United States v. Domenico Sandalo

70 F.4th 77

Opinion

21-708-cr United States v. Domenico Sandalo UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT ______________

August Term 2021

(Argued: March 15, 2022 | Decided: June 8, 2023)

Docket No. 21-708-cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DOMENICO SANDALO,

Defendant-Appellant. ______________

Before: JACOBS, WESLEY, MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Domenico Sandalo was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court (Bryant, J.) denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Sandalo entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision.

Sandalo now challenges the search warrant’s validity. He argues that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit. A majority of this panel holds that Sandalo was not entitled to a Franks hearing. For the reasons stated herein and in the accompanying summary order which disposes of Sandalo’s additional challenge, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Judge Jacobs dissents in a separate opinion. _________________

MATTHEW BRISSENDEN, Matthew W. Brissenden, P.C., Garden City, NY (Brian Edward King, Smith & King, LLC, Garden City, NY, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant.

MARC H. SILVERMAN, Assistant United States Attorney (Maria Del Pilar Gonzalez, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Leonard C. Boyle, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee. _________________

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Domenico Sandalo was indicted for possession with

intent to distribute controlled substances after law enforcement executed a search

warrant at his residence. The United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Bryant, J.) denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized during

the search. Sandalo entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal

the district court’s decision and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

Sandalo now exercises that right. He challenges the validity of the search

warrant on several grounds, including that the district court should have given

2 him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in

the supporting affidavit of the warrant application.

Sandalo raises additional challenges. This opinion focuses primarily on the

issues related to Sandalo’s request for a Franks hearing and probable cause; his

remaining arguments are resolved in a simultaneously issued summary order. We

hold that (i) Sandalo was not entitled to a Franks hearing and (ii) the warrant did

not lack probable cause.

As a result, for the reasons set forth here and in the accompanying summary

order, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Sandalo’s motions to suppress and

to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTS 1

A. Search Warrant Affidavit and Application 2

On June 6, 2019, local law enforcement officers submitted an application

with a supporting affidavit to the Connecticut Superior Court in Norwalk,

1 The following facts are taken from the district court’s opinion and the Appendices. Citations to “App.” refer to the Appendix, citations to “S.A.” refer to the Special Appendix, and citations to “Conf. App.” refer to the Confidential Appendix. 2 The search warrant and the search warrant affidavit and application are attached as an appendix to this opinion. 3 Connecticut, requesting a search warrant for Sandalo and his residence. The

warrant application listed possession of narcotics and possession of a controlled

substance as Sandalo’s suspected crimes.

The affidavit was signed by both Officer Michael Connelly of the Stamford

Police Department’s Narcotics and Organized Crime Unit and Officer Mark Suda

of the Norwalk Police Department (together, the “Officers” or the “Affiants”). It

described Sandalo’s home as a “two[-]occupancy, two-story, colonial[-]style

residence with tan[-]colored siding, white[-]colored trim[,] and red shutters.”

App. 91 ¶ 10.

In the affidavit, the Officers attested that, from January 2019 through June

2019, a confidential informant (the “CI”) provided Officer Connelly with

information that Sandalo was trafficking large amounts of marijuana, powdered

cocaine, and oxycodone pills in Norwalk, Connecticut. The CI described Sandalo’s

appearance and vehicle and provided his address. The Officers attested that the

CI had previously provided reliable and accurate information to Officer Connelly

and other members of the Stamford Police Department, which “ha[d] been

corroborated through an independent investigation” and resulted in several

4 arrests and seizures of narcotics. Id. 90 ¶ 4. The CI positively identified Sandalo

after the Officers presented several photographs to the CI.

The affidavit also provided information concerning Sandalo’s criminal

history. It represented that, from October 2009 through January 2010, Sandalo was

the target of a joint investigation run by the Drug Enforcement Administration

(“DEA”) and the Norwalk Police Department during which officers made several

undercover purchases of OxyContin pills from him. That investigation concluded

in Sandalo’s arrest and a search of his home—the same residence identified in the

search warrant before us—where officers seized large amounts of cash, marijuana,

Percocet pills, OxyContin pills, and hydrocodone pills. As a result, Sandalo was

convicted and sentenced to 70 months in federal prison and 3 years of supervised

release.

The affidavit further revealed a parallel investigation ongoing at the time of

the warrant application. In particular, the Officers attested that from September

2016 to December 2016, Sandalo was the target of another joint investigation

conducted by the DEA and the Norwalk Police Department, during which officers

5 used “a [c]onfidential [s]ource ([the “CS”]) to conduct several controlled purchases

of [o]xy[c]odone pills from Sandalo [at] his residence . . . .” 3 Id. 91 ¶ 7.

The affidavit also described controlled phone communications that officers

oversaw between the CI and Sandalo. The Officers attested that in January 2019,

Officer Connelly and Officer C. Pennoyer of the Stamford Police Department met

with the CI “at a pre-arranged meet location for the purpose of conducting a

controlled phone contact with Domenico Sandalo.” Id. 91 ¶ 11. The Officers

attested that the CI and Sandalo “made contact via both SMS / text and phone calls

utilizing []2[] of Sandalo’s phone numbers,” during which Connelly “observed . . .

Sandalo advise[] the [CI] that he (Sandalo) was currently waiting to receive a large

shipment of [o]xycodone pills, which he was then planning to sell.” Id.

The Officers stated that they “and [o]fficers of the Stamford Police Narcotics

Division contacted members of the Bridgeport DEA Resident Office as well as

members of the Norwalk Police Special Services [D]ivision and began a multi-

jurisdictional investigation.” Id. 91 ¶ 12. The Officers noted that “all above

information [in the affidavit] was corroborated with both the DEA and members

3The Confidential Source, or CS, is not to be confused with the Confidential Informant, or CI, used in the Officers’ investigation. 6 of the Norwalk Police Special Services Division.” Id. “Through this

corroboration[,] it was confirmed that Norwalk Special Services Officers were

aware through physical observation and [CI] information that Sandalo does in fact

currently reside at” the address associated with his residence. Id.

Notably, the affidavit additionally alleged that the CI knew and/or believed

that drugs were located in Sandalo’s residence and that the CI saw narcotics there

mere hours before the Officers requested the search warrant on June 6, 2019. The

Officers attested that on that day, the CI “contacted [Officer] Connelly and stated

that Sandalo [wa]s currently in possession of a large amount of powder[ed]

cocaine (approximately 1 kilo), hundreds of oxycodone pills (described as

approximately 600 pills, light blue in color)[,] and multiple pounds of marijuana”

and claimed that “the above[-]stated narcotics [we]re being stored within

Sandalo’s residence and that the [CI] observed the narcotics within Sandalo’s

residence . . . within the last 24 hours.” Id. 92 ¶ 13. The CI, according to the

affidavit, also informed Officer Connelly that “Sandalo utilize[d] the residence as

the storage area for his . . . narcotics and that Sandalo w[ould] package, weigh[,]

and distribute the narcotics from his residence” and that “he/she ha[d] observed

7 in the past that Sandalo occasionally conceal[ed] amounts of narcotics around the

curtilage of the residence.” Id.

B. Search Warrant Issued

On June 6, 2019, the Connecticut Superior Court granted the application and

issued a search warrant permitting law enforcement to search Sandalo and to enter

his residence to conduct a search therein. The warrant listed numerous items that

could be seized from Sandalo and his residence.

C. Search and Seizure

The day the warrant was issued, Affiant Suda led a team to execute the

warrant utilizing members of the DEA, Norwalk Police Department, Stamford

Narcotics Unit, and Detective Bureau of Wilton, Connecticut. When law

enforcement arrived at Sandalo’s residence, they observed Sandalo in the

driveway performing what the officers described as a hand-to-hand narcotics

transaction with two other individuals; the officers detained Sandalo and the

individuals before entering the residence to commence the search. A substantial

8 amount of cash and illegal substances were recovered along with other items

related to drug activity. 4

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Grand Jury Indictment

Sandalo was indicted by a federal grand jury for possession with intent to

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(B) (“Count One”), and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl,

marijuana, and oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C)

(“Count Two”). The indictment further alleged that Sandalo faced enhanced

statutory penalties based on his previous federal conviction for possession with

intent to distribute oxycodone.

According to the Norwalk Police Department’s reports detailing the search, law 4

enforcement seized the following items from Sandalo’s residence: roughly $50,000 in cash; a digital scale; “14.8 pounds of marijuana”; over 600 grams of powdered cocaine; 77 prescription oxycodone pills; 46 prescription fentanyl pills; over 600 vape cartridges; 1.2 grams of anabolic steroids and 19 tablets of anastrozole steroids; “[n]umerous hypodermic needles commonly used to ingest narcotics”; and “[n]umerous financial documents and bank cards.” App. 99–101. 9 B. Sandalo’s Motions to Compel, Suppress, Dismiss, and Unseal

Sandalo brought four motions challenging the search warrant and his

indictment. First, Sandalo moved to compel the Government to identify the CI

referenced in the affidavit. The district court denied this motion.

Sandalo then moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home during

the search, to dismiss the case, and to unseal certain documents in the record to

support his motions. He argued, inter alia, that the affidavit supporting the

warrant and the issuing court’s finding of probable cause contained statements

that the Officers knew were false. Accordingly, Sandalo requested a separate

hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to challenge the truth

of three sets of statements: (1) that Officer Connelly “observed” Sandalo say he

was awaiting “a large shipment of [o]xycodone pills” for sale during “a controlled

phone contact” between the CI and Sandalo, App. 91 ¶ 11; (2) that most of the

information in the affidavit “was corroborated with both the DEA and . . . the

Norwalk Police [Department],” id. 91–92 ¶ 12; and (3) that the CI “observed . . .

narcotics within Sandalo’s residence . . . within the last 24 hours” preceding the

search warrant application, id. 92 ¶ 13.

10 C. Sandalo’s Supporting Affidavits

To support his challenges, Sandalo submitted affidavits from himself, his

wife, his father, and his lawyer. Notably, Sandalo and his family attested that on

the night the CI claimed to see narcotics in Sandalo’s home, the person they

suspected to be the CI never entered Sandalo’s residence and neither the suspected

CI nor any other visitor observed any drugs in or around the residence.

Sandalo’s affidavit contended that Officer Connelly falsely claimed he had

“observed” Sandalo inform the CI that Sandalo was awaiting a large shipment of

drugs for sale during a controlled phone contact between the CI and Sandalo in

January 2019. He further argued that the individual he believes to be the CI suffers

from ailments and poor health that made it very difficult to traverse his two-story

home, especially the stairs. Sandalo claimed that because officers found the

narcotics hidden throughout his residence during the search, the statements in the

warrant affidavit that the CI saw narcotics in Sandalo’s residence must have been

false; Sandalo attested that the CI’s poor mobility would have prevented him from

going through the home noting the location of the drugs. Lastly, Sandalo stated

that because the drugs were kept in containers, the CI could not have readily

identified or quantified the narcotics.

11 Defense counsel’s affidavit made much of the fact “that there were never

any audio or visual recordings, copies, notes, memos, or reports of the alleged

phone calls or texts between Mr. Sandalo and the confidential informant in

January 2019 that are referenced in . . . the search warrant affidavit.” App. 85 ¶

12. 5

The district court scheduled a hearing concerning Sandalo’s pending

motions and received additional briefing from the parties on the relevant issues.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Prior to the hearing, the DEA and an Assistant United States Attorney

representing the Government interviewed Officer Connelly on August 18, 2020,

and September 11, 2020, and the CI on September 14, 2020; the DEA prepared

reports summarizing the interviews. In response to Sandalo’s motion to suppress,

the Government disclosed the reports to Sandalo, who later submitted them into

the record under seal after the hearing. Before the hearing, Sandalo subpoenaed

5In Sandalo’s brief, he suggests that this lack of physical evidence “lead[s] to the . . . conclusion” that Officer Connelly “knowingly and intentionally lied about th[e] texts and calls taking place.” Appellant Br. at 50–51. 12 the person he believed to be the CI. In response, the Government moved to quash

the subpoena.

At the hearing, the parties presented arguments regarding Sandalo’s

subpoena, his motions to unseal, and his related request to hold a Franks hearing.

The parties argued at considerable length about whether testimony from the

person Sandalo suspected was the CI was necessary. To support his argument,

Sandalo relied on, inter alia, the reports prepared by the Government of the CI and

Officer Connelly’s pre-hearing interviews, which occurred over fourteen months

after the search. The Government informed the district court that the reports were

not part of the record. The district court then asked the Government to produce

the CI’s witness interview report and recessed to review it.

After reviewing the CI’s interview report, the district court ultimately ruled

that Sandalo was not entitled to a Franks hearing or to call the CI as a witness. The

district court held that Sandalo failed to establish that he correctly identified the

CI and that even if that person were the CI, he failed to present facts showing that

the CI “would cast any doubt on the veracity or the belief of the police officers at

the time they signed the warrant.” App. 262, 51:13–15.

13 E. Decision Below

In a written opinion, the district court denied Sandalo’s motion to suppress,

motion to dismiss, request for a Franks hearing, and request to subpoena the

witness he thought to be the CI. 6 Notably, the district court held that Sandalo was

not entitled to a Franks hearing because he failed to make a substantial preliminary

showing that any of the three statements Sandalo scrutinized were false material

statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search

warrant affidavit. With respect to the two sets of statements in the affidavit that

Connelly “observed” Sandalo say during a controlled call with the CI that Sandalo

was awaiting a large shipment of narcotics for sale, and that the information

provided in the affidavit was corroborated with two other law enforcement

agencies, the district court concluded that Sandalo failed to establish that these

statements were necessary to a finding of probable cause. The district court

explained that probable cause for the warrant still existed without these

statements because of the CI’s reliability, Sandalo’s previous conviction for similar

conduct, statements in the affidavit that a CS made controlled purchases of

6As a result, the district court also denied as moot the Government’s motion to quash Sandalo’s subpoena. 14 narcotics from Sandalo in 2016 during another joint investigation, and the

statements in the affidavit that the CI saw drugs in Sandalo’s residence within 24

hours before the search warrant application.

As for the statements in the affidavit that the CI observed narcotics in

Sandalo’s home, the district court found that Sandalo did not make “a substantial

preliminary showing that the statements [we]re false and that they were made by

[the A]ffiants knowing[ly] or recklessly disregarding their falsity.” S.A. 37.

The district court discredited the affidavits Sandalo submitted in support of

his motion to suppress. It noted that Sandalo’s own affidavit was “a self-serving

statement offered with no corroborati[ng] evidence” that “did not carry the burden

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” the affidavits of Sandalo’s wife and

father did not account for “the entire 24-hour period prior to the” warrant affidavit

and did not “unequivocally state there were no drugs in the house,” and all the

affidavits together did not preclude every way in which the CI may have “entered

the home without someone inside the home knowing it.” Id. 37–38. The district

court also determined that none of Sandalo’s affidavits “provide[d] an offer of

proof that the Affiants knew or recklessly disregarded the truth of” the statements

in the warrant affidavit that the CI saw drugs in Sandalo’s residence. Id. at 38. The

15 CI’s health issues discussed in these affidavits, the court reasoned, were not

enough to prevent the CI from observing narcotics inside Sandalo’s residence

because the affidavits did not state “the CI could not walk or could not use stairs,”

just that the CI “could not do it well.” Id.

F. Sandalo’s Guilty Plea and Conviction

Sandalo entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment

for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine but preserved

his right to appeal the district court’s decision denying his suppression motion and

related requests. The district court sentenced Sandalo to 10 years of imprisonment,

followed by 8 years of supervised release. He filed a timely notice of appeal.

Sandalo appeals the district court’s judgment denying his motions to

suppress and dismiss.

DISCUSSION

This case presents a complicated record, a complex set of facts, an intricate

procedural history, and a number of meritless arguments. Sandalo contends that

the Officers knowingly included false information in the affidavit supporting the

search warrant, thus entitling him to a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of

16 that information. This opinion focuses on the issues related to Sandalo’s request

for a Franks hearing and whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.

Unsatisfied by the district court’s conclusion that the Officers established

probable cause for the search warrant, Sandalo argues that they did so by

knowingly including three false, material statements in the warrant affidavit: (1)

that Officer Connelly witnessed phone calls and text conversations between the CI

and Sandalo in which Sandalo represented that he was “currently waiting to

receive a large shipment of [o]xycodone pills, which he (Sandalo) was then

planning to sell,” App. 91 ¶ 11; (2) that the information in the affidavit “was

corroborated with” the DEA and Norwalk Police Department, and around that

time, law enforcement began a “multi-jurisdictional investigation,” id. 91–92 ¶ 12;

and (3) that the CI “observed . . . narcotics within Sandalo’s residence . . . within

. . . 24 hours” of the search warrant application, id. 92 ¶ 13. He also attempts to

define the showing necessary to obtain a Franks hearing and argues he has met

that requirement.

The Officers’ conduct in obtaining a warrant to search Sandalo’s residence

did not necessitate a Franks hearing. Accordingly, the judgment entered by the

district court is affirmed.

17 I. Governing Law

To be entitled to a Franks hearing, a defendant must make “a substantial

preliminary showing” of (1) falsity, “that a false statement . . . was included by the

affiant in the warrant affidavit,” (2) knowledge, that the affiant made the allegedly

false statement “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the

truth,” and (3) materiality, that “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the

finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56; see United States v. McKenzie,

13 F.4th 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2021). A defendant’s obligation to prove these elements

is well established in this Circuit. See McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 236.

With respect to knowledge, “[a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake

are insufficient.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. As for materiality, the alleged falsehood

or omission should be set aside and “the remaining portions of the affidavit should

be reviewed . . . to determine if probable cause still exists.” United States v. Canfield,

212 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2000); Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72. If after doing so “there

remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable

cause, no hearing is required.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72. But “if the remaining

content is insufficient, the defendant is entitled . . . to [a] hearing.” Id. at 172.

18 The Franks Court warned that a defendant’s challenge of a warrant “must

be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to

cross-examine.” Id. at 171. A defendant is required to make “allegations of

deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth . . . accompanied by an

offer of proof” with the defendant’s allegations “point[ing] out specifically the

portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false” and “be[ing]

accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons.” Id. But the Court did not

further define what threshold the defendant must meet in securing a Franks

hearing.

If a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing, Franks noted that

the defendant is entitled to a hearing where he must establish falsity, knowledge,

and materiality “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 156. If a defendant

prevails at the Franks hearing, “the search warrant must be voided and the fruits

of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the

face of the affidavit.” Id.; see Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717–18.

Franks also reflects the Supreme Court’s concern that permitting a hearing

that impugns the veracity of statements included in a search warrant affidavit

without a “sensible threshold showing” could lead to a “new large-scale

19 commitment of judicial resources” and the “misuse of [] veracity hearing[s] for

purposes of discovery or obstruction.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 170. We have

recognized that Franks “adopted the substantial preliminary showing requirement

and stressed the need for a ‘sensible threshold’ before a hearing would be

required” to alleviate concerns that “frivolous challenges” could result in

“unnecessary pretrial delays.” United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir.

1984) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170).

Reflecting this purpose, courts have construed the burden imposed by the

“substantial preliminary showing” standard as a heavy one that requires more

than a mere conclusory showing. This includes our Circuit, 7 several of our sister

7See, e.g., Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that a defendant challenging a warrant’s probable cause faces a “heavy burden” that can be met by making a “substantial preliminary showing” and prevailing at a Franks hearing); Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the substantial preliminary showing “standard is a high one”). 20 circuits, 8 and the district courts within our Circuit. 9 As such, the substantial

preliminary showing standard imposes a “high” burden on Sandalo. Rivera, 928

F.2d at 604.

II. Standard of Review

While there is a circuit split on the appropriate standard of review for the

denial of a Franks hearing, see United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 156 n.19 (2d

Cir. 2013), and there appears to be some confusion on the matter within our own

circuit, see McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 236 (stating that “[t]here is mixed authority

regarding the standard of review for denial of a Franks hearing in the Circuit”), we

have held that we review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo, its

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 769 F. Appx. 288, 288 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) 8

(characterizing the substantial preliminary showing standard as a “heavy burden”); United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that the burden of making a substantial preliminary showing is “a heavy one to bear”); United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) (“These elements are hard to prove, and thus Franks hearings are rarely held.”); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 973 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “the ‘substantial preliminary showing’ requirement needed to obtain a Franks hearing is not lightly met”) (citing United States v. Hively, 61 F.3d 1358, 1360 (8th Cir. 1995)). See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, No. 1:18-00126 (EAW), 2019 WL 4509028, at *6 9

(W.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2019) (describing the “substantial preliminary showing” standard as a “high burden”); United States v. Melendez, No. 16-33 (LTS), 2016 WL 4098556, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016) (“The burden to obtain such a hearing is a heavy one, and such hearings are exceedingly rare.”); Turner v. Boyle, 116 F. Supp.3d 58, 87 (D. Conn. 2015) (calling the standard a “heavy burden”) (citation omitted). 21 conclusions of fact for clear error, and its “denial of a Franks hearing for clear error

to the extent that it rests on factual findings,” id. Accordingly, we review the

district court’s factual findings of falsity and knowledge for clear error and its

determinations of materiality de novo. See id. at 237.

We hold that the district court properly denied Sandalo’s request for a

Franks hearing “even under the more exacting de novo review.” Id. at 236.

III. Analysis

1. The Officers’ Statements Regarding the January 2019 Controlled Phone Communications Between the CI and Sandalo

Sandalo challenges the Officers’ statements in the warrant affidavit that in

January 2019, Officer Connelly was present when the CI made “a controlled phone

contact with” Sandalo “via both SMS / text and phone calls,” during which Officer

Connelly “observed . . . Sandalo advise[] the [CI] that he . . . was currently waiting

to receive a large shipment of [o]xycodone pills, which he was then planning to

sell.” App. 91 ¶ 11. Sandalo contends these statements were false and the Officers,

knowing they were false, intentionally included them in the affidavit.

Sandalo relies on an assortment of evidence to establish that Officer

Connelly knew them to be false. That evidence includes Sandalo’s own affidavit

22 in which he denies ever making similar statements over the phone to anyone in

January 2019; a report of Officer Connelly’s September 2020 interview with the

Government in which Connelly recounted the CI’s then lack of recall of the

January 2019 controlled phone communications; the warrant affidavit’s failure to

specify the date, time, or contents of the controlled phone communications; the

lack of any audio or visual depictions or recordings of the controlled phone

communications; and the “fact” that the Officers did not arrest Sandalo at the time

of the phone communications or gather other proof of his drug dealing at that

time. Sandalo also argues that the statements in the warrant affidavit regarding

the controlled phone communications are material because without them, the only

remaining examples of Sandalo’s criminality in the affidavit are the statements

that law enforcement utilized the CS to make purchases of controlled substances

from Sandalo in 2016 and the statements that the CI saw narcotics in Sandalo’s

residence within 24 hours of the June 2019 warrant application. 10

10Sandalo contends the statements that led to the 2016 arrest are insufficient as the circumstances alleged in those statements occurred over two and a half years prior to the conduct in question here. 23 But even assuming that the statements about the January 2019 controlled

phone communications were false and were included by the Officers with

knowledge of their falsity, Sandalo has failed to make a substantial preliminary

showing that they are material to a determination of probable cause. If we

removed these statements from the affidavit, as the district court rightly

recognized, “there is still probable cause due to [] Sandalo’s prior conviction for

similar conduct out of the same property, the 2016 controlled [substance] buys, the

CI’s June 2019 observations [of narcotics in Sandalo’s residence], and the

statement[s] relating to the CI’s reliability.” S.A. 36. Ultimately, the remaining

totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit establishes a “fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime w[ould] be found” at Sandalo’s residence.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).

2. The Officers’ Statements that the Information in the Affidavit “Was Corroborated” With Other Law Enforcement Agencies

Sandalo also challenges the statements that (1) the Affiants and the Stamford

Police Department contacted the DEA and Norwalk Police Department and began

a “multi-jurisdictional investigation,” and (2) information in the affidavit “was

24 corroborated” 11 with the DEA and Norwalk Police Department. App. 91 ¶ 12. In

particular, he takes these statements to mean that the Affiants, the DEA, the

Stamford Police Department, and the Norwalk Police Department jointly

conducted an investigation to “directly confirm and corroborate” the statements

regarding the January 2019 controlled phone communications—an inquiry he calls

the “confirmatory investigation.” Appellant Br. at 53–54. Sandalo, however, fails

to make a substantial preliminary showing of falsity, knowledge, and materiality

as to these statements.

Sandalo claims that these statements were knowingly false because there is

nothing reflecting what was done by the various law enforcement agencies to

confirm or corroborate the claim that during the January 2019 controlled phone

communications, Sandalo informed the CI that he was awaiting a shipment of

oxycodone for sale. The lack of information in the record or the affidavit

concerning the Officers’ statement that the information in the affidavit “was

11 The affidavit is not clear how the information included therein “was corroborated” with the DEA and Norwalk Police Department or even what “corroborated” means as used in the affidavit. App. 91 ¶ 12. We take “corroborated” to mean, at a minimum, that the Affiants and the Stamford Police Department both confirmed, if not learned of, Sandalo’s address and the 2016 controlled substance buys upon contacting the two law enforcement agencies. 25 corroborated” with the DEA and Norwalk Police Department does little for

Sandalo. It does not show that Officer Connelly’s professed observations were

false or that they were included in the affidavit with knowledge of their falsity or

in reckless disregard for their truthfulness.

To be clear, Sandalo plainly misconstrues this portion of the affidavit by

conflating the two sets of statements he challenges. The affidavit alleges both that

(1) a “multi-jurisdictional investigation” began once the Officers and the Stamford

Police Department contacted the DEA and Norwalk Police Department, and

(2) “all above” information in the affidavit was corroborated with those agencies.

App. 91 ¶ 12. However, the affidavit does not suggest the “multi-jurisdictional

investigation” that then commenced was directed at corroborating the January

2019 controlled phone communications or other information in the affidavit. Nor

does the fact that these statements are both included in the same paragraph in the

affidavit suggest otherwise. Besides, it is obvious how the Norwalk Police

Department would have corroborated the January 2019 controlled phone

communications and every other statement in the affidavit: one of its officers was

an Affiant. And there is little doubt that a “multi-jurisdictional investigation”

commenced at some time before the Officers requested the warrant; officers from

26 the DEA, Wilton Police Department, and Stamford Police Department all assisted

the search team in executing the warrant.

In any event, even if the statements in the affidavit said that the DEA

corroborated the January 2019 controlled phone communications and even if the

statements were false and included with knowledge of their falsity, these

statements—as the district court determined—are not material to a finding of

probable cause for the warrant. If we were to remove them, “there is still probable

cause due to [] Sandalo’s prior conviction for similar conduct [at] the same

property, the 2016 controlled [substance] buys, the CI’s June 2019 observations [of

drugs in Sandalo’s home], and the statement relating to the CI’s reliability.” S.A.

36. As a result, Sandalo fails to meet his burden with respect to these statements.

3. The Officers’ Statements Concerning the CI’s June 2019 Observations

Next, Sandalo takes issue with the Officers’ statement in the affidavit that

the CI saw narcotics within Sandalo’s residence in June 2019. Sandalo offers, as

proof, the affidavits submitted on his behalf, and the CI and Officer Connelly’s

witness interview reports. He argues this evidence shows law enforcement never

established a basis for the CI’s statement and, thus, the Officers lied when they

stated that the CI observed narcotics in Sandalo’s home. Relying on the Seventh 27 Circuit’s decision in United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2013),

Sandalo insists that this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the

Officers’ knowledge as to the falsity of the statement.

We are not convinced that this purported lack of support in the record for

the Officers’ statement that the CI observed narcotics in Sandalo’s residence

suggests that the statement was false. But even if the statement was false, we are

not persuaded that this suggests the Officers knew the statement was false. While

circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish knowledge of falsity, lack of

affirmative support in the record falls short of “contradictions and discrepancies”

that “are ‘sufficient to support a reasonable inference of deliberate or reckless

deception of the issuing judge.’” Appellant Reply Br. 13–14 (quoting McMurtrey,

704 F.3d at 510 n.4).

Sandalo also contends that there is a conflict between the statements the CI

and Officer Connelly made during their witness interviews as to where in the

residence the CI said the drugs would be found and that this perceived conflict

proves the Officers lied in their affidavit. Identifying an inconsistency between

the CI and Officer Connelly’s statements is Sandalo’s best argument. But the CI

and Officer Connelly made these statements to interviewing officers over fourteen

28 months after the warrant application. 12 The later statements in the interview

reports only show what the CI and Connelly could recall concerning the CI’s

earlier statements. Moreover, the inconsistent witness interview statements do not

cast doubt on the CI’s earlier statement, reported in the warrant affidavit, that the

CI saw drugs in Sandalo’s home. At best the inconsistent statements cast doubt as

to where in Sandalo’s home the CI said the drugs were located. But even if the

CI’s statement about seeing drugs in Sandalo’s home were false, that does not

indicate the Officers knew the statements were false when they included them in

the warrant affidavit. That said, during the CI’s interview, the CI explained that

Sandalo would “show the CI drugs whenever the CI stopped by Sandalo’s house,”

and “whenever [the CI] would see narcotics at Sandalo’s residence[,] [the CI]

would call [] Connelly, either on the same day or whenever [the CI] could get in

contact with him.” Conf. App. 82 ¶ 8. This is entirely consistent with the warrant

12 We find it unsurprising that the CI, who assisted in numerous other investigations leading to multiple arrests and drug seizures on “several occasions,” App. 90 ¶ 4, and Officer Connelly, a seventeen-year veteran of the Stamford Police Department and member of the Narcotics and Organized Crime Unit, would have inconsistent memories regarding exact stash spots from a specific search that occurred over a year before their respective interviews, id. 90 ¶ 1. 29 affidavit’s statement that the CI told Connelly that the CI saw drugs “within

Sandalo’s residence” within 24 hours of June 6, 2019. App. 92 ¶ 13.

Again, even if the statement were false and included in the affidavit with

the Officers’ requisite knowledge, Sandalo still fails to make a substantial

preliminary showing of materiality with respect to the specific portion of the

statement that the CI observed narcotics within the residence.

Paragraph 13 of the warrant affidavit contains the CI’s relevant statements

connecting the residence to Sandalo’s drug-trafficking activity. The first sentence

of that paragraph states that “[o]n this date 06/06/19, the above[-]stated [CI]

contacted Affiant Connelly and stated that Sandalo is currently in possession of a

large amount of powder[ed] cocaine (approximately 1 kilo), hundreds of

oxycodone pills (described as approximately 600 pills, light blue in color)[,] and

multiple pounds of marijuana.” Id. This sentence reflects the CI’s knowledge

and/or belief that narcotics were present at Sandalo’s residence on June 6, 2019.

The second sentence provides that “[t]he [CI] stated that the above[-]stated

narcotics are being stored within Sandalo’s residence and that the [CI] observed

the narcotics within Sandalo’s residence . . . within the last 24 hours.” Id. It reflects

the CI’s observation of drugs “within” Sandalo’s residence mere hours before the

30 warrant application. Id. The third sentence reads that “[t]he [CI] stated that

Sandalo utilizes the residence as the storage area for his (Sandalo’s) narcotics and

that Sandalo will[] package, weigh[,] and distribute the narcotics from his

residence.” Id. This sentence reflects the CI’s knowledge and/or belief that

Sandalo utilized his residence for drug-trafficking purposes at that time, including

as a place to store his narcotics.

Sandalo, however, only disputes whether the CI observed the narcotics in the

residence—the second sentence of paragraph 13—not the CI’s separate knowledge

and/or belief that drugs were there or that Sandalo used the residence for his illicit

operation—the first and third sentences. By removing the second sentence, the

relevant portion of the affidavit would simply provide:

On this date 06/06/19, the above[-]stated [CI] contacted Affiant Connelly and stated that Sandalo is currently in possession of a large amount of powder[ed] cocaine (approximately 1 kilo), hundreds of oxycodone pills (described as approximately 600 pills, light blue in color)[,] and multiple pounds of marijuana. . . . The [CI] stated that Sandalo utilizes the residence as the storage area for his (Sandalo’s) narcotics and that Sandalo will[] package, weigh[,] and distribute the narcotics from his residence.

31 Id. With this revision and setting aside the statements regarding the January 2019

controlled phone communications or that the information in the affidavit was

“corroborated,” there still is probable cause based on (1) the CI’s knowledge

and/or belief that Sandalo was in possession of drugs on June 6, 2019, (2) the CI’s

knowledge and/or belief that Sandalo stored his drugs at the residence at that time,

(3) the CI’s reliability, (4) the 2016 controlled substances buys, and (5) Sandalo’s

prior conviction for similar drug-trafficking conduct. Thus, even if the Officers

“[i]ntentionally misstate[d]” the fact that the CI observed the narcotics within the

residence, “it is clear that no remedy is required as a constitutional matter” under

Franks and its progeny because that fact is “[i]mmaterial to a finding of probable

cause.” United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 153 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446

U.S. 907 (1980).

Sandalo has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the

three statements Sandalo scrutinized were false material statements that the

Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He

succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within

them—that are immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Worse yet, Sandalo

32 impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. He is not entitled to a Franks

hearing. 13

* * *

Finally, a few words regarding our colleague’s dissenting view. The

dissenter agrees with the Court on two significant points: (1) Sandalo did not make

a sufficient showing that the affidavit’s reference to corroboration by other law

enforcement agencies was false, and (2) the statement about the January 2019

13 In rejecting Sandalo’s argument for a Franks hearing, it is apparent to us that there was probable cause for the search warrant. Sandalo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. We also reject Sandalo’s argument that the district court committed an error in its rulings and procedures for the hearing where it considered Sandalo’s arguments for a Franks hearing. Sandalo argues that the district court did in fact grant him a Franks hearing, relying on statements made by the district court during the hearing and, in the alternative, representations made by the court deputy prior to the hearing that parties would be “free to present witness testimony and evidentiary exhibits.” App. 294. He insists that after supposedly granting him a Franks hearing, the court changed its mind once the Government made “an oral motion to reargue its opposition to Sandalo’s motion to suppress and dismiss” by objecting to producing the CI at the hearing. App. 318. While we review the sufficiency of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion, see Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (stating that all a district court’s “evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard”), there is no discretionary act here to review; the court did not exercise discretion in that it never granted Sandalo a Franks hearing. As the district court held, “there was no motion to reargue” because the court had not yet decided whether Sandalo was entitled to a Franks hearing, he should have sought clarification if he was unsure, the court deputy did not “speak for the [c]ourt,” and the deputy was right in telling Sandalo that he could present evidence at the hearing. S.A. 41–42. Sandalo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. 33 controlled calls was “likely immaterial” to the probable cause finding. See Dissent

at 6 n.4; 14. Despite conceding immateriality of that second statement, the

dissenter sees fit to dissect the issue of that statement’s falsity and concludes that

if both that statement and the CI’s statement about seeing drugs inside the house

were false, “the warrant application falls short.” Id. at 14. But in reaching that

conclusion, the dissenter employs generous inferences, misinterprets portions of

the affidavit as inseverable, and downplays a critical missing link in the facts

presented: that Sandalo makes no showing that the Officers—rather than the CI—

knowingly or recklessly made false statements.

Take, for example, the dissenter’s analysis of the January 2019 calls, in which

Sandalo told the CI that Sandalo was waiting to receive a large shipment of drugs

to sell. Although we reach no conclusion as to this statement’s falsity (because it

is immaterial), the dissenter simply makes too much of Sandalo’s self-serving

affidavit, and too much of the notes from the pre-hearing interviews of Officer

Connelly and the CI, which took place in August and September 2020—over

nineteen months after the controlled calls. The dissenter theorizes that the CI’s

unimpressive memory suggests falsity. See Dissent at 7–8. But failing to remember

34 is not an admission of lying. 14 Sandalo must show more than poor recall; he must

show the statements were false and that the Officers knowingly or recklessly

disregarded their falsity. Moreover, the dissenter’s inference of what the CI

“likely” could have told interviewers “if” certain questions had been asked is

guesswork at best. See Dissent at 7.

The dissenter also points to Officer’s Connelly’s “prodigious” inclusion of

“two ten-digit phone numbers . . . used to contact Sandalo” in the warrant affidavit

as evidence of some type of impropriety. Id. at 8. This is not the Perry-Mason

revelation Sandalo and the dissenter wish it to be. That the Government has no

phone records of the January calls or texts hardly forecloses other ways Officer

Connelly could have acquired Sandalo’s phone numbers when he produced his

warrant affidavit. Tellingly, in Sandalo’s affidavit, he does not dispute that the

two phone numbers belong to him.

14It is also unclear how Officer Connelly’s own statement in his interview that the CI “does not remember making a controlled phone call to [Sandalo]” shows that Connelly knowingly or recklessly lied in the warrant affidavit over a year earlier. Conf. App. 76 ¶ 2. The dissenter would have us believe that Officer Connelly was feckless enough to lie under oath in his warrant application about the existence of phone calls between Sandalo and the CI, but honest enough to admit that the CI had no memory of those calls during Connelly’s out-of-court interview. This is a stretch, and it relies on hearsay. 35 The dissenter’s observations regarding the third statement—that the CI

observed drugs in Sandalo’s home within 24 hours of making the tip—fare no

better. See Dissent at 8–9. Unlike the dissent, we cannot credit Sandalo’s

self-serving statement that showing his drugs to the CI would not have “ma[de]

any sense” at the time. App. 70 ¶ 11; Dissent at 10. We also fail to see a meaningful

difference between Officer Connelly’s interview statement that the CI told him

that the CI “just left [Sandalo’s] house,” Conf. App. 78 ¶ 4, and the warrant

affidavit’s statement that the CI saw drugs “within” Sandalo’s house, App. 92 ¶

13. Nor do we discern any meaningful “daylight,” Dissent at 11, between the latter

statement and the CI’s interview notes recounting where the police “would” find

narcotics, Conf. App. 83 ¶ 11. These statements are not mutually exclusive; they

do not contradict each other. A statement that one “left” a house does not mean

he never entered it, and a statement that one “would find narcotics” in a specific

location does not mean he never saw them there himself. Even the most generous

reading of these statements would possibly raise questions about the CI’s accuracy

– but, again, Sandalo must show that it was the Officers who made false statements

knowingly or recklessly, not the CI.

36 Finally, we cannot agree with the dissenter’s objections to our materiality

analysis. Even if Sandalo made an adequate showing of falsity as to the CI’s

observations of drugs in Sandalo’s house within 24 hours of June 6, 2019—which

he has not—the dissenter would have us discard close to all of the statements the

CI made to Officer Connelly on June 6, 2019. See Dissent at 14–15. That does not

follow. Sandalo’s allegations of falsity are not pertinent to all of those statements;

they do nothing to undermine that the CI generally knew Sandalo was in

“possession of” drugs, or that Sandalo “utilizes [his] residence as the [drug]

storage area” and would “package, weigh, and distribute” the narcotics there.

App. 92 ¶ 13. After all, in the very same interview notes to which Sandalo and the

dissenter direct us, the CI recounted seeing drugs inside Sandalo’s house on 15 to

20 separate occasions. Conf. App. 82 ¶ 9. Thus, our review of the warrant affidavit

does not, as the dissenter characterizes it, “depend[] on the particular sentence

breaks in a passage that . . . could as easily be rendered without periods.” Dissent

at 15. It depends on Sandalo’s own evidence or, more accurately, lack thereof.

CONCLUSION

We have examined Sandalo’s remaining arguments and conclude that they

are without merit. For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the

37 accompanying summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying Sandalo’s motion to suppress

and motion to dismiss.

United States v. Sandalo, No. 21-708, Search Warrant, Application, and Affidavit, ECF No. 24, App'x at 74–79. SEARCHANDSBZUREWARRANT STATE OF CONNECTICUT SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT SUPERIOR COURT The foregoing Affidavit and Application for se·aroh and Seizure Warrant having been presented to and been considered by 1he under� signed, a Judge cf the Supenor Court or a Judge Trial Referee, and the foregoing Affidavit having been subscribed and sworn to by the affiant[s) before ma at the time it was presented, the undersigned (a) is satisfied .therefrom that grounds exist for said application, and (b) finds that said affidavit established grounds and probable cause for the undersigned to issue this Search and Se[zura Warrant, such probable cause being the following: Frorn said affidavit, the undersigned finds that there is probable cause for the undersigned to believe that the property described in the foregoing affidavit and application is within or upon the person, if any, named or descnbed in the foregoing affidavit and application, or the place or thing, if any, described in the foregoing affidavit and application, under the conditions and circumstances set forth in the foregoing affidavit and application, and that, therefore, a Search and Seizure warrant should issue for said property. NOW THEREFORE, by Authority of the state of Connecticut, I hereby command any"Police Officer of a regularly organized police department, any State Police Officer, any inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, or any conservation officer, special conseNation officer or patrol officer acting pursuant to C.G.S. § 26-6 to whom these presents shall come within ten days after the date of this warrant to enter into or upon and search the place or thing described in the foregoing affidavit and application, or search the person descnced in the foregoing affidavit and application or both, to wit The zcsidcnce, property a.:od co.rtilage of. S Mobackemo Drive, Norwalk. CT described as a two-story, colo.w.al style rcside111:e with tau colored siding, white colored trim and red shutters. The n�ber 5 is affixed to the front ofth;, residenc.:. The residence is located on the southern side ofMohackemo Drive.

for the property described in the foregoing affidavit and application, to wit: Prescription narcotics and medications, controlled substances, opium and feutanyl derivatives, powder cocaine, cannabis.drugs, cutting agents, instruments used to package, weigh. dilute, ingest, inject, or smoke drugs, scales, measuring devices, mollies, and written records pertaining to the sales ofnarcotics, telephone records, bank records, and/or safes, safe deposit keys, electronic devices, suc!t as cellular phones/pagers used for communication of drug operatives and the data recovery from the cell-phones 1hat would include but would not be limited to; all text messages, including multi.media messaging.service and short message serviC1:s, video, audio, and photograph recqrding, call logs, call history, contacts, address books, global positioning system, cache, calendar, and e-mails., computers used for record keeping practices, and cameras commonly used for the protection of drug trafficking operations. AIJ..y and all items reasonably believed to be proceeds from the crime(s).

ri submit the properfy described in the foregoing affidavit and application to laboratory analysis and examination:

and upon 1inding said property to seize the same, take and keep it ln custody until the further order of the court, and with reasonable promptness make due return of this warrant accompanied by a written inventory of all property seized. frhe foregoing request that the judge or judge trial referee dispense with the requirement of C.G.S. § 54-33c that a copy of the [SJ' warrant application and affidaVit(s} in support cf the warrant ce given to the owner; occupant or person named therein and that the affidavit in support of such ll'lquest arso be included in such nondelivery is hereby: NOTTOEXCEE 2WcEl

D SefVlce of thls Search Warrant upori the customer whose financial records are being sought is hereby waived. pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-43 (a). (NOTE: AFFIANrs OATH MUST BE TAKEN PRIOR TO JUDGE/ JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE SIGNING BELOW)

(This is page 7 of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.) At(TimeJ a.m. {:::._ , Connecticut, on: 1·�z1 p.m.

39 AFFIDAVIT AND APPLICATION STATE OF CONNECTICUT SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT SUPERIOR COURT JO.CR-61 Rev. 3-10 www.jtJd.ct.gov C.G.S. §§ S4-33a, 54-33c, 54--33j Ferm JD-CR-52 must also be c:omp/eted Instructions To Applicant Instructions To GA Cletk Fife the application forthe warrant and all affldavfts upon which Upon execution and retum of the warrant, affidavits which are the W

� is pos��ssed, co�tr<;>Ued, designe� or intended for use or which is or has been or may be used as the means of commlttmg the criminal offense ot Poss of Narcotics 21a-279{a), Poss of Controlled Substanc 1 e 2 a-279{c) D was stolen or embezzled from: ------------------------------- � constitutes evidence of the following offense or that a particular person participated in the commission of the offense of: Poss of Narcotics 21a-279(a}, Poss of Controlled Substance 21a-279(c) D is in the possession, custody or control of a journalist or news organization, to wit:

D and such person or organization has committed or is committing the following offense which is related to such property:

D and such property constitutes contraband or an instrumentality of the criminal offense of:

And is within or upon a certain person, place, or thing, to wit The residence, property and curtil.age of; S Mohackcmo Drive, Norwalk, CT described as a two-sro:y, colonial style residence with·ta.n colo�d siding, white colored trim and red shutters. The number 5 is affixed 10 the fumtofthc residence. The residence is located on the southern side ofMohackemo Drive.

(This is page 1 of a B page Affidavit and Application.)

40 And the facts establishing the grounds for issuing a Search and Seizure Warrant are the following: 1. That Affiant Officer Michael Connelly is a regular member of the Stamford Police Department with over 17 years of Police experience and training respectively. Affiant Connelly is currently assigned to the Stamford l'olice Narcotics & Organized Crime Unit. Affiant Connelly has participated in numerous narcotics investigations, which have resulted in the seizure of narcotics and the arrest and convictions of the accused. At all times mentioned herein, A.ffiant Connelly was acting in his official capacity as a member of the Stamford l'olice Department. Affiant Connelly has knowledge of the facts contained herein from bis personal knowledge and efforts, as well as, the efforts of other Officers of the Stamford Police Narcotics & Organized Crime Unit who were all acting in their official duties. That Affiant Mark Suda is a swom member of the Norwalk Police Department with over twenty four years of law enforcement experience. Affiant Suda is currently assigned to the Special Services Division, and has .over fifteen years of experience in the field of narcotics investigations and other related criminal activities. A:ffiant Suda has participated in nwnerous investigations resulting in the issuance of arrest warrant$ and search and seizure warrants for the crimes of Sale ofNarcotics, Possession ofNarcotics and other drug related offenses. Affiant Suda has attended various schools and training° seminars pertaining to criminal investigations and search and seizure. Affiant Suda has regularly utilized the services of confidential infonnants to further such investigations. As a result of Affiant Suda's experience in the field of narcotics enforcement, Affiant Suda ,has become familiar with the methods, practic.es and tenninology of narcotics violators and the deceptions and codes used by them to avoid detection by Law Enforcement Authorities. The information contained within this investigation has been provided by fellow Law Enforcement Officers and through personal investigation by Affiant Suda.

2. Starting within tp,e month of January 2019 and continuing through June 2019, a credible and reliable Confidential Informant or (C/I) cont.acted Affiant Coooelly and stated that he/she had knowledge that a large amount of Oxycodone pills, powder cocaine and marijuana were currently being .dealt by a male whom the C/I identified as Domenico Sandalo D.O.B. - of 5 Mohackemo Drive Norwalk, CT. The C/I st.ated that he/ she has knowleq.ge that Sandalo transports, delivers and sells a large amount of Oxycodone Pills, powder cocaine and marijuana \Vithin the City ofNorwalk, CT.

3. The C/I described Sandalo as a white male, approximately 44 years old, approximately 5'11, stocky build, approximately 190 lbs, with a bald head. The C/I stated that Sandalo operates a newer model, silver colored, Nissan Rogue.

4. The C/I providing this infonnation has given Affiant Connelly as well as other members of the Stamford Police Narcotics and Organized Crime Unit reliable and accurate information in the past, which has been corroborated through an independent investigation. The C/I providing this infotmation has given Affiant Connelly and other members of the Stamford Police Narcotics and Organized Crim� Unit reliable and accurate information in the past which has resulted in nwnerous arrests and seizures narcotics on several occasions.

5. During the A:ffiant's independent investigation the Affiants positively identified Domenico Sandalo D.O.B. -of5 Mohackemo Drive Norwalk, CT as the target of this investigation. The Affi�ts were able to retrieve several photographs of Sandalo via numerous independent sources. The Affiants $bowed the pictures of Sandalo to the C/I who confirmed that the person in the photograph is the person he/she knows a_s Domenico Sandalo.

(This is page 2 of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.) City/Town

'\ Jurat

JD-CR-61 Rev. 3"1 o

41 6. Through the Affiant's independent investigation, they discovered that between the months of October 2009 through January 2010, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Norwalk, CT Police Depar1ment conducted a joint investigation into Sandalo. Through this investigation, the DEA and the Norwalk Police Department �onducted several undercover purchases of OxyContin pills from Sandalo. The investigation concluded on January 27th 2010, which resulted in Sandalo's arrest and a search of his residence of 5 Mobackemo Drive Norwalk, CT, which resulted in the seizure of: 731 bxyContin Pills, 683 PercocetPills; 190 B:ydrocodone pills, approximately (6) kilograms ofmarijuap.a and $103,028.00 in U.S. Currency. As a result of this investigation, Sandalo was convicted and sentenced to 70 months in_Federal prison followed by three years of supervised rel�e.

7. It was also discovered that between the months of September 2016 and December 2016, the DEA and Norwalk Police Department conducted ari additional investigation into Sandalo. During this time frame, The DEA and Norwalk Police Department utilized a Confidential Source (CS) to conduct several controlled purchases of OxyCodone pills from Sandalo and his residence located at 5 Mohackemo Dr., Norwalk, CT. The status of the 2016 investigation is still currently open.

8. A DMV/NCIC search revealed that a 2017, Nissan Rogue, color silver, VIN: 5N1AT2MVXHC892941, bearing CT Registration AM-23151, is registered to Domenico Sandalo's mother: (11.1aria Sandalo D.O.B. of 5 Mohackemo Drive Notwalk, CT.

9. The Affiants were able to confirm through several Law Enforcement databases that Domenico Sandalo is listed as residing at 5 Mohackemo Drive Norwalk, CT.

10. The residence of5 Mohackemo Di;ive, Notwalk, CT is described as a two occupancy, two-story, colonial style residence with tan colored siding, white colored trim and red shutters. That the number 5 is affixed to the front of the residence. The residence is located on the southern side of Mohackemo Drive. That there is an apartment within the residence located on the first floor (left side) of the residence, which is independently rented and encased with closed walls and doors. The apartment is owned by Sandalo but due to the fact thatit may be rented to an independent person the Affiants are respectfully requesting to exclude the apartment from the scope of this warrant.

11. During the month of January 2019, A.ffiant Connelly and Stamford police Narcotics Officer C.Pennoyer met with the previously stated C/I at a pre-arranged meet location for the prn:pose of conducting_ a controlled phone contact with Domenico Sandalo. The C/I and Sandalo made contact via both SMS / text and phone calls utilizing (2) of Sandalo's phone numbers of 585-635�5962 and 203-253-6224. During the conversations, Affiant Connelly observed that Sandalo advised the ·c11 that he (Sandalo) was currently waiting to receive a large shipment of Oxycodone pills, which he was then planning to sell. Therefore Affiant Connelly was able to directly confirm and corroborate the above stated information.

12. The Affiants and Officers of the Stamford Police Narcotics Division contacted members of the Bridgeport DEA Resident Office as well as members of the Notwaik Police Special Services division and began a multi.­ jurisdictional investigation. Note that all above information was corroborated with both the DEA and members of

(This ;s page 3 of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.)

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JIU:R-61 Re\l, 3--10

42 the Norwalk Police Special Services Division. Through this corroboration it was confirmed th.at Norwalk Special Services Officers were aware through physical observation and C/I information th.at Sandalo does in fact currently reside at 5 Mohackemo Drive Norwalk, CT.

13. On this date 06/06/19, the above stated C/I contacted Affiant Connelly and stated that Sandalo is currently in possessiqn of a large amount of powder cocaine (approxiately I kilo), hundreds of oxycodone pills (descnoed as • approximately 600 pills, light blue in color) and multiple pounds of marijuana. The C/I stated that the above stated �otics are being stored within Sandalo's residence and that ):he C/I observed the narcotics within Sandalo's residence (5 Mohackemo Drive Norwalk, Cl) within the last 24 hours. The C/I stated th.at Sandalo utilizes the residence as the storage area for his (Sandalo's) narcotics and that Sandalo will, package, weigh and distribute the narcotics from his residence. The C/I stated that he/she has observed in the past that Sandalo occasionally conceals amounts of narcotics around the curtilage of the residence.

14. That based on the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the Affiants believe that probable cause exists and requests thata search warrant be issued for the residence of5 Mohackemo Drive, Norwalk, CT (excluding the separate apartment located on the first floor, left side).

(fhis is page 4 of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.) CityfTown

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JD-CR-61 Re\1.3-10

43 The undersigned ('Xn one) 'X1 has not presented this application in any other court or to any other judge or � judge trial referee. has presented th_is appl[cafion in another court or to another judge or D judge trial referee (specify):

Wherefore the undersigned requests that a warrant may issue commanding a proper officer to search said person

✓ or to enter into or 1.Jpon said place or thing, search the same, and take into custody all such property.

,.nd to submit the property described in the foregoing affidavit and application to laboratory analysis and examination:

(This is page 5 of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.) Cityffown

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44 AFF1DAVil REQUESTING DISPENSATlON WITH REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY pursuant to § 54-33c, Connecticut General Statutes TO: A Judge of the Superior Court or a Judge Trial Referee For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned, being duly sworn, requests that the judge/ judge trial referee dispense with the requirement of C.G.S. § 54-33cthat a copy of the application for the warrant and a copy of any affidavit(s) in support of the warrant be given to the owner, occupant or person named therein with forty-e1ght hours of the search: !RI �he personal safety of a cor:ifidential informant would be jeopardized by the giving of a copy of the affidavits at such time; D The search is part of a continuing investigatlon which would be adversely affected by the giving of a copy of the affidavits at such time;

D The givlng of such affidavits at such time would require disclosure of information or material prohibited from belng discfosed by chapter 959a of the general statutes;

D ·Inrecords addition, lt ls requested that the requirement of advance service of this warrant upon the customer whose financial are being sough� be waived pursuant to C.G.S. § 36a-43 (a);

and the specific details with regard to such reasons are as follows: So the confidential and reliable informant can continue to work In an undercover capacity on·future investigations. . .

The undersigned further requests that this affidavit also be included in such nondelivery. {[his is page 6 .of a 8 page Affidavit and Application.) Citytrown

45 DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Domenico Sandalo entered a conditional plea to drug offenses. The only

evidence substantiating the charges was collected pursuant to a single search

warrant. The application for that search warrant premised probable cause

principally on two averments: (1) Sandalo incriminated himself in January 2019

via phone calls and text messages with a confidential informant, contacts which

were observed by law enforcement; and (2) the informant personally observed

drugs inside Sandalo’s home on June 5, 2019, the night before the warrant

application was submitted.

In anticipation of a hearing on whether the affiants intentionally or

recklessly misled the magistrate with these two allegations, the prosecution sat

down both with the principal affiant, Officer Connelly, and with his informant.

But the notes from the informant’s interview unaccountably fail to mention

either Sandalo’s January self-incrimination or the informant’s personal

observation of drugs on the night in question. And the notes from Connelly’s

interview provide little insight into what, specifically, the informant told him on

the night of June 5 after leaving Sandalo’s house. These omissions, together with Sandalo’s affidavits plausibly discrediting

the informant’s story, constitute a substantial (and therefore sufficient)

preliminary showing that the affiants intentionally or recklessly presented false

information to the magistrate. Franks v. Delaware thus mandates an evidentiary

hearing at which a factfinder may determine whether the search warrant was

premised on falsehood.

The majority concludes that (1) Sandalo failed to make a preliminary

showing that the contested allegations were knowingly false and (2) that the

allegations were immaterial to the finding of probable cause. I disagree on both

scores. The majority lays too heavy a burden on a defendant seeking a Franks

hearing, and then dismisses too lightly Sandalo’s evidence suggesting that the

core factual representations underpinning the warrant were false. And if we

excise the allegedly false statements, what remains of the application would fall

well short of probable cause. I respectfully dissent.

I

The warrant requirement is “[t]he bulwark of Fourth Amendment

protection,” and the issuance of a warrant presumptively authorizes the

subsequent search. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). But “[w]hen the

2 Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise ‘probable

cause,’ the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing.” Id. at

164–65 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Accordingly, Franks v. Delaware

provides for suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that

was procured by an intentionally or recklessly false warrant affidavit. Without

the threat of suppression when an affiant fabricates the basis for a warrant, the

probable cause requirement “would be reduced to a nullity.” Id. at 168.

Under Franks, a defendant who believes that a warrant authorizing search

and seizure of his property was procured through perjury may request an

evidentiary hearing. To obtain such a hearing, the defendant must make a

“substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant intentionally or recklessly

misled the magistrate regarding facts material to probable cause. Id. at 156, 170.

For the “preliminary showing” to be “substantial,” “the challenger’s attack must

be more than conclusory”; it must include “allegations of deliberate falsehood or

of reckless disregard for the truth . . . accompanied by an offer of proof,” such as

“[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses”; and it must

“specifically” identify which “portion of the warrant affidavit . . . is claimed to be

false.” Id. at 171.

3 The majority argues that a defendant bears a “high” and “heavy” burden

to obtain a Franks hearing. Maj. Op. at 20–21. It is no useful clarification for the

majority to then add that the burden is “more than a mere conclusory showing.”

Id. at 20. Every burden in law is greater than conclusory; and a “heavy” or

“high” burden can be read to approach or even exceed the burden the defendant

bears at the hearing itself: to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

affidavit was tainted by intentional or reckless falsehoods. Franks, 438 U.S. at

156. If no more than a preponderance is needed to succeed at the hearing, it

follows that no “heavy” burden must be sustained to obtain a hearing in the first

place. If the majority had simply explained, as Franks itself does, that the

defendant’s showing “must be more than conclusory” and stopped there, then its

opinion would be correct on the law, and Sandalo would get his hearing.

The cases on which the majority relies for its “high” and “heavy” burden

merely note how difficult it is to obtain a Franks hearing in practice. Those

practical impediments 1 do not raise the burden of proof. Applying the proper

1 A defendant must do more than claim that, because he is innocent, the affiant must have lied. He must produce an offer of proof regarding behind-the-scenes conduct ordinarily unknown to the defendant given the ex parte and pre-arrest nature of the warrant application. He must then furnish evidence of the affiant’s state of mind, and when, as here, the affidavit rests on a confidential informant, the defendant must show not simply that the information was bad but that the tip never happened or that the officer knew the tip was rotten. And he must do all this without the benefit of cross-examination. For these reasons, I do not share the majority’s 4 standard, district courts should grant a Franks hearing when a defendant has

produced evidence beyond conclusory allegations, such as sworn affidavits from

relevant witnesses, raising a legitimate question whether the warrant application

relied on specific intentional or reckless material falsehoods. Sandalo is the rare

defendant who has overcome these obstacles and made the kind of showing

required by Franks.

In its response to this dissent, the majority manifests its erroneous premise:

that a defendant cannot get a Franks hearing without all but establishing that he

will prevail. It is no answer to a motion for a Franks hearing to say, as the

majority does, that the prosecution could refute what the defendant will try to

show at the hearing, or that the defendant’s affidavit is self-serving (it always

will be), or that the court “cannot credit” something it is not called upon to

decide or weigh. 2

For the same reason, it is no answer that my dissent “downplays” this, or

“hardly forecloses” that, or “employs generous inferences.” 3 Sandalo’s burden at

concern that faithfully applying Franks’s more-than-conclusory standard will result in a “new large-scale commitment of judicial resources” or in “frivolous challenges” creating “unnecessary pretrial delays.” Maj. Op. at 20–21 (citations omitted). 2 Maj. Op. at 36. 3 Maj. Op. at 34, 35.

5 a Franks hearing is to make his case by a preponderance; his burden in seeking the

hearing is to make a non-conclusory showing that he might eventually succeed.

He need not show that the government will have no response or will lie supine at

the hearing. His right to a Franks hearing easily withstands the majority’s

labored demonstration that the government might refute Sandalo’s presentation

in ways the majority can conceive and would credit.

II

I express no opinion on the likely or proper outcome of a Franks hearing in

this case; but I am convinced that Sandalo is entitled to one.

Sandalo has made a substantial preliminary showing that two statements

in the warrant affidavit were either knowingly false or made with reckless

disregard for the truth:

1. “During the month of January 2019 . . . [t]he [confidential informant] and Sandalo made contact via both SMS/text and phone calls utilizing (2) of Sandalo’s phone numbers . . . . During the conversations, Affiant Connelly observed that Sandalo advised the [confidential informant] that he (Sandalo) was currently waiting to receive a large shipment of Oxycodone pills, which he was then planning to sell[.]” App. 91.

2. “On this date 06/06/19, the above stated [confidential informant] contacted Affiant Connelly and stated that Sandalo is currently in possession of a large amount of [various illegal drugs,] . . . . The [confidential informant] stated that the above narcotics are being stored within Sandalo’s residence and that the [confidential 6 informant] observed the narcotics within Sandalo’s residence . . . within the last 24 hours.” App. 92.

I will address each in turn. 4

First, the phone contacts. Sandalo has four grounds for challenging to the

application’s claim that he incriminated himself in January 2019:

• Sandalo submitted a sworn affidavit that the alleged phone conversations never happened. App. at 68. Though this statement is self-serving, Sandalo is the only possible witness to the alleged conversations other than Connelly and the informant. One of the requisites to obtain a Franks hearing is the defendant’s specific denial of the critical facts: that is what Sandalo has done.

• Prosecutors interviewed Officer Connelly twice in anticipation of a Franks hearing (which ultimately never occurred) and memorialized the conversations in notes subsequently turned over to the defense (the “Connelly Notes”). Yet in those interviews, Connelly provided only a perfunctory summary of the phone calls. He also reported the informant’s eye-opening statement that the informant “does not remember making a controlled phone call to [Sandalo].” Conf. App. at 76.

• Notes made of a similar interview with the informant (the “Informant Notes”) omit any mention of the phone contacts at all. If prosecutors asked about the informant’s recollection, it is likely that the informant told them what he or she told Connelly: that he or she did not remember calling or texting Sandalo under Officer Connelly’s supervision.

• Connelly’s warrant application, prepared in June, contained the two ten-digit phone numbers that he and the informant had used to contact Sandalo in January, five months prior. This was a feat of memory: the government

4I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis of the warrant affidavit’s reference to corroboration by other law enforcement agencies. Maj. Op. at 24–27.

7 represents that no one kept any notes, phone records, screenshots, or other documentation of either the existence or content of the calls and text messages. See App. at 85.

So, we have a sworn (if self-serving) denial that the conversations ever

happened, and statements by the informant that he or she does not remember

them. There is no evidence of the text messages referenced in the warrant

application, and Connelly’s prodigious recall of the phone numbers raises doubt

as to his truthfulness. This is the requisite nonconclusory showing that the

portion of the warrant affidavit regarding Sandalo’s alleged self-incrimination in

January 2019 was knowingly, or at least recklessly, false; and it exposes factual

issues which would benefit from resolution at an evidentiary hearing.

Next, the warrant application’s central claim is the informant’s alleged

personal observation of drugs in Sandalo’s home on June 5. But as with the

January phone contacts, the warrant application itself contains the only

statement that the informant actually entered Sandalo’s house on the night of

June 5, let alone that the informant toured Sandalo’s various stash spots. Sandalo

averred that on the night of June 5, he and his wife hosted another couple for

dinner; the informant (whom Sandalo has identified) arrived fashionably late

around ten; after socializing in the driveway for about an hour, the guests left

8 without going inside. Sandalo’s wife swore to the same facts. Sandalo’s father,

who lives in an apartment in the same house, swore that he was home the entire

evening of June 5 and saw neither drugs in the house nor anyone else who could

have seen drugs. 5

These witnesses have their interests. But neither Connelly nor the

informant contradicted this account in their interviews. The informant, the only

other individual who could directly state that he went into Sandalo’s house on

June 5, did not do so. Indeed, the informant said nothing about what he or she

did or did not do on June 5. Nor did the informant tell Connelly that he or she

had entered the house: instead, per Connelly, the informant said only that he or

she had “just left [Sandalo’s] house.” Conf. App. at 78.

Moreover, the warrant affidavit (premised on the informant’s tip) specified

the quantity and color of the drugs—notwithstanding that these drugs were

tucked away in hiding places throughout Sandalo’s house. In order to have

collected this information, the informant would have needed a realtor’s tour of

the house, including Sandalo’s stashes. Yet as Sandalo explains in his affidavit,

5 The district court discounted Sandalo’s offer of proof because it did not account for the possibility that the informant returned on June 6 and observed the drugs house when no one was home to see him. But the Connelly Notes record that the informant’s tip came “late on the night of the 5th.” Conf. App. 78.

9 taking the informant on such a tour would not “make[] any sense as there was no

reason for [Sandalo] to have shown those drugs to [the informant].” App. at 70.

There is thus ample room to doubt that the personal observation at the

heart of the warrant application ever occurred. The government argues that the

informant may have sneaked in, evading the notice of the three residents for long

enough to spy out the drugs hidden about the premises. This is particularly

doubtful considering that the informant “had undergone multiple amputations

to his feet due to diabetes,” Reply Br. at 3, requiring “a break” every 40 to 50 feet

and causing “difficulty” in climbing stairs, such as those needed to enter

Sandalo’s home without detection. Conf. App. at 80, 82. Given this, a multi-

story, clandestine snooping mission seems out of the question.

Of course, “Franks does not require that all statements in an affidavit be

true,” United States v. Campino, 890 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1989)—suppression is

required only when the affiant knew that his submission was false or was

reckless with regard to its truth. If Connelly unknowingly repeated a lie to the

magistrate, Franks would not require suppression.

But was Connelly ever told that that the informant had actually seen the

drugs? Neither the Connelly Notes nor the Informant Notes say so, even though

10 the interviews occurred in anticipation of a hearing on that very question. The

Connelly Notes conspicuously fail to say that the informant told Connelly that

the informant went inside the house. What Connelly recalled instead is that the

informant told him “I . . . just left [Sandalo’s] house . . . [and] drugs (narcotics)

were located” at various places inside. Conf. App. at 78. The informant,

meanwhile, “remembers telling [] Connelly the locations of where the police

would find narcotics.” Conf. App. at 83. Note the daylight between saying

where drugs could be found (which could have been based on months-old

information) and saying that the informant had personally seen them there that

night. Sandalo should be able to question the relevant witnesses to determine

why the government attorneys either asked no questions about the night on

which this case hinges or, if they did ask, what answers the witnesses gave that

the prosecutors omitted to record.

Perhaps more telling is the contradictory recollections of where the

informant said the drugs would be located. Per Connelly, the informant told him

that “drugs . . . were located on the first floor and to check the refrigerator, trunk

of the car in the garage, and the vase in the dining room.” Conf. App. 78. The

informant, meanwhile, recalled saying that Sandalo “would keep pills in the

11 boiler room, cocaine in a partially finished area of the basement,” marijuana in “a

crawl space,” and “marijuana vape cartridges in the refrigerator.” Conf. App. 83.

With the exception of the refrigerator (a seemingly universal stash spot), these

very specific lists of hiding places are so different as to call into question whether

the conversation occurred at all.

The majority, which deems these contradictions “Sandalo’s best

argument,” dismisses them as having been made “fourteen months after the

warrant application.” Maj. Op. at 28–29. But there was no failure to remember:

both recalled specific lists of hiding places. The government’s explanation at oral

argument—that the informant was merely talking generally about Sandalo’s

practices—is no help. Rather, it highlights the unaccountable omission of any

discussion of the informant’s conduct or conversations on June 5 in an interview

nominally about what happened that night.

In sum, Sandalo checked every box that Franks requires. He identified

specific provisions of the warrant affidavit as false: the self-incriminating phone

call and the personal observation of drugs inside the house. He provided an

explanation backed by an offer of proof for why he believed those statements

were false and why he believed the affiants knew or were reckless with respect to

12 their falsity. He attested that the self-incriminating phone contacts never

occurred, and provided evidence that (a) the informant had no recollection of

them and (b) that the police have no record of them. And Sandalo undermined

the government’s account of the June 5 events: despite opportunities to do so in

their witness interviews, neither Connelly nor the informant contradicted

Sandalo’s denial that the informant ever entered his home or observed any

narcotics. More importantly, neither interviewee said that the informant told

Connelly that he or she had done so. Nothing more is required for a “substantial

preliminary showing.”

III

Rather than confront Sandalo’s evidence of false statements in the warrant

application, the majority labors to show that the statements were not material,

i.e., “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; United

States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2021). To determine materiality, a

court “set[s]” the challenged factual assertions “to one side” and determines if

“there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of

probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72.

13 There were four bases for probable cause in the warrant application:

Sandalo’s ten-year-old conviction for dealing drugs; a three-year-old controlled

buy; the January 2019 phone conversations in which Sandalo allegedly

incriminated himself; and the informant’s alleged personal observation of drugs

in Sandalo’s home in June 2019. I agree with the majority that the January phone

contacts, considered in isolation, were likely immaterial to the probable cause

finding. 6 See Maj. Op. at 24–25. But the informant’s alleged personal

observation of drugs inside Sandalo’s house was critical to probable cause, and if

we set aside both the personal observation and the phone contacts, the warrant

application falls short.

Paragraph 13 is the critical paragraph in the affidavit:

On [June 6, 2019], the above stated C/I contacted Affiant Connelly and stated that Sandalo is currently in possession of a large amount of [drugs]. The C/I stated that the above stated narcotics are being stored within Sandalo's residence and that the C/I observed the narcotics within Sandalo’s residence . . . within the last 24 hours. The C/I stated that Sandalo utilizes the residence as the storage area for his (Sandalo's) narcotics and that Sandalo will[] package, weigh and distribute the narcotics from his residence.

6 Nonetheless, if the district court did hypothetically conclude at an evidentiary hearing that Connelly had fabricated the January phone contacts, that act of deception would speak forcefully to his state of mind regarding other allegedly false aspects of the affidavit.

14 App. at 92 (emphasis added). The majority’s analysis excises only the sentence

that specifically mentions the observation of the drugs (in bold above) and deems

the remainder sufficient for probable cause. See Maj. Op. at 31–32. But in my

view, paragraph 13 is not divisible and must stand or fall as a whole. The

majority’s analysis depends on the particular sentence breaks in a passage that

(with a small grammatical change) could as easily be rendered without periods.

The alleged personal observation in the second sentence accounts for and is thus

inextricable from the informant’s assertions in the first and third sentences that

Sandalo had drugs in his home.

Once we set aside the entirety of paragraph 13 (along with the January

phone contacts), the affidavit thus corrected fails to state probable cause: the only

basis for such a finding would have been Sandalo’s distribution activity ten and

three years earlier. Although prior similar conduct can be relevant to probable

cause, there must be some indication that criminal activity is ongoing at the time

the warrant is to be executed. 7 See United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122–23

7I am far from convinced that the affidavit even as “corrected” by the majority would support probable cause. In the majority’s truncated paragraph 13, see Maj. Op. at 31, the informant’s assertions regarding Sandalo’s possession of drugs in his home are presented without any basis of knowledge or corroboration, leaving probable cause to lean solely on the informant’s credibility. Although it is not necessary for a warrant affidavit to include corroboration or explain an informant’s basis of knowledge, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 15 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 732 (2d Cir. 1998). That is

conspicuously missing.

* * *

Sandalo has made a substantial preliminary showing that the two core

factual assertions critical to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause

were intentionally or recklessly false. Accordingly, Sandalo was entitled to a

Franks hearing.

232–34 (1983), those considerations are unquestionably important to the probable cause inquiry, see McColley v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 2014).