United States v. Hugo Key and Son, Inc.

731 F. Supp. 1135, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21146, 30 ERC (BNA) 1697, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16890, 1989 WL 197178
CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedMarch 27, 1989
DocketCiv. A. 87-0214 P
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 731 F. Supp. 1135 (United States v. Hugo Key and Son, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Hugo Key and Son, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1135, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21146, 30 ERC (BNA) 1697, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16890, 1989 WL 197178 (D.R.I. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PETTINE, District Judge.

This action was brought by the United States of America, on behalf of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), against Defendant Hugo Key and Son, Inc. (“Hugo Key”) for assessment of civil penalties and injunctive relief pursuant to the authority of Section 113(b) of the Clean Air Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b). Section 113(b) of the Act authorizes EPA to institute a civil action for injunctive relief and civil penalties for violations of the Act’s emission standards and for violations of Section 114(a) reporting requirements and Section 113(a)(3) compliance orders. 1

*1137 The United States has alleged in its complaint that Hugo Key violated Sections 112(c), 113(a)(3) and 114(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c), 7413(a)(3), 7414(a), and the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAP”) for asbestos, 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M. These violations occurred in connection with a demolition operation conducted by Hugo Key at the United States Naval Base in Newport, Rhode Island.

The United States’ allegations are based on Hugo Key’s failure to follow certain work practices designed to prevent emissions of asbestos into the outside air. In particular, Defendant is charged with: (1) failure to adequately wet friable asbestos materials during stripping in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.147(d); (2) failure to keep friable asbestos materials wet until collected for disposal in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.147(e)(1); and, (3) discharging visible emissions into the outside air during the handling of asbestos-containing waste material and failing to use disposal methods specified in the regulations in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.152(b).

The United States has also alleged that Hugo Key failed to timely respond to a reporting requirement issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in violation of Section 114(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a), and failed to timely respond to a compliance order issued by EPA in violation of Section 113(a)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3).

On February 28, 1989, the Court heard the United States’ motion for summary judgment against Hugo Key on the issue of liability. After having considered the submissions of the parties and the arguments of counsel, 2 and reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the Defendant, the Court has determined that there are no issues of material fact as to the five claims alleged in the United States’ complaint and that summary judgment should be granted in the United States’ favor as to each of those claims.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and other submissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (1st Cir.1985). 3 The Supreme Court has recognized that summary judgment is a useful tool to assist in achieving a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of litigation. See, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (em *1138 phasis in original). The United States has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of fact as to its claims against Hugo Key. Therefore, this Court holds that summary judgment establishing the liability of Defendant on all five claims is appropriate. The Court’s specific findings are set forth in the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II.FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to the following facts. These facts are established for purposes of trial in this matter.

1. Pursuant to Section 112(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b), the Administrator of the EPA is required to publish a list of air pollutants that he determines are hazardous and to prescribe an emission standard for each such air pollutant. These emission standards are known as the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAP”). EPA designated asbestos as a hazardous air pollutant in 1971. 36 Fed.Reg. 5931. The asbestos NESHAP was codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 61. The asbestos NESHAP included and includes various regulations related to the emissions and handling of asbestos. In 1984, EPA published amendments to and repromulgated portions of the asbestos NESHAP, which was recodified at 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart M, Sections 61.140 to 61.156. 49 Fed.Reg. 13658, 13661 (April 5,1984); 49 Fed.Reg. 25453 (June 21,1984). These amendments did not substantively alter the requirements applicable to renovations and demolitions.

2. Section 112(c)(1)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(B), provides that no hazardous air pollutant to which a national emission standard applies may be emitted from any stationary source in violation of the standard. Thus, a violation of NESH-AP standard constitutes a violation of Section 112(c) of the Act.

3.

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731 F. Supp. 1135, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21146, 30 ERC (BNA) 1697, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16890, 1989 WL 197178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hugo-key-and-son-inc-rid-1989.