United States v. Garcia

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1370 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 5, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-1370 (D.C. No. 1:25-CR-00163-DDD-11) ERIKA ESMERALDA GARCIA, (D. Colo.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

A grand jury in the District of Colorado indicted Erika Esmeralda Garcia on

three charges: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; possession with intent to

distribute fentanyl and aiding and abetting the distribution of fentanyl, in violation of

§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Ms. Garcia appeals the district court’s pretrial

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1370 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2

detention order. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we reverse.

I. LAW GOVERNING PRETRIAL DETENTION

The Bail Reform Act allows pretrial detention only if “no condition or

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as

required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(e)(1). The detention decision must account for four factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense . . . involves . . . a controlled substance; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person . . . ; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.

Id. § 3142(g).

If the court finds there is probable cause to believe that the defendant

committed certain enumerated offenses, including, as here, an offense under the

Controlled Substances Act that carries a maximum sentence of ten years or more,

there is a presumption that no conditions will reasonably assure her appearance and

community safety. See id. § 3142(e)(3)(A). The defendant may rebut that

presumption by producing “some evidence” that she is not a flight risk and that she

does not pose a danger to the community. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353,

1355 (10th Cir. 1991). Even if the defendant rebuts it, the presumption remains a

factor in the court’s detention decision. Id. at 1355. The government must prove

flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence, and it “must prove dangerousness to

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any other person or to the community by clear and convincing evidence.” United

States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003).

II. BACKGROUND

After the grand jury indicted Ms. Garcia, the probation office filed a pretrial

services report, which recommended her pretrial release with conditions. The

government argued for pretrial detention. After a hearing, a magistrate judge ordered

that Ms. Garcia be detained pending trial. She appealed, and, after reviewing the

matter de novo, the district court upheld the magistrate judge’s detention order.

The district court determined Ms. Garcia’s controlled-substance charges

triggered the presumption that release conditions could not reasonably assure her

appearance or community safety. It then found that each of the four § 3142(g)

factors weighed in favor of detention. Ultimately, the district court said that, given

those factors, no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure

Ms. Garcia’s appearance at trial. It therefore concluded the government had proved

by a preponderance of the evidence that she poses a flight risk necessitating pretrial

detention. Ms. Garcia timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

“[W]e accept the district court’s findings of historical fact . . . unless they are

clearly erroneous.” Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 613. We review de novo the district

court’s application of the law to the facts, including the ultimate detention decision.

See id.

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A. Nature and Circumstances of the Charged Offenses

In determining the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses weighed

“strongly in favor of detention,” the district court said “[t]hese charges involve

controlled substances that contain fentanyl and, more importantly, a significant

amount (8,128 pills).” Aplt. App. vol. I at 89. The court recognized that the charges

“have the potential for a mandatory sentence.” Id. And the possibility of “a very

long sentence,” the court explained, “could encourage flight from justice.” Id. We

agree that this factor favors detention.

B. Weight of the Evidence

The district court concluded “the weight of the evidence against [Ms. Garcia]

is heavy.” Id. Although she “disputes the significance of her role in the charged

crimes,” the court said, “significant evidence supports a finding she engaged in

activities to support the drug trafficking efforts of her codefendants and laundered the

proceeds.” Id. In evaluating this factor, the court highlighted a wiretapped phone

call and found that “wiretaps on [Ms. Garcia]’s phone . . . indicate she alerted

codefendants that a large cache of drugs and weapons were confiscated at her home.”

Id. Ms. Garcia argues that this finding was clearly erroneous. We agree.

At the detention hearing before the magistrate judge, the government proffered

that after her apartment was searched, Ms. Garcia called a codefendant to tell him

“that someone had broken into the apartment.” Id. at 19. When the codefendant

“asked if the things had been taken,” Ms. Garcia “responded that she didn’t know and

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needed him to come over.” Id. The record does not support the finding that

Ms. Garcia told her codefendants that the drugs and weapons were taken.

Once we set aside the clearly erroneous finding, the remaining evidence

against Ms. Garcia does not weigh in favor of detention. That is not to say there is

no evidence against her. As the government highlights, Ms. Garcia expressed no

doubt about what “things” her codefendant referred to in their phone call, permitting

an inference that she may have known about the drugs and weapons in her home.

The government also points to evidence that Ms. Garcia transferred money to a

codefendant (her boyfriend). But although the government has identified some

evidence against Ms. Garcia, it is not so strong that it will likely motivate her to flee.

We therefore conclude that the weight of the evidence favors release.

C. History and Characteristics

The district court said Ms. Garcia’s history and characteristics presented a

“close call” but ultimately weighed in favor of detention. Id. at 90. The court found

Ms. Garcia’s “significant ties to the United States, including three daughters and

siblings who live in Colorado, as well as her father in Ohio and mother in Texas”

weighed “in her favor.” Id. But it found “having two sisters who reside in Mexico,”

and “a father who travels there and back often,” favored detention. It also found

Ms. Garcia’s own travel to Mexico within the last year weighed in favor of detention.

The district court then said, “These facts support the government’s position that

absconding to Mexico is a serious risk in [Ms. Garcia]’s case, especially where loss

of residency status and deportation are the likely result of a conviction.” Id.

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Ms. Garcia argues the district court was wrong to rely on evidence of her

father’s frequent travel to Mexico. She asserts that because her father lives in a

different state, his travels offer “no insight as to her own ties to either the Mexican or

American community” or “her own travel patterns.” Aplt. Mem. Br. at 14. We

disagree. Her father’s frequent travel to Mexico suggests that her family has ties to

that country. That remains true even though she and her father live in different

states.

Ms. Garcia also argues the district court erred in finding the possibility that

she could lose her immigration status and be removed from the country supported its

flight-risk determination. In support, she cites United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d

1334 (10th Cir. 2017). But in that case, we held only that the word “flee,” as used in

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), does not include involuntary removal. See Ailon-Ailon,

875 F.3d at 1337. 1 Here, the district court did not find that Ms. Garcia’s risk of

involuntary removal created a flight risk. Instead, the district court considered the

possibility that Ms. Garcia might voluntarily leave the country before trial to avoid,

among other things, the risk of losing her status as a lawful permanent resident and

being involuntarily removed from the country if convicted. The district court was not

wrong to consider this possibility in its overall assessment of Ms. Garcia’s history

and characteristics.

Section 3142(f)(2)(A) is not at issue here; it provides that if a case involves 1

“a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee,” the government or the court can initiate a pretrial detention hearing. 6 Appellate Case: 25-1370 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7

Although we discern no clear error in the district court’s factual findings

related to Ms. Garcia’s history and characteristics, we disagree with its conclusion

that this factor favors detention. The district court was not required to explicitly

mention every piece of evidence, but we are troubled by its failure to acknowledge

most of the compelling character evidence in Ms. Garcia’s favor. She has no

criminal record, no history of drug or alcohol abuse, and no gang affiliation. She has

a stable employment history and strong community ties, as evidenced by the letter

from her employer and the numerous character letters from her friends and family

members. Ms. Garcia also has strong family ties in Colorado—she lives with and

financially supports her youngest daughter, and she has two adult daughters and a

sister who live nearby. These positive equities significantly outweigh the evidence

that Ms. Garcia poses a flight risk. The third factor thus cuts strongly in favor of

release.

D. Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Release

The district court determined Ms. Garcia’s release posed a risk of danger to the

community, explaining that “[her] residence was the epicenter of the government’s

confiscation effort, which included large quantities of drugs (8,128 fentanyl pills,

27.9 grams of methamphetamine, 285.7 grams of heroin, 471.6 grams of cocaine) and

illegal firearms (two ghost guns and a stolen gun).” Aplt. App. vol. I at 90–91. The

court further noted that the evidence of Ms. Garcia’s involvement “in the alleged

drug trafficking operation and money laundering” was sufficient to show that her

release posed a risk of danger to the community. Id. at 91.

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We reach the opposite conclusion. Ms. Garcia’s lack of criminal history

indicates that her release would not endanger the community. Her personal

characteristics, including her employment history and strong family and community

ties, also undercut the idea that she poses a danger to the community. We therefore

conclude that this factor weighs in favor of release.

⃰ ⃰ ⃰

“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial

is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755

(1987). Detention is unwarranted in Ms. Garcia’s case because three of the four

§ 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of her release, and we have no doubt that there are

release conditions that can reasonably assure her appearance at trial.

IV. DISPOSITION

We reverse the district court’s pretrial detention order. We remand for the

district court to order Ms. Garcia’s release pending trial and conduct further

proceedings to impose appropriate release conditions. We grant the motion to seal

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam

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No. 25-1370, United States v. Garcia Dissent, filed per curiam.

I would affirm the detention order because I agree with the district court’s

conclusion that each of the four § 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of detention.

Regarding the weight-of-the-evidence factor, although the record does not support

the finding that Ms. Garcia told her codefendants that the drugs and weapons were taken,

the evidence against her is strong. Investigators found a significant quantity of drugs—

8,128 fentanyl pills, 27.9 grams of methamphetamine, 285.7 grams of heroin, and 471.6

grams of cocaine—in Ms. Garcia’s apartment. Aplt. App. vol. I at 19. They also found

two AR-style ghost guns, extended rifle magazines, drug packaging, and “suspected drug

ledgers” there. Id. The government also proffered that Ms. Garcia transferred money to

her codefendant from “her cash app, her First Bank account, another First Bank account

. . . , and her Zelle account.” Id. at 34. Additionally, the government proffered evidence

of a call between Ms. Garcia and the same codefendant from the day before the

search. In that call, the codefendant told Ms. Garcia he was “coming over to hustle at the

house” and said “I still have time to do the things I have pending there. Be on the

lookout. If anything, let me know. Be aware because they are going to be doing transfers

in a bit.” Id. at 34. Therefore, in my view, the weight of the evidence against Ms. Garcia

favors detention.

And while the district court did not explicitly mention some of Ms. Garcia’s

positive equities, such as her lack of criminal history, I have no doubt that it considered

them because it found the history-and-characteristics factor presented “a close call.” Id. Appellate Case: 25-1370 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10

at 90. The district court was not required to explicitly mention every piece of

evidence. Cf. United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating, in

the sentencing context, “We do not require a ritualistic incantation to establish

consideration of a legal issue, nor do we demand that the district court recite any magic

words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that

Congress has instructed it to consider.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). I agree with

the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Garcia’s history and characteristics present a close

call but ultimately weigh in favor of detention.

Ms. Garcia’s lack of criminal history and other positive equities may lessen her

risk of danger to the community, but I would nevertheless conclude that the fourth factor

favors detention for the same reasons employed by the district court.