15‐1444‐cr(L) United States v. Gill
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2016
(Argued: February 9, 2017 Decided: August 30, 2017)
Docket Nos. 15‐1444‐cr(L); 15‐1447‐cr (CON) 15‐1450‐cr(CON)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SEAN DUPREE, DERRICK LEWIS, AKA Boobie, DONALD LEWIS, AKA Don Don, BONITA MBAYE, MICHAEL MOORE, NORBERT GRIGGER, AKA Jah, DENNIS PORTER, AKA Finesse, ROLAND DOWE, AKA Terrell,
Defendants,
BRIAN GILL, AKA Brawl, DAVID GILL, AKA Plot, SAMUEL WACO MCINTOSH, AKA Samuel McIntosh, AKA Waco,
Defendants‐Appellants.*
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption to conform with the above.
Before: LIVINGSTON, CHIN, AND CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Amon, J.), convicting all three defendants‐
appellants of murder and conspiracy to murder in furtherance of a drug
trafficking conspiracy in Staten Island in 1994, and two of the three defendants‐
appellants of engaging in a drug trafficking conspiracy in Staten Island from
2011 to 2013. Defendants appeal their convictions on several grounds, including
the failure of the superseding indictment to allege drug quantity, the admission
of evidence of a prior drug conspiracy in Maryland in the early 1990s, and the
sufficiency of the evidence of the charged narcotics conspiracies.
AFFIRMED.
NADIA I. SHIHATA, Assistant United States Attorney (Jo Ann M. Navickas, Alicyn L. Cooley, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Bridget M. Rohde, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee.
PETER F. LANGROCK, Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Middlebury, Vermont, for Defendant‐Appellant Brian Gill.
VIVIAN SHEVITZ, South Salem, New York, for Defendant‐ Appellant David Gill.
CHRISTOPHER P. CONNIFF (Elizabeth Bierut, on the brief), Ropes & Gray LLP, New York, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant Samuel Waco McIntosh.
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
Defendants‐appellants Brian Gill (ʺBrianʺ), David Gill (ʺDavidʺ), and
Samuel Waco McIntosh (ʺSamuelʺ) ‐‐ three brothers ‐‐ appeal from judgments of
the district court (Amon, J.), convicting them of committing and conspiring to
commit the drug‐related murder of Michael Dawson in Staten Island in 1994, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(e)(1)(A) and 846. Brian and David also appeal from
their convictions for conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base in
Staten Island from 2011 to 2013, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and
846.
Defendants principally challenge the failure of the superseding
indictment to allege that the drug conspiracy underlying the murder charges
involved at least 280 grams of cocaine base, the admission at trial of evidence of
their involvement in a drug conspiracy in Maryland in the early 1990s, and the
sufficiency of the evidence of the charged narcotics conspiracies. In addition,
David and Samuel assert that the court erroneously admitted certain witness
testimony as statements against penal interest and that another witness
committed perjury warranting vacatur.
We conclude that the defect in the superseding indictment did not
amount to plain error, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the challenged evidence, there was sufficient record evidence to support the
convictions, and the claim of perjury is unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the
judgments of the district court are affirmed.
BACKGROUND
I. The Facts
Because defendants appeal their convictions following a jury trial,
ʺour statement of the facts views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, crediting any inferences that the jury might have drawn in its
favor.ʺ United States v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 99‐100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2001)).
A. The Prior Drug Conspiracy in Maryland
In the early 1990s, Brian and Samuel sold crack cocaine in Maryland.
Brian asked his friend Norbert Grigger to help and provided him an apartment
for drug sales and two guns for protection. Brian bought powder cocaine from
Manhattan and Staten Island in New York and cooked it into crack cocaine. Each
week, they sold 500 to 800 grams of crack cocaine and made approximately
$40,000 to $50,000.
Brian stored the drugs in his Maryland apartment, along with
ammunition, bullet‐proof vests, and approximately 20 guns. He and Samuel
often carried guns. Grigger understood that he might need to use guns for
protection from rival drug dealers. Brian, Samuel, and Grigger once got into a
ʺstandoffʺ with a rival group after a dispute over drug sales, and during the
confrontation ʺ[e]veryoneʺ drew their guns. Samuel App. 288. The three men
also made plans to retaliate against another group of rival dealers by ʺtak[ing]
them, handcuff[ing] them, driv[ing] them out to the middle of the woods and
shoot[ing] them.ʺ Id. at 290. Brian procured a U‐Haul truck and handcuffs, but
the remaining plans were never carried out.
B. The 1994 Drug Conspiracy
In April 1994, Brian began selling crack cocaine with cooperating
witness Donald Lewis at 160 Park Hill Avenue (ʺ160 Park Hillʺ) in Staten Island.
Brian bought 125 grams of powder cocaine from Washington Heights in
Manhattan every three to four days, which yielded 120 to 121 grams of crack
cocaine that would sell for $8,000 or $9,000. After a few weeks, Brian and Lewis
began selling cocaine in rotating shifts around the clock. Each man had access to
a gun for protection from other dealers. David and Samuel also sold cocaine at
160 Park Hill.
At some point, rival dealer Michael Dawson asked to join the 160
Park Hill operation. Brian opposed the idea. Dawson nevertheless joined Lewis
in selling cocaine on the night shift. Dawson and Lewis made three trips to buy
150 grams of powder cocaine each time, which resulted in 140 grams of crack
cocaine and $13,000 or $14,000 in profit after every trip. Brian and his brothers
confronted Dawson, beat him up, broke into his car, and stole his drugs and
money. Brian began acting ʺshadyʺ and ʺfunnyʺ toward Lewis and talked to him
less frequently. Id. at 220.
C. The Dawson Murder
On June 22, 1994, Brian complained to Lewis that Charles Gordon,
Lewisʹs cousin, was robbing their customers whenever he and Lewis were not in
the 160 Park Hill area. Brian walked toward Gordon and hit him in the face. The
two men fought. Lewis got his gun because ʺit looked like it was going to get
crazy,ʺ id. at 226, and told Gordon to leave. Brian, in turn, got his gun and yelled,
ʺ[W]hereʹs he at now, whereʹs he at now, whereʹs he at.ʺ Id. at 223. Brian looked
upset and told Lewis and Lewisʹs brother, who was the only other person in the
area, that they ʺshouldnʹt be there when his brothers get here, wait until his
brothers get here.ʺ Id.
David and Samuel arrived within a few minutes of each other. Brian
declared that Gordon and Lewisʹs brother had ʺjumpedʺ him. Id. at 223. Lewis
ʺyell[ed] back and forth across the street that [Brian was] lying, that [his] cousin
and [his] brother didnʹt jump him.ʺ Id. at 224. A security guard told the men to
take their argument elsewhere. During the altercation, Dawson came and tried
to help Lewis sell crack cocaine to customers, but David blocked their efforts.
Dawson pulled out a gun. He and Brian brandished their guns at
each other during ʺa little standoff.ʺ Id. at 224. Lewis talked them down. Brian
continued to ʺtalk[] shitʺ and went inside the 160 Park Hill building, followed by
David, Lewis, and Lewisʹs brother. Id. at 225. David pulled a gun on Lewisʹs
brother once they were inside, but Brian directed him to beat Lewisʹs brother up
instead. David punched Lewisʹs brother in the face.
Meanwhile, a customer in a car had pulled up in front of the 160
Park Hill building. Samuel approached the car from the driverʹs side while
Dawson approached it from the passenger side. Samuel completed the sale,
pulled out a gun, and shot Dawson. Samuel ran inside the building and grabbed
his brothers. Brian and David each came out and shot in Dawsonʹs direction.
Lewis found Dawson bleeding in the street. Dawson later died.
D. The 2011‐2013 Drug Conspiracy
In March 2011, Lewis saw Brian selling crack cocaine again near 160
Park Hill. The two men went to New Brighton in Staten Island to buy 15 to 20
grams of crack cocaine, which they sold to customers in the 160 Park Hill area.
Brian, Samuel, and Lewis bought 25 to 30 grams more of cocaine from New
Brighton and split the batch between them.
Brian and Lewis sold cocaine daily in the 160 Park Hill area. Lewis
bought 10 to 30 grams of cocaine for them twice a week. In early 2012, Brian told
Grigger that he was selling cocaine, that ʺPark Hill was wide open[,] and [that]
there was a lot of money to be made.ʺ Id. at 300. Grigger offered to get Brian
cocaine on consignment because he knew Brian could sell it.
Grigger then delivered 500 grams of powder cocaine to Brian and
suggested that he sell cocaine 3.5 grams at a time. Brian showed Grigger how he
cooked and packaged cocaine. Grigger agreed to bring ʺworkersʺ to 160 Park
Hill to ʺhandle the everyday sales of hand‐to‐hand business dealing with the
customers, set up various drug spots in different buildings to receive the revenue
from the drugs, and to create shifts,ʺ just like ʺthe way [they] did [it in]
Baltimore.ʺ Id. at 302. Grigger understood that Brian would pay him for the
cocaine once he sold all of it.
After Brian paid Grigger back in full, Grigger supplied him with two
more batches of cocaine on consignment, one with 250 grams and one with
nearly 200 grams. In addition, Grigger sold Brian 20 to 50 grams of cocaine
approximately nine times. Grigger visited Brian several times in 2012 and 2013
to pick up money and deliver cocaine. During his visits, Grigger watched Brian
cook crack cocaine and sell it to customers, observed David selling cocaine, and
ʺsometimesʺ saw Samuel in the area. Id. at 304.
When Lewis was released from prison, Brian gave him a thousand
dollarsʹ worth of crack cocaine, which Brian let him sell in the 160 Park Hill area.
Lewis sold 20 to 25 grams of the crack cocaine to Brianʹs customers. Brian bought
ʺa big rockʺ of cocaine in Brooklyn and gave Lewis another 75 grams. Id. at 231.
Lewis had Brian buy him 20 to 30 grams of powder cocaine every other week, for
about a month.
Lewis testified that Brian sometimes sold drugs in Davidʹs and
Samuelʹs presence at 160 Park Hill. The three defendants were arrested in 2013.
II. The Proceedings Below
In October 2014, defendants were charged by superseding
indictment with (1) killing and conspiring to kill Dawson in 1994 while
conspiring to distribute cocaine base in Staten Island (an offense punishable
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 848(e)(1)(A)
(Counts One and Two); and (2) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base in Staten Island from 2011 to 2013,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count Three).
Trial began in October 2014 and lasted approximately four weeks.
The government called 30 witnesses, including Lewis and Grigger, and
introduced recordings of 911 calls into evidence. The district court reserved
decision on defendantsʹ motions for judgments of acquittal at the close of the
governmentʹs case. Davidʹs counsel called one witness on behalf of the three
defendants.
On November 13, 2014, the jury found Brian and David guilty on all
three counts, found Samuel guilty of the 1994 killing and conspiracy charged in
Counts One and Two, and acquitted Samuel of the 2011‐2013 drug conspiracy
charged in Count Three. The court sentenced Brian to three concurrent life
terms, David to three concurrent 40‐year terms, and Samuel to two concurrent
40‐year terms.
On April 28, 2015, the court denied Samuelʹs pro se motion for
acquittal and a new trial and held that there was ample evidence, including the
testimony of witnesses with direct knowledge of the murder and underlying
conspiracy, to support his convictions on Counts One and Two. The court
thereafter entered judgments against the three defendants.
These appeals followed.
DISCUSSION
Five issues are presented: (1) the omission of drug quantity in
Counts One and Two of the superseding indictment, (2) the admission of
evidence of the early 1990s Maryland conspiracy as prior bad act evidence,
(3) the sufficiency of the evidence for each conviction, (4) the admission of
statements against penal interest, and (5) the alleged perjury during trial. We
address each issue in turn.
I. The Superseding Indictment
All three defendants argue that their convictions on the murder and
related conspiracy counts are unsustainable because Counts One and Two of the
superseding indictment do not allege drug quantity. We agree the superseding
indictment was defective but decline to vacate the convictions because the errors
were not plain.
A. Applicable Law
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, ʺa defendant has a
ʹsubstantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned
by a grand jury.ʹʺ United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985)). ʺAn indictment that
does not set out all of the essential elements of the offense charged is defective.ʺ
Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) requires an indictment to contain
both ʺa plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense chargedʺ and a citation to the ʺstatute, rule, regulation, or
other provision of law that the defendant is alleged to have violated.ʺ Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The statements of essential facts and statutory citation are
separate requirements, and a deficiency in the factual allegations cannot be cured
by a statutory citation in the same count. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d at 128.
Although ʺwe have consistently upheld indictments that ʹdo little
more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and
place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime,ʹʺ United States v. Walsh, 194
F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113
(2d Cir. 1975)), an indictment charging an aggravated drug offense under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) ʺmust alwaysʺ include a factual allegation of the drug
quantity as an essential element, Gonzalez, 686 F.3d at 130 (internal quotation
marks omitted). It is not enough for the indictment to make a ʺsimple reference
to a drug‐quantity‐based penalty provision . . . without any language alleging the
factual predicate for application of that penalty, and without any other
allegations that reasonably permit the inference that the grand jury intended to
charge the defendant with the quantity necessary for application of that penalty.ʺ
Id. at 132‐33. Thus, an indictment charging an aggravated drug offense under
§ 841(b)(1)(A) is defective if it does not factually allege the drug quantity
involved in the charged offense. See id.
We review a challenge based on a factually deficient indictment and
raised for the first time on appeal under the plain error standard. United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). Under this standard, a defendant is not entitled
to relief unless there is (1) error that (2) is plain and (3) affects his substantial
rights. Id. ʺIf all three conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [our] discretion
to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.ʺ Id. (last alteration in
original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).
B. Application
i. Failure to Allege Drug Quantity
Counts One and Two of the superseding indictment charged
defendants with killing and conspiring to kill Dawson in violation of
§ 848(e)(1)(A), which applies to ʺany person engaging in an offense punishable
under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title . . . who intentionally kills or counsels,
commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual
and such killing results.ʺ Section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) establishes penalties for drug
offenses involving at least 280 grams of cocaine base. Under § 846, a conspiracy
to commit a drug offense under § 841(b)(1)(A) is itself punishable under
§ 841(b)(1)(A) and, likewise, a conspiracy to commit drug‐related murder under
§ 848(e)(1)(A) is punishable under § 848(e)(1)(A). As a result, a defendant
commits, or conspires to commit, a drug‐related murder under § 848(e)(1)(A) if
he kills or conspires to kill another person while engaged, or conspiring to
engage, in distributing at least 280 grams of cocaine base. See United States v.
Santos, 541 F.3d 63, 67‐68 (2d Cir. 2008).
In this case, Count One of the superseding indictment charged:
On or about June 22, 1994, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants BRIAN GILL, also known as ʺBrawl,ʺ DAVID GILL, also known as ʺPlot,ʺ and SAMUEL MCINTOSH, also known as ʺSamuel Gillʺ
and ʺWaco,ʺ together with others, while engaged in one or more offenses punishable under Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code, to wit: conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, did knowingly and intentionally kill and counsel, command, induce, procure, and cause the intentional killing of Michael Dawson, also known as ʺNIMʺ and ʺNIMS,ʺ and such killing did result.
(Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(e)(1)(A); Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2 and 3551 et seq.)
Samuel App. 37‐38. Count Two of the superseding indictment charged:
On or about June 22, 1994, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants BRIAN GILL, also known as ʺBrawl,ʺ DAVID GILL, also known as ʺPlot,ʺ and SAMUEL MCINTOSH, also known as ʺSamuel Gillʺ and ʺWaco,ʺ together with others, while engaged in one or more offenses punishable under Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code, to wit: conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, did knowingly and intentionally conspire to kill and cause the intentional killing of Michael Dawson, also known as ʺNIMʺ and ʺNIMS,ʺ and such killing did result.
(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 848(e)(1)(A); Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3551 et seq.)
Id. at 38. Counts One and Two, in other words, charged defendants with
violating § 848(e)(1)(A) by killing and conspiring to kill Dawson while engaged
in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base under § 841(b)(1)(A).
Neither count, however, alleged that the underlying drug
conspiracy involved at least 280 grams of cocaine base, and thus the superseding
indictment did not allege the factual predicate required under § 841(b)(1)(A) and
§ 848(e)(1)(A). See §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 848(e)(1)(A). There was no statement of
drug quantity as an essential fact constituting the charged offenses and no
language alleging the factual predicate for the penalty provision in § 848(e)(1)(A).
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); Gonzalez, 686 F.3d at 130, 132‐33. The superseding
indictment had to do more than reference §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 848(e)(1)(A) to
allege the essential facts. See Gonzalez, 686 F.3d at 128.
We conclude the failure to allege drug quantity constituted a defect
in Counts One and Two of the superseding indictment.
ii. Plain Error
Although the omissions of drug quantity in the superseding
indictment were error, the errors did not amount to reversible plain error
because they did not affect defendantsʹ substantial rights.
The plain error standard applies because defendants challenge the
deficiencies in the superseding indictment for the first time on appeal. See
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. The trial transcript reflects that after the district court
instructed the jury, defendants drew the courtʹs attention to the failure of the
verdict sheet to allege drug quantities for Counts One and Two, but did not raise
any sufficiency concerns as to the allegations in the superseding indictment.
The defect in the superseding indictment did not affect defendantsʹ
substantial rights. The court instructed the jury with respect to Count One that:
In order to prove the charge in Count One against each defendant the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the following elements with respect to that defendant. First, that the defendant is guilty of either conspiring to distribute or conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base . . . .
. . . .
It is an offense punishable under [21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A)] to engage [in a] conspiracy to either distribute or possess with intention to distribute 280 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base.
What this means is to find that the government has established the first element, you must first determine whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that on the date of Michael Dawsonʹs killing, which was on or about June 22nd, 1994, the defendant was engaged in a conspiracy either to distribute 280 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base or to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base.
Samuel App. 395 (emphasis added). The court also referred to the threshold
quantity of 280 grams of cocaine base three other times in its instructions with
respect to Count One.
The court instructed the jury with respect to Count Two that:
[Count T]wo charges the defendants with conspiring to commit the drug‐ related murder of Michael Dawson . . . Iʹve already instructed you about the elements of drug‐related murder with respect to Count One. That crime is the object of the charged conspiracy. The same instructions apply here, and I will not repeat them. I already explained to you what it means to conspire to commit a crime and what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before you find the defendant guilty of conspiracy. Those same instructions apply here and I need not repeat them.
By way of brief summary, in order to prove that a defendant is guilty in the drug‐related conspiracy to murder Michael Dawson, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
First, that two or more persons knowingly and willfully conspired;
Second, that those persons agreed to commit the unlawful act ascribed in Count One, to wit: the knowing and intentional killing of Michael Dawson while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute [] 280 grams of a substance containing cocaine base . . . .
Id. at 397 (emphasis added). The court then sent the jury to the jury room to
begin its deliberations.
Defendants raised the drug quantity issue only with respect to the
verdict sheet. The court pointed out that it had instructed the jury, several times,
that a defendant could be convicted on Count One or Two only if the jury found
that he conspired to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base. Defendants
responded that the verdict sheet specifically referenced a threshold drug
quantity with respect to Count Three but not Count One or Two, which they
argued could suggest that the jury need not make a finding of drug quantity
with respect to the first two counts. The court noted its own ʺconcern . . . that the
jury reaches the opposite conclusion, that the 280 grams does not have to be
establishedʺ as to Counts One and Two, and decided to orally instruct the jury on
this issue rather than modify the verdict sheet. Id. at 401. The court called the
jury back into the courtroom and instructed:
I just wanted to clarify an issue that might not have been clear from the verdict sheet. Itʹs clear in the courtʹs instructions, but I didnʹt want there to be any confusion on the verdict sheet.
Youʹll see that Counts One and Two do not have any questions about the amount of cocaine base. The reason for that is, in Count One and Two itʹs actually one of the elements of the offense that the conspiracy involved 280 grams or more of cocaine base. Thatʹs an element of the offense on Count One and Two. So I donʹt ask the question. You could not find the defendant ‐‐ any of the defendants guilty of [Count O]ne or [Count T]wo unless you found that that conspiracy in fact involved 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. Thatʹs one of the elements.
So I donʹt ask the question, but it must be a finding that you make to find defendant guilty of Count One or Two, which is different from how Count Three is handled. So I just wanted to clarify that for you.
Id. at 401‐02.
We conclude that the initial jury instructions and subsequent
clarification made it clear to the jury that drug quantity was an element of both
Counts One and Two and that a conviction on either count required a finding
that the defendant killed Dawson while engaged in a conspiracy involving at
least 280 grams of cocaine base. There is no claim or evidence that the jury
disregarded the courtʹs multiple and express instructions about drug quantity,
and so we presume ʺthat [the] jurors remain[ed] true to their oath and
conscientiously observe[d] the instructions and admonitions of the court.ʹʺ
United States v. Esso, 684 F.3d 347, 352 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Rosario, 111 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Accordingly, the omissions of drug quantity in Counts One and Two
of the superseding indictment did not affect defendantsʹ substantial rights and
did not constitute reversible plain error. We affirm the convictions of all three
defendants on Counts One and Two in this respect.
II. The Prior Drug Conspiracy in Maryland
Brian and Samuel challenge the admission of Griggerʹs testimony
under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 with respect to uncharged acts
that they committed in Maryland before any of the charged acts took place.
Before trial, the government moved to admit testimony that in the
early 1990s Brian and Samuel conspired to sell crack cocaine in Maryland, carried
guns, and conspired to kill rival drug dealers. It argued that evidence of the
uncharged crimes was admissible to show how defendants developed
longstanding relationships of trust as brothers and co‐conspirators in drug
trafficking and murder, and to establish their knowledge and intent with respect
to the charged counts.
Shortly before the government elicited the disputed testimony at
trial, and in response to Davidʹs request ʺto talk about Mr. Griggerʺ and address
ʺsome outstanding 404(b) issues,ʺ the court informed the parties that:
I thought that [Griggerʹs testimony] would be admissible both as to knowledge and intent and developed a relationship to the defendants as to one another as well as a relationship to Mr. Grigger and the concern was whether it would have been cumulative. I donʹt see, at least on what I have heard so far, that it in any way would be cumulative so I am inclined to let it in.
Samuel App. 277. The parties and the court discussed the proper scope of cross‐
examination with respect to Griggerʹs criminal history. At the end of the
discussion, Brianʹs counsel clarified with the court:
MR. PAUL: Judge, just so I understand, Your Honor has ruled that testimony regarding Maryland activities prior to the date of Count One and Two concerning a witness with one or more of these defendants in Maryland is going to be permitted?
THE COURT: Yes.
Id. at 281‐82. The court granted Brianʹs and Samuelʹs requests that the record
reflect their continuing objections. The court later referred to its statements as an
evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of Griggerʹs testimony when it explained:
[Grigger] is going to testify about all the similar act evidence that I have said that could be testified about on the theory of the development of relationships, et cetera, knowledge and intent. I donʹt believe any defendant has taken that out of the case here.
The government provided information in terms of 404(b), the evidence I had before in the past, and we donʹt need to completely revisit this, but it was evidence related to establishing trust and relationship among the defendants and the witness, although I recognize [Grigger] wasnʹt involved in Dawsonʹs murder.
As I understand it, in terms of whether the defendants acted knowingly and wil[l]fully in terms of allegations of drug activity, no one has taken that out of the case or has stipulated that out of the case. So, itʹs relevant to those issues, as well. So, all I can say now is, weʹre going to go forward with the evidence.
Govʹt App. 111, 114. In other words, the court admitted Griggerʹs testimony of
the Maryland acts as non‐cumulative evidence of defendantsʹ knowledge, intent,
and relationships with each other.
At trial, the government elicited testimony from Grigger that he,
Brian, and Samuel sold crack cocaine together in northern Baltimore in the early
1990s. The men bought powder cocaine from suppliers in New York, cooked it
into crack cocaine, and stored the crack cocaine in an apartment next to where
they sold the drugs. The three of them had access to guns for protection from
rival drug dealers. One dispute with rival dealers escalated into an armed
standoff, and another dispute resulted in defendants planning to handcuff their
rivals and shoot them in the middle of the woods.
The court instructed the jury in the middle of this testimony that ʺto
the extent I gave you instructions earlier about testimony about drug trafficking
outside of the charged conspiracy itself, again, this testimony ‐‐ the instruction I
gave you before also applies to this testimony, as well.ʺ Samuel App. 286. The
court had previously instructed:
This evidence of a time period earlier than whatʹs charged in the indictment is not a substitute for proof of the crimes charged in the indictment. Itʹs offered for a limited purpose, which is the establishment of a relationship between the witness and defendants. It also can be considered on the issues of the defendantʹs knowledge and intent in engaging in later activity. But it cannot be used simply to conclude because someone did something wrong in an earlier period of time, then they must have done something wrong at a later time.
Id. at 285.
On summation, the government told the jury:
From Grigger, you know that [Brian] and [Samuel] had a history of backing each other up with violence to protect their drug turf, to plan and carry out murders together. They did it in Maryland with Grigger prior to Dawsonʹs murder in the early ʹ90s and they did it again in June 1994 when they killed Dawson. The defendants were ready and willing to murder rival drug dealers when their crack dealing and reputation were at risk.
So why is what Grigger told you about these years in Maryland, a few years before Dawsonʹs murder, important? First, because it shows you that the relationship between [Brian] and [Samuel] went far beyond being brothers. It shows you that at a time before they murdered Dawson, [Brian] and [Samuel] were willing to back each other up with violence, with murder, to protect their own drug turf. They were willing to plan
and carry out murders together. This testimony about Maryland shows you that [Brian] and [Samuel] were ready and willing to murder rival drug dealers when their crack dealing and reputation were at risk.
Id. at 382, 383.
On appeal, Brian and Samuel argue that Griggerʹs testimony should
not have been admitted under Rules 404(b) and 403. We review evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if there is manifest error that
is harmful and affects substantial rights. United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 688
(2d Cir. 2010).
A. Rule 404(b)
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of prior crimes,
wrongs, or acts ʺto prove the defendantʹs propensity to commit the crime
charged.ʺ United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (referring to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(1)). The rule does not bar admission if the evidence is used ʺfor
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or lack of accident.ʺ Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2).
Under our Circuitʹs ʺʹinclusionary approach,ʹ prior act evidence is
admissible if offered ʹfor any purpose other than to show a defendantʹs criminal
propensity.ʹʺ United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002)). The district court can, for
example, ʺadmit evidence of prior acts to inform the jury of the background of
the conspiracy charged, in order to help explain how the illegal relationship
between participants in the crime developed, or to explain the mutual trust that
existed between coconspirators.ʺ Diaz, 176 F.3d at 79 (quoting United States v.
Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993)). The court can also admit evidence of prior
acts as probative of knowledge and intent if the evidence is relevant to the
charged offense, i.e., if there is a similarity or connection between the charged
and uncharged acts. United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 223 (2d Cir. 2006).
ʺTo determine if the court properly admitted prior act evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b), we consider whether: (1) the prior act evidence was
offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence was relevant to a disputed issue;
(3) the probative value of the prior act evidence substantially outweighed the
danger of its unfair prejudice; and (4) the court administered an appropriate
limiting instruction.ʺ Garcia, 291 F.3d at 136.
We conclude that Griggerʹs testimony of Brianʹs and Samuelʹs
participation in the Maryland drug operation was properly admitted under
Rule 404(b). First, the government presented the Maryland testimony, in
compliance with the courtʹs in limine ruling, as probative evidence of defendantsʹ
knowledge of the charged drug‐ and murder‐related acts, their intent to engage
in these acts, and the development of their relationships with each other. The
government offered the evidence for a purpose other than to show criminal
propensity, i.e, for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), and did not characterize
the testimony on summation as evidence of propensity.
Second, contrary to Brianʹs arguments, at trial the parties disputed
the nature of defendantsʹ relationships and their intent to sell drugs together.
Brian claimed he sold drugs as an individual dealer in the ʺfree zoneʺ around the
160 Park Hill building, where it was ʺevery man for himself.ʺ Govʹt App. 40‐41.
Samuel asserted that his relationship with Brian was familial, not criminal, and
did not involve any joint narcotic conduct. The government disagreed and
argued that the three defendants sold drugs together as part of a conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, and that they knew and worked with each other as co‐
conspirators rather than merely as individuals or brothers. The Maryland
testimony was relevant to these disputed issues as probative evidence of
defendantsʹ knowledge, intent, and relationships as to the charged conduct.
Third, the court issued an appropriate limiting instruction during
the testimony and directed the jury to consider the Maryland evidence only as
evidence of knowledge, intent, and the co‐conspiratorsʹ relationships, and not as
propensity evidence or direct proof of the charged acts.
Lastly, the probative value of the Maryland evidence was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. As discussed, the evidence
was probative with respect to the disputed issues of knowledge, intent, and
relationships. There was no undue prejudice because the Maryland acts did not
involve conduct more serious than the crimes charged, and any prejudicial effect
was mitigated by the contemporaneous limiting instruction. See United States v.
Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding there was no undue prejudice
under analogous Rule 403 test because ʺthe evidence did not involve conduct
more serious than the charged crime and the district court gave a proper limiting
instructionʺ).
As a result, Brianʹs and Samuelʹs Rule 404(b) challenge to the
admission of Griggerʹs testimony fails on the merits, and their arguments to the
contrary are unpersuasive. The mere fact that the Maryland acts and the charged
conduct did not involve exactly the same co‐conspirators, cocaine amounts, sales
locations, or temporal timelines does not overcome the similarity between the
two sets of acts or render Griggerʹs testimony insufficiently relevant or probative.
The government did not refer to the testimony as propensity evidence during its
summation. Any concerns about the reliability of Griggerʹs testimony could
have been addressed on cross‐examination and, in any event, witness credibility
is not a consideration in this admissibility analysis. See Garcia, 291 F.3d at 136
(describing the Rule 404(b) analysis).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Griggerʹs testimony of the Maryland acts under Rule 404(b).
B. Rule 403
Rule 403 allows a court to ʺexclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 403. While ʺʹa mechanical recitation of the Rule 403
analysis is not required,ʹ . . . ʹthe district court must make a ʹconscientious
assessmentʹ of whether unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative
value.ʹʺ United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992), and then quoting United States v.
Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).
Although the district court could have conducted a more explicit
analysis of the Rule 403 balancing test, there was no harmful error because, as
discussed, Griggerʹs testimony was probative as to disputed, relevant issues and
was not unduly prejudicial in light of the similarity of the conduct and the
contemporaneous limiting instruction. See Williams, 205 F.3d at 34.
Accordingly, we affirm the evidentiary ruling admitting Griggerʹs
testimony of the Maryland acts.
III. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
All three defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Brian, David, and Samuel contend, with respect to Counts One and Two, that
there was insufficient evidence that they engaged in the underlying drug
conspiracy at all, much less one involving at least 280 grams of cocaine base, or
that they shot at Dawson in furtherance of such a conspiracy. Brian and David
raise sufficiency challenges to their convictions on Count Three for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, arguing that the trial evidence at most showed that they
individually participated in a series of drug sales, not that they conspired with
others to buy or sell cocaine.
ʺWe review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de novo, and
will uphold a conviction if ʹany rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʹʺ Rosemond, 841 F.3d
at 113 (quoting United States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016)). In
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ʺview the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been
drawn in the governmentʹs favor, and deferring to the juryʹs assessment of
witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.ʺ Id. (quoting
United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)). A defendant asserting a
sufficiency challenge ʺbears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is
exceedingly deferential.ʺ United States v. Brock, 789 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Coplan, 703 F.3d at 62).
A. Counts One and Two
To prove a drug conspiracy, the government must show that the
defendant knew the conspiracy existed, intentionally joined it with specific intent
to commit the object of the conspiracy, and knew or could reasonably foresee
that the conspiracy involved the alleged quantity and type of drugs. United
States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 515‐16 (2d Cir. 2015); Santos, 541 F.3d at 70‐71.
Circumstantial evidence that the defendant associated with co‐conspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy can be sufficient for conviction. United States v.
Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 292‐93 (2d Cir. 2002). ʺ[T]he government need not show
that the defendant knew all of the details of the conspiracy, so long as he knew
its general nature and extent.ʺ United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008)).
To prove that a defendant killed or conspired to kill in furtherance
of a drug conspiracy, the government must establish that ʺone motive for the
killing (or conspiracy to kill) was related to the drug conspiracy,ʺ but it need not
ʺestablish that [the] drug‐related motive was the sole purpose, the primary
purpose, or even that it was equally as important as any non‐drug‐related
purpose.ʺ United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2008).
Thus, the issue here is whether the evidence was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that the three defendants each participated in a
conspiracy to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base and was motivated by
this conspiracy to kill Dawson on June 22, 1994. We conclude that there was, and
affirm all three defendantsʹ convictions on Counts One and Two.
There was sufficient evidence at trial that Brian, David, and Samuel
knowingly and intentionally participated in the underlying drug conspiracy to
distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine in 1994. First, Lewis testified that starting
in April 1994, he and Brian sold crack cocaine every day in the 160 Park Hill area
and had access to guns for protection. They bought 125 grams of powder
cocaine, which yielded 120 to 121 grams of crack cocaine, every three to four
days and sold it to customers. They began selling cocaine in rotating shifts after
a few weeks. Second, rival dealer Paul Ford testified that both David and
Samuel sold crack cocaine at or around 160 Park Hill in the 1990s. Third, there
was testimony that Brian, David, and Samuel violently confronted Dawson after
he began selling cocaine at 160 Park Hill over Brianʹs objections.
Thus, there was evidence that (1) Brian ran a drug‐selling operation
at 160 Park Hill involving at least 280 grams of cocaine base, (2) Brian protected
this area from other drug dealers, (3) David and Samuel also sold crack cocaine
in the area, and (4) David and Samuel helped Brian confront Dawson for selling
cocaine at 160 Park Hill. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that David and Samuel each knew about Brianʹs conspiracy to sell crack
cocaine at 160 Park Hill, joined the conspiracy to sell crack cocaine, and knew or
should have known that the conspiracy involved at least 280 grams of cocaine
base. See Santos, 541 F.3d at 70‐71.
There was also sufficient evidence for a jury to find that each of the
three defendants killed, and conspired to kill, Dawson while motivated by a
desire to further this drug conspiracy. As discussed, there was testimony that
Brian did not want Dawson selling crack cocaine at 160 Park Hill and that David
and Samuel helped Brian violently confront Dawson for selling cocaine there.
On June 22, 1994, David tried to block Lewisʹs and Dawsonʹs drug sales at 160
Park Hill, and both David and Samuel stood next to Brian during his armed
standoff with Dawson. Samuel later pulled out a gun and shot Dawson after
they competed for the same sale. Samuel then grabbed Brian and David, who
both approached Dawson and fired guns in his direction. A jury could have
found that each defendant shot at Dawson and conspired to kill him for reasons
related to the underlying conspiracy involving at least 280 grams of cocaine base.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Brian, David, and Samuel each killed, and conspired to kill, Dawson in
furtherance of a drug conspiracy to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base.
B. Count Three
Brian and David were also convicted of conspiracy to distribute at
least 280 grams of cocaine base between 2011 and 2013. First, there was
testimony that Brian sold cocaine with Lewis in the 160 Park Hill area every day
from March 2011 to November 2011, and that they replenished their supply by
buying 10 to 30 grams of cocaine about twice a week. In 2012, Brian bought three
batches of powder cocaine ‐‐ 950 grams in total ‐‐ on consignment and at least
seven batches of cocaine ‐‐ ranging from 20 to 50 grams each ‐‐ with payments
upfront. Brian also worked with Lewis in 2012 to buy and sell over 100 grams of
cocaine to customers. Second, there was testimony that David sold crack cocaine
at 160 Park Hill in 2012 and 2013 as well, and that he assumed a larger role in the
drug operation after Brianʹs arrest by managing the ʺdrug phoneʺ that Brian used
to contact customers. Samuel App. 240.
We conclude there was ample evidence that Brian knowingly and
intentionally participated in a conspiracy to distribute at least 280 grams of crack
cocaine between 2011 and 2013. There was also sufficient evidence to support a
jury finding that David knew about this conspiracy, joined the conspiracy with
intent to help Brian sell crack cocaine in the 160 Park Hill area, and knew or
should have known that at least 280 grams of crack cocaine were involved.
Accordingly, we affirm Brianʹs and Davidʹs convictions on Count Three.
IV. Statements Against Penal Interest
David and Samuel argue that Dawsonʹs testimony that defendants
beat and robbed him was improperly admitted as a statement against penal
interest. Samuel additionally asserts that the court erred in admitting Griggerʹs
testimony that Brian made a statement against penal interest to Grigger when
they were in prison together in 2013.
We review a decision to admit testimony as a statement against
penal interest for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 128 (2d
Cir. 2014). Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) permits the admission of a
statement against an unavailable declarantʹs penal interest if the statement, when
made, had so great a tendency to expose the declarant to criminal liability that a
reasonable person in his position would have made the statement only if he
believed it to be true, and corroborating evidence clearly indicates the
trustworthiness of the statement. Id. at 127 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)).
First, the court conducts ʺan adequately particularized analysis,ʺ id.
(quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004)), to determine
ʺwhether ʹa reasonable person in the declarantʹs shoes would [have] perceive[d]
the statement as detrimental to his or her own penal interestʹ . . . ʹin light of all
the surrounding circumstances,ʹʺ id. (quoting Saget, 377 F.3d at 231, and then
quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994)). The statement
ʺʹ[need] not have been sufficient, standing alone, to convict [the declarant] of any
crime,ʹ so long as it would have been ʹprobativeʹ in a criminal case against him.ʺ
Id. (quoting United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 102 (2d Cir. 2011)). Second, the
court looks for ʺcorroborating circumstances indicating ʹboth the declarantʹs
trustworthiness and the truth of the statement.ʹʺ Id. (quoting United States v.
Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 1999)). There must be a ʺstrong, [and] not
merely allowable,ʺ inference of trustworthiness. Id. (quoting United States v.
Salvador, 820 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir. 1987)).
A. Dawsonʹs Statements
Ford testified at trial that Dawson told him before the murder that
Brian ʺand his brothers had broke[n] into [Dawsonʹs] car and stole[n] his drugs
and his money and they had beat him up.ʺ Samuel App. 116.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dawsonʹs
statement as a statement against penal interest. Dawson was deceased and
unavailable to testify. A reasonable person in his position would have perceived
the statement as against his penal interest because it implicated him in drug
activity, and he would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. Two circumstances in particular suggested the statementʹs trustworthiness:
first, that Dawson uttered it to Ford, ʺa person whom the declarant believe[d
was] an ally,ʺ and second, that, in making it, Dawson ʺdoes not appear to have
been attempting to shift criminal culpability from himself.ʺ Saget, 377 F.3d at 230.
In addition, a strong inference of truth arose from evidence that Brian was
prepared to use violence to protect the drug operation at 160 Park Hill from rival
dealers, Brian disliked that Dawson had started selling cocaine in the area, and
David and Samuel both sold crack cocaine for and were involved in this scheme.
The admission of Dawsonʹs statement was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Davidʹs arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Dawsonʹs
statement was self‐inculpatory because it referred to his drug activity. The fact
that Dawson referred to David and Samuel as Brianʹs brothers, rather than
individually by name, does not reflect a lack of personal knowledge that would
bar admission of this evidence. Any concerns with witness credibility could
have been addressed in cross‐examination of Ford or closing arguments. See
United States v. Cacace, 796 F.3d 176, 192 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion and we affirm the
decision to admit Fordʹs testimony of Dawsonʹs statement against penal interest.
B. Brianʹs Statements
At trial, Grigger recounted statements that Brian made to him while
they were incarcerated at the same facility in 2013. Grigger stated that Brian told
him about a conversation that Brian had with Samuel in Staten Island in 2011 or
2012, when Brian expressed concern that Lewis was still alive. Grigger testified:
[Brian] said that he was with [Samuel] and him and [Samuel] were talking and while they were together, he saw [Lewis]. [Brian] asked [Samuel] why are they still breathing, why is [Lewis] and him still alive. And [Samuel] responded, saying that [Brian] was you know, bugging out. No one was worried about that, that was a long time ago.
Samuel App. 321. Grigger asked Brian to elaborate and understood from his
statements that (1) Brian singled Lewis out because Lewis was at the scene when
Dawson was shot, (2) Brian asked Samuel why ʺ[Lewis] or anyone else who may
have been there that night [had not] los[t] their [sic] life for that particular
reason,ʺ and (3) Samuel responded that Brian was overreacting because nobody
was worried about the shootings. Id.
The district court acted within its discretion in admitting Griggerʹs
testimony of Brianʹs statements. Brian, as a defendant, was an unavailable
declarant because he did not testify at trial. See United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d
95, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). His statements, taken in context, were against his penal
interest because they described his concern when he found out that Lewis, a
witness to the shootings, was still alive. A reasonable person would have made
these statements only if he believed them to be true. Brianʹs statements bear
indicia of trustworthiness because he was speaking with his brother Samuel, an
ally, when he made them and he did not attempt in the statements to shift blame
for Dawsonʹs murder away from himself. See Saget, 377 F.3d at 230. Moreover,
the government presented corroborating evidence of the truth of the statements,
including testimony that (1) Brian shot in Dawsonʹs direction shortly after
Samuel shot Dawson and (2) Lewis saw Brian run outside, heard gunshots, and
found Dawson bleeding in the street, that created a strong inference of
trustworthiness and truth.
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion and we affirm the decision to
admit Griggerʹs testimony of Brianʹs statements against penal interest.
V. Perjury
David asserts, for the first time, that Ford committed perjury when
he testified that he saw David selling crack cocaine around 160 Park Hill in the
early 1990s. David declares that Ford could not have seen him selling crack
cocaine because, as his rap sheets show, he was incarcerated during this period.
Davidʹs rap sheets, however, do not support this perjury claim. His
rap sheets instead establish that he was arrested in July 1990, incarcerated in
January 1991, and released in November 1993. He was arrested again in January
1994 and March 1994 on separate offenses. The state court issued a bench
warrant for his arrest in April 1994 but vacated the warrant in January 1995.
Because the rap sheets do not reflect a continuous period of incarceration and
because David raises no other arguments to substantiate his claim, we decline to
vacate his convictions on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgments of the district court
are AFFIRMED.