Appellate Case: 20-3233 Document: 010110626415 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
January 3, 2022 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Christopher M. Wolpert TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 20-3233
LEROYA COZAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D.C. No. 6:19-CR-10123-EFM-1)
Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender (Kayla Gassmann, Appellate Attorney, with her on the briefs), Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Robert A. Parker, United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC (James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas; and Mona Lee M. Furst and Molly M. Gordon, Assistant United States Attorneys, Wichita, Kansas, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BACHARACH, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. Appellate Case: 20-3233 Document: 010110626415 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 2
This appeal raises one issue: whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it is
unreasonable for a district court to impose a harsher sentence based on a defendant’s
decision to plead guilty without a plea agreement. For the reasons explained below, we
hold that it is.
I Background Ms. Leroya Cozad was indicted on a single charge of aiding and abetting the
making of counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 471. During plea
negotiations, she offered to plead guilty in exchange for the government’s
recommendation that she be sentenced to 48 months’ probation. The government
countered with an offer to recommend a custodial sentence at the low end of the
guideline range. She declined and entered an open plea.
Following her plea, probation prepared a presentence investigation report that
recommended a custodial sentence of between 24 and 30 months based on the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR’s guideline calculation reflected probation’s
conclusion that Ms. Cozad had “clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for the
offense” and was therefore due a reduction of two levels under § 3E1.1(a) of the
guidelines.1 Neither party objected to the PSR, although both submitted sentencing
memoranda advocating for their preferred outcome. Ms. Cozad advocated for a term of
1 Because Ms. Cozad’s adjusted offense level was below 16, she was not eligible for an additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b).
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probation. The government recommended a custodial sentence of 24 months, the same
recommendation it had offered to make during the abortive plea negotiations.
The district court rejected both recommendations and sentenced Ms. Cozad to a
prison term of 27 months, the midpoint of the guideline range. In explaining its decision,
the district court said the following:
I think sometimes there’s sort of an implicit assumption that an individual is entitled to a sentence at the low end of the guideline range, but there is, of course, no such right. And, in practice, one of the factors I’ve used to lean against a low-end guideline range are defendants who submit a plea without a plea agreement, without the agreements that typically happen in a plea agreement. That’s certainly their right to plead without a plea agreement, but they do not have a right to a low end guideline range sentence, and so it’s always been my -- again this isn’t a hard-and-fast rule by any means that I apply, but it’s always been my practice to say if someone agrees to a plea agreement, the additional conditions that are obtained in that, they’re entitled to additional consideration, which is where I start at a low end guideline range. But in my calculation, without a plea agreement, I have always started with looking more at the mid-tier of the guideline range, which is where I think the guidelines initially envisioned that courts would operate, and not giving them the additional credit for actually entering into a plea agreement to do that. In this case, having thought about it obviously since our hearing last week, having looked through the briefs that have been filed in this case since that time, as well as additional information I’ve received from the probation office and going back through the report as well, it’s my conclusion that, first of all, Ms. Cozad has not shown demonstration that entitles her to a variance from the guideline recommendation of a custodial sentence, and I cannot find that that variance has been earned; and secondly, in light of the matters that I’ve just discussed overall, that a low-end guideline range sentence is not appropriate.
Rec., vol. III at 42–44 (emphasis added).
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Ms. Cozad’s counsel objected, asserting that “the Court has entered its sentence
based on Ms. Cozad’s choice not to reach a plea agreement with the Government. That’s
a procedurally unreasonable reason to enter the sentence the Court described.” Rec., vol.
III at 48. The district court disagreed, leading to Ms. Cozad’s appeal.
II Standard of Review
We review a defendant’s sentence “for reasonableness under an abuse-of-
discretion standard,” which applies whether the sentence falls inside or outside of the
guideline range. United States v. Henson, 9 F.4th 1258, 1284 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 537 (2013)). The reasonableness of a sentence
includes a procedural component, which relates to the method by which a sentence was
calculated, and a substantive component, which relates to the length of the resulting
sentence. Id. In arguing that the district court impermissibly treated her open plea as an
aggravating fact warranting harsher punishment, Ms. Cozad raises a procedural
reasonableness challenge. See United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.
2009) (“Generally, a district court’s use of an improper factor invokes procedural
review.”); United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 835–36 (10th Cir. 2008) (“While the
weight the district court places on certain factors is reviewed for substantive
unreasonableness, use of an improper factor is reviewed for procedural
unreasonableness.”).
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III Discussion
At the outset, we think it is clear that the district court sentenced Ms. Cozad more
harshly than it otherwise would have but for her decision to plead guilty without entering
into an agreement with the government. Although the district court discussed Ms.
Cozad’s criminal history and her failure to fully comply with the conditions of her bond,
it did so while explaining its rejection of Ms. Cozad’s request for a noncustodial
sentence. See Rec., vol. III at 32, 41–42. When explaining its decision regarding the
length of her prison term, the district court first described its customary practice of
distinguishing defendants based on the nature of their plea. Then, in accordance with that
custom and despite the government’s recommendation of a sentence at the low end of the
guidelines, the court proceeded to impose a sentence of 27 months at the midpoint of the
guideline range. Notably, although the district court stated that its practice was not “a
hard-and-fast rule by any means,” the court did not explain why it was applying the rule
in Ms. Cozad’s case. Id. Similarly, although the district court made a passing reference
to “the agreements that typically happen in a plea agreement,” id., the court did not
specify what those “agreements” are. On this record, therefore, we cannot but conclude
that the district court gave Ms. Cozad a longer sentence than she otherwise would have
received simply because she pled guilty without a plea agreement. Whether it was
permissible for the district court to do so appears to be a question of first impression in
this or any other circuit.
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The factors a court may consider in determining a defendant’s sentence are set by
statute. They are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed— (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; . . . (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [by the sentencing guidelines] . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)] . . . ; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It is a form of procedural error to base a sentence on a factor falling
outside the scope of the considerations enumerated in § 3553(a). United States v. Smart,
518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2008).
For reasons of history, as well as congressional intent, appellate courts have
interpreted § 3553(a) liberally. Henson, 9 F.4th at 1293; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person . . . which a court of the United States may receive and consider for
the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). Nevertheless, a district court does
not enjoy boundless discretion with respect to the facts it relies on at sentencing. For
example, a factor may be impermissible because its consideration is prohibited by statute,
see United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that
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18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) prohibited considering the defendant’s need for rehabilitation as a
factor when deciding whether to impose a term of imprisonment or in determining its
length); or because its consideration burdens the exercise of a constitutional right, see
United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 808-09 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a within-
guidelines sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it was based on the
defendant’s refusal to testify); or because the factor is simply irrelevant to the
considerations enumerated in § 3553(a), United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957 (11th
Cir. 2016) (holding it unreasonable to sentence a defendant to prison based on her
inability to pay restitution because this was “not among the factors listed in § 3553(a)”).
Even when the fact ostensibly relates to the defendant’s conduct or characteristics, its
consideration may be grounds for remand when the fact has no bearing on any of the
aims of punishment set forth in § 3553(a)(2). See United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d
1284, 1288–90 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding a defendant could not be given a harsher
sentence due to her refusal to testify against her husband in an unrelated case because
doing so would not “‘reflect[] the seriousness’ of her own offense,” “promote respect for
the law,” or “‘provide just punishment for the offense,’ to which she plead guilty”); cf.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 365 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that it
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would be unreasonable for a district court to give “harsh sentences to Yankees fans and
lenient sentences to Red Sox fans”).2
Turning to the case at hand, we do not see how the fact of a defendant’s open plea,
standing alone, bears any meaningful relationship to the § 3553(a) factors. Certainly, it
says nothing about a defendant’s “history and characteristics,” § 3553(a)(1). At bottom, a
plea agreement is a contract and, like any other contract, it requires mutuality of assent
and an exchange of consideration. See United States v. Thompson, 814 F.2d 1472, 1479
(10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Miles, 902 F.3d 1159, 1160–61 (10th Cir. 2018). Since
either party may reject the other’s offer or refuse to negotiate entirely, the fact that the
parties failed to reach a mutually satisfactory bargain, without more, can provide no
insight into the defendant’s character. For the same reason, the absence of a plea
agreement provides no information that might aid a district court in determining how
much punishment is sufficient to comply with the purposes of sentencing set out
§ 3553(a)(2). To penalize a defendant based on the absence of a plea agreement alone is
arbitrary.
The government argues that a district court may consider the absence of a plea
agreement because such agreements often include certain conditions, such as appellate
waivers. In United States v. Tena-Arana, 738 F. App’x 954, 961–64 (10th Cir. 2018)
2 Justice Stevens described the baseball-allegiance hypothetical as a substantive error, but “‘[s]ubstance’ and ‘procedure’ are admittedly chameleon-like terms.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 383 n.6. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia, for example, described the same error as procedural. Id.
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(unpublished), we held that a district court may consider a negotiated appellate waiver at
sentencing because such a waiver may demonstrate an “acceptance of responsibility”
beyond the guilty plea itself and may therefore be relevant to the question of how much
punishment is sufficient to achieve the goals of sentencing. The government reasons that
if a sentencing court may grant additional leniency in recognition of conditions in a plea
agreement that show acceptance of responsibility, it follows that the court may view a
defendant’s refusal to accept such conditions as demonstrating a corresponding lack of
acceptance and withhold that leniency. Accordingly, the government argues, because
Ms. Cozad’s open plea was not subject to such conditions, the district court was entitled
to “withhold the additional leniency.”
This argument misses the mark. The issue in Tena-Arana, a nonprecedential
opinion, was whether the district court could consider a defendant’s negotiated appellate
waiver when deciding whether to vary downward. It was not whether the court could
vary downward based on the existence of an agreement in and of itself. Because the
district court in this case cited the absence of a plea agreement, rather than the absence of
an appellate waiver or any other term that an agreement might have included, Tena-
Arana provides no support for the government.
Furthermore, although we held in Tena-Arana that a district court “may at least
sometimes find” that an appeal waiver is relevant to the § 3553(a) factors, 738 F. App’x
at 963, the presence of a waiver in an existing plea agreement is fundamentally different
than the absence of an appeal waiver in an agreement that never happened and whose
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terms remain purely hypothetical. When the parties reach an agreement, a district court
can evaluate the terms, including any waivers, in the context of the agreement as a whole
to determine the degree to which the waivers may show some additional acceptance of
responsibility. By contrast, when the defendant enters an open plea, the court may not
know whether any plea agreement was offered, let alone under what terms. Indeed, there
is no evidence in this case that an appellate waiver was ever discussed. In these
circumstances, without more information, it is unreasonable to penalize the defendant for
the absence of an appellate waiver in a nonexistent agreement.
The government further argues that courts may “for uniformity purposes” grant
“additional leniency” to defendants who enter into plea agreements and withhold it from
those who do not. Aple. Br. at 23 (quoting United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, 468 F.3d
1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006)).3 The government reasons that, were a court required to
sentence a defendant who pleads open “to the same sentence he would have had, had he
3 In addition to Reina-Rodriguez, the government cites § 3553(a)(6) and the need to avoid “‘unwarranted sentence disparities’ among similarly situated defendants.” Aple. Br. at 23. Although the government’s argument on this point is not entirely clear, the thrust of it seems to be that § 3553(a)(6) implicitly instructs courts to avoid unwarranted sentence similarities among defendants who accept plea agreements and those who do not. Having briefly gestured at this point, however, the government does nothing to develop the argument, which in any case does not withstand scrutiny. Section 3553(a)(6) instructs courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” But the manner of a defendant’s guilty plea has nothing to do with his record or criminal conduct, so the presence or absence of a plea agreement is entirely irrelevant to § 3553(a)(6). Moreover, because otherwise identical defendants may make different decisions with respect to a plea agreement, to impose different sentences on that basis tends to create disparities among like defendants rather than to eliminate them.
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taken a plea agreement,” there would be “no compelling reason” for a defendant to accept
the conditions of a plea bargain. See id. (quoting Reina-Rodriguez, 468 F.3d at 1158).
We are not convinced.
As a preliminary matter, the government’s argument proceeds from a false
premise. A rule that forbids district courts from treating a defendant’s open plea as an
aggravating fact in and of itself would not leave defendants with “no compelling reason”
to enter a plea agreement. In cases where there are multiple potential charges, the
government would still be able to leverage them during negotiations. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(A); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–64 (1978) (holding that a
prosecutor may pursue additional charges against a defendant who refuses a plea
bargain). And even in cases where there is only a single viable charge, the government
could threaten to recommend a harsher sentence or to pursue an aggressive interpretation
of the guidelines. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (C). Consequently, because courts
are free to take the government’s recommendation into account, a defendant who refuses
to plea bargain would still risk receiving a higher sentence in many cases.
More fundamentally, the government’s argument fails because providing a
“compelling reason” for a defendant to enter a plea agreement, whether by granting
“additional leniency” or withholding it, is not a valid sentencing rationale. Section
3553(a) provides that courts are to impose no more punishment than is necessary to
comply with the four penological goals enumerated in § 3553(a)(2). When a court
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imposes a sentence to achieve some other purpose, that sentence is unlawful. Burgos, 276
F.3d at 1289–90.
We do not see how any of the permissible aims of sentencing are advanced by
distinguishing between defendants based on the manner in which they plead guilty.
Imposing additional punishment on a defendant because her plea was not the result of a
bargain does nothing to more accurately “reflect the seriousness of the offense,”
“promote respect for the law,” or “provide just punishment for the offense,” see
§ 3553(a)(2)(A); it does nothing to deter criminal conduct, see § 3553(a)(2)(B); it does
nothing to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, see § 3553(a)(2)(C);
and it does nothing to address the defendant’s rehabilitative needs, see § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Given the limited objectives of punishment enumerated in § 3553(a), we do not
find the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reina-Rodriguez persuasive. In that case, the
government declined to move for a downward departure under § 5K3.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines because the defendant had not entered a plea agreement under the district’s
fast-track sentencing program. See Reina-Rodriguez, 468 F.3d at 1158. At sentencing,
the district court concluded that the defendant was entitled to some leniency because he
pled guilty but reasoned that “for uniformity purposes” and “to show respect to the plea
process,” his sentence should not be so low as to fall within the guideline range that
would have applied had he entered a fast-track agreement, which would have required
him to waive his appeal. Id. at 1151. “Obviously if a court sentences the defendant to
the same sentence he would have had, had he taken a plea agreement, then there is no
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compelling reason for any defendant to take the plea offer,” the court reasoned. Id. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s rationale was permissible, citing an
earlier case holding that sentencing disparities caused by fast-track programs are not
“unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6). Id. at 1159–60 (citing United States v. Marcial–
Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2006)).
We do not find this reasoning sufficient to support the broad proposition that a
district court may, “for uniformity purposes” and to provide a “compelling reason” for
defendants to enter plea agreements, extend “additional leniency” to defendants who
enter into plea agreements and withhold it from those who do not. The court in Reina-
Rodriguez did not explain how punishing a defendant based on the nature of his plea
furthers a valid penological purpose under § 3553(a)(2) or relates to any of the other
§ 3553(a) factors in general.
To be clear, we do not pass judgment on whether Reina-Rodriguez was correctly
decided. The Sentencing Commission adopted § 5K3.1 at the direction of Congress,
which sought to incentivize early plea deals by accommodating fast-track programs
within the guidelines. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650
(2003). Consequently, § 5K3.1 arguably reflects a congressional intent that defendants
who plead pursuant to fast-track agreements receive leniency not shown to defendants
who enter open pleas. It is therefore at least arguable that, notwithstanding the limited
penological purposes provided for under § 3553(a)(2), § 5K3.1 implicitly permits a
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district court to impose higher sentences on defendants who enter open pleas in order to
provide a “compelling reason” for them to enter fast-track agreements. That said, we
need not resolve any tension between § 3553(a)(2) and § 5K3.1 because § 5K3.1 only
applies to agreements made under fast-track resolution programs, and no such program
was at play here. The district court’s decision to select a higher sentence for Ms. Cozad
was an expression of its own policy in favor of plea agreements, not congressional intent.
That Ms. Cozad’s sentence was the result of the district court’s own custom is
significant. A court’s role in plea bargaining, at least in the federal system, is generally
limited to accepting or rejecting an agreement after the parties have reached one. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (“The court must not participate in [plea agreement]
discussions.”). This is not to say that the district court violated Rule 11 in this case or
even that Rule 11 itself prohibits courts from imposing harsher sentences on defendants
who plead guilty without a plea agreement. See United States v. Carver, 160 F.3d 1266,
1269 (10th Cir. 1998) (“While it is true that [now Rule 11(c)] prevents a judge from
shaping the terms of a plea bargain or pressuring a criminal defendant to settle his case,
these stringent prohibitions . . . do not apply once “the parties ha[ve] concluded their
agreement, and the prosecutor ha[s] laid it out in open court . . . .”). It is only to say that,
in the federal system, courts are intended to have a limited role with respect to the plea-
bargaining process. And it is the role of the government, not the court, to provide a
defendant with “compelling reasons” for entering into a plea agreement.
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IV Conclusion
We hold that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it was procedurally unreasonable for the
district court to impose a harsher sentence on Ms. Cozad based on her decision to enter
an open plea. Because the district court abused its discretion, we vacate Ms. Cozad’s
sentence and remand for resentencing.