RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0129P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0129p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X Plaintiff-Appellee, - - - No. 01-5881 v. - > , ABRAHAM DENKINS, II, - Defendant-Appellant. - N Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington. No. 00-00026—Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge.
Submitted: August 5, 2003
Decided and Filed: May 6, 2004
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; RYAN, Circuit Judge; ROSEN, District Judge.*
* The Honorable Gerald E. Rosen, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1 No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 3 4 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
ON BRIEF: Melvin Houston, Detroit, Michigan, for Defendant now appeals from his conviction and sentence Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., ASSISTANT UNITED on three grounds. First, he challenges the district court’s STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, claiming substantive and procedural errors in the lower court’s _________________ resolution of this motion. Next, Defendant asserts that his nolo contendere plea should not have been accepted, where OPINION the district court purportedly failed to adequately ascertain _________________ whether he understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. Finally, in a separate brief ROSEN, District Judge. filed on his own behalf, Defendant challenges the district court’s enhancement of his sentence based on his prior drug I. INTRODUCTION convictions, contending that the court failed to establish Defendant/Appellant Abraham Denkins was charged in a whether the prior convictions relied upon were three-count indictment for his alleged role in a drug constitutionally sound and valid. For the reasons set forth conspiracy. Specifically, the Government alleged that on below, we affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence. May 5, 2000, Defendant delivered approximately 12 grams of II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND cocaine base to a witness cooperating with the Government, and that Defendant accepted $100 from a co-defendant for A. Defendant’s alleged role in the charged offenses completing this transaction. The indictment charged Defendant with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with The presentence report in this case discloses the following intent to distribute crack cocaine, distribution of cocaine base, facts. On May 5, 2000 at around 5:00 p.m., and travel in interstate commerce to facilitate narcotics defendant/appellant Abraham Denkins arrived at a Holiday trafficking. Inn parking lot in Covington, Kentucky with approximately 12 grams of crack cocaine. He delivered the narcotics to a Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to each of witness cooperating with the Government, and was given these three charges. Shortly before he was to be sentenced, $540 in cash. Immediately following this exchange, however, Defendant filed motions, through new counsel, Defendant was arrested. seeking to withdraw his plea and be referred for a competency evaluation. The district court granted the motion for a Defendant reportedly advised the arresting officers that he competency evaluation but denied the motion to withdraw the had delivered the drugs at the request of a co-defendant, plea pending the completion of the competency evaluation. Miller Beckham, who had approached him in Cincinnati, The evaluation concluded that Defendant was competent to Ohio and offered him $100 to complete the transaction. plead guilty and participate in sentencing, and Defendant Defendant further stated that Beckham and a third defendant, subsequently withdrew his blanket objection to the Jackie Sanders, drove him from Cincinnati to Covington, and presentence report based on lack of competency. The court that, along the way, Beckham gave him the narcotics wrapped then sentenced Defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment, the in a tissue. Finally, Defendant reported that, upon arriving at statutory minimum in light of his prior drug convictions. the Holiday Inn parking lot, he entered a vehicle occupied by the Government’s cooperating witness and delivered the No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 5 6 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
package of drugs to this individual. In his statement to the basis for a plea of guilty to the Count One conspiracy arresting officers, Defendant indicated that he knew he was offense.2 delivering drugs, but only became aware of the type of drug when the cooperating witness opened the package in his Following reassignment of the case to District Judge presence.1 Jennifer B. Coffman, Defendant again attempted to withdraw his initial plea, and instead sought to plead nolo contendere to B. Procedural History all of the charges. At a plea hearing on September 21, 2000, Judge Coffman asked Defendant a number of questions On May 10, 2000, the grand jury returned a three-count bearing upon his competency. (See 9/21/2000 Hearing Tr. at indictment against defendants Abraham Denkins, Miller 3-18, J.A. at 76-91.) During the colloquy, Defendant advised Beckham, and Jackie Sanders. Count One charged the three the court that he had sustained a work-related injury several Defendants with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with years earlier, and since that time had suffered from memory intent to distribute approximately twelve grams of crack problems, ringing in his ears, and hallucinations. Defendant cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). also advised the court that he took regular medication for high Count Two charged that the defendants had traveled in blood pressure and for “ringing and voices” in his head. (Id. interstate commerce to facilitate narcotics trafficking, thereby at 4-6, J.A. at 77-79.) violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Count Three charged that Defendant Denkins, aided and abetted by his two co- Following these initial inquiries, Judge Coffman asked defendants, had distributed approximately twelve grams of Defendant whether he understood and could make reasonable cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 decisions about the case, notwithstanding his medical U.S.C. § 2. Defendant initially entered a plea of not guilty to conditions and medications. The district judge also asked if all of these charges. Defendant was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Defendant responded affirmatively to both inquiries, and his On June 22, 2000, Defendant moved to be re-arraigned. attorney, Ruey Newsom, likewise expressed his view that U.S. District Judge William O. Bertelsman granted Defendant was competent. Defendant’s motion, and on July 13, 2000, Defendant was re- arraigned before Magistrate Judge J. Gregory Wehrman. The district court next advised Defendant of the Although Defendant attempted to plead guilty to all of the consequences of pleading nolo contendere. Judge Coffman charges against him, the Magistrate Judge declined to accept informed Defendant that he could continue to plead not guilty this plea, finding that Defendant had not provided a factual and the matter would go to trial. The district court also reminded Defendant that there was no plea agreement with the Government, and that such an agreement normally would address the sentence to be imposed. Defendant indicated that he still wished to proceed, despite the absence of a plea
1 2 In one of his pro se submissions to this court, however, Defendant According to the presentence report, Defendant’s plea was refused denies that he delivered any drugs to the Government’s cooperating because he denied knowing at the time that there were drugs in the witness. Instead, he apparently suggests that he was framed by the package he had delivered to the hotel parking lot on the date spe cified in arresting officers. the indictment. No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 7 8 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
agreement. Judge Coffman then read through each of the evaluation but denied the motion to withdraw his plea, charges against Defendant, and Defendant affirmed that he pending the findings of the competency evaluation. In understood each count of the indictment. granting the former motion, the court emphasized that the assessment “should address the question of (1) was defendant Finally, Judge Coffman advised Defendant of the competent when he entered his plea and (2) is he competent sentencing consequences of his plea. The court indicated that to proceed with sentencing.” (1/18/2001 Order, J.A. at 46.) Count One and Count Three carried mandatory minimum sentences of ten years in prison and maximum sentences of As indicated in an addendum to the presentence report, the life imprisonment, and that Count Two carried a maximum Bureau of Prisons referred Defendant for a competency prison term of five years. Judge Coffman also explained that evaluation, and the resulting report concluded that Defendant Defendant faced a maximum eight-year period of supervised was “competent when he entered his guilty plea and that he is release following his imprisonment. currently competent to participate in his sentencing.” (J.A. at 117.) Following the completion of this evaluation, the district Having addressed all of these matters, the district court court scheduled Defendant’s sentencing for June 21, 2001. revisited certain key points for Defendant’s further consideration. First, Judge Coffman reminded Defendant that At the sentencing hearing, the district court observed that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea in the event defense counsel had objected to the entire presentence report that he disagreed with his sentence. Next, the court asked “on the grounds that you believed that a competency Defendant to confirm his understanding of everything that evaluation should occur.” (6/21/2001 Hearing Tr. at 5, J.A. had transpired at the plea hearing, and emphasized that if at 60.) In light of the completed evaluation, the court asked Defendant was unsure of this, he could halt the proceeding whether Defendant wished to withdraw this objection, and and confer with his attorney. Finally, the court addressed the counsel responded that this objection was being withdrawn. particular nature of a plea of nolo contendere. Defendant then (See id. at 5, J.A. at 60.) After addressing Defendant’s entered a plea of no contest to each of the charges, and the remaining objections, the district court sentenced Defendant court accepted this plea. to the statutory minimum prison term of 120 months on the first and third counts, and 60 months on the second count, Mr. Newsom subsequently withdrew from the case, and with these sentences to be served concurrently. Defendant new counsel was appointed for Defendant at a pre-sentencing now appeals. conference on November 16, 2000. On that occasion, Defendant was asked if he wished to withdraw his nolo plea, III. ANALYSIS and he responded that he did not. On December 18, 2000, however, Defendant filed two motions through his new As observed earlier, three issues are presented on appeal: counsel, seeking to withdraw his plea and requesting a (i) whether the district court properly denied Defendant’s competency evaluation. In support of these motions, defense motion to withdraw his plea; (ii) whether the district court counsel stated that his client’s answers to his inquiries were properly accepted Defendant’s nolo contendere plea; and (iii) “either non-responsive or totally incoherent,” and that whether Defendant’s prior drug convictions were properly Defendant seemed not to apprehend the nature of the case or considered in computing his sentence. We address each of the consequences of his plea. (J.A. at 44-45.) The district these matters in turn. court granted Defendant’s request for a competency No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 9 10 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
A. Defendant Waived Any Objection to the District waiver, does not extinguish an “error” under Rule 52(b). Court’s Denial of His Motion to Withdraw His Plea. Although in theory it could be argued that if the question was not presented to the trial court no error was As his first issue on appeal, Defendant challenges the committed by the trial court, hence there is nothing to district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his nolo review, this is not the theory that Rule 52(b) adopts. If a contendere plea, claiming substantive and procedural errors legal rule was violated during the District Court in the lower court’s review of this motion. More specifically, proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, Defendant argues that his plea should have been withdrawn, then there has been an “error” within the meaning of and perhaps not even accepted in the first instance, in light of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection. his purported lack of competency at the time this plea was entered. Defendant further asserts that the district court Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S. Ct. at 1777 (internal deviated from the standard adopted in this circuit for quotations and citations omitted). resolving a motion to withdraw a plea. We decline to address the merits of these contentions because Defendant waived any We readily conclude that Defendant did not merely forfeit right of appeal by expressly abandoning this issue in the court his present challenge regarding the motion to withdraw his below. plea, but that he has wholly waived any opportunity to contest the district court’s disposition of this motion. Defendant’s In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770 motion to withdraw his plea and his motion for a competency (1993), the Supreme Court addressed the extent of the evaluation were presented in a single submission to the court appellate courts’ authority to review claims of “plain error” below, with the former motion resting solely on the ground under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). In resolving this issue, the that Defendant lacked the mental competency to understand Court carefully distinguished between “waiver” and the nature of the proceedings or to knowingly, voluntarily, “forfeiture,” explaining: and intelligently enter a plea. (See Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea and Motion for Competency Evaluation, J.A. The first limitation on appellate authority under Rule at 44-45.) Thus, it cannot be said that Defendant forfeited his 52(b) is that there indeed be an “error.” Deviation from claim of incompetency by failing to assert it in the court a legal rule is “error” unless the rule has been waived. below. To the contrary, he squarely presented this issue, For example, a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily persuading the district court to grant his request for a pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule competency evaluation. 11 cannot have his conviction vacated by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that he ought to have had a trial. Having expressly raised this issue, however, Defendant and Because the right to trial is waivable, and because the his counsel then proceeded to abandon it. While awaiting a defendant who enters a valid guilty plea waives that ruling on Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and his right, his conviction without a trial is not “error.” request for a competency evaluation, defense counsel filed an objection to the presentence report in its entirety, on the Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture ground that his client was not “competent in any fashion to is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, understand the proceedings going on around him.” waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment (12/20/2000 Objections to Presentence Report, J.A. at 115.) of a known right . . . . Mere forfeiture, as opposed to Following the completion of a competency evaluation, in No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 11 12 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
which it was concluded that Defendant was competent at the The circumstances presented here are legally time of his plea, the district court scheduled Defendant’s indistinguishable from those addressed in Sheppard. The sole sentencing for June 21, 2001. basis for Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea was that he lacked the competency to enter this plea. When a subsequent At the sentencing hearing, the court and defense counsel evaluation failed to support this contention, Defendant and his David Fessler expressly revisited the issue of Defendant’s counsel abandoned their competency-based objection to the competency, with counsel unequivocally stating that he no presentence report. In light of this withdrawn objection, the longer wished to pursue it: district court was never called upon to decide whether to permit Defendant to withdraw his plea on the ground of THE COURT: Now, let me see. Mr. Fessler, you had incompetency. at one point objected to the entire [presentence] report, but I think that was on the grounds that you believed that We recognize that Defendant did not explicitly abandon his a competency evaluation should occur. That having underlying motion to withdraw his plea, and that the district occurred, do you withdraw your objection? court denied this motion, at least as a formal matter. Yet, in the very same order denying this motion, the district court MR. FESSLER: I withdraw objections to the entire granted Defendant’s companion motion for a competency presentence report, Judge. evaluation. (See 1/18/2001 Order, J.A. at 46.) Having afforded Defendant the opportunity to explore the underlying (6/21/2001 Hearing Tr. at 5, J.A. at 60.) Defense counsel basis for his request to withdraw his plea, the district court then raised a few other objections, but none concerning surely would have been willing to revisit the issue of Defendant’s competency. Defendant’s competency, and hence the validity of his plea, if the competency evaluation had provided support for Under analogous circumstances, we have held that this sort Defendant’s position and Defendant had elected to pursue the of abandonment of an issue raised by way of motion waives matter at the sentencing hearing. Defendant did not so elect, any right of appeal on that issue. In United States v. however, presumably because the evaluation provided no Sheppard, 149 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 1998), for example, the such support. This constituted an abandonment of the defendant had filed a motion to suppress evidence in the competency issue, plain and simple. “Consequently, that district court, but then withdrew the motion when the challenge is forever foreclosed, and cannot be resurrected on Government disproved its factual predicate. On appeal, the this appeal.” United States v. Saucedo, 226 F.3d 782, 787 defendant again sought to argue, albeit under a slightly (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1102 (2001).3 different theory, that the district court should have suppressed the evidence that had been the subject of his motion in the court below. We held that the defendant “did not forfeit his 3 suppression argument,” but rather had “waived the argument In any event, even if we were to reach the merits of this issue, we by withdrawing his motion to suppress prior to trial.” would find no basis to disturb the district court’s ruling denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. We review such a decision for Sheppard, 149 F.3d at 461 (footnote omitted). Consequently, an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Plu ta, 144 F.3d 968 , 973 (6th we concluded that we were “without jurisdiction to consider Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 916 (1998). As explained, the sole ground this argument.” 149 F.3d at 461 (footnote omitted). for Defendant’s motion — and his sole substantive argum ent on appeal — was that he lacked co mpe tency at the time he entered his plea. Yet, the district court thoroughly explored this subject at the plea hearing, No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 13 14 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
B. Any Defect in the District Court’s Plea Colloquy Did The substantive basis for this challenge, once again, is that Not Rise to the Level of Plain Error, But Instead Was Defendant’s mental and emotional problems should have Harmless. prevented the district court from accepting his plea, and instead should have led the court to order a competency Apart from contending that the district court erred in not evaluation. By statute, a defendant or the Government “may allowing him to withdraw his plea, Defendant argues that his file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental plea should have been rejected in the first instance. In competency of the defendant,” and such a motion must be particular, Defendant asserts that the district court’s plea granted “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the colloquy did not adequately ensure that Defendant understood defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent his plea. Because Defendant failed to object to this plea that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences colloquy, we review this matter only for plain error. See of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Even in the absence of such (2002). a motion, a court is required to order such a hearing if the statutory standard of “reasonable cause” is satisfied. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). We have recognized that, under this statute, “the district court has not only the prerogative, but the duty, to inquire into a defendant’s competency whenever inquiring repeatedly whether Defendant understood the nature of the there is ‘reasonable cause to believe’ that the defendant is proceeding and the consequences of his plea. Indeed, the court engaged incompetent to stand trial.” United States v. White, 887 F.2d in this inquiry sua sponte, unpromp ted by any exp licit claim by Defendant 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1989). or his counsel that Defendant might not be competent to enter a plea. In addition, the lower court afford ed D efendant ample opp ortunity to support his claim of incompetency by granting his request for an evaluation. This For ease of analysis, we assume for present purposes that evaluation, of course, confirmed the court’s own initial assessment that Defendant’s statements at the September 21, 2000 plea Defendant was competent to enter a plea. Under these facts, we cannot hearing provided “reasonable cause to believe” that imagine how the district court could be dee med to have abu sed its Defendant might be “mentally incompetent” within the discretion. meaning of § 4241(a). It follows, under this assumption, that Nor are we troubled by the district court’s failure, in its order denying the district court erred in going forward with the plea hearing Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, to address each of the several without first employing the process set forth in § 4241 for considerations endo rsed b y this court in United States v. Bash ara, 27 F.3d determining a defendant’s competency. Even so, this surely 1174, 118 1 (6th Cir. 1994 ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). As we was the very essence of a “harmless error,” since all pertinent have elsewhere exp lained, it is “unnecessary to addre ss each of these portions of this process subsequently were employed at the factors” where a defendant fails, at the threshold, to identify any “fair and behest of Defendant himself. just reason” for permitting him to withdra w his plea. United States v. Bazzi, 94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6th C ir. 199 6) (citing the “fair and just reason” standard of former Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d), now incorporated into Fed. R. Upon a showing or finding of “reasonable cause” under Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). Such is the case here, where the district court § 4241(a), a court is required to order a hearing to address the fairly addressed the issue of Defendant’s competency to enter a plea — matter of the defendant’s competency. See 18 U.S.C. and likely would have revisited the issue at sentencing, had Defendant not § 4241(a). Prior to this hearing, the court “may order that a abandoned it — and this was the sole reason given by Defendant for seeking to withdraw his plea. psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 15 16 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be at sentencing whether he wished to pursue the issue of filed with the court.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). The statute Defendant’s competency, he expressly withdrew his objection further provides: in light of the outcome of the competency evaluation. Likewise, on appeal, Defendant does not point to any further If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance evidence bearing on his competency that might have been, but of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering was not, offered for the district court’s consideration at from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally sentencing. We know of no authority, and Defendant has not incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand cited any, for the proposition that § 4241 mandates a hearing the nature and consequences of the proceedings against even when there is no prospect of meeting the statutory him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall standard of incompetency. Defendant and his counsel commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney evidently concluded that this standard could not be satisfied, General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the and the district court was not obligated to press forward defendant for treatment in a suitable facility . . . . despite Defendant’s abandonment of the issue. Even assuming, as we do here, that Defendant’s testimony at the 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). plea hearing provided “reasonable cause” to question his competency, this “cause” surely was dissipated by the results Under the assumption that Defendant’s statements at the of the competency examination. See United States v. Giron- September 21, 2000 plea hearing should have triggered these Reyes, 234 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Initial competency statutory mechanisms, the district court would have been hearings under [§ 4241](a) are not mandated absent required to order a hearing on the issue of Defendant’s reasonable cause because the evidence of competency may be competency to enter a plea. Prior to this hearing, the court so overwhelming as to render any such hearing a superfluous was empowered to order that Defendant be referred for a formality.”); United States v. Lebron, 76 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.) competency examination. Yet, regardless of whether the (“If a psychiatrist has determined that a defendant is district court perceived, or should have perceived, that such competent, a court is not required to hold a further evidentiary an evaluation was desirable, Defendant himself, through his hearing absent extenuating circumstances.”), cert. denied, 518 new counsel, filed a motion requesting this very procedure. U.S. 1011 (1996). In its January 18, 2001 Order, the district court granted this request, and directed that Defendant be referred for a Defendant suggests, however, that the order of events here competency evaluation. The court further ordered that the was significant, and that he suffered harm as a result of the resulting report “should address the question of (1) was district court accepting his plea before referring him for a defendant competent when he entered his plea and (2) is he competency evaluation. We fail to discern any legal competent to proceed with sentencing.” (1/18/2001 Order, significance in this chronology, at least under the facts of this J.A. at 46.) The report addressed both of these issues, case. In ordering the competency evaluation, the court answering both inquiries in the affirmative. instructed that this process should address Defendant’s competency at the time he entered his plea. The resulting At this point, all that remained under § 4241 was the report opined that Defendant was competent to enter his plea, hearing, at which the district court would have been obliged thereby confirming the lower court’s own assessment at the to determine whether Defendant was incompetent within the plea hearing. If this report had been available before the meaning of the statute. Yet, when defense counsel was asked No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 17 18 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
hearing, it can hardly be said that the district court would with his lawyers and a reasonable degree of rational and have been less likely to accept Defendant’s plea. factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 580 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. We do not mean to suggest that timing can never matter. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000). A different analysis might pertain, for example, where the evidence indicates that the defendant’s condition fluctuates It would be difficult to find such a due process violation over time, or where there is a substantial temporal gap here, where the district court’s assessment of Defendant’s between a defendant’s competency evaluation and the competency at the plea hearing was subsequently confirmed proceeding or hearing at which his competency is called into by qualified mental health professionals, and where the record question. See Pate v. Smith, 637 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. contains no professional opinion to the contrary. Nor did 1981) (noting that “a retrospective determination [of a Defendant exhibit irrational behavior at the plea hearing, or defendant’s competency] may satisfy the requirements of due otherwise act in a way that called his competency into process if it is based on evidence related to observations made question. To the extent that Defendant’s statements regarding or knowledge possessed at the time of trial”). In this case, voices and ringing in his ears raised concerns about his however, Defendant does not claim that the timing of his mental condition, the district court did not ignore this competency evaluation affected its outcome, or that an earlier testimony, but instead explored the matter further. In examination might have produced a different result. response, both Defendant and his counsel expressly assured Accordingly, if the district court violated § 4241 by accepting the court that Defendant understood the nature of the charges Defendant’s plea before ordering a competency examination, and the consequences of his plea. As demonstrated by our this error surely was harmless. precedents, these circumstances did not compel the court below to order a competency hearing. See Williams, 696 F.2d This leaves only the question whether Defendant’s at 465, 467; Owens v. Sowders, 661 F.2d 584, 585-86 (6th statements during the plea colloquy itself were so indicative Cir. 1981). Rather, we find that the district court’s plea of incompetency that the district court was compelled, as a colloquy adequately protected Defendant’s right to due matter of basic due process, to refuse Defendant’s plea and process. instead convene a competency hearing. The Supreme Court has observed that “the conviction of an accused person while C. The District Court Properly Considered Defendant’s he is legally incompetent violates due process,” and has Prior Drug Convictions in Computing His Sentence. instructed that a hearing is required “[w]here the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s competence to As his final issue on appeal, raised in a pro se submission, stand trial.” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.375, 378, 385, 86 S. Defendant argues that the district court erred in relying on his Ct. 836, 838, 842 (1966) (internal quotations and citations prior drug convictions to trigger an enhanced statutory omitted). On this matter, we ask “[w]hether a reasonable sentencing range. Specifically, Defendant contends that the judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to Government failed to give proper notice of its intent to rely conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have upon these prior convictions, and that the district court failed experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” to determine whether the prior convictions were valid. We Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir.), cert. find no merit in the first of these challenges, and hold with denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). The test of competency, in turn, regard to the second that any error was harmless. “is whether [the defendant] had sufficient ability to consult No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 19 20 United States v. Denkins No. 01-5881
The procedures governing the use of prior convictions in light of the drug quantity alleged in the indictment. See 21 sentencing are set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 851. Under subsection U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Moreover, the court expressly (a)(1) of this statute, a person cannot be “sentenced to informed Defendant at the plea hearing that he faced a 10- increased punishment by reason of one or more prior year mandatory minimum sentence. (See 9/21/2000 Hearing convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of Tr. at 14, J.A. at 87.) Thus, Defendant was given proper guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the notice, in accordance with the dictates of § 851(a)(1), of the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or Government’s intended reliance on these two prior felony counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions. convictions to be relied upon.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The statute further dictates that a defendant must file a written Nonetheless, Defendant correctly notes that the district response if he “denies any allegation of the information of court failed to conduct the inquiry dictated by § 851(b). In prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is particular, while Defendant neither objected to the portion of invalid.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1). Finally, the statute imposes the presentence report detailing his prior convictions nor a duty of inquiry upon the district court: raised this matter at sentencing, the court did not inquire before sentencing Defendant whether he affirmed or denied If the United States attorney files an information under the two prior convictions disclosed in the July 10, 2000 this section, the court shall after conviction but before information. We have held that “a failure to engage in the pronouncement of sentence inquire of the person with colloquy required by section 851(b) is subject to harmless respect to whom the information was filed whether he error analysis.” United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 313 (6th affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 898 (1998). as alleged in the information, and shall inform him that any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made As demonstrated by the facts and holding of Hill, the lower before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised court’s error here was harmless. In Hill, as in this case, the to attack the sentence. Government filed the required information disclosing two prior drug convictions, but the defendant “did not object to 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). the presentence report, which referred to his prior convictions,” and he “also did not object at sentencing.” Hill, In this case, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the 142 F.3d at 313. Accordingly, we found “no indication in the Government complied with § 851(a)(1) by filing a July 10, record that defendant ever complied with the mechanisms of 2000 information with the district court and serving a copy of section 851(c) to notify the district court that he would this information upon defense counsel. (See 7/10/2000 Prior challenge these convictions.” 142 F.3d at 313. Because of Conviction Information, J.A. at 36.) This information, filed the defendant’s failure to invoke the statutory mechanism for two months before Defendant’s September 21, 2000 plea contesting the Government’s statement of his prior hearing, disclosed two prior felony convictions: (i) an convictions, we held that there was “no reason for [the] April 3, 1998 Ohio conviction for trafficking in drugs, and (ii) district court to conduct a hearing on the validity of the prior a November 30, 1995 Connecticut conviction for possession convictions.” 142 F.3d at 313. More specifically, we held of narcotics. Either of these prior convictions, standing alone, that “the district court’s failure to engage in the colloquy would suffice to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum described in section 851(b) [wa]s harmless” where, sentence that the district court imposed upon Defendant, in “notwithstanding repeated opportunity, defendant did not No. 01-5881 United States v. Denkins 21
challenge his prior convictions before the district court.” 142 F.3d at 313. Precisely the same can be said here. Defendant neither filed the requisite response under § 851(c)(1) challenging the validity of his prior drug convictions, nor did he object at sentencing to the use of these convictions to trigger a statutory minimum 10-year term of imprisonment.4 Under Hill, this absence of any challenge or objection renders harmless the district court’s failure to conduct the inquiry called for under § 851(b). Consequently, we affirm the use of Defendant’s prior drug convictions in computing his sentence. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the conviction and sentence of Defendant/Appellant Abraham Denkins.
4 Even on ap peal, Defendant has not suggested any basis for questioning the validity of either of the prior drug convictions relied upon in sentencing. T o the contrary, in one o f his pro se subm issions to this court, Defendant states that “I have o ne weed ca se and one n[a]rco [t]ic case w[hi]ch was blown out of proportion.” (Appellant’s 9/5/2002 Br. at 3.)