United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 13-1225
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS DÁVILA-FÉLIX, a/k/a Carlos Mona,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges, and Gelpí,* District Judge.
Ignacio Fernández-de Lahongrais, by appointment of the court, for appellant. Luke V. Cass, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Marcela Claudia Mateo, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
August 18, 2014
* Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation. TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case marks the second
time that Appellant Carlos Dávila-Félix ("Dávila") has appeared
before this court to challenge his sentence. In March 2009, a jury
convicted Dávila of robbing an FDIC-insured bank using force and
intimidation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) ("Count
One"), and of carrying and brandishing a firearm to commit that
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) ("Count
Two"). As to Count One, the district court imposed a mandatory
life sentence pursuant to the federal "three strikes" statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1), and as to Count Two, it sentenced Dávila to
the mandatory minimum of 84 months' imprisonment, to be served
consecutively. In Dávila's first appeal, he argued that the
district court erred in sentencing him under the "three strikes"
statute. We agreed and remanded for resentencing.
At the resentencing hearing, the government presented
additional evidence about Dávila's prior offenses. The district
court found that the evidence established that Dávila was a career
offender, and the court enhanced Dávila's Guidelines sentence
accordingly. As a result, Dávila received a sentence of 300 months
for Count One and 120 months for Count Two, for a total of 420
months' imprisonment. Dávila now appeals his second sentence,
arguing that the district court erred by permitting the government
to introduce additional evidence at resentencing to support the
-2- career offender enhancement. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
I. Background
The details of Dávila's offense conduct and first
sentencing were described thoroughly in United States v. Dávila-
Félix, 667 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Dávila I"), so we provide only
a brief recitation of those facts here.
In 2003, beginning in May and ending in November, Dávila
participated in a string of six bank robberies in Puerto Rico. The
Commonwealth arrested Dávila and charged him with armed robbery and
related weapons offenses arising out of five of the six robberies.
The fourth robbery that took place on September 8, 2003, however,
was not included in the charges. Dávila pled guilty and received
a six-year sentence.
In April 2008, Dávila was again indicted, this time for
violations of federal law stemming from the previously uncharged
September 8, 2003, robbery. Before trial began, the government
filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), giving
notice that it intended to seek a mandatory life sentence under the
federal "three strikes" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1).1 The
1 The federal "three strikes" statute provides that:
[A] person who is convicted in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if -- (A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a
-3- information listed four prior convictions that the government
believed triggered the "three strikes" statute: (1) a May 23, 1993,
conviction for second-degree murder; (2) a June 25, 1993,
conviction for violations of Article 401 of the Controlled
Substances Act of Puerto Rico; (3) a July 20, 2000, conviction for
a violation of Article 404 of the Controlled Substances Act of
Puerto Rico; and (4) the April 5, 2004, conviction for bank robbery
and weapons violations.
After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Dávila on both
the robbery and firearm counts, and he was sentenced on
September 29, 2009. At that sentencing hearing, the district court
found that Dávila had two prior violent felony convictions: (1) the
second-degree murder conviction from May 26, 1993, and (2) the
armed bank robbery conviction from April 5, 2004. The sentencing
judge began by observing that these two convictions qualified
Dávila as a career offender,2 but ultimately concluded that the
State of -- (i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or (ii) one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses; and (B) each serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the defendant’s conviction of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). 2 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant is a career offender if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
-4- prior offenses triggered a mandatory life sentence under the "three
strikes" statute. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Dávila
to life imprisonment as to Count One, and to the mandatory minimum
of 84 months for Count Two, to be served consecutively.
Dávila's first appeal followed. He argued that his
sentence was imposed in error because his April 5, 2004, armed
robbery conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under
either the "three strikes" or career offender provisions. In
Dávila I, this court agreed, holding that the April 2004 conviction
did not qualify as a prior conviction for "three strikes" or career
offender purposes because the April 2004 conviction occurred after
-- not prior to -- Dávila's commission of the September 8, 2003,
offenses. 667 F.3d at 52, 55.
Additionally, we found that the record on appeal was
inadequate to establish that Dávila's June 25, 1993, conviction
qualified as a "controlled substance offense"3 that could trigger
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 3 As used here, a "controlled substance offense" is:
[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance
-5- the career offender sentencing enhancement. Id. at 55-57. As this
court explained in Dávila I, the 1993 conviction stemmed from two
violations of Article 401 of the Controlled Substances Act of
Puerto Rico. That statute criminalizes a range of offenses
including concealment, distribution, dispersal, and possession with
intent to distribute controlled substances. See P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 24, § 2401. The record on appeal, however, was insufficient
to allow this court to determine whether Dávila's June 1993
conviction was for merely concealing a controlled substance, which
would not qualify as a predicate "controlled substance offense," or
whether the conviction was for possession with intent to distribute
a controlled substance, which would qualify as a predicate offense.
Id. We thus reversed and remanded for resentencing.
At resentencing, the government provided the district
court with additional documents -- including Dávila's change of
plea motion -- to prove that the June 25, 1993, conviction
qualified as a controlled substance offense that supported the
application of the career offender enhancement.4 Dávila objected,
arguing that this court's opinion in Dávila I foreclosed
(or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). 4 In addition, the government offered for the first time the search and seizure order and certificate of forensic analysis related to the June 1993 conviction.
-6- reconsideration of the 1993 conviction, and that the government
should not be given an opportunity to present supplemental evidence
to establish the career offender enhancement on remand.
After briefing by both parties, the district court ruled
that the remand was not limited in scope and that the government
could introduce the additional evidence. The court then determined
that -- in light of the May 1993 second-degree murder conviction
and the June 1993 conviction for drug offenses -- Dávila qualified
as a career offender. This meant that Dávila's guidelines sentence
for Count One increased from the original range of 84 to 105 months
to an enhanced range of 360 months to life. The district court
then imposed a 300-month sentence for Count One -- the statutory
maximum -- to run consecutively with Dávila's 120-month sentence on
Count Two.
II. Analysis
This court reviews the correctness of a district court's
legal analysis at sentencing de novo. Sampson v. United States,
724 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Wallace, 573
F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2009). We thus consider anew Dávila's
assertions that the sentencing judge erred by permitting the
government to introduce additional evidence related to his prior
conviction, thereby violating the law of the case doctrine and
exceeding the scope of remand. See United States v. Genao-Sánchez,
525 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that the interpretation
-7- of this court's mandate "is a quintessentially legal question, so
our review is plenary").
Before we address the merits of Dávila's claim, however,
a bit of background on the governing legal framework is in order.
The law of the case doctrine is a prudential principle rooted in
important policy interests like "stability in the decisionmaking
process, predictability of results, proper working relationships
between trial and appellate courts, and judicial economy." United
States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). It provides generally that
"when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same
case." Wallace, 573 F.3d at 87-88 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The so-called "mandate rule" is a branch of the law of
the case doctrine that "prevents relitigation in the trial court of
matters that were explicitly or implicitly decided by an earlier
appellate decision in the same case." United States v. Moran, 393
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004). Put another way, the mandate rule
requires that the trial court conform with the directions of the
appellate court on remand. Bell, 988 F.2d at 251. A district
court seeking to determine the scope of remand must therefore
consider carefully "both the letter and the spirit of the mandate,
taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the
-8- circumstances it embraces." Genao-Sánchez, 525 F.3d at 70 (quoting
United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1993)).
In keeping with this legal framework, we begin our review
by considering carefully the letter and spirit of Dávila I. As
pertinent to this appeal, our opinion in Dávila I explained that
the district court had interpreted the "three strikes" statute and
the career offender enhancement erroneously, and that the record
did not support the application of either. 677 F.3d at 52-55.
Although we did not foreclose the possibility that Dávila's
violations of Article 401 of the Controlled Substances Act of
Puerto Rico could qualify as a "controlled substance offense"
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, we held that the government
had not provided sufficient record evidence for this court to make
such a determination one way or the other. Id. ("On the record
before us, the information presented regarding these drug
convictions simply does not contain the requisite information that
would permit a court to determine whether they indeed constitute
'controlled substance offenses' as defined by U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(b)."). We ultimately concluded that the "record provides
insufficient information to justify the imposition of the sentence"
based on Dávila's drug offenses, and that "the sentence imposed by
the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for
resentencing." Id. at 57-58.
-9- Pointing to this language, the government argues that
Dávila I includes no express limitation on the district court's
ability to receive new arguments or evidence at resentencing. In
the absence of any such prohibition, the government posits that the
district court was free to consider additional evidence introduced
for the first time at resentencing. See United States v. Bryant,
643 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2011).
The government is correct that Dávila I imposed no
express limitations on the scope of remand. However, the absence
of an express limitation does not a limitless remand make. Unlike
some of our sister circuits, the First Circuit does not generally
allow de novo resentencing on remand. Compare United States v.
McFalls, 675 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The presumption in
favor of a general remand is necessarily strong in the context of
a resentencing because the calculation of a sentence under the
Guidelines requires a balancing of many related variables, and
these variables do not always become fixed independently of one
another." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), and
United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2002)
("On remand, the district court generally should be free to
consider any matters relevant to sentencing, even those that may
not have been raised at the first sentencing hearing, as if it were
sentencing de novo."), with United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 527
F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Although some circuits do generally
-10- allow de novo resentencing on remand, the First Circuit does not."
(citations omitted)).
The rule of this circuit is that "upon a resentencing
occasioned by a remand, unless the court of appeals [has expressly
directed otherwise], the district court may consider only such new
arguments or new facts as are made newly relevant by the court of
appeals' decision -- whether by the reasoning or the result."
United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 1999)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d
956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). We therefore must determine whether
the evidence regarding Dávila's June 1993 conviction was made newly
relevant by either the reasoning or result of Dávila I.
Dávila contends that the career offender enhancement was
not made newly relevant by Dávila I, which found the record
evidence of his 1993 conviction insufficient to support the career
offender enhancement under the long-since-established modified
categorical approach.5 667 F.3d at 56. In Dávila's view, the
government had access to the evidence of his 1993 conviction at the
first sentencing as well as the opportunity to present it then.
5 The modified categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-602 (1990), establishes that a court seeking to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense at sentencing must look first to the statutory definition of the offense. If the statute is divisible and encompasses both predicate and non-predicate offense conduct, the court should consult certain documents of record to determine whether predicate conduct formed the basis of the prior conviction. Id.; Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
-11- Thus, the government's failure to provide adequate support for the
career offender enhancement at the first sentencing did not make
the topic newly relevant; it constituted waiver. In addition,
Dávila argues that we ought to follow our sister circuits in
holding that the interests of fairness and judicial economy must
prevent the government from getting a "second bite at the apple"
after having failed to meet its burden to establish an enhancement
at the first sentencing. We take each argument in turn.6
Beginning with the question of whether the government's
career offender argument was newly relevant or waived, we find this
court's analysis in Ticchiarelli particularly instructive. In
Ticchiarelli, we held that our mandate did not preclude
consideration of the defendant's new argument as to drug quantity
at resentencing. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d at 31-33. We explained
that where our mandate does not expressly preclude it, "the
district court may consider . . . such new arguments or new facts
as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals' decision." Id.
at 32 (quoting Whren, 111 F.3d at 960). This is true even in cases
6 Dávila also argues that the government's introduction of newly acquired evidence at resentencing ought to have been rejected for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1). However, Rule 33(b)(1) deals only with the ability of criminal defendants to seek new trials on the basis of "newly discovered evidence" found within three years of the date of their convictions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). As Dávila's resentencing involved neither "newly discovered evidence" nor a motion for a new trial, Rule 33(b)(1) is entirely inapplicable to this appeal. Accordingly, we will spill no more ink on the subject.
-12- where the defendant had the opportunity to present his position at
his first sentencing hearing "if he did not have a reason to raise
it at his original sentencing." Id. (quoting Whren, 111 F.3d at
960). Put another way, "[w]hether there is a waiver depends not
. . . on counting the number of missed opportunities . . . to raise
an issue, but on whether the party had sufficient incentive to
raise the issue in the prior proceedings." Id. at 32-33.
In Ticchiarelli's first sentencing hearing, he had no
incentive to argue drug weight because it could not affect his
sentence; the district court had already issued a ruling that would
have made any such argument merely academic. Id. at 33. As a
defendant is under no obligation to "raise every objection that
might have been relevant" had the district court not already ruled
to the contrary, we found that Ticchiarelli should be afforded the
opportunity to present his newly relevant evidence of drug quantity
at resentencing. Id. (citing United States v. Atehortva, 69 F.3d
679, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the government could
articulate new grounds for a departure at resentencing where the
defendant's sentence had initially been automatically set at the
statutory maximum for reasons that were no longer applicable after
the appellate court's decision in an earlier appeal)).
In Dávila's case, the district court applied Ticchiarelli
and found that the government had no incentive to delve into the
June 1993 conviction at Dávila's first sentencing, and thus there
-13- was no waiver. We agree. The consequence of the district court's
erroneous application of the "three strikes" statute at the first
sentencing hearing was a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
That mandatory sentence made irrelevant any discussion of potential
sentencing enhancements at the first sentencing. However, this
court's decision reversing the mandatory life sentence made the
subject of the Guidelines generally, and the career offender
enhancement specifically, newly relevant at resentencing.7
In response, Dávila argues that the government's position
is more closely analogous to that of the appellant in Bell than in
Ticchiarelli. In Bell, this court affirmed the district court's
decision to prevent the defendant from challenging -- for the first
time at resentencing -- his status as an armed career criminal.
988 F.2d at 248-50. Similarly, Dávila reasons, the government here
7 In this regard, Dávila's case is readily distinguishable from the portion of Ticchiarelli holding that the district court erred by considering at resentencing an unrelated Florida sentence. 171 F.3d at 35-36. In that instance, we explained that the Florida sentence did not constitute a "prior sentence" as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Id. Additionally, we observed that unlike the drug quantity issue, the Florida sentence was not made newly relevant by virtue of our decision that the district court should have treated Ticchiarelli's drugs as marijuana rather than hashish oil for Guidelines purposes. See id. Certainly, the reversal of a discretionary sentence alone does not render newly relevant at resentencing alternative arguments that were relevant but not argued by the government at a defendant's initial sentencing. But that is not the case before us. Our decision in Dávila I reversed the imposition of a mandatory life sentence under § 3559, not a discretionary sentence, making newly relevant the previously unargued career offender enhancement that was irrelevant at the first sentencing.
-14- should not have been able to argue that Dávila was a career
offender for the first time at his second sentencing. He also
points out that Ticchiarelli is not entirely on all-fours with the
facts of his case, because Ticchiarelli recognized the ability of
a defendant -- not the government -- to present new facts and
argument at resentencing. Moreover, the sentencing judge in
Ticchiarelli had already issued a final ruling against the
defendant's position prior to the first sentencing, while there
were no such final rulings against the application of the career
offender enhancement in this case. See Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d at
33.
Ultimately, we find none of these distinctions persuasive
given the particular facts of this case. As an initial matter,
Bell is readily distinguishable. In that case, the defendant
argued successfully during his first appeal that the nature of his
prior convictions called for sentencing under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (the "ACCA") and not the career offender guideline.
Bell, 988 F.2d at 249. At his resentencing, however, the defendant
attempted to reverse his position, arguing for the first time that
the ACCA should not apply. Id. at 249-50. The district court
refused to allow the new argument, and on Bell's second appeal, we
affirmed the district court's finding that the mandate rule
prevented relitigation of the issue where no exceptional
circumstances applied and the issue had been previously agreed upon
-15- and decided in the case. Id. at 252. Here, in contrast, the
government is not arguing in contravention of its previously
asserted position. Additionally, it has explained its failure to
present the career offender evidence at the first sentencing, and
it has provided credible evidence to support the enhancement.
As for Dávila's arguments that Ticchiarelli allows only
a defendant to introduce new evidence and that it ought not apply
to the government or in the absence of a final order of the
district court, we cannot agree. First, Dávila ignores the fact
that Ticchiarelli cites with approval a Second Circuit case that
held that the government could introduce a new argument at
resentencing when it lacked incentive to introduce the argument at
the initial sentencing. 171 F.3d at 33 (citing Atehortva, 69 F.3d
at 684-85). Second, given the mandatory nature of a life sentence
under § 3559, the district court's ruling on the subject prior to
hearing any Guidelines arguments served as the functional
equivalent of the prior ruling in Ticchiarelli, as it rendered all
other potential alternative arguments as to applicable Guidelines
irrelevant.
In United States v. Montero-Montero, 370 F.3d 121, 124
(1st Cir. 2004), decided a full five years after Ticchiarelli, we
held there was insufficient record support for the special skills
adjustment imposed by the district court at the defendant's initial
sentencing. Nevertheless, we held that the district court could
-16- allow the parties to develop the record further at resentencing to
determine whether the adjustment was warranted. Id. As we
explained, the case did not involve an enhancement that the
government had sought at the initial sentencing hearing and simply
failed to support adequately. Id. Rather, the district court had
determined sua sponte that a special skills adjustment was
warranted without any such request by either party. Id. In those
circumstances, we held that our usual concerns about the government
getting a second bite at the apple did not apply, and the district
court could properly conduct additional factfinding regarding the
enhancement at resentencing. Id.
Here, as in Montero-Montero, we find that this is "not a
case where the government asked for the enhancement but failed to
adduce sufficient proof for its imposition." Id. In fact, neither
party so much as mentioned the existence of the career offender
enhancement prior to the sentencing judge's sua sponte decision to
announce the enhancement's applicability. The district court then
went on to render the enhancement moot by sentencing Dávila in
accordance with the "three strikes" statute. Applying the
Ticchiarelli rule to the facts of this case, we find that the
government did not waive its career offender argument by failing to
advance it at the initial sentencing hearing when it lacked the
incentive to do so. Our reversal of the district court's
application of the "three strikes" statute invalidated a mandatory
-17- sentence of life imprisonment, thereby making the career offender
enhancement newly relevant at resentencing. In the absence of any
express limitations on our mandate, the district court acted well
within its discretion by permitting the parties to introduce new
evidence on the subject of the enhancement at Dávila's
resentencing.
As a final matter, we consider Dávila's argument that we
ought to follow the lead of our sister circuits and find that the
interests of fairness and judicial economy prevent the government
from obtaining too many bites at the sentencing apple. Our failure
to do so, he contends, will provide the government with a blank
check to take as many passes at sentencing as necessary to produce
the desired result.8
In support of this view, Dávila directs us to opinions
from our sister circuits, pointing out instances in which an
appellate court expressly limited the scope of remand on the basis
of the government's failure to meet its burden at the initial
sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779
8 To the extent that Dávila seeks to invoke generally the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, we note that such principles are entirely inapplicable to the situation at hand, which involves resentencing a defendant to a lesser sentence after the defendant's successful appeal, and not repeated efforts to convict a defendant for a given offense. See United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc) ("[N]either appellate review of sentences nor increases after appeal will ordinarily implicate double jeopardy considerations." (citations omitted)).
-18- (8th Cir. 2009) ("Because the government was clearly on notice that
it was required to prove up [the defendant's] convictions before he
would be subject to the enhancement at issue, we direct the
district court on remand to resentence [the defendant] based on the
record already before it."). He also directs our attention to
discussions of the government's obligation to make its case the
first time around. See, e.g., United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d
818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here the government has the burden of
production and persuasion . . . its case should ordinarily have to
stand or fall on the record it makes the first time around. It
should not normally be afforded a second bite at the apple."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Without a doubt, Dávila is correct insofar as he argues
that no party -- including the government -- is entitled to an
unlimited number of opportunities to seek the sentence it desires.
This basic proposition is already well-established in this circuit.
See, e.g., Connell, 6 F.3d at 30 ("In the interests of both
consistency and judicial economy, . . . litigants should not
ordinarily be allowed to take serial bites at the appellate
apple."). As we have previously recognized, in "a case where the
government asked for [an] enhancement but failed to adduce
sufficient proof for its imposition . . . there would not likely be
reason to permit a second bite at the apple." Montero-Montero, 370
F.3d at 124.
-19- Here, however, the government did not seek to introduce
at resentencing additional evidence to bolster its failed "three
strikes" statute argument, or to support a career offender argument
it had presented unsuccessfully at the first sentencing, either of
which would have constituted a second bite at the apple in
violation of the mandate rule. See Whren, 111 F.3d at 959 ("[U]pon
remand the Government could not offer new evidence in support of
the sentencing level for which it had unsuccessfully argued at the
original sentencing hearing."). Rather, it presented evidence to
support an enhancement -- previously announced sua sponte by the
district court and not in response to a request from the government
-- that was made newly relevant by this court's reversal of a
mandatory life sentence. Cf. Atehortva, 69 F.3d at 684-85
(allowing consideration of new grounds for an enhancement at
resentencing that were not previously addressed by the government
due to the automatic application of the statutory maximum at the
first sentencing); United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 241 (2d
Cir. 2004) ("[T]he issue of other enhancements was put aside, owing
to the murder enhancement, and became newly relevant only upon
remand."). And although Dávila seeks to frame the issue as one
unfairly permitting the government latitude denied to a defendant,
in truth, our remand allowed the district court to consider new
evidence or argument relating to the newly relevant career offender
enhancement as produced by either party.
-20- Neither does Dávila's appeal to judicial economy do him
any favors. Our waiver doctrine ensures that a party must present
all relevant arguments before the district court in the first
instance to avoid waiver. Our decision today does nothing to
undermine this generally applicable rule. The narrow Ticchiarelli
exception applies only in instances where a previously irrelevant
argument becomes newly relevant as a consequence of an appellate
decision; it does nothing to help a litigant who fails to present
relevant evidence or argument below. In this way, the Ticchiarelli
exception acts itself as a safeguard of judicial economy. It
guards against the creation of an "irrational" system in which
litigants would be forced to litigate every conceivable sentencing
issue at their hearing "even though irrelevant to the immediate
sentencing determination in anticipation of the possibility that,
upon remand, the issue might be relevant." Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d
at 32 (quoting United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th
Cir. 1996)). We are thus confident that our decision today
promotes rather than undermines judicial economy.
III. Conclusion
In sum, the district court did not err by considering at
resentencing the newly relevant evidence of Dávila's June 1993
conviction. Neither waiver nor the scope of remand precluded such
consideration. As Dávila's challenge on appeal goes only to the
propriety of the court's consideration of such evidence, and he
-21- does not otherwise contest the application of the career offender
enhancement at resentencing, we need go no further.9 Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
9 As a final matter, we note that Dávila flagged in his brief a potential instructional error as to Count Two. He argues that although he was indicted and sentenced for having brandished a firearm, the jury made no specific finding as to brandishing, which constitutes a violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Both in his brief and at argument, however, Dávila flatly conceded that he did not preserve his claim by objecting at trial or sentencing, and that his unpreserved Alleyne claim could not survive plain-error review. Our case law makes clear that we review such unpreserved Alleyne claims for plain error, United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 184 (1st Cir. 2014), so in light of Dávila's concession on that point, no further discussion of the matter is required.
-22-