United States v. Guzman-Aviles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 24-3109
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 26, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-3109 (D.C. No. 2:14-CR-20017-JWL-1) ANGEL GUZMAN-AVILES, (D. Kan.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Angel Guzman-Aviles appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion

for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied

the motion, ruling he failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for a

sentence reduction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 2

I

Guzman-Aviles pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than

50 grams of methamphetamine. Given the quantity of drugs involved, the

presentence investigation report (PSR) assessed a base offense level of 38; it then

added two levels for possession of a dangerous weapon, and subtracted two levels for

acceptance of responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 38. Coupled with a

criminal history of I, the PSR’s advisory guideline range was 235 to 293 months in

prison. The district court sentenced him to 235 months, and we affirmed. See United

States v. Guzman-Aviles, 663 F. App’x 674, 678 (10th Cir. 2016).

Guzman-Aviles later moved for compassionate release, claiming he had

extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction because his sentence

was unusually long and a change in the law resulted in a disparity between the

sentence he was serving and the sentence he likely would have received at the time

he filed his motion. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). He asserted that, according to the

guidelines’ drug-conversion calculator, his base offense level should be 30, which

would yield a shorter sentence than the one he received. He argued that these

circumstances, combined with his rehabilitation efforts, sufficed to show

extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.

The district court rejected this argument, noting the PSR held Guzman-Aviles

responsible for more than 27 kilograms of “Ice” methamphetamine and over 108

kilograms of marijuana, for a total combined marijuana equivalency of 544,508.9

kilograms. R., Vol. 1 at 196. The district court noted that this quantity exceeded the

2 Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 3

quantity of marijuana required to trigger his base offense level of 38, see U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(c)(1) (requiring 90,000 kilograms of marijuana), so he was still subject to

the same guideline range. Thus, the district court concluded that he failed to show a

change in the law resulting in a gross sentencing disparity for purposes of

establishing extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6).

II

We review the district court’s denial of compassionate release for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). An

abuse of discretion occurs when the district court relies on an incorrect legal

conclusion or a clearly erroneous factual finding. Id.

Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant compassionate release if

(1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction; (2) a

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the United States

Sentencing Commission; and (3) the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

support a reduction. See United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 941 (10th Cir. 2021).

The district court may consider these steps in any order and deny the motion for

failure to satisfy any one step, without considering the rest. See id. at 941-43.

District courts “possess the authority to determine . . . what constitutes extraordinary

and compelling reasons, but that [authority] is bounded by the requirement . . . that a

reduction in sentence be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 832 (10th Cir.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 4

The policy statement here at issue states:

If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law . . . may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

On appeal Guzman-Aviles contends the district court failed “to rule on

[whether] there are any extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant [a sentence]

modification.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 (capitalization omitted). But as explained

above, the district court determined he failed to show extraordinary and compelling

reasons for compassionate release because there was no change in the law resulting in

a gross disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence he likely would

have received at the time he filed his motion. See R., Vol. 1 at 195-97.1

Guzman-Aviles also contends the district court failed to consider whether he

satisfied other qualifying criteria and his individual circumstances. In particular, he

1 Guzman-Aviles raises several other issues he did not present to the district court, including a challenge to the conditions of his confinement, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 12-13; requests for sentence reductions based on Amendments 817, 820, and 821 of the sentencing guidelines, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 14, 16-20; and a separate request for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the purity of his methamphetamine, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 25-29. We normally do not consider issues and arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and Guzman-Aviles gives us no reason to do so here. See Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1088 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Normally when a party presents a new argument on appeal and fails to request plain error review, we do not address it.”).

4 Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 5

says the district court failed to recognize his sentence was unusually long and

incorrectly calculated, he served more than ten years of his sentence, he was locked

down during the Covid-19 pandemic, he suffers from a grave medical condition, and

he made rehabilitative efforts. But absent a change in the law that resulted in a gross

disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence that likely would have been

imposed when he filed his motion, there was no need for the district court to consider

his individual circumstances and whether he satisfied other criteria. See

§ 1B1.13(b)(6) (stating that relief is available “only where such change would

produce a gross disparity” (emphasis added)).

Additionally, Guzman-Aviles faults the district court for failing to evaluate the

relevant § 3553(a) factors. But having found that Guzman-Aviles failed to establish

extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, the district court was

free to deny compassionate release without addressing the § 3553(a) factors. See

Hald, 8 F.4th at 942-43 (“If the most convenient way for the district court to dispose

of a motion for compassionate release is to reject it for failure to satisfy one of the

steps, we see no benefit in requiring it to make the useless gesture of determining

whether one of the other steps is satisfied.”).

Last, Guzman-Aviles contends that under United States v. Corner, 967 F.3d

662 (7th Cir. 2020), and “comparable” standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the

district court erred by denying relief as a matter of discretion, without first

determining whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction. See Aplt. Opening Br.

at 11. He points out that a district court may consider an intervening change of law

5 Appellate Case: 24-3109 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2025 Page: 6

or fact in deciding whether to grant relief under the First Step Act, but the district

court failed to do so here.

This argument is unavailing. To the extent Guzman-Aviles suggests a district

court must analyze a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion in a particular sequence, we have

already rejected the argument. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 942 (holding the three-step

analysis of § 3582(c)(1)(A) can “be considered in any order”). Thus, his efforts to

draw parallels to § 3582(c)(2) are mistaken. And in any event, the district court did

effectively evaluate whether Guzman-Aviles was eligible for relief: it examined the

specific argument he raised—that the quantity of drugs should have yielded a lower

base offense level—and it determined he would be subject to the same sentencing

range because the equivalent quantity of drugs he possessed “still results in a base

offense level of 38.” R., Vol. 1 at 197. Hence, the district court properly concluded

he had “not shown that he is entitled to relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6) because there is

no change in law that results in any disparity between the sentence he is serving and

the sentence likely to be imposed today.” Id.

III

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge