of whether evidence is admissible as direct, in- trinsic or extrinsic, a district court may exclude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. We’ve said that the exclusion of relevant evi- dence is extraordinary relief, so a district court should deploy that strong medicine sparingly. United States v. McGregor, 960 F.3d 1319, USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 5 of 18
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1324 (11th Cir. 2020). We view the disputed evidence “in a light most favorable to admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Id. (quotations omitted). Moreover, the risk of undue prejudice can be reduced by an appro- priate limiting instruction. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 1993). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admit- ting at Pettway’s felon-in-possession trial evidence of an attempted robbery. As the record reflects, Pettway’s felon-in-possession con- viction arose out of a report the Mobile Police Department re- ceived of a robbery in November 2022, where the suspect was de- scribed as having used a motorized scooter or bicycle. When the investigating officer canvassed the scene two days later, a witness claimed that a person named “Jimmy” committed the robbery and described a nearby location where the officer likely could find “Jimmy.” At that location, the investigating officer saw a person “on a motorized black bike” who matched the suspect’s descrip- tion. The investigating officer approached the individual, whom he later identified as Pettway, and noticed a handgun inside Pettway’s waistband. Pettway was taken into custody, and during the subsequent interview, he admitted that he’d had the gun for about three weeks and was a convicted felon. Investigators later concluded that the casing from the robbery scene matched the handgun officers found on Pettway during his arrest, and images from the body camera footage of another officer at the scene sug- gested that a firearm was in Pettway’s waistband. USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 6 of 18
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On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the attempted robbery. At trial, Pettway questioned the investigating officer’s credibility and investigative decisions, highlighting the lack of fingerprint and DNA testing on the firearm and problems with the video evidence of the incident and the interview. In response, the government presented the rob- bery evidence to complete the story of how Pettway came to be investigated by police and found to be a felon in possession of a firearm, just two days after the attempted robbery. We’ve often allowed the introduction of evidence to explain the actions of law enforcement officers. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming the introduc- tion of evidence that a defendant used a false identity to rent a prop- erty at which he stored drugs because it was “necessary to com- plete the story of how officers discovered [the defendant] was rent- ing the apartment and garage”); United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding the admission of evidence about an investigation into stolen vehicles as part of the story of a subse- quent assault of an officer involved in that investigation). In Pettway’s case, the robbery evidence did just that, demonstrating what kicked off the discovery of the firearm; why officers focused on Pettway; and the close temporal and factual link between the firearm officers discovered during Pettway’s arrest and a spent cas- ing found at the robbery scene. By showing how Pettway came to be found knowingly carrying a firearm, the attempted robbery ev- idence was admissible intrinsic evidence that fell within the same transaction or series of transactions, told the story of the crime, or USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 7 of 18
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otherwise was intertwined with evidence about the charged of- fense. Moreover, the evidence satisfied the requirements of Rule 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially out- weigh the probative force of the evidence. Pettway cursorily ar- gues that the evidence had little probative value and resulted in substantial unfair prejudice, presumably because he did not want the jury to hear that he had allegedly used the gun he was carrying around. But he does not explain how the robbery evidence’s risk of prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value in, among other things, helping the jury understand the investigating officer’s account of the circumstances that gave rise to Pettway’s arrest and corroborating Pettway’s admissions as to the time frame for his un- lawful possession. It’s also worth noting that the court gave a lim- iting instruction concerning this evidence, telling the jury that it could not consider the evidence about other acts to decide if he committed the activity alleged in the indictment, but could con- sider the evidence only for limited purposes, including as evidence of Pettway’s motive to possess a firearm. With this instruction, which mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice, we cannot say that the risk of unfair prejudice from the robbery evidence substantially outweighed its probative value in proving Pettway’s knowing pos- session of the firearm. But, even if we were to conclude that its risk of prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, the error still would be harmless because there was overwhelming evidence that USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 8 of 18
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Pettway possessed the firearm unlawfully. As the record reflects, when the investigating officer approached Pettway, he saw a fire- arm in Pettway’s waistband; images from another officer’s body camera footage supported the firearm’s presence; and Pettway con- fessed to his possession of the firearm in an interview. See, e.g., United States v. Hosford, 782 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he evidence of guilt was of such magnitude that even if the prior bad acts testimony was improvidently admitted, the error did not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” (quotations omitted)). Fur- ther, as we’ve noted, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury. For these reasons, we affirm the court’s decision to admit evidence of the attempted robbery at trial. III. We also are unpersuaded by Pettway’s argument that the district court erred at sentencing when it assigned to him a higher base offense level based on the cross-reference found in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) to the robbery guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a). In brief, § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines directs district courts to apply a cross reference to § 2X1.1 if a defendant used or possessed any firearm in the convicted offense in connection with an attempt of “another offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). Section 2X1.1 covers attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy, and directs dis- tricts courts to look to the guideline for the substantive offense. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a). Section 2B3.1, the guideline provision for rob- bery, assigns a base offense level of 20. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a). The guideline provides for varying enhancements to the base offense USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 9 of 18
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level depending on the particular use of the firearm. Id. § 2B3.1(b). Specifically, the section provides for a seven-level increase if a fire- arm was “discharged.” Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). District courts may rely on statements in the presentence in- vestigation report that the defendant did not object to “with speci- ficity and clarity,” as well as trial evidence. Cenephat, 115 F.4th at 1367–68 (quotations omitted). However, if “a defendant objects to the factual basis of his sentence, the government has the burden of establishing the disputed fact.” Id. (quotations omitted). A prepon- derance of reliable evidence is necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 1368. Under Alabama law, robbery occurs when a person, in the course of committing a theft, “[t]hreatens the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.” Ala. Code § 13A-8-43(a)(2). A person commits first-de- gree robbery when he violates § 13A-8-43, and, among other ele- ments, does so while armed with a deadly weapon. Id. § 13A-8- 41(a)(1). Under Alabama law, “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with the intent to commit a specific offense, he or she does any overt act towards the commission of the offense.” Id. § 13A-4-2(a). Here, Pettway argues that the district court erred at sentenc- ing when it assigned to him the higher base offense level from § 2B3.1(a) because the evidence did not sufficiently establish that he committed an attempted robbery with the firearm found in his USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 10 of 18
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possession. We disagree. At trial, the district court heard that Pettway had admitted to possessing the firearm for three weeks, prior to and including the date of the attempted robbery. The trial evidence also showed that the fired cartridge recovered from the area of the attempted robbery matched Pettway’s firearm. Plus, the investigating officer testified that the victim had identified Pettway as the attempted robber in a photographic lineup. On this record, a preponderance of the evidence established that Pettway had committed an attempted robbery, as defined by Alabama law, Ala. Code §§ 13A-4-2(a), 13A-8-43(a)(2), 13-A-41(a)(1), and thus sup- ported the court’s decision to apply the cross-reference to the rob- bery guideline for purposes of applying its higher base offense level. We affirm as to this issue as well. IV. We are also unconvinced by Pettway’s claim that his up- ward-variance sentence was substantively unreasonable. In re- viewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any vari- ance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the district court and will “affirm a sentence so long as the court’s decision was in the ballpark of permissible outcomes,” even if we were to reach a different con- clusion. United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted); United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005). USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 11 of 18
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Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seri- ousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and pro- tect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the court must consider, among other fac- tors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants. Id. The court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or ir- relevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in consid- ering the proper factors.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (quotations omit- ted). The court “commits a clear error of judgment when it weighs the § 3553(a) sentencing factors unreasonably.” Id. The party chal- lenging the sentence bears the burden to show that it is unreason- able in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the district court is required to consider all rele- vant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is commit- ted to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court may attach great weight to one factor over the others. Id. Further, the court’s “failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider the evidence.” Id. at 1356 (quotations omitted and alterations adopted). Thus, the court is not required to state on the record that is has explicitly USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 12 of 18
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considered each § 3553(a) factor or to discuss each § 3553(a) factor, but instead should set forth enough information to satisfy the re- viewing court that it considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for making its decision. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). In prior cases, when a district court correctly has calculated the guidelines’ range, found that the range did not address ade- quately the § 3553(a) factors, and did not cite a specific departure provision, we’ve concluded that the above-guidelines sentence in- volved a variance rather than a departure. See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 553 U.S. 708 (2008). In addition to the sentencing factors, courts may consider any information relevant to a defendant’s background, character, and conduct in imposing a variance. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2007). We may not presume that a sentence outside of the calculated guidelines’ range is unreasonable, but we consider the extent of the variance in our analysis, since major var- iances require more significant justifications than minor ones. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186–87 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Gall, 552 U.S. at 50–51. A sentence being well below the stat- utory maximum is indicative of a reasonable sentence. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sen- tencing Pettway to 180 months of imprisonment. At sentencing, the court began by calculating the guidelines’ range to be 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment. However, the court found that the USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 13 of 18
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guidelines’ range did not adequately capture Pettway’s previous criminal history since he had committed more than four violent crimes since the age of 18. It also found that Pettway’s case was “outside the normal realm” of a § 922(g)(1) offense because the fire- arm was previously stolen in a burglary; there was strong reason to believe Pettway knew it was acquired in an unlawful manner; and the evidence was sufficient to “show that Mr. Pettway used this firearm in a way that would not have been justified in any way,” especially since he had fired the gun in a city location, putting not just the robbery victim at risk, but others as well. The court sum- marized that it was imposing a 180-month sentence “because of the defendant’s . . . demonstrated dangerousness, to the community on other occasions, in addition to what I find on this occasion. But I think his previous dangerousness to the community alone would justify this sentence.” The court added that the sentence addressed the seriousness of the offense, and the need for punishment, deter- rence, and incapacitation. On this record, the court amply supported its upward-vari- ance 180-month sentence.1 Indeed, it was well within the district court’s discretion to conclude that the guidelines did not ade- quately capture his criminal history, since there were prior convic- tions for which Pettway received no criminal-history points. The court also explained that based on many of the § 3553(a) factors --
1 Even though Pettway called the above-guidelines sentence an upward “de-
parture,” no departure provision was cited, and, thus, we construe his sen- tence as involving a variance. Irizarry, 458 F.3d at 1211–12. USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 14 of 18
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including the defendant’s characteristics, the seriousness of the of- fense, and the need for punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation -- the sentence was justified, even independent of the demonstrated dangerousness of the attempted robbery. And even if the district court heavily emphasized Pettway’s dangerousness and violent past, a court may attach great weight to one factor over the others, this factor was not an improper or irrelevant factor, and it did not unreasonably balance this factor against the others. Therefore, we cannot say that the sentence was substantively unreasonable, nor that the court abused its discretion in sentencing Pettway to a term of 180 months’ imprisonment. V. Finally, we reject Pettway’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is un- constitutional, both facially and as applied, under the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment provides that, “[a] well reg- ulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Section 922(g) prohibits anyone who has been convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm or ammuni- tion. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Su- preme Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a D.C. law that barred the private possession of handguns in homes. Id. at 574–75. After considering both the text and history of the Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an individual a right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 595. The Supreme USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 15 of 18
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Court ultimately held that the ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. However, the Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohi- bitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 626. The Supreme Court labeled these restrictions as “pre- sumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. It specifically ruled that the District of Columbia had to allow Heller to carry his handgun in his home, “[a]ssuming that Heller [was] not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights[.]” Id. at 635. After Heller, we considered, and rejected, a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms. See United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he first question to be asked” under Heller, we explained, was “whether one is qualified to possess a firearm.” Id. at 770. We ob- served that Heller’s clarification that it should not be read to cast doubt on prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons “sug- gest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amend- ment.” Id. at 771. We also noted that Heller recognized that pro- hibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively law- ful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, we held that § 922(g)(1) was a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment rights of convicted felons as a class of people disqualified from possessing firearms. Id. USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 16 of 18
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Several years later, the Supreme Court in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), considered a Second Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a firearm outside the home. See id. at 11–13. The Supreme Court recognized that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. It explained that, to determine whether a re- striction on firearms was constitutional, courts must begin by ask- ing whether the firearm regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17. If the regulation does cover such conduct, the court may uphold it only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms reg- ulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. Bruen em- phasized that Heller established the correct test for determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions. See id. at 39 (applying “Heller’s text-and-history standard” to the challenged statute). And, like Hel- ler, Bruen described Second Amendment rights as extending only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 26 (quotations omitted). In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Supreme Court recently considered a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8), the federal statute that prohibits an individual who is sub- ject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a fire- arm when the order includes a finding that he represents a credible threat to the safety of an intimate partner, a child of that partner, or individual. Id. at 684–85. The Supreme Court held that this USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 17 of 18
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firearm restriction was constitutional. Id. at 693. It also once again declared that the prohibition on “the possession of firearms by ‘fel- ons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 699 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). Finally, in Dubois, we explained that neither Bruen nor Rahimi had abrogated our decision in Rozier, which upheld the con- stitutionality of 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment. See 139 F.4th at 891–94. 2 Applying our prior-panel-precedent rule in con- sidering the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his con- viction and sentence under section 922(g)(1), we affirmed, holding that Rozier continued to bar Second Amendment challenges to sec- tion 922(g)(1) unless and until the Supreme Court offered “clearer instruction.” Id. at 894. Rozier, we made clear, remained binding precedent in this Circuit. Id. As this discussion reveals, our Court has repeatedly consid- ered Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)’s constitutional- ity and rejected them. E.g., id. Our binding precedent thus dictates that felons may be categorically disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment rights and forecloses Pettway’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Id. at 893; Rozier, 598 F.3d at
2 We originally issued Dubois in March 2024. The Supreme Court released its
decision in Rahimi in June 2024. Dubois filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to this Court for consideration in light of Rahimi. Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041, 1042 (2025). On remand, we reinstated our previous opinion, holding “that Rahimi -- like [Bruen] -- did not abrogate our holding in Rozier that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.” 139 F.4th at 889–90. USCA11 Case: 24-10422 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 18 of 18
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771. Accordingly, our prior-precedent rule forecloses Pettway’s fa- cial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). See Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1255 (holding that a Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point and “actually abrogate or directly conflict with” this Court’s decision to overrule precedent under the prior-prece- dent rule). As for Pettway’s as-applied challenge, § 922(g)(1) did not dis- qualify Pettway from Second Amendment protection because he was not “responsible,” “dangerous,” or even because he was not “law-abiding.” Rather, the statute disqualifies Pettway because of his status as a felon, and our binding precedent holds that bans on felon firearm possession do not offend the Second Amendment in light of this nation’s “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” regardless of the particular circumstances of any defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71. Accordingly, we affirm Pettway’s conviction under § 922(g)(1). AFFIRMED.