United States v. Eric Arthur Walton, United States of America v. Eldridge Mayfield, A/K/A Sippy

207 F.3d 694, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5115, 2000 WL 308990

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 27, 2000
• Docket: 97-4498, 97-4537
• Status: Published

Opinions

Affirmed by published per curiam opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON and Judge WILLIAMS wrote concurring opinions. Judge WIDENER wrote a dissenting opinion. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN, Judge WILKINS, and Judge TRAXLER joined. Senior Judge HAMILTON wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case came to be argued before the en banc court on April 6, 1999. The judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed by an equally divided en banc court. Separate opinions follow seriatim.

AFFIRMED

PREFATORY NOTE:

On April 6, 1999, the en banc court heard argument in this case. While the case was under submission, Judge Ervin died, leaving the judgment of the district court affirmed by an equally divided en banc court. Chief Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge Luttig, Judge Williams, and Judge Michael continue to concur in what Judge Ervin wrote. Judge Motz concurs in the judgment.

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

The question before this Court is whether a district court must comply with a jury’s request for a definition of reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. Our current practice is well-established. We have never required a district court to define reasonable doubt to a jury. See United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 46 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2679, 129 L.Ed.2d 813 (1994).

During its deliberations, the jury in the present case asked the district court for a definition of reasonable doubt. In accordance with our longstanding practice, the district court refused. On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed.¹

We granted a rehearing en banc in this case to reconsider this issue. Finding no reason to change our current practice, we affirm.

I.

Eric A. Walton and Eldridge Mayfield (the “Defendants”) were convicted by a jury for conspiracy to influence a petit juror and for aiding and abetting in the attempt to influence a petit juror. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2 (West 1969), 371 (West 1966 & Supp.1999), 1503(a), (b)(3) (Supp.1999). During its deliberations, the jury asked the district court for a definition of reasonable doubt. The district court refused.

On appeal, the Defendants argued that, because the jury may have been confused over the burden of proof and, therefore, may have convicted the Defendants upon a lesser showing than required by due process, the district court should have defined reasonable doubt for the jury. In support, the Defendants argued that our opinion in United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir.1995), compelled such a result.

A panel of this Court rejected the Defendants’ argument, holding that “[t]he rule regarding reasonable doubt for the jury is well settled in this Circuit — a trial judge may define reasonable doubt only if the jury requests a definition; however, the trial judge is not required to provide a definition, even if the jury requests it.” Walton, 1998 WL 879650, at *4. Finding “nothing in Oriakhi overruling or creating exceptions to the rule,” id. at *5, the panel affirmed the Defendants’ conviction.

Subsequently, the Defendants submitted a petition for rehearing en banc to this Court. The only issue raised in this petition was whether a district court should give a jury an instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt when requested. Granting the petition, we elected to rehear this case en banc.

II.

The issue before this Court is whether a district court should be required to give an instruction defining reasonable doubt when requested by a jury. This is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir.1995).

There is no constitutional requirement to define reasonable doubt to a jury. The Supreme Court has never required trial courts to define the term. In its most recent case addressing reasonable doubt, the Court stated that

the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (citations omitted).² The Court has even recognized that “[ajttempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.” Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954) (citation omitted).

As the panel observed in its original opinion, the well-established rule of this Circuit is that although the district court may define reasonable doubt to a jury upon request, the district court is not required to do so. Walton, 1998 WL 879650, at *4. According to our research, the First, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits share our unwillingness to require the district court to define reasonable doubt.³ At least fifteen state courts also appear not to require a trial court to de-gne reasonakie doubt to a jury.⁴ In addition, the foreign courts of England and Australia — with which we share a common lineage, the right to trial by jury, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials — also do not require trial courts to define reasonable doubt to a jury.⁵

The rationale behind this rule is “our belief that efforts to define reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept....” United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir.1998). We are convinced “that the term reasonable doubt has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror which judicial efforts to define generally do more to obscure than to illuminate.” United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).⁶

This rationale is challenged when, as in the present case, a jury specifically requests a definition of reasonable doubt. We understand that when a jury specifically requests a definition of reasonable doubt during deliberations, there is a risk that the jury may be confused over what standard of proof to apply in a criminal case. At the same time, we also appreciate the constitutionally-mandated importance of the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal trial. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”). Nevertheless, we remain convinced that attempting to explain the words “beyond a reasonable doubt” is more dangerous than leaving a jury to wrestle with only the words themselves.⁷

In the end, only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt. Keasonable doubt cannot be divorced from its specific context any more than the concepts of “reason” or a “reasonable person.” Jurors differ in their own individual conceptions of reasonable doubt. During jury deliberations, these jurors debate whether or not the prosecution in the specific case before them has proven the guilt of a particular defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Through “the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence,” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the jury itself defines reasonable doubt and applies its own definition to the specific case before it.

The only definition of the standard of proof in criminal cases required by the Supreme Court remains “the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). While we discourage further definition of the reasonable doubt standard, see Williams, 152 F.3d at 298, we continue to leave the final decision of whether to acquiesce to a jury’s request and define reasonable doubt to the district court’s discretion. See United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 389 (4th Cir.1998). Given the inherent risks, however, we refuse to require such a practice.

III.

Accordingly, since we find no reason to alter our current practice of not requiring a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in criminal cases, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1 . The original panel opinion was unpublished. See United States v. Walton, 166 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1998) (Table). The full text of this opinion has been reproduced in United States v. Walton, Nos. 97-4498, 97-4537, 1998 WL 879650 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (per curiam).

2 . As Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurrence in Victor, this statement from the majority opinion could be considered dictum because in both consolidated cases the trial judges defined reasonable doubt. The question of whether a definition of reasonable doubt was constitutionally required, therefore, was not squarely before the Court. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring with the judgment). But see Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887) (commenting that a jury instruction refusing to define reasonable doubt further "is simple, and as a rule to guide the jury is as intelligible to them generally as any which could be stated ... ”).

3 . See United States v. Smith, 46 F.3d 1223, 1238 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that "district courts need not define the concept of reasonable doubt so long as the phrase is not buried as an aside”); United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding a district court’s refusal to define reasonable doubt even after a jury’s request); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1557 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (holding that "a District Court need not give any definition of reasonable doubt at all”); United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (holding that "an appropriate instruction defining reasonable doubt is permissible but not necessarily required”).

The status of reasonable doubt jury instructions in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits remains unclear. Although in Thompson v. Lynaugh the Fifth Circuit stated that "attempts by trial courts to define 'reasonable doubt’ have been disfavored by this court,” 821 F.2d 1054, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987), Thompson is distinguishable because it concerned a state collateral attack. Id. at 1055. See also United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 128 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has never "required a particular definition of reasonable doubt to be read to the jury”). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit’s District Judges Association commented:

Some Sixth Circuit decisions have sustained state criminal convictions against constitutional attacks based on the trial court’s failure to define the term reasonable doubt. Other Sixth Circuit decisions have noted in dicta the Supreme Court's statement that attempts to define reasonable doubt do not usually make the term more understandable. But no Sixth Circuit decisions reviewing federal criminal convictions have explicitly discouraged or condemned instructions defining reasonable doubt, as some other circuits have done.

Instead, Sixth Circuit decisions have rather consistently proceeded on the assumption that some definition should be given, with the only real question being what the definition should say.

Committee on Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions, District Judges Ass’n, Sixth Circuit, Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions § 1.03 (1991) (citations omitted).

4 . See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 804A(3) (West 1998) ("The court may, but is not required to, define ... ‘reasonable doubt.’ ”); Ky. R.Crim. P. § 9.56(2) ("The instructions should not attempt to define the term ’reasonable doubt.’ ”); People v. Carroll, 278 Ill.App.3d 464, 215 Ill.Dec. 447, 663 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ill.App.Ct.1996) ("The concept of reasonable doubt needs no definition, and it is prejudicial error for the court to give an involved instruction on that concept.”); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 850 (Miss. 1994) ("reasonable doubt defines itself and needs no further definition by the court”); State v. Johnson, 315 S.C. 485, 445 S.E.2d 637, 637 (S.C.1994) (upholding a trial court's refusal to define reasonable doubt, commenting that the expression "without an explanation of its legal significance is much more favorable to a defendant”); State v. McMahon, 158 Vt. 640, 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Vt.1992) ("We have never held that a defendant is entitled to an explanation of 'reasonable doubt'... ”); Means v. Sidiropolis, 184 W.Va. 514, 401 S.E.2d 447, 451 n. 1 (W.Va.1990) ("We have made it clear that a jury instruction attempting to define 'reasonable doubt’ probably confuses the jury more than it helps it.”); Grant v. State, 703 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla.Crim.App. 1985) ("The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that trial judges should not define the term.”); State v. Burton, 235 Kan. 472, 681 P.2d 646, 655 (Kan.1984) (“This court has consistently adhered to the position that no definition could make the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’ any clearer than the words themselves.”); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 105 (Minn.1980) ("Defining the term should be at the option of the trial judge even though a defining instruction is tendered. Lack of definition would not appear to be prejudicial.”); Cosco v. State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wy.1974) (holding that “the term 'reasonable doubt' need not be defined and a trial court would be well-advised to avoid instructions on reasonable doubt”); Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179, 149 S.E.2d 315, 318 (Ga.1966) (affirming trial court's refusal to define reasonable doubt); State v. Robinson, 235 Or. 524, 385 P.2d 754, 756 (Or.1963) ("While it is doubtful if a definition is necessary, attempts to define the term are not error for that reason.”); City of Sioux Falls v. Wolf, 79 S.D. 519, 114 N.W.2d 100, 101 (S.D.1962) ("The term 'reasonable doubt’ needs no definition. It means what it says.”) (citation omitted); Strawderman v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 855, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Va.1959) (commenting "that instructions attempting to define reasonable doubt should be discouraged as it is highly probable that any definition devised would be less illuminating than the expression itself”).

5 . See Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined?, 12 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol'y 195, 217-18 (1997), citing Regina v. Ching, 63 Crim.App. 7, 10 (Eng. 1976) (warning trial judges not to attempt to put "any gloss on what is meant by ... ‘reasonable doubt’ ”); The Queen v. Bilick, 36 S.A. St. R. 321 (Austl.1984) (stating that "[a]n attempt to characterize a reasonable doubt is a misdirection”). For an examination of the joint Anglo-American origins of the "beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, see generally Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘To a Moral Certainty’: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries, 1600-1850, 38 Hastings L.J. 153 (1986); Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U.L. Rev. 507, 508 (1975).

6 . The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts summarized this belief as "a basic philosophical precept that the concept of reasonable doubt has an a priori existence in the minds of all jurors.” Smith v. Butler, 696 F.Supp. 748, 765 (D.Mass. 1988). Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit commented that "deeply entrenched in the popular culture as it is, the term ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' may be the single legal term that jurors understand best.” United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).

7 . The Seventh Circuit analogized defining reasonable doubt to a jury to "playing with fire.” United States v. Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir.1975). It recognized that "at best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and, at worst, they have the potential to impair a defendant’s constitutional right to have the government prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hall, 854 F.2d at 1039. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Victor, reasonable doubt "defies easy explanation.” 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire observed that reasonable doubt jury instructions often result in a "grand conglomeration of garbled verbiage and verbal garbage.” State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H.1980) (citation omitted). While we believe that the jury instructions we have examined were more artfully drafted than that, we still did not find any of them clearer than the words themselves. See Edward J. Devitt et al.. Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil and Criminal § 12.10 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp.1998) (collecting federal reasonable doubt jury instructions); 5 Edward R. Bran-son, The Law of Instructions to Juries in Civil and Criminal Cases § 3308 (3d ed. 1962 & Supp.1997) (collecting state reasonable doubt jury instructions). Dean John Henry Wig-more expressed this sentiment earlier when he wrote, "The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet no successful method of communicating intelligibly to a jury a sound method of self-analysis for one's belief.” 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).