MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
James M. Edgar appeals the sentence imposed by the district court after a jury found him guilty of bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud. We reverse and remand.
I.
Edgar’s conviction for bankruptcy fraud stemmed from his legal representation of Peter Salter. Salter was the owner of Du-plitech Corporation, a copying and printing business. Although Duplitech had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1983, the bankruptcy was still pending in early 1987 when Dan Fuss approached Salter about the possibility of purchasing his business. Edgar, acting as Salter’s attorney, handled the successful negotiations for this sale and drew up many of the documents. The final purchase agreement provided that Salter would receive a total of $35,000 up front and a specified percentage of gross receipts over a period of twenty years. This agreement also contained a clause stating that Fuss would pay off or compromise the bankruptcy claims against Duplitech “as the BUYER shall determine in the buyer’s sole discretion.” Pl.’s Ex. 19. In addition to the purchase agreement, Salter and Fuss entered an employment agreement in which Fuss agreed to employ Salter for a period of seven years with a specified monthly salary that included use of a car. Despite the fact that the assets of Duplitech formally belonged to the bankruptcy estate, neither Edgar nor Salter informed the bankruptcy court of their sale to Fuss. In fact, Edgar structured the sale so that the assets of Duplitech and the proceeds from their sale would be difficult to trace. Salter did not use any of the proceeds he received up front to pay Dupli-tech creditors.
Approximately seven months after completion of the sale, the bankruptcy court was informed that Salter had sold all of Duplitech’s assets to Fuss. In response, the court appointed á trustee to investigate the sale and attempt to recover for the estate either the assets transferred or the value of those assets. The trustee’s investigation led to his filing of a civil suit against, inter alia, Edgar and Fuss. Edgar settled his suit for $5000. Fuss, from whom the trustee was attempting to recover either the assets of Duplitech or the value of those assets, settled for $300,000. This settlement amount was based on the present value of the payments Salter was to receive under the purchase agreement and the employment agreement.
The bankruptcy court also informed the FBI of the sale. The FBI’s investigation led to the indictment of Edgar for bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. [92]*92§§ 152 and 371 (1988).1 Although Edgar admitted the acts he had taken in connection with the sale of Duplitech’s assets, he denied any intent to defraud creditors or to conceal assets of the bankruptcy estate. After a three-week trial, a jury found him guilty on all counts — rejecting Edgar’s defense of lack of the requisite criminal intent. Following a sentencing hearing,2 the district court concluded that Edgar’s offense level was seventeen, based on a base offense level of six, a seven-level increase for a loss of more than $120,000 but less than $200,000, a two-level increase for violation of the bankruptcy process, and a two-level increase for more than minimal planning. The court denied Edgar’s request for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of I, this resulted in a sentencing range of twenty-four to thirty months. The court denied Edgar’s request for a downward departure from this range, and sentenced Edgar to twenty-four months incarceration, three years supervised release, and $25,000 restitution.
Edgar now appeals his sentence. He claims that the district court erred in denying a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, in denying a downward departure from the sentencing range, and in calculating the loss caused by his fraud. We discuss each of his claims in turn.
II.
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the court may reduce the defendant’s offense level by two “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). We give great deference to the district court “when reviewing its evaluation of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and will disturb the district court’s decision only if it is without foundation.” United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1295 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1687, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991).
Prior to being found guilty by a jury, Edgar denied any intent to defraud the creditors. Only after the jury returned its verdict of guilty did Edgar voluntarily relinquish his license to. practice law and state that he accepted the jury’s verdict of guilty and thought that it was correct. The district court did not clearly err in denying the reduction based on Edgar’s refusal to admit an essential element of bankruptcy fraud before his conviction. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 2); see also, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 613 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1599, 113 L.Ed.2d 662 (1991) (no acceptance of responsibility reduction when defendant put the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying any intent to distribute a controlled substance); United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir.1990) (no acceptance of responsibility reduction when defendant gave statements to officers and expressed regret over what happened, but never admitted any fraudulent intent).
B. Downward Departure
The Sentencing Guidelines allow a court to depart downward from the applicable sentencing range if the court finds “ ‘that there exists [a] ... mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines....’” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. The district court’s ruling that it could depart from the sentencing range only if it found that such a mitigating circumstance existed was a correct interpretation of the guidelines.3 See United States v. John[93]*93son, 908 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir.1990). The district court’s conclusion that no such mitigating circumstance existed in this case, and thus it did not have a basis for departure, was an exercise of discretion that is not reviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 1956, 109 L.Ed.2d 318 (1990).
C. Amount of Loss
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level for fraudulent conduct is increased according to the amount of loss. The amount of loss used to increase the offense level may be either the amount of loss the defendant intended to inflict or the actual loss resulting from the fraudulent conduct, whichever is greater.4 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment, (n. 7);
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MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
James M. Edgar appeals the sentence imposed by the district court after a jury found him guilty of bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud. We reverse and remand.
I.
Edgar’s conviction for bankruptcy fraud stemmed from his legal representation of Peter Salter. Salter was the owner of Du-plitech Corporation, a copying and printing business. Although Duplitech had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1983, the bankruptcy was still pending in early 1987 when Dan Fuss approached Salter about the possibility of purchasing his business. Edgar, acting as Salter’s attorney, handled the successful negotiations for this sale and drew up many of the documents. The final purchase agreement provided that Salter would receive a total of $35,000 up front and a specified percentage of gross receipts over a period of twenty years. This agreement also contained a clause stating that Fuss would pay off or compromise the bankruptcy claims against Duplitech “as the BUYER shall determine in the buyer’s sole discretion.” Pl.’s Ex. 19. In addition to the purchase agreement, Salter and Fuss entered an employment agreement in which Fuss agreed to employ Salter for a period of seven years with a specified monthly salary that included use of a car. Despite the fact that the assets of Duplitech formally belonged to the bankruptcy estate, neither Edgar nor Salter informed the bankruptcy court of their sale to Fuss. In fact, Edgar structured the sale so that the assets of Duplitech and the proceeds from their sale would be difficult to trace. Salter did not use any of the proceeds he received up front to pay Dupli-tech creditors.
Approximately seven months after completion of the sale, the bankruptcy court was informed that Salter had sold all of Duplitech’s assets to Fuss. In response, the court appointed á trustee to investigate the sale and attempt to recover for the estate either the assets transferred or the value of those assets. The trustee’s investigation led to his filing of a civil suit against, inter alia, Edgar and Fuss. Edgar settled his suit for $5000. Fuss, from whom the trustee was attempting to recover either the assets of Duplitech or the value of those assets, settled for $300,000. This settlement amount was based on the present value of the payments Salter was to receive under the purchase agreement and the employment agreement.
The bankruptcy court also informed the FBI of the sale. The FBI’s investigation led to the indictment of Edgar for bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. [92]*92§§ 152 and 371 (1988).1 Although Edgar admitted the acts he had taken in connection with the sale of Duplitech’s assets, he denied any intent to defraud creditors or to conceal assets of the bankruptcy estate. After a three-week trial, a jury found him guilty on all counts — rejecting Edgar’s defense of lack of the requisite criminal intent. Following a sentencing hearing,2 the district court concluded that Edgar’s offense level was seventeen, based on a base offense level of six, a seven-level increase for a loss of more than $120,000 but less than $200,000, a two-level increase for violation of the bankruptcy process, and a two-level increase for more than minimal planning. The court denied Edgar’s request for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of I, this resulted in a sentencing range of twenty-four to thirty months. The court denied Edgar’s request for a downward departure from this range, and sentenced Edgar to twenty-four months incarceration, three years supervised release, and $25,000 restitution.
Edgar now appeals his sentence. He claims that the district court erred in denying a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, in denying a downward departure from the sentencing range, and in calculating the loss caused by his fraud. We discuss each of his claims in turn.
II.
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the court may reduce the defendant’s offense level by two “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). We give great deference to the district court “when reviewing its evaluation of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and will disturb the district court’s decision only if it is without foundation.” United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1295 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1687, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991).
Prior to being found guilty by a jury, Edgar denied any intent to defraud the creditors. Only after the jury returned its verdict of guilty did Edgar voluntarily relinquish his license to. practice law and state that he accepted the jury’s verdict of guilty and thought that it was correct. The district court did not clearly err in denying the reduction based on Edgar’s refusal to admit an essential element of bankruptcy fraud before his conviction. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 2); see also, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 613 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1599, 113 L.Ed.2d 662 (1991) (no acceptance of responsibility reduction when defendant put the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying any intent to distribute a controlled substance); United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir.1990) (no acceptance of responsibility reduction when defendant gave statements to officers and expressed regret over what happened, but never admitted any fraudulent intent).
B. Downward Departure
The Sentencing Guidelines allow a court to depart downward from the applicable sentencing range if the court finds “ ‘that there exists [a] ... mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines....’” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. The district court’s ruling that it could depart from the sentencing range only if it found that such a mitigating circumstance existed was a correct interpretation of the guidelines.3 See United States v. John[93]*93son, 908 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir.1990). The district court’s conclusion that no such mitigating circumstance existed in this case, and thus it did not have a basis for departure, was an exercise of discretion that is not reviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 1956, 109 L.Ed.2d 318 (1990).
C. Amount of Loss
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level for fraudulent conduct is increased according to the amount of loss. The amount of loss used to increase the offense level may be either the amount of loss the defendant intended to inflict or the actual loss resulting from the fraudulent conduct, whichever is greater.4 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment, (n. 7); see also, e.g., United States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir.1991). In this case, the district court found that the intended loss was the value of Duplitech as a going concern. The court further concluded that the only reliable evidence of Duplitech’s value was the $300,000 settlement between Fuss and the bankruptcy trustee, and the present value of the payments Salter was to receive under the purchase agreement and the employment agreement. An accountant calculated that the present value of these payments was about $270,000.5 Based on this evidence, the court estimated that Dupli-tech’s value was in the range of $270,000 to $300,000.’ The court then subtracted $100,-000 from this amount because the court found that Edgar intended Fuss to pay the bankruptcy creditors approximately $100,-000. Sentencing Tr. at 17-18 (held June 17, ■1991). These calculations resulted in an intended loss of approximately $170,000 to $200,000. Because this amount exceeded the actual loss of approximately $75,000, the court concluded that the appropriate loss range was $120,000 to $200,000, resulting in a seven-level increase. U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(H).
As the above facts make clear, the calculation of loss in a bankruptcy fraud case can be rather complicated. It is thus not surprising that the district court made both some correct and some incorrect assumptions in calculating the loss. The district court correctly used the greater of the intended loss and the actual loss to calculate the offense level increase. The court also did not err in using the going-concern value of Duplitech rather than its liquidation value in calculating the value of the concealed assets. There was no proof that [94]*94the creditors would have recovered only the liquidation value of Duplitech if it had not been sold to Fuss without the bankruptcy court’s approval. Additionally, the court properly concluded that the present value of the amount Fuss was willing to pay for Duplitech is a valid measure of Duplitech’s value. It is well established that the fair market value of a business as a going concern is “that price a willing seller could secure from a willing buyer.” Albrecht v. Herald Co., 452 F.2d 124, 131 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S.Ct. 564, 83 L.Ed.2d 505 (1984); Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F.Supp. 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y.1980), rev’d on other grounds, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.1981), rev’d, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983). In this case, Fuss was a purchaser willing to buy Dupli-tech, and Salter was an owner willing to sell it. In fact, the amount Fuss agreed to pay for Duplitech was the most reliable evidence of Duplitech’s value available to the district court. The $300,000 settlement between Fuss and the bankruptcy trustee had little, if no, independent significance in the valuation of Duplitech because it was derived from the present value of the amount Fuss agreed to pay under the purchase agreement and employment agreement.
Although the court correctly treated the amount Fuss paid for Duplitech as reliable evidence of Duplitech’s value, the court erred when it treated the amount Salter was to receive under the employment agreement as part of the purchase price for Duplitech. The monthly salary Fuss agreed to pay Salter and the car Fuss gave Salter to drive were not compensation for the assets of Duplitech.6 Rather, the employment agreement between Fuss and Salter clearly provides that the monthly salary and the car were compensation for Salter’s post-sale services, and that Fuss was not liable for this compensation if he terminated Salter’s employment for cause. Because the valuation of Duplitech should not have included the payments Salter was to receive under the employment agreement, the only amounts relevant to Dupli-tech’s value were the $35,000 up-front payment and the percentage of gross receipts Fuss agreed to pay Salter.7 Based on the accountant’s calculations, the present value of all these payments totalled approximately $150,000. Supp.App. at 4-5.
In addition to not being properly included in the valuation of Duplitech, the present value of the employment agreement cannot, in its own right, constitute a portion of the intended loss. Salter’s future earnings from personal service were never part of the bankruptcy estate. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988) (the bankruptcy estate does not include “earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case”). Edgar could not have intended to deprive Duplitech creditors of an amount they were not entitled to in the first place.
Another error the district court made in calculating the intended loss was to deduct the $100,000 it found that Fuss was going to pay the Duplitech creditors from the amount Fuss was going to pay Salter. Fuss had agreed to pay Salter approximately $150,000 in 1987 dollars, and to pay the creditors approximately $100,-000. This indicates that Fuss valued Dupli-tech at approximately $250,000, not at the difference between these two amounts. Thus, based on the amount Fuss was willing to pay for Duplitech, Salter, with the [95]*95help of Edgar, fraudulently transferred assets worth approximately $250,000. Obviously, however, Edgar did not intend to deprive the creditors of the entire $250,000 because Fuss was to pay $100,000 of Dupli-tech’s value to the creditors rather than to Salter. Accordingly, Edgar could not have intended to conceal from the creditors more than the $150,000 that Salter was to receive.
If calculation of the intended loss stopped here, we could simply affirm Edgar’s sentence, which was based on a loss range of $120,000 to $200,000. It is possible, however, for the intended loss to be less than the value of the concealed property. This situation arises when an individual debtor or the sole owner of a corporate debtor is the party who benefits from the concealment, and the value of the concealed property exceeds the amount of debt owed to the creditors.
A hypothetical can best illustrate this situation. Assume that an individual debt- or has one asset, a painting worth $5000, and debt of $1000. Assume further that because her creditors are threatening to execute judgment — forcing her to sell the painting — the debtor, with the help of a third party, fraudulently conceals the painting and files for bankruptcy, depriving her creditors of $1000. After the third party who helped the debtor is found guilty of fraud, the sentencing court must determine the amount of intended loss. Because the debtor is the party who benefited from the concealment, the third party clearly intended no loss to the debtor. The only remaining entities that could be injured by the concealment are the creditors and the bankruptcy estate. The third party clearly intended to deprive the creditors of the $1000 they were owed. Additionally, because all the debtor’s property goes into the bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988), the estate was deprived of $5000, the full value of the concealed painting. The estate, however, would not have kept this $5000 indefinitely. Rather, the estate trustee would have used it to pay the creditors, and then would have returned the remaining portion, approximately $4000, to the debtor. Because this $4000 would have been returned to the same person who obtained it as a result of the fraudulent concealment, we do not believe it is appropriate to include it in the amount of intended loss. In this situation, the third party’s culpability is more comparable to that of a con artist who swindles a person of $1000 than to that of a con artist who swindles a person of $5000. Cf. Smith, 951 F.2d at 1167 (noting that the relative culpability of a defendant is a relevant factor in calculating the amount of loss); United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir.1991) (same). We thus conclude that the amount of debt places a cap on the intended loss when an individual debtor or the sole owner of a corporate debtor is the party who benefits from the concealment.
Of course, the amount of debt is not fixed in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Accordingly, the sentencing court must make a reasonable estimate of the amount of debt anticipated at the time of the fraudulent transfer. When estimating this debt, the court should include the liabilities likely to be incurred by the on-going operations of the debtor and the foreseeable costs of administering the estate. Additionally, the court should deduct from these estimated liabilities any payments that the defendant intended the creditors to receive. Although it is always possible that an intended payment will not be made, intended loss is not the same as possible or potential loss. See Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529; United States v. Hughes, 775 F.Supp. 348, 350 (E.D.Cal.1991).
In this case, Salter, the owner of Duplitech,8 was the party who benefited from the concealment — Fuss was to pay him the $150,000. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the amount of debt was less than $150,000, the value of the con[96]*96cealed property. If it is, the amount of debt is the intended loss. If it is not, the value of the concealed property, $150,000, is the intended loss. The amount of debt reasonably anticipated in September 1987, when Edgar arranged for Fuss to purchase Duplitech, is not readily apparent. At the time Duplitech filed for bankruptcy in 1988, it listed outstanding liabilities of $118,016.14. At the time Duplitech had a plan confirmed in 1990, it had outstanding liabilities of approximately $643,851.89. The amount of liabilities anticipated in 1987 must be somewhere between these two figures.9 Additionally, because Edgar intended Fuss to pay off $100,000 of these liabilities, $100,000 must be subtracted from the anticipated liabilities to arrive at the amount of debt reasonably anticipated by Edgar. Although Fuss did not actually pay the creditors the $100,000, the district court concluded that Edgar thought and intended that Fuss would make this payment. We find no clear error in this factual finding.
Because the district court did not calculate the intended loss within the structure here provided, we must reverse and remand for resentencing. In recalculating the intended loss, the court need not reach an exact number. All the guidelines require is a reasonable estimate of the loss. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment, (n. 8). Once the court has recalculated the intended loss, it should again compare it to the actual loss, and use the greater amount to determine the appropriate increase in offense level.
III.
In conclusion, we affirm the district court’s denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and its refusal to depart downward from the applicable sentencing range. Because we conclude that the district court incorrectly calculated the intended loss, however, we reverse and remand for further findings consistent with this opinion.