USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4354
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KULBIR KAUR,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-4356
HARMANPREET SINGH,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:23-cr-00092-REP-1; 3:23-cr-00092-REP-2)
Submitted: June 17, 2025 Decided: July 8, 2025 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Jonathan P. Sheldon, SHELDON & FLOOD, P.L.C., Fairfax, Virginia; Meghan Skelton, SKELTONLAW, LLC, Cabin John, Maryland, for Appellants. Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, Erin H. Flynn, Teresa Kwong, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Avishek Panth, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Kulbir Kaur and Harmanpreet Singh (“Appellants”) appeal their convictions for
conspiracy to commit forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594(b); forced
labor, and attempted forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594(a); harboring an
alien for financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324; document servitude, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1592; and unlawful conduct with respect to immigration documents, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1597. The charges stemmed from a report by the victim to federal
authorities alleging Appellants brought him with them from India under the false pretense
of enrolling him in school. Once he was in the United States, Appellants forced him to
work at their convenience store for no pay, abused him, and forced him to marry Kaur so
he could stay in the country to work. On appeal, Singh challenges the district court’s
admission of statements Kaur made in an application to extend the victim’s tourist visa and
the denial of his request to sever his trial from Kaur’s, and Appellants challenge the district
court’s exclusion of allegations they made against the victim regarding assaults on their
children. We affirm.
With respect to Kaur’s statements on the visa extension application, Singh argues
their admission at trial violated his right to confront Kaur because she was not available
for cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause “bars the admission of ‘testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” United States v.
Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53-54 (2004)). A statement is testimonial if it was made by a declarant who could
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
reasonably expect the statement to be used prosecutorially. See United States v. Udeozor,
515 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, statements by a coconspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy are inherently not testimonial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
Singh claims the statements made on the visa application were testimonial because they
were solemn declarations and formal statements to government officials; he also contends
the district court adopted an overly narrow interpretation of “testimonial.” The district
court’s interpretation of “testimonial” was correct; the test is whether the declarant could
have reasonably foreseen her statement being used at a later trial. See Uzedor, 513 F.3d at
268 (noting three categories of statements that are testimonial in nature, including sworn
statements such as affidavits, and explaining that each of those categories share a “common
nucleus” that the declarant “would have expected [her] statements to be used at trial”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the district court correctly found that Kaur
would not have reasonably foreseen the statements she made on the visa application would
be used at a later trial, and so the statements were not testimonial.
Singh next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever his and
Kaur’s trials, asserting that admission of her statements on the visa extension application
prejudiced him. We review “a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 2018). A defendant
moving to sever has the burden of demonstrating a “strong showing of prejudice.” United
States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984). Moreover, “[d]efendants must
show clear prejudice arising from a joint trial to establish an entitlement to reversal of their
convictions.” Zelaya, 908 F.3d at 929. Singh has failed to show any prejudice or
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deprivation of his trial rights caused by the joint trial, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in conducting a joint trial.
Finally, Appellants challenge the district court’s exclusion of their allegations that
the victim assaulted their children. With respect to Singh, who challenged the exclusion
of this evidence below, we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion and will only overturn a ruling that is arbitrary or irrational. United States v.
Farrell, 921 F.3d 116, 143 (4th Cir. 2019). Even if there is error, “we will not vacate a
conviction if an error was harmless.” United States v. Sutherland, 921 F.3d 421, 429 (4th
Cir. 2019). To the extent that Singh asserts the exclusion of this evidence violated his due
process rights, we “review[] evidentiary rulings implicating constitutional claims de novo,”
and will find the constitutional error harmless if it “was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129, 132 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Kaur, on the other hand, failed to challenge the exclusion of this evidence before
the district court.
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4354
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KULBIR KAUR,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-4356
HARMANPREET SINGH,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:23-cr-00092-REP-1; 3:23-cr-00092-REP-2)
Submitted: June 17, 2025 Decided: July 8, 2025 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Jonathan P. Sheldon, SHELDON & FLOOD, P.L.C., Fairfax, Virginia; Meghan Skelton, SKELTONLAW, LLC, Cabin John, Maryland, for Appellants. Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, Erin H. Flynn, Teresa Kwong, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Avishek Panth, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Kulbir Kaur and Harmanpreet Singh (“Appellants”) appeal their convictions for
conspiracy to commit forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594(b); forced
labor, and attempted forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594(a); harboring an
alien for financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324; document servitude, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1592; and unlawful conduct with respect to immigration documents, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1597. The charges stemmed from a report by the victim to federal
authorities alleging Appellants brought him with them from India under the false pretense
of enrolling him in school. Once he was in the United States, Appellants forced him to
work at their convenience store for no pay, abused him, and forced him to marry Kaur so
he could stay in the country to work. On appeal, Singh challenges the district court’s
admission of statements Kaur made in an application to extend the victim’s tourist visa and
the denial of his request to sever his trial from Kaur’s, and Appellants challenge the district
court’s exclusion of allegations they made against the victim regarding assaults on their
children. We affirm.
With respect to Kaur’s statements on the visa extension application, Singh argues
their admission at trial violated his right to confront Kaur because she was not available
for cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause “bars the admission of ‘testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” United States v.
Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53-54 (2004)). A statement is testimonial if it was made by a declarant who could
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4356 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/08/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
reasonably expect the statement to be used prosecutorially. See United States v. Udeozor,
515 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, statements by a coconspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy are inherently not testimonial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
Singh claims the statements made on the visa application were testimonial because they
were solemn declarations and formal statements to government officials; he also contends
the district court adopted an overly narrow interpretation of “testimonial.” The district
court’s interpretation of “testimonial” was correct; the test is whether the declarant could
have reasonably foreseen her statement being used at a later trial. See Uzedor, 513 F.3d at
268 (noting three categories of statements that are testimonial in nature, including sworn
statements such as affidavits, and explaining that each of those categories share a “common
nucleus” that the declarant “would have expected [her] statements to be used at trial”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the district court correctly found that Kaur
would not have reasonably foreseen the statements she made on the visa application would
be used at a later trial, and so the statements were not testimonial.
Singh next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever his and
Kaur’s trials, asserting that admission of her statements on the visa extension application
prejudiced him. We review “a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 2018). A defendant
moving to sever has the burden of demonstrating a “strong showing of prejudice.” United
States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984). Moreover, “[d]efendants must
show clear prejudice arising from a joint trial to establish an entitlement to reversal of their
convictions.” Zelaya, 908 F.3d at 929. Singh has failed to show any prejudice or
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deprivation of his trial rights caused by the joint trial, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in conducting a joint trial.
Finally, Appellants challenge the district court’s exclusion of their allegations that
the victim assaulted their children. With respect to Singh, who challenged the exclusion
of this evidence below, we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion and will only overturn a ruling that is arbitrary or irrational. United States v.
Farrell, 921 F.3d 116, 143 (4th Cir. 2019). Even if there is error, “we will not vacate a
conviction if an error was harmless.” United States v. Sutherland, 921 F.3d 421, 429 (4th
Cir. 2019). To the extent that Singh asserts the exclusion of this evidence violated his due
process rights, we “review[] evidentiary rulings implicating constitutional claims de novo,”
and will find the constitutional error harmless if it “was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129, 132 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Kaur, on the other hand, failed to challenge the exclusion of this evidence before
the district court. We therefore review her claim for plain error. See United States v.
Walker, 32 F.4th 377, 394 (4th Cir. 2022). To demonstrate plain error, Kaur must show
“(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 294-95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of any other crime,
wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid.
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404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible for other purposes, such as to show motive or
intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for one of these
purposes if it is (1) relevant to an issue such as an element of the offense; (2) necessary,
i.e. probative of an essential claim or element of the offense; (3) reliable; and (4) more
probative than prejudicial. United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 266 (4th Cir. 2017); see
Fed. R. Evid. 403. While Rule 404(b) is usually used to exclude evidence of a defendant’s
prior bad acts, it also “authorizes the admission of a witness’s other wrongs, acts, or crimes
for defensive purposes if it tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate the defendant’s
guilt of the crime charged against him.” United States v. Myers, 589 F.3d 117, 124 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellants have not demonstrated that the district court erred in excluding this
evidence because they have not shown that the evidence was reliable. In addition, even if
the evidence was reliable, the district court did not err in excluding it because its potential
for prejudice far outweighed its probative value.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED