GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Daniel Proa-Tovar appeals his felony conviction for being a deported alien in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). Relying on United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987), Proa-Tovar collaterally challenges the deportation order upon which his section 1326 violation is predicated. He argues that his February 1989 deportation could not be the basis of his November 1989 criminal offense because the immigration judge had denied him direct judicial review of the underlying deportation.
In December 1988, Proa-Tovar pled guilty in state court to felony possession of cocaine for sale. The conviction made him eligible for deportation. ' On February 24, 1989, following a hearing conducted by an Immigration and Naturalization Service administrative law judge, he was ordered deported. He did not appeal.
On November 2, 1989, Proa-Tovar was found again in San Diego. The police turned him over to immigration officials and he was promptly indicted by a federal grand jury for being present in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court denied his motion to quash the indictment on Mendoza-Lopez grounds, and he appeals his resulting conviction.
Proa-Tovar argues that the deportation hearing in February effectively denied him opportunity for judicial review because he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal the deportation order.
I. The right to collateral review
We first determine whether, in a section 1326 criminal prosecution, a defendant can make a collateral attack on the underlying deportation order. Mendoza-Lopez holds that where defects in an administrative proceeding have effectively foreclosed direct judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used as conclusive proof of an element of a criminal offense. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838, 107 S.Ct. at 2155; see also United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 438 (9th Cir.1989).
If waiver of the right to appeal a deportation proceeding was not knowingly and intelligently made, direct judicial review has been effectively denied and use of the deportation order as the necessary predicate to a section 1326 offense may be [1452]*1452collaterally challenged. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839-40, 107 S.Ct. at 2155-56.
II. Was there a knowing waiver?
Proa-Tovar alleges that the waiver of his right to appeal the deportation proceeding was not knowing and considered. The government argues that the record of the deportation proceeding indicates that Proa-Tovar’s waiver was valid.
At the opening of the hearing twelve detainees appeared before the immigration judge in response to show cause orders. The immigration judge had appointed a nearby lawyer to act as counsel, without pay, for the group of aliens. The appointed counsel stated that he had interviewed each detainee and that each had consented to representation.
The immigration judge caused a number of routine questions to be put to the group, in Spanish. The immigration judge then inquired of counsel: “[a]nd can you tell that they do understand the nature of this hearing or the rights they have.” Counsel responded, “Yes, that’s correct your hon- or.” At the conclusion of the hearing the English speaking judge, through an interpreter, offered each Spanish speaking detainee an opportunity to make a final statement opposing or questioning the deportation decision. All declined.
The judge then explained that eleven of the twelve detainees would be deported and one would be granted voluntary departure. The judge asked the eleven whether they understood the deportation order and the reasons for it. The judge asked the detainees to “answer together” and, as a group, they responded “yes.”
Finally the immigration judge questioned government counsel and appointed counsel as follows:
Judge: Alright now, attorneys, you have both heard the decision stated and ah, I must ask if there is any appeal? Mr. Siddel, do you want to make any appeal?
Attorney: No appeal with [sic].
The immigration judge concluded the hearing with the following statement:
Judge: To all of the respondents. Gentlemen, there will be no appeal in your cases. So the decision in your case is final. I promise you will all go to Mexico tonight and am giving you and the attorneys copies of the decision.
In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court questioned the use of an administrative order to establish an element of a criminal offense. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 2155 n. 15. The Court stressed that such a practice could only be legitimized by adequate judicial review of the administrative action. Id. We therefore require strong evidence to ensure that a valid waiver of the right to appeal exists in the deportation record. “Courts should ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver....’” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 812, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)) (discussing the Court’s view on waiver of constitutional rights).
The judge’s generalized questions to appointed counsel and to the roomful of alien detainees regarding whether the detainees understood their rights were inadequate without more to guarantee that each detainee was made aware of his right to judicial review and that his waiver of judicial review was a product of his knowing and considered decision. The immigration judge failed to explain to the detainees their absolute right to appeal, as is customary at such hearings. The quoted exchange with counsel regarding whether any of the detainees wished to appeal reveals no input from any of the twelve aliens present. We cannot conclude from the record that the decision to waive the detainees’ appeal rights was anything more than the independent decision of Proa-Tovar’s appointed counsel. There was no knowing waiver.
III. Effect of counsel’s “waiver”
The government argues that representation by counsel, absent proof of ineffective assistance, guarantees the propriety of the waiver. The record in this case precludes [1453]*1453the government from relying on counsel’s waiver. The inquiries, standards, and purposes of the law of ineffective assistance of counsel differ markedly from those governing waivers.
Although broad deference is accorded the many strategic decisions made by counsel throughout the course of representation, the validity of a waiver is subject to exacting scrutiny.
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GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Daniel Proa-Tovar appeals his felony conviction for being a deported alien in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). Relying on United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987), Proa-Tovar collaterally challenges the deportation order upon which his section 1326 violation is predicated. He argues that his February 1989 deportation could not be the basis of his November 1989 criminal offense because the immigration judge had denied him direct judicial review of the underlying deportation.
In December 1988, Proa-Tovar pled guilty in state court to felony possession of cocaine for sale. The conviction made him eligible for deportation. ' On February 24, 1989, following a hearing conducted by an Immigration and Naturalization Service administrative law judge, he was ordered deported. He did not appeal.
On November 2, 1989, Proa-Tovar was found again in San Diego. The police turned him over to immigration officials and he was promptly indicted by a federal grand jury for being present in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court denied his motion to quash the indictment on Mendoza-Lopez grounds, and he appeals his resulting conviction.
Proa-Tovar argues that the deportation hearing in February effectively denied him opportunity for judicial review because he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal the deportation order.
I. The right to collateral review
We first determine whether, in a section 1326 criminal prosecution, a defendant can make a collateral attack on the underlying deportation order. Mendoza-Lopez holds that where defects in an administrative proceeding have effectively foreclosed direct judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used as conclusive proof of an element of a criminal offense. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838, 107 S.Ct. at 2155; see also United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 438 (9th Cir.1989).
If waiver of the right to appeal a deportation proceeding was not knowingly and intelligently made, direct judicial review has been effectively denied and use of the deportation order as the necessary predicate to a section 1326 offense may be [1452]*1452collaterally challenged. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839-40, 107 S.Ct. at 2155-56.
II. Was there a knowing waiver?
Proa-Tovar alleges that the waiver of his right to appeal the deportation proceeding was not knowing and considered. The government argues that the record of the deportation proceeding indicates that Proa-Tovar’s waiver was valid.
At the opening of the hearing twelve detainees appeared before the immigration judge in response to show cause orders. The immigration judge had appointed a nearby lawyer to act as counsel, without pay, for the group of aliens. The appointed counsel stated that he had interviewed each detainee and that each had consented to representation.
The immigration judge caused a number of routine questions to be put to the group, in Spanish. The immigration judge then inquired of counsel: “[a]nd can you tell that they do understand the nature of this hearing or the rights they have.” Counsel responded, “Yes, that’s correct your hon- or.” At the conclusion of the hearing the English speaking judge, through an interpreter, offered each Spanish speaking detainee an opportunity to make a final statement opposing or questioning the deportation decision. All declined.
The judge then explained that eleven of the twelve detainees would be deported and one would be granted voluntary departure. The judge asked the eleven whether they understood the deportation order and the reasons for it. The judge asked the detainees to “answer together” and, as a group, they responded “yes.”
Finally the immigration judge questioned government counsel and appointed counsel as follows:
Judge: Alright now, attorneys, you have both heard the decision stated and ah, I must ask if there is any appeal? Mr. Siddel, do you want to make any appeal?
Attorney: No appeal with [sic].
The immigration judge concluded the hearing with the following statement:
Judge: To all of the respondents. Gentlemen, there will be no appeal in your cases. So the decision in your case is final. I promise you will all go to Mexico tonight and am giving you and the attorneys copies of the decision.
In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court questioned the use of an administrative order to establish an element of a criminal offense. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 2155 n. 15. The Court stressed that such a practice could only be legitimized by adequate judicial review of the administrative action. Id. We therefore require strong evidence to ensure that a valid waiver of the right to appeal exists in the deportation record. “Courts should ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver....’” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 812, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)) (discussing the Court’s view on waiver of constitutional rights).
The judge’s generalized questions to appointed counsel and to the roomful of alien detainees regarding whether the detainees understood their rights were inadequate without more to guarantee that each detainee was made aware of his right to judicial review and that his waiver of judicial review was a product of his knowing and considered decision. The immigration judge failed to explain to the detainees their absolute right to appeal, as is customary at such hearings. The quoted exchange with counsel regarding whether any of the detainees wished to appeal reveals no input from any of the twelve aliens present. We cannot conclude from the record that the decision to waive the detainees’ appeal rights was anything more than the independent decision of Proa-Tovar’s appointed counsel. There was no knowing waiver.
III. Effect of counsel’s “waiver”
The government argues that representation by counsel, absent proof of ineffective assistance, guarantees the propriety of the waiver. The record in this case precludes [1453]*1453the government from relying on counsel’s waiver. The inquiries, standards, and purposes of the law of ineffective assistance of counsel differ markedly from those governing waivers.
Although broad deference is accorded the many strategic decisions made by counsel throughout the course of representation, the validity of a waiver is subject to exacting scrutiny. For a waiver to be effective, it must be clearly established that there was “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Moreover, waiver by counsel is not, ipso facto, sufficient to establish that a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1248, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (petitioner’s constitutional right to confront witnesses could not be waived by counsel without petitioner’s consent). Waiver under the Johnson standard appears to require knowing participation by the accused. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-246, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2051-2058, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (discussing the use of the “knowing and intelligent” waiver standard). While an independent decision by counsel to forego appeal of the deportation hearing may or may not raise the question of ineffective assistance, counsel’s waiver will not support a finding that the detainee made a knowing and considered waiver of the right to appeal.
IV. Need to show prejudice
Proa-Tovar argues because Mendoza-Lopez bars the use of the February 1989 deportation order in the § 1326 indictment, he need not show prejudice from the defective waiver. He cites Villa-Fabela in support. Although Villa-Fabela held that Mendoza-Lopez did not affect Ninth Circuit precedent requiring a showing of actual prejudice in collateral attacks on deportation proceedings whose defects did not deny judicial review, we stated that “a procedural defect that effectively denies judicial review precludes use of the deportation order to establish an element of a criminal offense under Mendoza-Lopez whether or not the defendant establishes actual prejudice.” Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d at 438.
The government asks us in effect to treat Villa-Fabela as dictum and to hold instead that where a waiver of appeal was not knowing and intelligent, a defendant in a section 1326 proceeding must show he was prejudiced by the lack of appeal in the deportation proceeding. We decline to do so.
While we recognize that Mendoza-Lopez arose in a different procedural context than we have in this case, it is apparent from the way the immigration judge conducted the deportation hearing in this case that a bright-line rule is needed.
Proa-Tovar presents as weak a case as can be imagined for a showing of prejudice, but the strength of whatever appeal he might have attempted is immaterial. One purpose of the Mendoza-Lopez rule is to avoid mini trials on the presence or absence of prejudice after a defective administrative hearing. A corollary purpose is to encourage the Immigration and Naturalization Service to conduct a proper hearing if the deportation order is to be relied upon in future felony prosecutions.
The government argues that we can grant all the judicial review that is necessary and thus satisfy the requirement of Mendozar-Lopez. We decline independently to assess the underlying administrative hearing with respect to the fundamental fairness of the use of mass waiver by counsel of all the possible appeals that might have been attempted by a dozen silent aliens.
Other circuits have interpreted Mendoza-Lopez to require a showing of prejudice in the collateral challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844, 109 S.Ct. 119, 102 L.Ed.2d 92 (1988).
We believe it to be a better reading of Mendoza-Lopez to read it as a bright-line rule and to encourage the INS to make [1454]*1454certain that every person deported as the result of an administrative hearing was adequately apprised, on the record, of his right to appeal. See Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 840, 107 S.Ct. at 2156 (“If the violation of respondents’ rights that took place in this case amounted to a complete deprivation of judicial review of the determination, that determination may not be used to enhance the penalty for an unlawful entry under section 1326.”) (emphasis added). The alternative is to fill the courts with claims requiring minute scrutiny of such questions as whether the alien was or was not deportable, or whether the alien was or was not eligible for any of the three modes of relief available to avoid deportation: (1) suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1); (2) voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e); and (3) record of admission for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
All of this review in the courts can be avoided by the simple expedient of instructing immigration judges to follow the law and make a record showing a knowing waiver by each person of his right to appeal.
REVERSED.