United States v. Felton

753 F.2d 276
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·Decided January 16, 1985·No. No. 84-3270·Published·Cited by 34 cases

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Chief Judge.

The question for decision is whether appellant would be placed in double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment were he to be prosecuted in the Western District of Pennsylvania on a charge of conspiracy to distribute and possess marijuana following a plea of guilty and subsequent sentence in the Northern District of Florida on a similar charge. Appellant argues that the Florida and Pennsylvania activities were part of the same conspiracy; the government argues otherwise. The district court agreed with the government and denied appellant’s double jeopardy motion to dismiss the indictment. 592 F.Supp. 172. This appeal followed. Although the question is close, we are persuaded that the government failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of two distinct conspiracies.

I.

John Hathorn1 pleaded guilty in the Northern District of Florida in 1982 to a charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. In the Western Pennsylvania indictment he is charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

[278] Legal precepts that control our evaluation of the facts are familiar. Jeopardy attached in the Florida prosecution with acceptance of the guilty plea. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir.1973). To support a claim of double jeopardy, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124, 86 S.Ct. 773, 778, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). “Offenses are not the same merely because they arise out of the same general course of criminal conduct, ‘they are the same only when the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of [the indictments] would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other.’ ” United States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir.1974) (citations omitted). “[A] single conspiracy may not be subdivided arbitrarily for the purposes of prosecution.” Id. at 1075. See also United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.1977). Although the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence by putting his double jeopardy claim in issue, once he has made a non-frivolous showing, the burden of persuasion shifts to the government. Id. at 330. Where, as here, the issue is whether there was one or two conspiracies, the government must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there were separate conspiracies. Id. at 331-32.

We are satisfied that the district court recognized these precepts in its consideration of the motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court held that Hathorn presented a non-frivolous claim. We agree. Our inquiry thus follows a narrow compass. We now must decide whether the government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there were two separate conspiracies.

To decide this controlling question we must evaluate the government’s case and decide if a sufficient quantity of evidence was presented to meet the legal standard governing the burden. Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir.1969). The government suggests a different review standard, urging us to adopt the clearly erroneous test because the question whether the conspiracy in this case is the same as the Florida conspiracy is one of fact. As authority for this novel proposition, it relies upon United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843, 103 S.Ct. 95, 74 L.Ed.2d 87 (1982). But the government reads into a single sentence from Lurz a sweep not reasonably embraced in its terms. All that the Court said there was: “However, the issue is factual and, where facts are different, so may the conclusion differ.” Id. We find it necessary to reiterate that on review the trial court’s findings of narrative or historical facts are measured by the clearly erroneous test, but as to the legal component of its conclusion, this court has plenary review. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir.1981). Accordingly, what we must examine here is whether the district court correctly determined that as a matter of law the government met its burden of proving the separate conspiracies by a preponderance of the evidence. Such an inquiry requires us to examine the basic facts of record and the permissible inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

II.

Turning now to the facts, we conclude that the government has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hathorn was involved in two separate conspiracies. Initially, we note an overlap in the time periods covered by the indictments. The Western Pennsylvania indictment covers a period from “the beginning of 1979 through, on, or about May 13,1981, in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere.” App. at 2a. The time period in the Florida indictment is included within the time frame above, and runs “from on or about December 1, 1980, until on or about March 24, 1981, in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere.” Id. at 3a.

Next, we must examine the specific activities alleged in the indictments. The Florida indictment charged Hathorn and several [279] co-conspirators with a conspiracy “to possess with intent to distribute ... more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana.” The Western Pennsylvania indictment charged Hathorn and another group of co-conspirators with a similar conspiracy and described Hathorn’s specific activity as follows:

Overt Act # 9
In or about mid-September of 1980, in the area of Suwanee, Georgia, DEAN K. FELTON purchased approximately 650 pounds of marijuana from JOHN HATHORNE and other persons known to the grand jury. The defendant, DEAN K. FELTON, tendered a partial payment which consisted of approximately 80 gold krugerands and $30,000 in currency for the aforementioned marihuana.

Id. at 2a-3.

Overt Act # 12
In or about late October, 1980, DEAN K. FELTON purchased approximately 1200 pounds of marijuana from JAMES THURMAN, JOHN HATHORNE and persons known to the grand jury in the Atlanta, Georgia area.

Id. at 2a-4.2

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