United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 21-1855
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
WILFREDO ISAAC DELGADO, A/K/A EL GORDO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo and Lipez, Circuit Judges, and Burroughs,* District Judge.
Héctor Sueiro-Álvarez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, were on brief, for appellant.
Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
July 3, 2024
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. While completing a term of
supervised release, Wilfredo Isaac-Delgado ("Isaac") tested
positive for multiple controlled substances, failed to abide by
the regulations of his residential reentry center, and was charged
with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute for
harassing a former romantic partner. Isaac's probation officer
detailed these actions, each of which violated the conditions of
Isaac's supervised release, in two motions to the district court.
Those motions requested that the court revoke Isaac's supervised
release.
At the beginning of a hearing on the motions, Isaac
informed the court that he would "not be contesting the[]
violations" described by his probation officer. Isaac instead
identified mitigating circumstances that, in his view, justified
a sentence within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.
Relying on the uncontested representations about Isaac's conduct
from the probation officer, the district court imposed a sentence
more than three times longer than the high end of the Guidelines
range. Isaac now challenges that sentence as procedurally
unreasonable. Finding no procedural flaw, we affirm the sentence
imposed by the district court.
- 2 - I.
A. Isaac's Conditions of Supervised Release
In November 2018, Isaac completed a term of imprisonment
for federal offenses related to a bank robbery and began serving
a five-year term of supervised release. Less than a year later,
in August 2019, Isaac's probation officer notified the district
court that Isaac had violated two conditions of his release: one
that prohibited him from committing another crime and another that
required him to follow the instructions of his probation officer.
The probation officer explained that Isaac had violated a court-
issued restraining order imposed because he had threatened and
mistreated a former romantic partner. Despite his probation
officer's instructions to the contrary, Isaac continued to contact
his former partner and, as a result, he was criminally charged
with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute
("Commonwealth charges").
The district court initiated proceedings to consider
revoking Isaac's supervised release. However, before Isaac's
preliminary revocation hearing, the Commonwealth charges were
dismissed. Isaac's probation officer then moved to vacate the
revocation proceedings, asking that the court instead add new
conditions to Isaac's supervised release. The court granted that
request, with Isaac's acquiescence. Among the new conditions was
a requirement that Isaac participate in reentry support programs,
- 3 - including cognitive behavioral treatment services related to
domestic violence.
One year later, Isaac's probation officer notified the
district court that Isaac had again violated his conditions of
release by using controlled substances and failing to follow the
instructions of his probation officer. The probation officer
reported that Isaac had tested positive for marijuana five times
in the past year and had failed to call into his drug testing
program on more than sixty occasions. He recommended that Isaac
be admitted to a residential reentry center. Isaac agreed, and
his conditions of release were modified to include his
participation in such a residential reentry program.
B. Isaac's Violations of Supervised Release
During his short-lived stay at a residential reentry
center, however, Isaac failed required drug screens, testing
positive for marijuana four times between February and April 2021,
and, in one instance, also testing positive for benzodiazepines.
Isaac also continued exhibiting aggressive behavior
toward another of his former romantic partners, Johanna
Gonzalez-Crespo ("Gonzalez"). In May 2021, staff members at the
reentry center heard Isaac insulting a woman over the phone. Two
months later, on July 19, 2021, Gonzalez reported to the probation
office that Isaac was inundating her with harassing and threatening
calls. She explained that, despite blocking his number, she
- 4 - continued to receive threatening calls from Isaac, who started
using the phones of other individuals to insult and intimidate
her. The probation office reviewed hostile voicemails left by
Isaac and recommended that Gonzalez seek assistance from her local
police department.
A week later, on July 26, Gonzalez reached out to the
reentry center to report her problems with Isaac. She explained
that Isaac had been calling her from different phone numbers and
coming to her residence to threaten her family. The following
day, Gonzalez filed a police report against Isaac detailing the
relevant events, including Isaac's threat that "if she is not with
him, she will not be with nobody [sic]."
When police officers went to the reentry center to arrest
Isaac, he refused to report to the lobby upon request. He became
agitated, slammed electronics, violently kicked a desk, and
announced: "If they are coming to arrest me, they have to take me
death [sic]." After an hour of negotiations, he surrendered to
the police. On July 28, Isaac was again charged with violating
Puerto Rico's domestic violence law. Two days later, the probation
office received a "failure letter" from the reentry center,
reporting that Isaac had violated several of the center's
regulations.
Isaac's probation officer notified the district court of
Isaac's violations of supervised release stemming from these
- 5 - events. In two filings ("Docket Entries 108 and 117" or,
collectively, "Probation Motions"), the probation officer detailed
Isaac's repeated positive tests for marijuana and benzodiazepines,
his threats to Gonzalez, and the resulting criminal charges. The
Probation Motions also noted Isaac's prior criminal charges
involving his mistreatment of two other women. In addition to the
2019 episode described above, Isaac was also arrested in 2008 on
criminal domestic violence charges.
Finally, the probation officer explained that Isaac
refused medication to treat his anxiety and substance dependence,
despite the probation office paying the cost of his prescription
medications. The Probation Motions asserted that Isaac's refusal
to take these medications "sabotag[ed] his mental health
treatment," thus violating his condition of release requiring him
to "participate in a mental health program . . . as arranged and
approved by [his] U.S. Probation Officer."
Isaac waived his right to a preliminary revocation
hearing, and the district court subsequently entered a finding of
probable cause "as to all violations included in the motions filed
by [Isaac's probation officer] at Dockets No. 108 and 117." The
matter proceeded to a final revocation hearing.
C. Final Revocation Hearing
Isaac began the final revocation hearing by admitting to
the violations: "[A]fter review of both the motions of the
- 6 - Probation Officer notifying violations at docket entry 108 and
117, the Defendant will not be contesting these violations but we
would like to be heard before Your Honor pronounces sentencing."
Isaac then broadly summarized the allegations, explaining that the
Probation Motions allege "four positive results to marijuana and
another one to benzo[diazepines] and the other one, basically the
Probation Officer informed the Court of a domestic violence case
that the Defendant had in State Court."
Isaac then identified mitigating circumstances for the
court's consideration in sentencing, explaining that the most
recent Commonwealth domestic violence charges involved no force or
physical aggression, only threats. And those charges, he noted,
were dismissed before the final revocation hearing. Isaac also
stressed that an existing restraining order would preclude him
from "communicat[ing] with the victim."
Isaac further explained that he had been diagnosed with
impulsiveness, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. He stated that,
to treat these conditions, he "was taking his medications" and had
been attending a mental health clinic every month for nearly a
year, even while working. Citing monthly reports from the clinic,
Isaac highlighted that he "had taken positive steps toward [his
treatment] goals, that he was on time for his appointments[,] and
was communicative." And, despite the prior modifications of his
release conditions, Isaac noted that "[t]his [was] basically his
- 7 - first revocation hearing." Isaac's own allocution to the court
requested one "last opportunity" to "not go on the way that [he]
ha[d] been going," and he asked for a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range of four to ten months of imprisonment.
The government requested a much longer term of
imprisonment. Isaac's conduct, the government argued, justified
a sentence beyond the Guidelines range because he had harassed his
former romantic partner, continuing a pattern of threatening women
going back to 2008. Though the Commonwealth charges were
eventually dismissed, the government viewed Isaac's multiple
arrests for similar conduct as occurring "too many times . . . to
be a coincidence." Even accepting that Isaac's conduct came "from
a place of mental health," the government asserted "he's not fixing
it." On that basis, the government concluded that a prison
sentence "closer to three years" was more appropriate than the
applicable Guidelines range.
Although the district court acknowledged that the
relevant Guidelines range provided for a term of imprisonment of
four to ten months, the court nonetheless imposed a prison sentence
of thirty-six months -- a sentence more than three times longer
than the high end of the applicable Guidelines range. The court
justified its significant upward variance because Isaac had "shown
that he is unable to comply with the conditions of supervision
imposed on him." Specifically, the court explained that Isaac did
- 8 - not follow the requirements of his mental health and substance
abuse treatment programs in that he continually used controlled
substances and declined to pick up his prescribed anti-anxiety
medications. The court noted that the probation office had spent
more than $8,000 providing for Isaac's treatment, including the
cost of his medications. Moreover, Isaac had engaged in conduct
constituting a crime by threatening his former romantic partner.
Thus, the court concluded, Isaac's sentence was necessary to
"promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for his
violations . . . and to protect the public from additional crimes
by Mr. Isaac."
Isaac objected to the sentence as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable.1 In so doing, Isaac again explained
that "he was benefitting from treatment" and "manag[ed] to go to
every single session for over a year" while holding a stable job.
Isaac emphasized that he "underst[ood] what he did was wrong," and
once more stated "[h]e did not contest the allegations." But,
Isaac concluded, "[his] conduct d[id] not amount to the punishment"
1 Isaac does not advance a substantive reasonableness claim on appeal. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, No. 21-1855 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2023), ECF No. 48 ("On appeal, Mr. Isaac does not argue he did not violate his conditions of release, or that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. He is challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence . . . .").
- 9 - imposed by the district court. The court noted the objection for
the record. Isaac now appeals his sentence.2
II.
We review preserved sentencing challenges for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Viloria-Sepulveda, 921 F.3d 5, 8
(1st Cir. 2019). Unpreserved challenges are subject only to plain
error review. United States v. Bruzón-Velázquez, 49 F.4th 23, 31
(1st Cir. 2022). "Under the plain error standard, the appellant
must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious
and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights,
but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Viloria-Sepulveda, 921 F.3d
at 8 n.1 (quoting United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448
(1st Cir. 2017)).
A criminal defendant's sentence must be procedurally and
substantively reasonable. United States v. Contreras-Delgado, 913
F.3d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 2019). A district court commits a
procedural error by, among other things, "selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts." Id. (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). In making factual findings, a
2 Isaac was released from incarceration in October 2023. However, he is currently serving a term of supervised release. Isaac thus continues to have a stake in the outcome of this appeal because "[i]f we were to determine that his incarcerative sentence was unreasonable, he could seek equitable relief." United States v. Reyes-Barreto, 24 F.4th 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2022).
- 10 - sentencing court may consider evidence not usually admissible in
a criminal trial. See United States v. Colón-Maldonado, 953 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 2020). That said, a court may only consider reliable
evidence in determining a sentence. Id.; see also United States
v. Mills, 710 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2013) ("[T]he court can consider
all kinds of relevant information regardless of admissibility at
trial (including hearsay that has never been tested by
cross-examination), provided it has 'sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy.'" (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 6A1.3(a))).
III.
Isaac challenges the procedural reasonableness of his
sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court
based its sentence on impermissible factual findings. Second, he
claims that the district court failed to consider relevant
mitigating evidence as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We address
each argument in turn.
A. Factual Basis for the Sentence
1. Medications
Isaac contends that the district court erred in finding
that he was "not taking or even picking up the mental health
[medication] with which he was prescribed for his anxiety
disorder." Isaac notes that, during the final revocation hearing,
he told the district court that "he was taking his medications for
- 11 - [his] mental health treatment." Because the government never
disputed that statement, Isaac insists the district court erred in
making a contrary finding absent any evidence on the issue.
As an initial matter, we note that the parties dispute
whether Isaac preserved his challenge concerning the district
court's reference to his medication regimen. If not, we would
review his argument under the plain error standard. However, we
need not resolve that issue because Isaac cannot prevail even if
we grant him the benefit of reviewing the district court's decision
for abuse of discretion, United States v. Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th
95, 100 (1st Cir. 2024), the more favorable standard of review.
By admitting to the violations detailed in the Probation
Motions, Isaac himself provided the district court with a
sufficiently reliable basis for the factual finding regarding his
prescribed medication. True, Isaac did not mention his medication
regimen in his quick summary of the Probation Motions at the
beginning of the hearing. However, both before and after that
summary, Isaac provided a broad, unqualified statement that he was
not contesting the violations described in the Probation Motions.
In addition to detailing how Isaac failed several drug tests and
was arrested multiple times on allegations of domestic violence,
those motions explained that Isaac had "sabotaged his mental health
treatment" by, among other things, "refus[ing] his medication paid
[for] by the probation office." It is well established that a
- 12 - defendant's admission to certain conduct provides a sufficiently
reliable basis for a court to consider the admitted-to conduct
during sentencing, and the district court was therefore entitled
to rely on Isaac's concession. See United States v. Rivera-Ruiz,
43 F.4th 172, 184 (1st Cir. 2022); see also United States v.
Dávila-Bonilla, 968 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that a
district court did not err in considering a local charge that did
not result in conviction because the defendant's admissions in an
unobjected-to presentence report ("PSR") "provide some greater
indicia of reliability that the actions triggering the arrests
occurred" (alteration and quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Rodríguez-Reyes, 925 F.3d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 2019))).
Perhaps recognizing that district courts are generally
allowed to rely on such admissions, Isaac instead focuses his
argument on the scope of his concession. Isaac contends that,
although he accepted responsibility for violating his conditions
of release, he never made a blanket admission to every underlying
factual allegation detailed in the Probation Motions. He asserts
that, by later telling the sentencing court he "was taking his
medications," he had in fact disputed the contrary representations
found in the Probation Motions. And because those representations
were disputed, Isaac concludes that the district court abused its
discretion in finding, without evidence, that he was not taking
his medications.
- 13 - Isaac's position is unsupported by the record and
precluded by our precedent. In United States v. Portell-Márquez,
59 F.4th 533 (1st Cir. 2023), for example, Portell was charged
with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence law while on
supervised release. Id. at 535. As here, Portell's Commonwealth
charges were dismissed before his revocation hearing, but the
probation officer's motion still described the altercation
underlying his arrest. Id. at 535 n.1. At his first revocation
hearing, Portell similarly told the court that he did not contest
the violations and, more specifically, that "he was not
contesting . . . the [docketed] motion filed by the probation
officer." Id. at 535 (quotation marks omitted). For reasons
unrelated to the present issue, we vacated Portell's sentence from
his first revocation hearing.3 On remand, in his second revocation
hearing, Portell again did not contest the violations as set forth
in his probation officer's motion. He instead argued, like Isaac,
that a Guidelines sentence was appropriate and "informed the court
During his first revocation hearing, Portell urged the 3
district court to find that his conduct underlying the arrest constituted a "grade B" violation, which carries a lower Guidelines range than a "grade A" violation. See Portell-Márquez, 59 F.4th at 536. The district court determined that Portell's conduct constituted a grade A violation, and Portell appealed the resulting sentence. In Portell's first appeal to this court, the government conceded the district court's grading analysis was erroneous, so we vacated Portell's sentence and remanded the case to the district court for another revocation hearing. See United States v. Portell-Márquez, No. 21-1447, 2021 WL 5458605, at *1-2 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 2021).
- 14 - that he would be receiving treatment for his anger management
issues." Id. at 536. The district court imposed an upwardly
variant sentence based on the conduct described in the probation
officer's motion, and Portell again appealed his sentence.
In affirming, we explained that district courts "may
rely on [a defendant's] admission as demonstrating reliably that
the conduct alleged [in a probation officer's motion] occurred,
just as we have previously held that it may do so where the
admission is made to conduct described in a PSR." Id. at 538.
Like Isaac, Portell had asserted "that the district court
misunderstood the scope of his admission, claiming that while he
admitted to violating [Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute],
and thus the conditions of his supervised release, he did not admit
to any specific conduct in violation of [that statute]." Id. We
rejected that argument because Portell told the court that he was
"not contesting" his probation officer's motion, which detailed
the facts at issue. Id. Moreover, Portell's arguments in favor
of mitigation at sentencing "were implicitly premised on the facts
alleged in the probation officer's motion," so he could not
"disclaim[] their validity" on appeal. Id.
Isaac's admission here was substantively identical to
the admission in Portell-Márquez. Again, Isaac categorically
stated that he was not contesting the violations found in the
Probation Motions; his only request was that he "be heard before
- 15 - [the district court] pronounce[d] sentencing." By accepting
responsibility for his non-compliant conduct, Isaac appears to
have made a reasonable strategic choice to glide quickly through
the "guilt or violation-determination phase" of the hearing,
focusing instead on mitigation arguments in hopes of a more lenient
sentence. See Colón-Maldonado, 953 F.3d at 8 (describing the
division in revocation hearings between "the guilt or violation-
determination phase" and "the sentencing phase"). Isaac cannot
now disclaim his admission simply because his mitigation arguments
did not result in the sentence he requested.
We do not view Isaac's passing comment that he "was
taking his medications" as revoking or otherwise qualifying his
broad admission at the outset of the revocation hearing. If Isaac
wanted to walk back his unqualified admission, he needed to do so
expressly. Indeed, Isaac's concluding remarks from the revocation
hearing reconfirmed his initial admission. Despite having stated
that he "was taking his medications," Isaac later emphasized that
"he did not contest the allegations."4 The district court was thus
entitled to rely on the details in the Probation Motions in
finalizing Isaac's sentence.
To be precise, Isaac stated that "he did not contest the 4
allegations" in noting his objection to the district court's sentence.
- 16 - 2. Cost of Treatment
Isaac next argues that the district court erred in noting
that the probation office had spent more than $8,000 on his
treatment, including the cost of his medications. More
specifically, Isaac draws our attention to the following comments
by the district court at sentencing:
During his period of supervision, the Probation Officer afforded Mr. Isaac with mental and substance abuse treatment with which Mr. Isaac did not follow by continuously using controlled substances and by not taking or even picking up the mental health [medication] with which he was prescribed for his anxiety disorder. He preferred to self-medicate by using marijuana.
The Probation Office[] has spent over $8,000 providing Mr. Isaac with the substance abuse and mental health treatment including paying for prescription drugs to absolutely no avail.
In addition, Mr. Isaac has engaged in conduct constituting a crime and failed the Residential Reentry Center, as ordered by the Court, verbally harassed his former consensual partner, hundreds of times, from different telephones and going to her work place with convicted felons and threatening her and her children. He has also become violent towards third parties.
Though the uncontested Probation Motions explained that
the probation office had paid for Isaac's substance-abuse and
mental-health treatment, including his medications, the $8,000
price tag is not in the record. Isaac contends that the district
court erred by making a factual finding about the cost of his
treatment sua sponte. However, Isaac failed to object to any
finding by the district court concerning the cost of his treatment.
- 17 - We therefore review this argument for plain error. See United
States v. Ramos-Carreras, 59 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2023) (applying
plain error standard where defendant "did not raise any objection
to the court's description of the alleged conduct"); see also
Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d at 448 & n.1 (applying plain error standard
because only an "[in]sufficiently specific," "general objection"
was raised to the court's comments later challenged on appeal).5
The district court's reference to the off-record $8,000
figure does give us pause. A sentencing court may rely on
off-record evidence from a probation officer only if "new facts
relevant to the sentencing calculus . . . are disclosed to the
parties and subjected to whatever adversarial testing may be
appropriate." United States v. Bramley, 847 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2017). Here, although Isaac acknowledges that he was aware of the
$8,000 cost of his treatment because "a similar monetary figure is
5 Isaac argues in a Rule 28(j) letter that our decision in United States v. Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2023), requires us to apply an abuse of discretion standard where counsel did not have a sufficient opportunity to object to a particular ruling. We disagree with the applicability of that precedent. The district court in Teixeira, after making the relevant ruling, "did not invite comments from the lawyers" before moving to a different phase of the proceeding and then ending the hearing. Id. at 18. We took a practical view of those circumstances and held that a lawyer need not "[i]nterrupt[] a judge in mid-stride" to properly preserve an objection. Id. In contrast, the district court here affirmatively gave Isaac an opportunity to object to the sentence. Indeed, Isaac used that opportunity to contest the court's lack of consideration of his mitigation-related arguments. See infra Section III.B.
- 18 - found in the disclosures that Probation made in preparation for
the final revocation hearing,"6 it is difficult to see how Isaac
had a meaningful opportunity to test that figure in an adversarial
forum. After all, the first and only mention of the $8,000 during
the proceeding was by the district court just before it pronounced
Isaac's sentence.
Ultimately, however, we need not resolve the
adversarial-testing issue because nothing in the record suggests
that the $8,000 cost of treatment affected the length of Isaac's
sentence. Isaac therefore cannot satisfy the third element of
plain error review, which requires an appellant to show the
purported error "affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings." United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734
(1993)).
In explaining its sentence, the district court stressed
that Isaac's substance-abuse and mental-health treatment had been
unsuccessful, even with financial assistance from the probation
6 Neither the district court's docket nor the record on appeal reveals how these disclosures were made. Thus, we may only speculate as to how the district court learned of the $8,000 figure. The court's local rules recommend that disclosures related to revocation proceedings be made "via email when possible." L. Crim. R. 132.1(c) (D.P.R. 2023). Hence, the district court may have been included on email correspondence containing the relevant disclosures. Alternatively, Isaac's probation officer may have mentioned the $8,000 figure in an ex parte discussion with the court.
- 19 - office, given Isaac's multiple positive drug tests and allegations
of harassment. Viewed in context, the district court's
consideration of that admitted-to conduct was unrelated to the
amount of money the probation office had spent on Isaac's
treatment. For the district court, the bottom-line was that
Isaac's treatment appeared to be doing little to stem his
concerning conduct. The specific cost of that treatment was a
superfluous detail unconnected to the justifications for the
sentence. Accordingly, we cannot say that, "but for" the district
court's consideration of the $8,000 figure, "the district court
would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence." Id.
(quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 39 (1st
Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 221
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("[T]he proponent -- the party asserting
plain error -- must show 'a reasonable probability that, but for
[the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been
different." (second alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004))).
In sum, we see no plain error in the district court's
factual findings related to Isaac's sentence.
B. Consideration of Section 3553(a) Factors
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), a sentencing court must
consider, among other things, "the history and characteristics of
the defendant" in determining the appropriate sentence. Isaac
- 20 - argues the district court failed to evaluate his specific history
and characteristics because the court pronounced his sentence
without mentioning his clinical attendance record, positive
treatment reports, or employment status. Isaac objected to his
sentence on the same basis. We review this preserved claim under
an abuse of discretion standard. See Viloria-Sepulveda, 921 F.3d
at 8.
It is true that the district court did not engage in a
point-by-point analysis of each argument Isaac raised in favor of
mitigation. But we have never required district courts to rebut
a defendant's sentencing arguments at such a granular level. See
United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 78 (1st Cir. 2012)
("[A] sentencing court is not required to address frontally every
argument advanced by the parties, nor need it dissect every factor
made relevant by 18 U.S.C. § 3553." (quoting Turbides–Leonardo,
468 F.3d at 40–41)). To the contrary, "[w]hen a defendant has
identified potentially mitigating sentencing factors and those
factors are thoroughly debated at sentencing, the fact that the
court did not explicitly mention them during the sentencing hearing
suggests they were unconvincing, not ignored." United States v.
Coplin-Benjamin, 79 F.4th 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 152
(1st Cir. 2020)).
- 21 - Here, the district court satisfied its obligations under
§ 3553(a). The court began its decision by stating on the record
that it had "taken into consideration the factors set forth in
Title 18, United States Code Section 3553(a) and the seriousness
of Mr. Isaac's violations." Though we do not give much weight to
that boilerplate pronouncement, the court then properly proceeded
to engage with Isaac's broader argument regarding the efficacy of
his medical treatment. In other words, the district court
distilled most of Isaac's arguments as standing for the proposition
that his mental health and substance abuse treatment was working.
The district court considered and rejected that argument by noting
that Isaac had been afforded treatment "to absolutely no avail."
That is because, the court explained, Isaac had admitted to
"continuously using controlled substances" and "harass[ing] his
former consensual partner[] hundreds of times." The court
continued by noting that Isaac "ha[d] also become violent towards
third parties," as evident from his standoff in the residential
center during his most recent arrest.
These observations by the district court directly
address Isaac's history and characteristics as required by
§ 3553(a)(1). A district court may commit procedural error by
"failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors," Gall, 552 U.S. at 51,
but the depth of a district court's consideration of those factors
is typically a matter of discretion. Isaac's assertion that the
- 22 - district court should have rebutted his arguments with more
specificity does not demonstrate an abuse of that discretion. See
Coplin-Benjamin, 79 F.4th at 43. Though the district court could
have provided more detail in justifying Isaac's sentence, its
explanation of the chosen sentence was nonetheless adequate. Cf.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (noting a district court may abuse its
discretion by failing to explain why a sentence deviated from the
Guidelines range). Hence, Isaac has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence.
We thus affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
So ordered.
- 23 -