BEAM, Circuit Judge.
After a jury trial, Frank McCaster was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). He appeals the district court’s2 denial of his motion to suppress evidence and to suppress statements. We affirm.
[932]*932I. BACKGROUND
Frank McCaster lived in a duplex at 3326 Penn Avenue North in Minneapolis. Pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing a search of his apartment, “including garages, outbuildings and curtilage,”3 police officers searched McCaster’s apartment. They found a small quantity of crack cocaine in a ceramic statue in the apartment. They also searched a hall closet in a common area at the back of the duplex. The closet was shared by the other tenant of the duplex. The officers found over six grams of crack cocaine in the closet.
After the drugs were found, the officers informed McCaster that he was under arrest and asked him to cooperate. After giving a Miranda warning, the officers questioned McCaster. He waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement that was recorded on audiotape. McCaster admitted that the crack cocaine, including that found in the closet, belonged to him. He further admitted that, although the crack cocaine found in the ceramic statue was for his personal consumption, he intended to sell the crack cocaine found in the closet. After the recorded interview, McCaster agreed to cooperate regarding his supplier. Based on that representation, McCaster was not taken into custody but was allowed to attend his son’s out-of-town football game that weekend. When it later became clear that he would not cooperate with the police, he was arrested.
Before trial, McCaster moved to suppress the crack cocaine seized from the closet and to suppress his statement. He contended that the search of the closet was not authorized by the search warrant and that his statement was the result of improper police coercion and was thus involuntary. After a hearing on the motions to suppress, the magistrate judge recommended that they be denied. The magistrate judge found that the search warrant authorized search of the closet as “curti-lage.” He further found that, even if the search warrant did not adequately describe the area, the evidence was nonetheless admissible since the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. The magistrate judge also found no evidence of improper coercion by the officers, and thus found McCaster’s statement admissible. Over McCaster’s objection, the district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.
McCaster was tried by a jury and convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ incarceration, finding the government had shown that he possessed over six grams of crack cocaine. On appeal, McCaster challenges the admission of the crack cocaine seized from the closet and the admission of his statement. He contends the district court erred in finding that the search warrant authorized search of the closet and in finding that his statement was voluntary.
II. DISCUSSION
McCaster argues that the closet does not fall within the definition of “curtilage,” authorized to be searched in the warrant. He contends that historical definitions of curtilage are not applicable in the context of urban, apartment-style living. We need not decide whether common areas of a multi-unit dwelling are always included in the term “curtilage,” for we find that whatever the modern-day urban equivalent of curtilage, the evidence found in the hall closet was properly admitted in this case. If the closet is within the apartment’s cur-tilage, the warrant specifically authorizes the search. If the closet is not part of the apartment’s curtilage, McCaster has shown no expectation of privacy to give him standing to challenge the search and [933]*933the admission of the evidence found therein.
We may affirm the judgment on any grounds supported by the record, even if not relied on by the district court. See Monterey Development Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1993). Assuming for the sake of argument that the area is not curtilage, and thus not covered by the warrant, to challenge the constitutionality of the search, McCaster must demonstrate that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched. See United States v. Nabors, 761 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir.1985). Fourth Amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted. See id. In order to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises, the person challenging the search has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation' of privacy and that the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one that society is willing to accept. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (recognizing that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Several factors are relevant to this showing: whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469. We have rejected the notion of a generalized expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. See United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.1984).
Our review of the record shows that McCaster has failed to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hall closet. His assertion that the closet is not within the curtilage of his apartment undermines his assertion of an expectation of privacy in the closet. Moreover, he disavowed any possessory interest in the contents of the closet,4 failed to show any efforts to exclude others from the space, or any precautions to maintain privacy. The evidence showed that two other tenants, as well as the landlord, had access to the closet. In short, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports a finding that McCaster had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hall closet. Under these circumstances, McCaster has no standing to challenge the search. To hold otherwise would allow a criminal to keep contraband from the legitimate reach of law enforcement by the simple act of storing it in a shared common area.
Finally, even if McCaster had shown an expectation of privacy in the closet, the evidence establishes that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to search the closet in reliance on the warrant.
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BEAM, Circuit Judge.
After a jury trial, Frank McCaster was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). He appeals the district court’s2 denial of his motion to suppress evidence and to suppress statements. We affirm.
[932]*932I. BACKGROUND
Frank McCaster lived in a duplex at 3326 Penn Avenue North in Minneapolis. Pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing a search of his apartment, “including garages, outbuildings and curtilage,”3 police officers searched McCaster’s apartment. They found a small quantity of crack cocaine in a ceramic statue in the apartment. They also searched a hall closet in a common area at the back of the duplex. The closet was shared by the other tenant of the duplex. The officers found over six grams of crack cocaine in the closet.
After the drugs were found, the officers informed McCaster that he was under arrest and asked him to cooperate. After giving a Miranda warning, the officers questioned McCaster. He waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement that was recorded on audiotape. McCaster admitted that the crack cocaine, including that found in the closet, belonged to him. He further admitted that, although the crack cocaine found in the ceramic statue was for his personal consumption, he intended to sell the crack cocaine found in the closet. After the recorded interview, McCaster agreed to cooperate regarding his supplier. Based on that representation, McCaster was not taken into custody but was allowed to attend his son’s out-of-town football game that weekend. When it later became clear that he would not cooperate with the police, he was arrested.
Before trial, McCaster moved to suppress the crack cocaine seized from the closet and to suppress his statement. He contended that the search of the closet was not authorized by the search warrant and that his statement was the result of improper police coercion and was thus involuntary. After a hearing on the motions to suppress, the magistrate judge recommended that they be denied. The magistrate judge found that the search warrant authorized search of the closet as “curti-lage.” He further found that, even if the search warrant did not adequately describe the area, the evidence was nonetheless admissible since the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. The magistrate judge also found no evidence of improper coercion by the officers, and thus found McCaster’s statement admissible. Over McCaster’s objection, the district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.
McCaster was tried by a jury and convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ incarceration, finding the government had shown that he possessed over six grams of crack cocaine. On appeal, McCaster challenges the admission of the crack cocaine seized from the closet and the admission of his statement. He contends the district court erred in finding that the search warrant authorized search of the closet and in finding that his statement was voluntary.
II. DISCUSSION
McCaster argues that the closet does not fall within the definition of “curtilage,” authorized to be searched in the warrant. He contends that historical definitions of curtilage are not applicable in the context of urban, apartment-style living. We need not decide whether common areas of a multi-unit dwelling are always included in the term “curtilage,” for we find that whatever the modern-day urban equivalent of curtilage, the evidence found in the hall closet was properly admitted in this case. If the closet is within the apartment’s cur-tilage, the warrant specifically authorizes the search. If the closet is not part of the apartment’s curtilage, McCaster has shown no expectation of privacy to give him standing to challenge the search and [933]*933the admission of the evidence found therein.
We may affirm the judgment on any grounds supported by the record, even if not relied on by the district court. See Monterey Development Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1993). Assuming for the sake of argument that the area is not curtilage, and thus not covered by the warrant, to challenge the constitutionality of the search, McCaster must demonstrate that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched. See United States v. Nabors, 761 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir.1985). Fourth Amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted. See id. In order to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises, the person challenging the search has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation' of privacy and that the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one that society is willing to accept. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (recognizing that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Several factors are relevant to this showing: whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469. We have rejected the notion of a generalized expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. See United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.1984).
Our review of the record shows that McCaster has failed to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hall closet. His assertion that the closet is not within the curtilage of his apartment undermines his assertion of an expectation of privacy in the closet. Moreover, he disavowed any possessory interest in the contents of the closet,4 failed to show any efforts to exclude others from the space, or any precautions to maintain privacy. The evidence showed that two other tenants, as well as the landlord, had access to the closet. In short, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports a finding that McCaster had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hall closet. Under these circumstances, McCaster has no standing to challenge the search. To hold otherwise would allow a criminal to keep contraband from the legitimate reach of law enforcement by the simple act of storing it in a shared common area.
Finally, even if McCaster had shown an expectation of privacy in the closet, the evidence establishes that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to search the closet in reliance on the warrant. Evidence seized even through a deficient warrant is still admissible if officers executing the warrant were objectively reasonable in relying upon it. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). We agree that the close proximity of the area to McCaster’s living quarters and its enclosure within the duplex unit supports the finding that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the area fell within the scope of the warrant.
McCaster next challenges the admission of his recorded statement, contending that it was not voluntary. In this context, we review the district court’s find[934]*934ings of fact for clear error, and its determination of voluntariness de novo, considering all the circumstances surrounding the confession. See United States v. Ingle, 157 F.3d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.1998). When a defendant’s will is overborne by coercive police activity, the resulting confession is inadmissible. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The magistrate judge found that the officers had not employed improper coercive tactics. We have reviewed the testimony and agree that there is no evidence of improper coercion. The fact that the government encouraged McCaster to cooperate, and then allowed him to remain at home rather than booking him, does not establish the kind of coercive police activity that renders a confession involuntary. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Tactics such as these will not render a confession involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant’s will to be overborne. See Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir.1993). The fact that McCaster had been given the Miranda warning is another factor that weighs in favor of the finding that the statement was voluntary. See United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1350 (8th Cir.1996).
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.