United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
Nos. 24-2076, 24-2077 UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIAN DEL-VALLE-CAMACHO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Aframe and Dunlap, Circuit Judges.
Jason González-Delgado was on brief for appellant.
Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
January 14, 2026 DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Christian
Del-Valle-Camacho appeals from the district court's judgment
imposing two concurrent sixty-month prison sentences for escaping
from a judicially mandated re-entry program and being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition. Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho
argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable because the district court imposed a nineteen-month
upward variance without providing an adequate explanation based on
a plausible sentencing rationale. After careful consideration,
we conclude that the district court provided sufficient reason to
justify its upward variance -- namely, the large amount of
ammunition and number of magazines in Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's
possession -- and therefore affirm.
I.
Following incarceration for a federal drug trafficking
conviction, Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho entered a residential re-entry
facility upon the court's order. On November 2, 2023, as
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho was returning to the facility from an
approved work pass, a drive-by shooting occurred and
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho ran away. Staff called
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho after the shooting, and he advised them that
he would return to the facility -- but he never did. U.S. Marshals
arrested Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho nearly two months later at a
residence, where they found in plain view a Glock pistol modified
- 2 - to shoot as a machine gun, seven Glock nine-millimeter magazines
of various capacities -- three of thirty-one-round capacity, two
of twenty-four-round capacity, one of sixteen-round capacity, and
one of fourteen-round capacity -- and 152 rounds of nine-millimeter
ammunition.
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho pled guilty to escaping from a
judicially mandated re-entry program in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 751 and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). At
sentencing, the court assessed a guideline range of thirty-three
to forty-one months' imprisonment, based on a total offense level
of nineteen and criminal history category of II.
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho requested a sentence of thirty-three months
due to his compliance with his re-entry program before escaping,
as well as his acceptance of responsibility upon arrest. The
government, on the other hand, requested a sentence of forty-one
months, arguing that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's escape demonstrated
a "lack of commitment to complying with his prior sentence" and
emphasizing that he was found with a modified pistol, "substantial
amounts of ammunition," and "seven magazines."
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho also cited statistics concerning
the "average" sentence imposed under the guideline applicable to
his case, United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.")
- 3 - § 2K2.1. 1 The court responded that those statistics were not
specific to sentencing for defendants who possessed "altered"
firearms or similar "number of rounds of ammunition." The court
concluded that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's case "may not be an average
case" because it involved "an altered pistol, plus 152 rounds of
ammunition, plus seven magazines, five of which were high
capacity."
Before imposing a sentence, the court noted its
consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the presentence investigation report, the plea
agreement, both parties' arguments, and Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's
allocution. Recounting the offenses, the court again highlighted
that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho "possessed a machine gun, a Glock model
19X, modified to shoot automatically, seven magazines, five of
which were high capacity, and 152 rounds of 9-millimeter
ammunition, while on escape status" from the residential re-entry
center. It concluded that a sentence within the guideline range
did not "reflect the seriousness of Mr. Del Valle's offenses,"
"promote respect for the law," "protect the public from additional
crimes by Mr. Del Valle," or "address the issues of deterrence and
punishment." The court thus imposed a sentence of sixty months'
1 This guideline provides base offense levels for offenses involving the unlawful receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms or ammunition, or other prohibited transactions involving firearms or ammunition. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
- 4 - imprisonment -- nineteen months above the upper end of the
guideline range. Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's counsel generally
"object[ed] to the sentence imposed" but did not identify any
procedural issues.
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho timely appealed, challenging both
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
II.
When confronting a challenge to the reasonableness of a
sentence, "[o]ur review process is bifurcated: we first determine
whether the sentence imposed is procedurally reasonable and then
determine whether it is substantively reasonable." United States
v. Flores-Quiñones, 985 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Reyes-Torres, 979 F.3d 1,
6–7 (1st Cir. 2020)). We analyze each in turn.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho did not preserve a challenge to
the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.2 We review such
unpreserved challenges only for plain error. United States v.
2 "[T]o preserve a claim of procedural sentencing error for appellate review," a defendant must make an objection that is "sufficiently specific to call the district court’s attention to the asserted error." United States v. Cordero-Velázquez, 124 F.4th 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Reyes-Correa, 81 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2023)). There is no dispute that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho did not object to any procedural aspect of his sentence and so did not preserve a challenge to its procedural reasonableness.
- 5 - Cruz-Ramos, 987 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 2021). "Plain error review
is not appellant-friendly. It 'entails four showings: (1) that
an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not
only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also
(4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v.
Rondón-García, 886 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United
States v. Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 569 (1st Cir. 2016)).
The district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in
explaining its nineteen-month upward variance. A court commits
procedural error where it "fail[s] to adequately explain" its
sentence, "including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range." United States v. Pupo, 995 F.3d 23, 28 (1st
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 25
(1st Cir. 2020)). When imposing an upward variance, the court
"must make clear which specific facts of the case motivated its
decision and why those facts led to its decision." United States
v. Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th 652, 657 (1st Cir. 2023) (emphasis in
original) (quoting United States v. Muñoz-Fontanez, 61 F.4th 212,
215 (1st Cir. 2023)). In particular, it must explain the variance
based on "factors not adequately accounted for in the
[guidelines]," United States v. Valle-Colón, 21 F.4th 44, 48 (1st
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 156
(1st Cir. 2020)), and "articulate why it believes that the
- 6 - defendant's case differs from the norm," United States v.
Cordero-Velázquez, 124 F.4th 44, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting
United States v. Reyes-Correa, 81 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2023)).
The court's explanation can be made explicitly or may be drawn "by
fair inference from the sentencing record." United States v.
Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016). The court's
rationale may be inferred, for example, through its "statements
made at the sentencing hearing," Muñoz-Fontanez, 61 F.4th at 215
n.5, or "by comparing what was argued by the parties . . . with
what the [court] did," United States v. Colón-Cordero, 91 F.4th
41, 53 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.
Carrasquillo-Sánchez, 9 F.4th 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2021)).
The district court's explanation of its sentence here,
considered in the context of the entire sentencing record,
adequately elucidates the facts that motivated its sentence. Both
the court and the government emphasized the large amount of
contraband possessed by Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho, including "seven
magazines, five of which were high capacity, and 152 rounds of
9-millimeter ammunition." And the court did not just identify
these facts; it explained that they distinguished
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's case from the "average" firearm-possession
case where U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 is the primary sentencing guideline.
For these reasons, the court concluded that a sentence within the
guideline range would not sufficiently promote the Section 3553(a)
- 7 - sentencing factors of respect for the law, protection of the
public, and deterrence of future crime. Even if the court could
have said more immediately before imposing its sentence, there is
more than "enough information in the record" based on the
statements made throughout the sentencing hearing "for us to
evaluate [its] reasoning." United States v. Polaco-Hance, 103
F.4th 95, 102 (1st Cir. 2024); see also United States v.
Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[B]revity is
not to be confused with inattention.").
The cases that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho cites to critique
the district court's explanation are inapposite. In Flores-Nater,
we held that a sentencing court erred by imposing a thirty-year
sentence, which reflected a twenty-year upward variance, without
any explanation -- explicit or otherwise. 62 F.4th at 656-57.
Emphasizing that the court's "burden of explanation 'increases in
proportion to the extent of [its] deviation from the guideline
range,'" we noted that the court's "only attempt at explanation"
was a "mere listing of the facts" of the offense and the sentencing
factors, "without emphasis on any particular circumstance" or
"case-specific rationale." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Muñoz-Fontanez, 61 F.4th at 214). We further observed that the
court's rationale could not even "be gleaned 'by fair inference'"
from the "empty sentencing record (which contain[ed] no meaningful
insight into the court's reasoning)." Id. at 656 (quoting United
- 8 - States v. Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th 107, 114 (1st Cir. 2022)). These
deficiencies made "'it impossible to tell' what led the district
court to impose a sentence that tripled the guideline sentence."
Id. at 657 (quoting Muñoz-Fontanez, 61 F.4th at 214).
The nineteen-month upward variance here did not require
the same degree of explanation as the twenty-year upward variance
in Flores-Nater that tripled the guideline sentence. In any
event, unlike in Flores-Nater, the sentencing court here did
identify case-specific factors that justified its upward variance,
specifically that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho possessed "an altered
pistol, plus 152 rounds of ammunition, plus seven magazines, five
of which were high capacity." The court explained that these
facts set Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's offense apart from the "average"
firearm-possession case. Whether that explanation immediately
preceded the court's imposition of the variance is beside the point
because a sentencing court need not "follow any particular format
in explaining an upwardly variant sentence." Id. at 656. At the
very least, the court's rationale can be gleaned "by fair
inference" from the entirety of its statements in the sentencing
record. Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th at 114 (quoting United States v.
Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016)).
The other cases cited by Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho are
likewise distinguishable because they lacked any explanation,
either express or fairly inferred from the record, by sentencing
- 9 - courts for significant upward variances. See Muñoz-Fontanez, 61
F.4th at 214 (holding that court plainly erred by imposing a
sentence "nearly two and a half times" the guideline range based
on "mere listing of the facts of the arrest, without emphasis on
any particular circumstance" and where its rationale could not
otherwise be "infer[red]" from the record); United States v.
Mantha, 944 F.3d 352, 357 (1st Cir. 2019) (explaining that it would
be plain error to impose a "substantially upwardly variant
sentence" of "forty-five months" with "no explanation whatsoever"
and where "defendant-specific reasons for a harsher sentence"
could not be "inferred from the record"); Montero-Montero, 817
F.3d at 37–38 (holding that court plainly erred where the record
showed the "virtually complete absence of any meaningful
explanation" and "offer[ed] very few clues as to what was in the
sentencing court's mind" for "what appear[ed] . . . to be an
uncommonly harsh" upward variance from twelve months to sixty
months); United States v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 809 F.3d 706, 711–12
(1st Cir. 2016) (holding that a "dramatic -- 25–year -- upwards
variance from the guidelines sentence" where "no explanation"
could be "inferred from the record" was plain error). In contrast
to the deficient explanations and lack of clues in the record
supporting far greater variances in those cases, the court here
did not plainly err because the record clearly indicates the
factors that supported its upward variance.
- 10 - B. Substantive Reasonableness
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho preserved a separate challenge to
the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, which we review
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Colón-De Jesús, 85
F.4th 15, 26 (1st Cir. 2023). "Each case is different: '[T]here
is no one reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a
universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.'" United States v.
Burgos, 133 F.4th 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2025) (alteration in original)
(quoting Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th at 104)). "[O]ur task is simply
to determine whether the sentence falls within this broad
universe." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020)). "[T]he key
inquiry is whether the sentencing court has articulated a plausible
rationale and reached a defensible result." Colón-De Jesús, 85
F.4th at 26 (quoting United States v. De Jesús-Torres, 64 F.4th
33, 40 (1st Cir. 2023)).
"When, as here, the district court imposes a sentence
above the guideline sentencing range, it 'must justify a variance
of the magnitude in question,' and 'the rationale underlying the
upward variance should "be rooted either in the nature and
circumstances of the offense or the characteristics of the
offender."'" Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th at 104 (citation omitted)
(internal quotations omitted) (first quoting United States v.
Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2008); and then quoting
- 11 - Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th at 656–57). The court must also
"articulate specifically the reasons that th[e] particular
defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation
covered by the guidelines calculation." Id. (quoting United
States v. Guzman-Fernandez, 824 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 2016)).
Even under an abuse of discretion standard, "considerable
deference must still be given to the district court's judgment,"
including when "the sentence is outside the applicable [guideline
range]." United States v. Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d 232, 239
(1st Cir. 2019).
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho contends, in part, that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable for the same reason that he
contends it is procedurally unreasonable: no explanation was given
for it. As we have already explained, however, the court did
explain the reasons for the sentence, see supra Part II.A, and so
this part of Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's substantive reasonableness
challenge necessarily fails.
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho separately contends that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because our decision in
United States v. Rivera-Berríos precludes sentencing courts from
relying on "factor[s] already accounted for by the sentencing
guidelines to impose a variant sentence." 968 F.3d 130, 136 (1st
Cir. 2020). This contention misconstrues the holding in
Rivera-Berríos; in that case, we acknowledged that a sentencing
- 12 - court may vary a sentence based on a factor already accounted for
in the guidelines so long as it explains why the defendant's case
"differ[s] from the mine-run of" cases involving that factor or
why that factor otherwise is "worthy of extra weight." Id.
Applying that principle, "[w]e have held repeatedly that
the amount of ammunition and the number of extended magazines," as
here, "can be valid bases for an upward variance for firearms
offenses," United States v. Mercado-Cañizares, 133 F.4th 173, 181
(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th at 101), because
these factors remove such offenses "from the heartland of the
relevant guidelines."3 United States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d
801, 806 (1st Cir. 2020); see also United States v. García-Mojica,
955 F.3d 187, 193 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that court
properly considered "extra ammunition" as basis for upward
variance because it "contributed to the lethalness of the automatic
weapon" and was not contemplated by the relevant guideline).
Here, while the applicable guideline contemplates the
type of firearm possessed (a machine gun) and
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's prior felony conviction, it says nothing
about the significant amount of ammunition that
3 Although we have often discussed the propriety of relying on the amount of ammunition and the number of magazines interchangeably in either the procedural or substantive reasonableness analyses in sentencing cases, we find this issue to be most relevant to the substantive reasonableness analysis in this case.
- 13 - Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho possessed, which exceeds an amount
"consistent with simple possession of a machine gun."4 United
States v. Morales-Vélez, 100 F.4th 334, 344-45 (1st Cir. 2024);
see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). Nor did any enhancement considering
that factor apply to Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's offense level.
Because the guidelines therefore "d[id] not account" for the
significant amount of "ammunition involved in [the] offense," an
upward variance was justified. United States v. Rosario-Merced,
109 F.4th 77, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2024).
We have affirmed upward variances in firearm-possession
cases involving less ammunition. See, e.g., Morales-Vélez, 100
F.4th at 340–41, 344–46 (affirming sixty-month upward variance
where defendant "possessed not only a machine gun but four
magazines, [two] of which were high capacity, and 125 rounds of
radically invasive projectiles" (alteration in original));
Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th at 100–01, 104–05 (affirming twenty-one
month upward variance where defendant possessed "111 rounds of
ammunition" and "five magazines, four of which were extended and
all of which were loaded"); see also United States v.
4 To be sure, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) accounts for a quantity of ammunition that is "consistent with simple possession of a machine gun." United States v. Morales-Vélez, 100 F.4th 334, 344 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2020)). But where, as here, the quantity of ammunition exceeds that, "[o]ur precedent is clear that sentencing courts may consider the amount of ammunition to be an aggravating factor, one not already accounted for by the guidelines." Id.
- 14 - Rivera-Santiago, 919 F.3d 82, 83–86 (1st Cir. 2019) (affirming
eleven-month upward variance where defendant possessed two empty
large-capacity magazines and 127 rounds of ammunition);
Mercado-Cañizares, 133 F.4th at 181 (concluding that "amount of
ammunition at issue . . . (seventy-four rounds and two extended
magazines)" was "independently sufficient to support" a "30%
upward variance"). In light of this precedent, the district court
properly based its upward variance on the 152 rounds of ammunition
and seven magazines (five of which were high capacity) that
Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho possessed at the time of his arrest.5
Because the court thus articulated a "plausible
rationale and reached a defensible result," Colón-De Jesus, 85
F.4th at 26 (quoting De Jesús-Torres, 64 F.4th at 40), its sentence
"falls within th[e] broad universe" of "reasonable sentencing
5 The district court further specified that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho committed his firearm offense "while on escape status" from his court-ordered residential re-entry program. The government correctly represents that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho’s escape status did not affect his total offense level. That is because his escape count was nine levels less than his felon-in-possession count, so it could not "increase the applicable offense level" under the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(c). The guidelines in turn contemplate that the lower-level offense may still be "reason for sentencing at the higher end of the sentencing range for the applicable offense level." Id. We need not reach the question regarding whether his escape status provides further grounds for an upward variance, however, because the number of magazines and large amount of ammunition that Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho possessed was "independently sufficient to support" an upward variance. United States v. Mercado-Cañizares, 133 F.4th 173, 181 (1st Cir. 2025).
- 15 - outcomes," Burgos, 133 F.4th at 195 (first quoting Rivera-Morales,
961 F.3d at 21; and then quoting Polaco-Hance, 103 F.4th at 104).
While Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho surely preferred a different result,
we cannot credit his effort to "substitute his judgment for that
of the sentencing court." Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 21 (quoting
United States v. Vargas-García, 794 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 2015)).
III. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Del-Valle-Camacho's
sentence is affirmed.
- 16 -