Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 31, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-6023 (D.C. No. 5:21-CR-00085-HE-1) DONELL LAMONT FRASER, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Donell Fraser, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district
court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion
that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors don’t warrant relief, and we reject Fraser’s
claims of procedural error. We therefore affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 1 We construe Fraser’s pro se brief liberally, “but we do not act as his advocate.” United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019). Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 2
Background
In 2021, Fraser pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on a total offense
level of 29 (which included a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility)
and a criminal-history category of VI, the district court set Fraser’s sentencing range
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines) at 151 to
188 months. But the court varied downward and sentenced Fraser to 120 months.
In the fall of 2024, Fraser filed a pro se motion for compassionate release. As
extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying relief, Fraser cited his father’s
deteriorating health, his own medical problems, and his policy disagreement with
how the Guidelines punish the possession of actual methamphetamine. In further
support, he noted his rehabilitation and remorse, as well as his strong family support.
On November 7, the district court ordered the government to respond within
21 days. The government filed its response on December 2, disputing the existence of
extraordinary and compelling reasons and arguing that Fraser wasn’t entitled to relief
based on the nature of his offense, his conduct in prison, and his criminal history.
Later in December, Fraser submitted a change-of-address letter to the district
court. In the letter, he noted that despite receiving the district court’s order directing
the government to file a response, he had not received the government’s response.
On February 6, 2025, the district court denied Fraser’s motion for
compassionate release, reasoning that even if Fraser could show extraordinary and
2 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 3
compelling reasons via his father’s health, the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in
favor of early release.
Fraser appeals.
Analysis
“We review a district court’s order denying relief on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect
conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits the district court to grant a sentence reduction
if: (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons support the reduction; (2) the reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors support
the reduction. 2 United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2021).
“[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three
prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the
others.” Id. at 1043 (quoting United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
2021)).
Here, the district court addressed two of the three prongs. On extraordinary
and compelling reasons, it rejected Fraser’s own medical conditions and his policy
2 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires a defendant to exhaust administrative remedies. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1030. The government conceded below that Fraser met that requirement, so we do not discuss it further. 3 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 4
disagreement with the Guidelines but determined that Fraser “made a plausible
argument” about his father’s deteriorating health. R. vol. 1, 176; see also U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3) (describing extraordinary and compelling family circumstances).
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant a
sentence reduction, citing Fraser’s “lengthy criminal record,” which includes both
violent convictions and prior drug convictions, and his “lengthy history of substance
abuse and of mental[-]health concerns.” R. vol. 1, 177. The court additionally noted
that Fraser “ha[d] served less than half of the sentence imposed by the court,” which
was particularly noteworthy “against the backdrop of the downward variance he
initially received.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that a reduction was not warranted
in light of the need for Fraser’s sentence to reflect the “seriousness of the offense, [to
provide] just punishment[ and] necessary deterrence, and . . . to protect the public
from the risk of further crimes.” Id.; see also § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).
Challenging this assessment on appeal, Fraser initially faults the district court
for relying in part on his prior downward variance. 3 But the overall length of a
sentence is a critical component of § 3553(a)(2)’s mandate that “the sentence
imposed . . . reflect the seriousness of the offense, . . . provide just punishment for
the offense,” deter criminal conduct, and “protect the public.” So the district court
3 Fraser relatedly contends that the district court erred by considering his prior offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Yet we see no discussion of that point in the district court’s compassionate-release order. At most, the district court noted as a matter of background that Fraser received a downward “variance based principally on [his] efforts at cooperation.” R. vol. 1, 175. 4 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 5
did not abuse its discretion by factoring in, as a matter of “backdrop,” R. vol.
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Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 31, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-6023 (D.C. No. 5:21-CR-00085-HE-1) DONELL LAMONT FRASER, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Donell Fraser, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district
court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion
that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors don’t warrant relief, and we reject Fraser’s
claims of procedural error. We therefore affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 1 We construe Fraser’s pro se brief liberally, “but we do not act as his advocate.” United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019). Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 2
Background
In 2021, Fraser pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on a total offense
level of 29 (which included a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility)
and a criminal-history category of VI, the district court set Fraser’s sentencing range
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines) at 151 to
188 months. But the court varied downward and sentenced Fraser to 120 months.
In the fall of 2024, Fraser filed a pro se motion for compassionate release. As
extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying relief, Fraser cited his father’s
deteriorating health, his own medical problems, and his policy disagreement with
how the Guidelines punish the possession of actual methamphetamine. In further
support, he noted his rehabilitation and remorse, as well as his strong family support.
On November 7, the district court ordered the government to respond within
21 days. The government filed its response on December 2, disputing the existence of
extraordinary and compelling reasons and arguing that Fraser wasn’t entitled to relief
based on the nature of his offense, his conduct in prison, and his criminal history.
Later in December, Fraser submitted a change-of-address letter to the district
court. In the letter, he noted that despite receiving the district court’s order directing
the government to file a response, he had not received the government’s response.
On February 6, 2025, the district court denied Fraser’s motion for
compassionate release, reasoning that even if Fraser could show extraordinary and
2 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 3
compelling reasons via his father’s health, the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in
favor of early release.
Fraser appeals.
Analysis
“We review a district court’s order denying relief on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect
conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits the district court to grant a sentence reduction
if: (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons support the reduction; (2) the reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors support
the reduction. 2 United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2021).
“[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three
prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the
others.” Id. at 1043 (quoting United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
2021)).
Here, the district court addressed two of the three prongs. On extraordinary
and compelling reasons, it rejected Fraser’s own medical conditions and his policy
2 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires a defendant to exhaust administrative remedies. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1030. The government conceded below that Fraser met that requirement, so we do not discuss it further. 3 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 4
disagreement with the Guidelines but determined that Fraser “made a plausible
argument” about his father’s deteriorating health. R. vol. 1, 176; see also U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3) (describing extraordinary and compelling family circumstances).
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant a
sentence reduction, citing Fraser’s “lengthy criminal record,” which includes both
violent convictions and prior drug convictions, and his “lengthy history of substance
abuse and of mental[-]health concerns.” R. vol. 1, 177. The court additionally noted
that Fraser “ha[d] served less than half of the sentence imposed by the court,” which
was particularly noteworthy “against the backdrop of the downward variance he
initially received.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that a reduction was not warranted
in light of the need for Fraser’s sentence to reflect the “seriousness of the offense, [to
provide] just punishment[ and] necessary deterrence, and . . . to protect the public
from the risk of further crimes.” Id.; see also § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).
Challenging this assessment on appeal, Fraser initially faults the district court
for relying in part on his prior downward variance. 3 But the overall length of a
sentence is a critical component of § 3553(a)(2)’s mandate that “the sentence
imposed . . . reflect the seriousness of the offense, . . . provide just punishment for
the offense,” deter criminal conduct, and “protect the public.” So the district court
3 Fraser relatedly contends that the district court erred by considering his prior offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Yet we see no discussion of that point in the district court’s compassionate-release order. At most, the district court noted as a matter of background that Fraser received a downward “variance based principally on [his] efforts at cooperation.” R. vol. 1, 175. 4 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 5
did not abuse its discretion by factoring in, as a matter of “backdrop,” R. vol. 1, 177,
Fraser’s initial downward-variant sentence. See United States v. Wilson, No. 20-1324,
2021 WL 4859690, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (unpublished) (finding no abuse of
discretion in district court’s assessment “that granting relief would amount to a
drastic reduction” of defendant’s sentence not appropriate under § 3553(a)(2)(A)
(cleaned up)); United States v. Bischof, No. 22-6140, 2023 WL 1788053, at *3 (10th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2023) (unpublished) (same). 4
Fraser next emphasizes his disagreement with how the Guidelines treat pure
methamphetamine. To be sure, some district courts agree with Fraser. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pereda, No. 18-cr-00228, 2019 WL 463027, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 6,
2019) (unpublished) (explaining that “a growing number of district courts have found
that the Guideline[s] ranges for offenses involving actual/pure methamphetamine . . .
are not based on empirical data and national experience, and thus do not exemplify
the [Sentencing] Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role”). But
the district court here was “unpersuaded.” R. vol. 1, 176 n.2. And as the government
asserts, “[a]greeing with the [G]uidelines’ policy choice is not an abuse of discretion,
even when other judges have disagreed with that policy choice.” Aplee. Br. 13–14;
see also United States v. Velasquez-Aguilera, 842 F. App’x 286, 290–91 (10th Cir.
2021) (“[Al]though sentencing courts are allowed to deviate from the Guidelines
4 We cite these and other unpublished cases for their persuasiveness. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 5 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 6
based on policy considerations, they are not required to do so simply because other
judges . . . have.”).
Next, Fraser contends that the district court placed too much weight on his
criminal history and not enough on his rehabilitation efforts, violating Pepper v.
United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011). But Pepper merely held that a sentencing court
“may consider evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation.” Id. at 481
(emphasis added). It did not hold that a district court is required to do so. Id. at 505
n.17 (noting that Court “d[id] not mean to imply that a district court must reduce a
defendant’s sentence upon any showing of postsentencing rehabilitation” (emphasis
added)). And to the extent that Fraser faults the district court for placing too much
weight on his criminal history and not enough on his rehabilitation efforts and family
circumstances, “reweighing the factors is beyond the ambit of our review.” United
States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 2020).
As a final matter, we reject Fraser’s two procedural arguments. First, contrary
to Fraser’s position, the government’s December 2 response was timely. Even though
the 21-day deadline fell on November 28, that was the Thanksgiving holiday, and the
district court was closed both that day and the next, as well as over the following
weekend. See U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. Okla., Court Closed—Thanksgiving Day
Holiday, https://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/event/court-closed-thanksgiving-day-
holiday-1 [https://perma.cc/8WCT-FPNU] (last visited Oct. 20, 2025); U.S. Dist. Ct.,
W. Dist. Okla., Court Closed—Thanksgiving Day Holiday,
https://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/event/court-closed-thanksgiving-day-holiday-2
6 Appellate Case: 25-6023 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2025 Page: 7
[https://perma.cc/S4ZK-XNYC] (last visited Oct. 20, 2025). Thus, the government
timely filed its response on Monday, December 2, “the next day that [wa]s not a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(C).
Second, Fraser argues that the district court deprived him of the opportunity to
file a reply brief by failing to send him a copy of the government’s response. But
under the applicable local rules, reply briefs are permitted only with leave from the
court. See W.D. Okla. Crim. R. 12.1(c); United States v. Hammons, No. 22-6044,
2022 WL 3681254, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2022) (unpublished) (suggesting that the
Western District of Oklahoma’s local rules did not permit defendant to file a reply
brief in support of his compassionate-release motion). And although Fraser alerted
the court that he hadn’t received the government’s response, he never asked the
district court for leave to file a reply.
Conclusion
Finding no abuse of discretion and no procedural errors, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge