United States v. Harold E. Smith

555 F.2d 249, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13037

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 8, 1977
• Docket: 76-3327
• Status: Published

Opinions

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Harold E. Smith was found guilty of criminal contempt in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 and was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment. He raises four points on appeal: first, that in convicting him the trial court improperly applied a less exacting standard of intent; second, that the application of this less rigid standard deprived him of his First Amendment rights; third, that even under this standard his actions did not constitute criminal contempt; and fourth, that his punishment was excessive. For the reasons set out below we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, James Walter Scott and Gregory Scott were spectators at the trial of William Gardiner for failure to file income tax returns and for wilfully supplying false and fraudulent information to his employer on a withholding exemption certificate. They shared Gardiner’s view that the income tax laws are unconstitutional. Prior to the noon recess, the court admonished the jury not to discuss the case among themselves or with others. Appellant was present in court at this time and heard this admonition.

During the noon recess, the three crossed the lobby of the courthouse and, in due course, exited into the street; as they walked, they actively discussed the Gard-iner trial. Appellant was aware of the presence in the lobby of jurors in the Gard-iner case. At the exit, they joined a group of people which included a juror named Paul Gartner. At this point, appellant commented to his companions, in a voice sufficiently loud to be heard by those in the immediate vicinity, something to the effect that “I hope this jury doesn’t go along with those communistic tax laws.” Gartner heard this remark and the incident was brought to the attention of the court. A motion for a mistrial was denied.

At appellant’s trial for criminal contempt stemming from this remark, the court found, inter alia, that (1) appellant was in the courtroom at the time of the admonition to the jury and was aware of this admonition, (2) appellant made the statement knowingly and wilfully, (3) the statement was made in tone of voice and volume sufficient for others in the immediate area, including Juror Paul Gartner, to hear the statement, (4) the statement had the tendency to influence improperly the actions of Gartner as a member of the jury and therefore had the tendency to influence improperly the actions of the jury, (5) appellant was aware of the presence of jurors in the lobby, (6) appellant was aware that he was speaking loudly enough to be heard beyond the immediate vicinity of his two companions, and (7) appellant made the statement with wilful and wanton disregard of whether jurors might hear it. The court pointed out that it was unable to find that appellant made the statement knowingly and intentionally to Gartner or that he made the statement knowing that Gartner was actually close enough to hear it.

On the basis of these findings, the trial court concluded that appellant was guilty of criminal contempt. We disagree. The type of intent necessary to support prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 401 has been the center of controversy in many cases. See, e. g. In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); Hawkins v. United States, 190 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1951). Reconciliation of these cases is not possible. However, our review of them leads us to conclude that under the circumstances of this case it is necessary that the appellant made the statement knowingly and intentionally to Gartner.

We believe our holding is consistent with an early expression of this court on this subject appearing in Kelly v. United States, 250 F. 947 (9th Cir. 1918), cert, denied, 248 U.S. 585, 39 S.Ct. 182, 63 L.Ed. 433 (1919). We said:

order that one may be held for contempt for communications with jurors, on the ground of the harmful tendency thereof, it is not necessary to prove that the communications had or the acts done were accompanied with a wrongful intent. It is sufficient if such acts and communications were knowingly and willfully done and had, and had the tendency to influence improperly the action of the jury. In

Id. at 950.

We read this as requiring that the communication be “knowingly and willfully . had . . ..” A communication made with “wilful and wanton disregard of whether the jurors might hear it,” in the trial court’s view of the circumstances of this case, is distinguishable from one made knowingly and intentionally. We accept the trial court’s view and conclude that the communication here made with “wilful and wanton disregard of whether the jurors might hear it” does not meet the requirements of Kelly.

We recognize that Kelly, as well as Hawkins v. United States, supra, and Higgins v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 160 F.2d 223 (1946), cert, denied, 331 U.S. 840, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1851 (1947), were concerned with instances in which admittedly the defendant knowingly had conversations with a juror.¹ The issue in each, to employ the language of Kelly once more, was whether the conversations “had the tendency to influence improperly the actions of the jury.” Such a tendency was found to exist in this case by the trial court. However, as we have indicated, we read Kelly, when applied to the facts of this case, also to require a communication be made knowingly and intentionally to the juror. A careless loud mouth expressing his opinion in the vicinity of a juror is unmannered but not, without more, a criminal.

Our holding is not intended to suggest that we reject, or have reservations about, the definition of the requisite intent for criminal contempt set forth in United States v. Seale, supra. Seale did not involve communications with a juror but rather allegedly contemptuous conduct within the courtroom. The context within which an inquiry regarding the requisite intent for conviction of criminal contempt arises invariably shapes the manner in which the requisite intent is expressed. For this reason we believe it better to employ Kelly as our guiding authority. For the same reason we do not wish to be understood as departing from In re Allis, 531 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 900, 97 S.Ct. 267, 50 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976), a case involving tardiness of an attorney in appearances in court. In each context the issue is whether the alleged contemnor has placed himself within the reach of the court’s power to punish for contempt under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 401. The formulations of the requisite intent cannot be expected to be uniform in all contexts.

Our disposition of the appellant’s first argument makes it unnecessary to discuss his other contentions.

REVERSED.

1 . In Kelly attorneys for two defendants conversed with and bought drinks for two jurors during the course of the trial of their clients.