United States v. Israel Rojas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 25-12421
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12421 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12421 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

ISRAEL ROJAS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20580-RS-1 ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Israel Rojas, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). After careful review, we vacate and remand. USCA11 Case: 25-12421 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12421

Rojas, who is serving an 180-month sentence, filed a motion for compassionate release in June 2025, relying in part on his recent cancer diagnosis. The government opposed Rojas’s motion, argu- ing, in relevant part, that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The government did not argue that Rojas’s motion should be denied on the merits. Af- ter receiving the government’s response, the district court denied Rojas’s motion in a paperless order, explaining that Rojas had “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.” In his pro se brief on appeal, Rojas argues that he did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies. The government now agrees. While we need not accept the government’s concession, United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 866 (11th Cir. 2009), we agree with both parties—Rojas exhausted his administrative remedies, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion require- ment and noting that it can be waived or forfeited). The government urges us to affirm on the merits nonethe- less, noting that we may affirm on any basis supported by the rec- ord. We decline to do so here. The district court did not address the merits and we “generally ‘will not consider issues which the district court did not decide.’” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Metro Gen. Ins. Co., 40 F.4th 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting McKissick v. Busby, 936 F.2d 520, 522 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Sin- gleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not USCA11 Case: 25-12421 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 3 of 4

25-12421 Opinion of the Court 3

passed on below.”). After all, we are “a court of review, not a court of first view.” Callahan v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. ex rel. Azar, 939 F.3d 1251, 1266 (11th Cir. 2019). Moreover, the govern- ment did not present its merits arguments to the district court in the first instance, and we typically require all parties to raise argu- ments to the district court if they wish to rely on them on appeal.1 Accordingly, we decline to address these issues in the first instance ourselves.

1 See, e.g., Ruckh v. Salus Rehab., LLC, 963 F.3d 1089, 1111 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]o

preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense on appeal, [an appellee] must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.” (quoting Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012))). These principles of party presentation apply to private parties and the government alike. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 875 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“The govern- ment failed to brief the good-faith exception on appeal. Accordingly, the ex- ception is forfeited.”). In addition, whether a movant qualifies for compas- sionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can entail factual findings. See United States v. Robelo-Galo, 166 F.4th 1311, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2026) (explaining that the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3) element of the compassionate release inquiry can be “fact-intensive” and turn on “‘case-specific factual issues’” (quoting Wil- kinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024))). Appellate courts “‘are not fact- finders[;]’ . . . it is the district court’s role to find the facts . . . .” United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993)). USCA11 Case: 25-12421 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2026 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 25-12421

We therefore vacate the district court’s ruling, which denied Rojas’s motion solely for failure to exhaust administrative reme- dies. We express no opinion on whether Rojas is ultimately eligible for compassionate release. VACATED AND REMANDED.