United States v. Douglas
This text of United States v. Douglas (United States v. Douglas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal No. 10-171-4 (JDB)
REGINALD DOUGLAS, JR.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Reginald Douglas, Jr.’s motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. See Mot. under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (“Def.’s
Mot.”) [ECF No. 314]. The government opposes the motion. See United States’ Opp’n to Def.’s
Mot. (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”) [ECF No. 320]. For the reasons that follow, Douglas’s motion is untimely
and is therefore denied.
In July 2012, Douglas pled guilty to second degree murder while armed in violation of
D.C. Code §§ 22-2103 and 22-4502 for the murder of Anthony Morrisey. Plea Agreement [ECF.
No. 213] at 1–2; see Tr. of Plea Hr’g (July 10, 2012) [ECF No. 326]. The Court entered judgment
on September 21, 2012, and Douglas did not appeal. Def.’s Mot. ¶¶ 2, 12. Douglas’s conviction
became final when the time to file a notice of appeal expired fourteen days later, on October 5,
2012. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). He
filed the instant motion for collateral relief challenging this Court’s jurisdiction over his case1
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 on October 26, 2018. 2
1 This Court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over his case. See D.C. Code §§ 11-502(2)(A)(v); 11-502(3). 2 Douglas’s motion was docketed in February 2019. However, Douglas asserts that he gave the motion and supporting documents to prison officials for mailing on October 26, 2018. See Attach. 2 to Def.’s Mot.; Attach. 1 to Letter filed by Reginald Douglas, Jr. [ECF No. 315]; Movant’s Reply to the Gov’t’s Opp’n (“Def.’s Reply”) [ECF The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) authorizes federal
prisoners to move to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A prisoner’s ability to bring such a motion is subject to a
strict one-year time limitation triggered by, as relevant to Douglas’s motion, 3 either “the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final” or “the date on which the facts supporting the
claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Id.
§ 2255(f)(1), (4); see Def.’s Mot. ¶ 18 (asserting timeliness under § 2255(f)(4)).
Douglas’s motion is clearly untimely under § 2255(f)(1) because he filed the instant motion
in October 2018, well over one year after his judgment of conviction became final in October
2012.
Douglas’s motion is also untimely under § 2255(f)(4). Douglas asserts that his conviction
and sentence for D.C. Code violations were unlawful because this court lacked jurisdiction over
violations of District of Columbia law and that his “motion is timely based on § 2255(f)(4) as of
October 26, 2017” because that was the date that “he finally was able to review the Judgment and
Commitment order” to discover that he had been convicted of D.C. Code violations in federal
court. Def.’s Mot. ¶ 18. Douglas explains that he sought a copy of the judgment while he was in
state custody in New York completing a term of incarceration for a different offense, and that he
did not actually obtain a copy of the judgment until the fall of 2017, when he completed his state
No. 327] at 2. The fate of Douglas’s original motion is unknown, but in light of Douglas’s conscientious efforts to explain and provide evidence supporting his October 2018 mailing, the Court will deem his motion filed as of October 26, 2018. 3 Douglas has not identified any impediment to making a motion caused by governmental action, see id. § 2255(f)(2), or any right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive on collateral review, see § 2255(f)(3).
2 sentence and transferred to federal custody to serve the sentence imposed in this case. Def.’s Reply
at 3–5. Douglas argues that his motion should be deemed timely because it was filed within one
year of his “severely delayed receipt of his federal judgment—which he diligently sought.” Def.’s
Reply at 4.
Douglas’s late receipt of a copy of his judgment does not make his motion timely because
any relevant facts were known to him at the time of his plea and sentencing in 2012. Douglas’s
signed plea agreement indicated that he was pleading guilty to D.C. Code offenses in federal court.
Plea Agreement at 1–2, 5. During his plea colloquy, the Court noted that Douglas was pleading
guilty to violations of the D.C. Code. Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 17:10–20; see also id. at 17:20–20:5
(discussing sentencing implications of D.C. Code offenses as opposed to federal offenses). The
Court also highlighted that Douglas was being sentenced for D.C. Code violations at Douglas’s
sentencing hearing. See Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g [ECF No. 319] at 3:4–4:8. Section 2255(f)(4)
“must be triggered by newly discovered facts, not new legal theories arising out of known facts.”
United States v. Satizabal, 190 F. Supp. 3d 183, 185 (D.D.C. 2016). Douglas does not allege facts
“newly discovered,” and his motion therefore is not timely under § 2255(f)(4). Id.
Douglas also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the time limit set by § 2255(f)
under the actual innocence exception. The actual innocence “exception is designed to excuse
procedural barriers to relief in only a ‘narrow class’ of ‘extraordinary instances when a
constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime.’” United
States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494
(1991)). In this context, “‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal
insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citation omitted).
3 Douglas identifies information that he believes undermines the credibility of a witness,
Antonio Harper, whose testimony, Douglas believes, “was the linchpin that . . . allowed for him to
be prosecuted in federal court,” and without this testimony, “the federal court did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute the Morrisey murder.” Def.’s Reply at 7. Douglas accordingly seeks an
evidentiary hearing about Harper’s statements in order “to resolve his actual innocence claim.” Id.
at 10–11.
However, Douglas is mistaken. Harper and his credibility are unrelated to Douglas’s crime
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