United States v. Hobson

590 F. App'x 32

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: November 6, 2014
• Docket: 13-4383-cr
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant James D. Hobson appeals from a November 6, 2018 judgment of conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, J.) following his guilty plea to one count of distribution of child pornography, one count of receipt of child pornography, and three counts of possession of child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (5)(B). Hobson challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 151-month prison sentence, imposed by the district court after it calculated without objection a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,” United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 258, 258 (2d Cir.2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and we will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,’ ” United States v. Gavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (citing United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)).

Hobson contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court placed disproportionate weight on the severity of his offense and because it failed to consider mitigating factors in accordance with United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir.2010). The district court reviewed and considered the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considering not only the mitigating evidence that Hobson set forth but also noting Hobson’s 12-year-long addiction to and expansive collection of child pornography, some depicting sadistic abuse of very young children. This was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 264, 270 (2d Cir.2008) (no “robotic incantations” or “particular formula” required in considering section 3553(a) factors).

Equally meritless is Hobson’s contention that the Guidelines’ treatment of child pornography offenses is irrational and therefore requires special consideration of mitigating factors. The Guidelines commentary acknowledges the limitations to which Hobson objects and suggests that a departure may be warranted in some circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, comment. Hobson relies on Dorvee to argue that the district court failed to fully appreciate Hobson’s mitigating factors, but that case is inapposite. See United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir.2011) (noting that the problem identified by Dorvee was that the applied child pornography enhancements resulted in a Guidelines range that at its low end was twenty-two months higher than the statutory maximum). Here, as in Aumais, the district court imposed a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range, which itself was significantly below the statutory maximum penalty for his offense. This was not an abuse of discretion.

We have considered Hobson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.