OPINION
KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.
The defendant-appellant, Eric William Kingsley (“Kingsley”), has mounted attacks on review, which he failed to preserve below, against the district court’s imposition of two special conditions of his three-year supervised release period scheduled to commence accruing upon the expiration of his seventy-eight month imprisonment term for possession of firearms after incurring a felony conviction.1 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). By reason of the defendant’s crime of conviction, coupled with his weighty twenty-year record of criminal arrests, charges, and convictions evidencing, among other things, habitual alcoholic and/or narcotic intoxication, recidivist illegal possession of controlled substances, a pattern of reckless vehicular crimes, and serious multiple firearms transgressions,2 plus demonstrated psychological abnormalities, the sentencing court ordered, among other things, that, during his supervised release, Kingsley (1) shall, in the sole discretion of his probation officer, submit to random warrantless searches of his person and/or effects; and (2) shall not at any time operate a motor vehicle. Although the defendant neglected to oppose those mandates before the sentencing forum, he has alleged for the first time before this appellate reviewing panel that the trial judge failed to articulate adequate factual findings supportive of the two subject special conditions of supervised release; and that those edicts unreasonably intruded upon his exercise of personal liberty to a degree unjustified by any legitimate penal objective, in light of his crime of conviction and other relevant factors.
[831]*831On December 17, 1996, the defendant, a 36-year-old unemployed “gun collector” with a high school equivalency degree and an extended history of chronic substance abuse, severe psychological disorders, and life-threatening felonious conduct, who was contemporaneously on state probation for a drugs-and-weapons conviction and was simultaneously under state indictment for controlled substance and vehicular transgressions, forcibly, entered the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, mobile home of Jerry Galloway, while armed with a shotgun and a pistol. Kingsley found Galloway sitting on a sofa. The defendant pointed his shotgun at Galloway, and accused him of having stolen one of Kingsley’s many unlawfully-possessed firearms. When Galloway attempted to telephone emergency assistance, Kingsley discharged his shotgun into the davenport, near the victim’s head. Kingsley then warned Galloway that he would aim the next shell fired at Galloway’s heart. The defendant ordered Galloway to remove his television set to Kingsley’s van, evidently to serve as compensation for the allegedly converted firearm. During that procedure, Kingsley fired his shotgun on at least two additional occasions. As Galloway carried his television to Kingsley’s vehicle, he observed Kingsley moving Galloway’s battery charger, which he also apparently intended to seize. Galloway perceived Kingsley retrieving a pistol from underneath his left shoulder. Immediately thereafter, Kings-ley accidently discharged a round from that weapon into his own foot:
Momentarily, Kingsley observed approaching police vehicles, which prompted him to flee the trailer park in his truck. Investigating Officer Bjelland of the Oak Ridge Police Department detected gunshot holes in the trailer’s front door, its floor, the sofa, and the window behind the sofa; as well as expended shotgun casings. On the ground approximately 25 to 30 yards outside the mobile home, the patrolman discovered a shotgun, the victim’s television, and fresh blood. Subsequently, fellow peace officers apprehended Kingsley on the highway. Their search of his vehicle produced ten additional firearms, including both foreign and American-made pieces.3
On May 29, 1997, during the pendency of state charges against Kingsley related to the December 17, 1996 incident (to wit, aggravated assault, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and “going armed”), the defendant’s neighbor complained to the Oak Ridge Police Department that a stray bullet had penetrated his residence’s window. The caller had proximately observed Kingsley running from his parents’ nearby home while carrying a firearm. Kingsley absconded to his own house while still armed with that weapon. The neighbor then heard several additional gunshots. In response to that citizen’s report, the police department dispatched investigators to the scene. Kings-ley’s mother informed them that her son had discharged a bullet into her residence’s wall. Immediately thereafter, the authorities arrested Kingsley. A subsequent warrant search of his domicile led to the confiscation of a cache of eleven firearms, including some of foreign manufacture.4
On October 7, 1997, while Kingsley was detained in state custody on charges anchored in the above-described December 17, 1996 and May 29, 1997 criminal epi[832]*832sodes, a federal grand jury indicted him on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (See note 1 above). Count one charged the defendant with unlawful possession of the ten firearms seized from his van on December 17, 1996. Count two charged him with illegal possession of the eleven armaments removed from his residence on May 29, 1997.5 On December 15, 1997, Kingsley and the United States executed a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 plea agreement, whereby the defendant promised to plead guilty to count one of the indictment, whereas the government, in exchange, would dismiss count two. That settlement contract further stipulated, inter alia, that “[t]he Court may impose any lawful term of supervised release;” and that “[t]he District Court will determine the [defendant’s] appropriate sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, and this determination will be based upon the entire scope of the defendant’s criminal conduct, criminal history, and pursuant to other factors and guidelines set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines.” [Sic]. (Emphasis added).
On May 19, 1998, the probation department completed Kingsley’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), which chronicled the defendant’s persistent pattern of vehicular offenses, substance abuse crimes, and other safety-menacing or otherwise irresponsible anti-social peace infractions. Between April 13, 1977 (when he incurred, at age 16, his first criminal conviction, for marijuana possession), and the December 17, 1996 crime of conviction, Kingsley sustained at least fourteen convictions for vehicular offenses, including five counts of driving while intoxicated or “driving under the influence,” three counts of reckless driving, one count of reckless endangerment, four counts of driving, with a revoked license, and one count of leaving the scene of a traffic mishap; and at least seven convictions for non-vehicular controlled substance offenses, including one charge of marijuana possession, one count of stealing controlled narcotics from a drug store, one count of possession of those stolen pharmaceuticals, one charge of possessing synthetic narcotics, one charge of possessing Diazepam, one charge of vandalizing another’s apartment while intoxicated, and one count of possession of Valium, Dilaudid, Methadone, and marijuana.
In addition, Kingsley’s two-decade crime spree encompassed one conviction for interfering with police business; one conviction for simple assault; one conviction for attempting to break and enter a plumbing supply company with intent to commit larceny; and one count of “going armed.”
Kingsley’s most recent prior conviction for a serious vehicular infraction emanated from his November 14, 1992 arrest for driving recklessly, while under chemical influence and in the possession of Diazep-am, without possessing a valid driver’s permit. He was convicted on those charges on December 21, 1993, which preceded his December 17, 1996 crime of conviction by only slightly less than three years.
Even more revealing, and disturbing, were the defendant’s most recent convictions for a prior non-vehicular controlled substance offense, and a weapons transgression, each of which occurred on August 2, 1996, only approximately four and one-half months preceding his subject December 17, 1996 weapons offense. On August 2,1996, Kingsley appeared at the Oak Ridge police station to “discuss” the previous evening’s, encounter with Officer Martina and other lawmen. The defendant boasted to Officer Martina that, because he had possessed an SKS automatic assault rifle during their recent confrontation, he “could have cut [Martina] in half’ at that time. Kingsley then replied affirmatively to Officer Martina’s query whether he was currently armed. A subsequent search of the defendant yielded a loaded Smith & Wesson .357 caliber Magnum handgun, together with 37 Valium tablets, [833]*83313 Dilaudid capsules, and a bottle of Methadone. Later, a consent search of Kingsley’s residence produced a .44 caliber Magnum pistol, a nine millimeter handgun, an SKS automatic rifle, a .308 caliber rifle, a .22 caliber rifle, and a shortened 12 gauge shotgun. Additionally, the suspect voluntarily furnished to law enforcement constables the combination to a house safe within which he had concealed three pounds of marijuana, 150 doses of Dilau-did, and an undetermined quantity of Methadone.6 Because the authorities deemed him to pose a danger to others, Kingsley incurred involuntary commitment to a mental health institution for an undisclosed duration.
The PSR further reported that, in addition to the convictions described above, Kingsley sustained additional arrests and open criminal charges which had not proceeded to judicial disposition.7 Only four months prior to his December 17, 1996 crime of conviction, on August 11, 1996, following a traffic stop, patrolmen arrested Kingsley for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, driving under the influence of a controlled substance, and driving with a revoked license. Those charges were pending in state court when he committed the federal weapons crime here in controversy.
A far more serious prior incident had transpired on November 16, 1992, when Kingsley was arrested for attempted first degree murder, driving under the influence of psychotropic chemicals, driving with a revoked license, and possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance. On that day, a citizen reported to the police that Kingsley had, by telephone, repeatedly threatened to kill him. Later that day, Kingsley committed a drive-by shooting from his vehicle by firing a twelve-gauge shotgun four times at that citizen’s house. One round penetrated the target residence’s outer wall and lodged in the bedroom wall, just several inches above its reclining occupant. Officers dispatched to the crime scene observed a van fleeing the area. When subsequently apprehended, that vehicle’s operator, Kingsley, reeked of alcohol, registered a .11 blood alcohol level on an intoxication test, and possessed Dia-zepam. For unknown reasons, on February 17, 1993, the prosecution dismissed the charges stemming from that incident.
The PSR also revealed that, on February 6,1995, the defendant had been arrested for assault against his wife. That charges was also dismissed.8
Additional alarming information material to Kingsley’s character and habits, which was especially pertinent to his [834]*834chronic hard-core substance abuse and mi-nacious emotional volatility, appeared within the PSR. Kingsley disclosed to his probation officer that, during his lifetime, he had experimented with virtually all types of controlled substances. He began smoking marijuana at age thirteen, and habitually consumed alcohol whenever he could afford it, although he disingenuously denied having an alcohol abuse problem. He had enrolled in a drug treatment program in early 1997, but terminated his participation therein against medical advice pri- or to its completion. The defendant’s father reported that his son had received drug treatment at two rehabilitation clinics, and indicated that the defendant had a “short temper.”
On September 14, 1998, the district judge presided over Kingsley’s sentencing hearing. Neither prior to, nor during, that proceeding, did his attorney assert any written or oral opposition to anything contained within the PSR. Moreover, Kingsley attested, under oath, that he and his lawyer had reviewed the PSR; that he had no reason to challenge the accuracy of anything stated therein; and, moreover, that he personally believed that its contents were accurate. In response to direct questioning by the trial judge, Kingsley conceded that he had incurred five prior convictions for driving under the influence of one or another variety of mind-altering substance; and that at the time of his subject December 17, 1996 arrest for illegal firearms possession, he was transporting ten guns inside his vehicle.
At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the district judge committed Kingsley to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 78 months,9 to be followed by three years of supervised release. The judicially fashioned special conditions of Kingsley’s supervised release included an absolute prohibition forbidding the driving of any motor vehicle for any reason, which element of the sentence was subsequently clarified to reflect that “[t]he defendant shall be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle during his term of supervised release." The special conditions also incorporated a blanket subjection of the defendant to warrantless personal and property searches in his probation officer’s discretion.10
[835]*835The lower court’s written judgment, journalized on September 21, 1998, modified and clarified those special conditions:
4. He [Kingsley] shall submit his person, residence, office or vehicle to a search conducted by any U.S. Probation Officer and such other law enforcement personnel as the probation officer may deem advisable, without a warrant.
5. The defendant shall be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle during his term of supervised release.11
On review, the defendant has, for the first time, assailed special conditions 4 and 5 of his supervised release. Ordinarily, an appellate bench scrutinizes a sentencing court’s imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.1997). On “abuse of discretion” review, “where a condition of supervised release is reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, [namely] the rehabilitation of the defendant and the protection of the public, it must be upheld.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir.1992)). The rigorous “abuse of discretion” standard permits reversal of a district court’s directive only in comparatively extreme circumstances.12
Moreover, when, as in the case instanter, the defendant neglected to preserve, in the trial court, proper objection(s) to those special conditions, and/or to allege any deficiency in the lower court’s supporting findings, an appellate court examines those belatedly-faulted special conditions and affiliated findings pursuant to the heightened “plain error” measure. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). “To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) that an error occurred in the district court; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., obvious or clear; (3) that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir.1998) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1030, 119 S.Ct. 1278, 143 L.Ed.2d 371 (1999). See also United States v. Hayes, [836]*836171 F.3d 389, 391-92 (6th Cir.1999) (explaining that the reviewing court’s exercise of power to notice and correct procedurally forfeited plain errors which have adversely affected the appellant’s substantial rights is entirely discretionary).
“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” including its rationale for mandating special conditions of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United States v. Berridge, 74 F.3d 113, 118-19 (6th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, a sentencing court’s failure to expressly explain its reason(s) for exacting a particular special condition of supervised release will be deemed harmless error if the supporting reasons are evident on the overall record, and .the subject special condition is related to the dual major purposes of probation, namely rehabilitation of the offender and enhancement of public safety. Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504; Berridge, 74 F.3d at 118-19.
General factors material to the trial court’s determination of an appropriate criminal sentence include:
. (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). (Emphases added).
Additionally, Congress has directed that any special (that is, non-mandatory) condition of supervised release13 must satisfy three requirements:
The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the'extent that such condition—
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D) [quoted above];
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D) [quoted above]; and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a);
... any other condition it considers to be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
The November 1, 1997 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), which governed Kingsley’s sentencing, paraphrased the above-quoted portion of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and its incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D), as follows:
The court may impose other [non-mandatory] conditions of supervised release to the extent that such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) the need to provide the defendant with medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most [837]*837effective manner; and (2) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth above and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.14
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) (eff. Nov. 1, 1997). (Emphases added).
The trial court’s special condition no. 4, which authorized, in the sole discretion of the defendant’s probation officer, the random warrantless search of the defendant, his premises, and/or his property, conducted by the probation officer and/or any law enforcement personnel enlisted for that task by the probation officer, during the defendant’s supervised release, advanced the legitimate goals of probation, and was supported by the instant record with reference to the § 5D1.3(b) factors. The district court crafted the blanket search authorization as a necessary and justifiable means to enforce its proscriptions against Kingsley’s possession of intoxicants, weapons, and/or other contraband or criminal instrumentalities; and to enable the detection of evidence of criminal activity or other probation violations. Both of those purposes related directly to the defendant’s rehabilitation and the hindrance of his future criminal activity. Equally evident, and of equal importance, was the district court’s correct determination that the random search proviso would be essential for the protection of the probation officer’s personal safety, as well as that of ordinary citizens who might come into contact with this potentially dangerous felon.
Kingsley’s crime of conviction implicated the illegal possession of multiple dangerous weapons. His prodigious twenty-year record of violent, reckless, and otherwise serious criminal activities, his lifetime abuse of omnifarious rationality-disabling and intellect-damaging intoxicants, his regular manifestations of troubling psychological derangement and emotional debilitation, and his customary total disregard of the law, cumulatively betrayed a dangerous anti-social personalty potentially capable of any act of violence or felonious behavior. At minimum, this defendant has proven his propensity to habitually possess, and misuse, alcohol, narcotics, and weapons, with recurring disastrous results. Accordingly, special condition no. 4 was reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of his subject offense, his personal history and characteristics, deterrence of future recidivist felonious actions, rehabilitation of the offender, and protection of public safety. It imposed no greater liberty deprivation than necessary to achieve those valid objectives. See United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.1994) (“A probation officer need not have a warrant to conduct a search of a probationer where the probation officer is properly carrying out her official responsibilities.”) (citations omitted). Any error in the district court’s failure to articulate, on the sentencing transcript, its precise reasons for ordering that special condition, was harmless.
Likewise, no plain error infected the sentencing court’s absolute suspension of Kingsley’s driving privileges during his three-year span of supervised release. The defendant has contended, for the first time on appeal, that the instant driving prohibition constituted plain error because it purportedly was unrelated to his crime of conviction, to wit, possession of firearms as a felony offender. However, “[t]he court may impose other conditions of supervised release to the extent that such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b) (emphases added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court-ordered driving ban was reasonably related to Kingsley’s demonstrative past wanton automotive vio[838]*838lations, including multiple episodes, of reckless operation while chemically impaired and/or in the possession of dangerous weapons. Indeed, the vexing “history and characteristics of the defendant” establish that furtherance of the paramount governmental interest in protection of public safety, standing alone, could justify the subject driving proscription.
Additionally, the district court’s ban on the defendant’s probationary operation of motorized vehicles was independently supported by “the nature and circumstances of the offense” of conviction. On December 17, 1996, using his truck, Kingsley had stored and transported an illegal arsenal of at least eleven firearms to the residence of his victim. He actively deployed two of those armaments to unlawfully threaten, intimidate, and coerce his victim into surrendering items of personal property. The defendant also intended to transport that extorted personalty in his motor vehicle. Although the use of his van was not an essential element of the instant offense of possessing firearms as a convicted felon, that vehicle’s involvement was nonetheless an integral “circumstance of the offense” which materially contributed to its overall “nature.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); U.S.S.G. § 501.3(b).
Accordingly, the subject three-year complete suspension of Kingsley’s driving privileges following his release from prison was reasonably related to both the nature and circumstances of his offense of conviction, and to his criminal history and personal characteristics. Because special condition no. 5 was independently justified by either factor standing alone, a fortiori, it was legitimized by the aggregation of both factors.
Furthermore, the driving restriction reasonably advanced legitimate goals of supervised release including assurance of community safety, crime deterrence, and rehabilitation of the felon, by restraining him from getting behind the wheel of a motor vehicle, an instrumentality through which he committed many of his multitudinous prior dangerous felonies, including the crime of conviction. See United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542 (6th Cir.1992) (resolving that a condition of supervised release which restrained a former union official, who had been convicted of tax fraud and uttering false statements, from exercising decision-making authority over a union-financed political action committee, was justified to “protect union members and the general public from continued abuses by [the defendant],” and because “it will also rehabilitate [the defendant] by removing him from the environment that originally led to his criminal activity.”).
Kingsley has also argued that the district judge’s absolute disallowance of his operation of any automobile during his three-year supervised release term would constitute a greater deprivation of his personal liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve the valid objectives of supervised release. However, this reviewing court initially observes, as a seminal analytic point of departure, that operating a motor vehicle on the public thoroughfares, under any circumstances, is not a fundamental personal right, but instead is a mere societally-bestowed privilege, granted by the grace of the state, which an adult citizen must earn, and which the government can restrict or invalidate, even administratively, in the rational furtherance of a legitimate public purpose. See Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1137-39 (6th Cir.1998) (explaining that the administrative suspension of a motorist’s license comprises the “revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted” by the state) (citations omitted).
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that some personal “right” of the defendant would be denied by the faulted driving prohibition, it nonetheless will not comprise a greater deprivation of personal liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of supervised [839]*839release,15 in light of Kingsley’s recidivist inclination to commit serious life-threatening vehicular offenses, often while chemically impaired and/or in the possession of firearms. Kingsley has repeatedly and conclusively demonstrated that, because of his mentally-destabilizing chemical dependencies, overall criminal tendencies, and generally erratic personality, he cannot be trusted to responsibly drive a vehicle at any time, for any reason. Indeed, his severe and chronic addictions to alcohol and narcotics, in tandem with his significant personality disorders and imbalanced psychology, should disqualify him from possessing driving authorization, even in the absence of his appalling driving record assembled to date.
In all events, the defendant’s life-long behavior patterns have convincingly demonstrated that, if he is indulged with any degree of permission to operate a motor, vehicle on the public highways, even for very specific and limited purposes, he will most likely violate that trust by using his vehicle to facilitate the commission of firearms or narcotics offenses or other criminal transgressions; and/or will menace community security by driving irresponsibly while inebriated or otherwise judgmentally disoriented, as he has done repeatedly in the past. After all is said and done, the post-imprisonment three-year suspension of the defendant’s driving privileges will be a comparatively modest cautionary prophylactic measure, given the total circumstances presented.
Kingsley has averred that, without at least a limited authorization to drive under restricted conditions, he will be unable to satisfy other court-imposed conditions of his supervised release, including participation in drug and alcohol, and mental health, treatment programs. However, even if, as asserted by the defendant’s counsel at appellate oral argument, public transportation is unavailable in his rural locality, adequate practical transportation alternatives undeniably exist. For example, the defendant may walk, peddle a bicycle, or engage the driving services of a relative, friend, neighbor, or professional taximan, to travel to and fro his treatment sessions.
On the other hand, if, during his supervised release term, Kingsley is able to prove that he has been sufficiently rehabilitated to justify the partial or complete removal of the absolute driving ban, and/or that the absolute motorist prohibition somehow renders his participation in the court-ordered treatment programs impossible (as opposed to merely inconvenient), he can apply to the district judge for modification of that special condition of his supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c). Indeed, Kingsley’s premature assaults against the blanket driving proscription are anchored in “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (citations omitted), namely that he will be unable to attain chemical dependency treatment and/or psychological counseling if he is precluded from driving; or that, under the circumstances which will prevail during his supervised release (including, but not necessarily limited to, his then-prevailing state of mental health and chemical dependency), a total driving ban will deprive him of more personal liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve the valid objectives of supervised release. See United States v. Worthington, 145 F.3d 1335 (Table), 1998 WL 279379, at *17 & n. 4 (6th Cir.), cert. [840]*840denied, 525 U.S. 886 & 988, 119 S.Ct. 200 & 459, 142 L.Ed.2d 164 & 411 (1998).
Therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that the district court committed “plain” error, or any error, on the subject record, by absolutely prohibiting Kingsley from driving a motor vehicle during his post-incarceration three-year supervised release term. Given the defendant’s direct use of his van in the commission of his offense of conviction, matched with overwhelming evidence within the sentencing record of his life-long pattern of dangerous vehicular offenses, overindulgence in drugs and alcohol, psychological maladjustment, and utilization of his vehicle to execute firearms offenses resembling the offense of conviction, any error appurtenant to the trial court’s failure to state specific reasons for imposing the absolute driving ban was harmless.
Because the defendant has identified no “plain error” affiliated with the lower court’s special conditions of supervised release nos. 4 and 5, his pretermitted attacks are non-cognizable on review. United States v. Saucedo, 226 F.3d 782, 787 n. 10 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 838, 148 L.Ed.2d 718 (2001) (No. 00-7313). Accordingly, the two challenged special conditions of supervised release are AFFIRMED.