24-2119 United States v. Coonan
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2024
(Argued: May 16, 2025 Decided: July 9, 2025)
Docket No. 24-2119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
–v.–
JAMES COONAN,
Defendant-Appellant,
KEVIN KELLY, JAMES MCELROY, KENNETH SHANNON, WILLIAM BOKUM, JOHN HALO, EDNA COONAN, RICHARD RITTER, FLORENCE COLLINS, THOMAS COLLINS,
Defendants. *
Before: LYNCH, PARK, and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption on this Court’s docket to be consistent with the caption on this opinion. Appellant James Coonan appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J.) denying his motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Coonan has been serving a lengthy prison sentence for crimes committed between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, including the provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), is inapplicable in cases that arise from conduct occurring before November 1, 1987. The First Step Act of 2018 changed some aspects of § 3582(c)(1) but did not change the Sentencing Reform Act’s limitations on the applicability of § 3582(c)(1). So Coonan is ineligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
JERRY J. FANG (Michael D. Maiman, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Danielle R. Sassoon, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
ANGELA D. LIPSMAN (Joseph R. Corozzo, on the brief), Rubinstein & Corozzo, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
ROBINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant James Coonan appeals from an order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J.) denying his motion for
sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). 1 Coonan’s appeal presents
1 Such motions are sometimes colloquially identified as “compassionate release” motions. We have recognized that this term is a misnomer, as the statute allows for sentence reductions, and not simply release. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020). We treat the terms “compassionate release” and “sentence reduction” as interchangeable and primarily use the latter term that more precisely reflects the scope of the statute.
2 a single, narrow question: Whether inmates serving federal prison time for
conduct that occurred prior to November 1, 1987, may seek a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. We hold
that they may not and AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Appellant James Coonan was once the leader of the “Westies,” an Irish-
American gang active in the Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood of Manhattan between
the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. Coonan and the Westies profited from illegal
loansharking, extortion, gambling, counterfeiting, and narcotics, and they
protected their power and influence through violence, including murder. The
United States government indicted Coonan and nine co-defendants on September
17, 1987, for (among other things) participating and conspiring to participate in a
racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. At trial, a jury convicted
Coonan of ten charges and acquitted on one. Taking into account mandatory
consecutive terms of imprisonment, the district court imposed a total sentence of
75 years. Coonan has now served approximately 38 years.
Over the course of his time in prison, Coonan has appeared at least three
times before the United States Parole Commission to request parole: in 2012, 2021,
and 2023. The Parole Commission has never granted Coonan parole. According
3 to the Bureau of Prisons, Coonan is projected to be released on mandatory release
on June 1, 2030.
Separate from the parole process, Coonan asked the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) to file a sentence reduction motion on his behalf in December 2020,
several years before Coonan filed his own § 3582(c)(1) motion at the heart of this
case. The BOP denied Coonan’s request and his administrative appeal of that
denial.
In August 2023, Coonan filed his own motion seeking a sentence reduction
pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The district court denied Coonan’s motion on the ground
that Coonan could not move for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1). United
States v. Coonan, No. 87-CR-249, 2024 WL 3567520, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2024).
The district court explained that § 3582 is a component of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, and the sentencing reforms in that statute apply only to sentences
arising from offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987. Id. The court
concluded that inmates like Coonan, who committed their offenses before
November 1, 1987, cannot seek a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1), even after
that section was amended in 2018 to give inmates the right to bring their own
§ 3582 motions. Id. at *4–5. Coonan timely appealed the district court’s order.
4 DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final order denying
compassionate release. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, “[w]e review the denial
of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion,” but we review
“underlying matters of statutory interpretation” without any deference to the
district court’s reasoning. United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022). 2
Coonan seeks a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(1), which says:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—(1) in any case—(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant [after exhausting administrative remedies], may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (as amended). The pivotal question in this case is whether
§ 3582(c)(1) applies in Coonan’s case.
Coonan says yes. He emphasizes that the statute specifically says that a
court may reduce the term of imprisonment upon motion of the defendant “in any
case.” And he contends that we should adopt his interpretation to avoid
2 In quotations from caselaw and the parties’ briefing, this opinion omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted.
5 potential constitutional questions that an alternative reading would raise. The
district court said no. Because § 3582 is part of a broader law that does not apply
to sentences imposed for crimes committed before November 1, 1987, the court
concluded that Coonan cannot rely on the sentence reduction provision. Our
analysis of these competing arguments focuses on the two acts of Congress that
shaped § 3582(c)(1)(A): the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), and the First
Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). We consider each in turn.
I. Sentencing Reform Act of 1987
We start with the SRA because it gave birth to § 3582. The SRA added a
new chapter to the United States Code, comprehensively overhauling federal law
governing sentencing and incarceration. See generally Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 367–68 (1989) (cataloguing ways that the SRA changed federal
sentencing laws); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 292–98 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (same). Among other things, the SRA
prospectively abolished the Parole Commission that had previously administered
the system for considering applications for parole, instead providing a mechanism
for judicial review of requests for sentence reductions in future cases. That
6 mechanism is set forth in part at § 3582(c)(1)(A)—the provision at issue in this case.
As enacted in 1984, it read:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—(1) in any case—(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, sec. 212(a)(2),
§ 3582(c)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 1998–99 (1984) (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3582). Pursuant to
this provision, the sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission, had the
power to reduce a sentence, and it could exercise that authority upon motion of the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (1984).
As to the applicability of this new regime, the SRA’s general effective date
provision, as subsequently amended, provides:
This chapter shall take effect on the first day of the first calendar month beginning 36 months after the date of enactment and shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this chapter[.]
SRA § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 2031, as amended by Sentencing Reform Amendments
Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (extending the effective date
from roughly 24 to roughly 36 months after the date of enactment), and Sentencing
7 Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-182, § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266 (1987) (adding language to
specify that the SRA “shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect
of this chapter”). 3
“This chapter” refers to the SRA, embodied in Chapter II of Title II of Public
Law 98–473, and encompasses § 3582. See SRA § 211, 98 Stat. at 1987. And
because the SRA became law on October 12, 1984, no one here disputes that “the
first day of the first calendar month beginning 36 months after the date of
enactment” of the SRA is November 1, 1987. When we translate § 235(a)(1) of the
SRA into plain English, it means that: (1) the SRA generally took effect beginning
November 1, 1987; (2) the SRA applies only to offenses that took place on or after
that date; and (3) by extension, as enacted, the SRA—including § 3582—doesn’t
apply to offenses like Coonan’s that took place before that date.
This Court discussed the consequences of the SRA’s November 1, 1987
effective date in United States v. Argitakos. 862 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1988). In that
case, two inmates had been serving prison terms for offenses they committed in
1982 and 1983 when they moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
3 The SRA carved out some exceptions, including deferring the effective date for the abolition of the Parole Commission and associated rights and procedures. SRA § 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 2032. Congress has repeatedly extended those deferrals, so the pre-SRA framework for administering the parole system remains in place, though it is inapplicable to offenses committed after November 1, 1987. See Part II.B, below.
8 § 3582(c)(2), a subsection of § 3582 that allows courts to “reduce the term of
imprisonment” for “a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 424 (quoting § 3582(c)(2)). Without reaching
the merits, the district court denied the inmates’ motions because § 3582 did not
apply given the date of the inmates’ offenses. Id. at 424–25.
We affirmed, holding that § 3582(c)(2) “clearly does not apply to
defendants’ sentences” because it is a provision of the SRA, and the SRA itself says
it “shall apply only to offenses committed after” its effective date of November 1,
1987. Id. at 425 (quoting the relevant 1987 amendment to the SRA). We
explained that one “goal of the SRA [was] to bring about greater uniformity in
sentences,” and that, “[w]ithout parole, the way to ensure uniformity in sentences
when sentence ranges are subsequently altered is to reduce the sentences of
offenders who received the earlier, longer sentences.” Id. But for prisoners
sentenced before the SRA, and the Sentencing Guidelines, came into effect,
“uniformity is to be achieved through the parole system.” Id.
Though Argitakos concerned § 3582(c)(2), and this case concerns § 3582(c)(1),
that distinction makes no difference. See id. at 424. Both subsections are part of
the same section of the SRA, and both allow federal courts to reduce a term of
9 imprisonment that it had previously imposed. Our holding in Argitakos as to the
limiting effect of the effective date in SRA § 235(a)(1) applies with equal force here.
And we reach this conclusion even though by its express terms § 3582(c)(1)
as originally enacted applied to “any case.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (1984). “[W]e
do not construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”
Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman, 28 F.4th 403, 418 (2d Cir. 2022).
“Interpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence
when the text of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning.” Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 414 (2017). Section 3582 is just
one subsection in a comprehensive overhaul of the federal statutes governing
sentencing and incarceration. We see no indication in the language or history of
the statute that the application of § 3582(c)(1) to “any case” was intended to
override the limitation of the SRA’s applicability to sentences for offenses
committed after November 1, 1987. To the contrary, the statement that
§ 3582(c)(1) applies “in any case” makes sense as a means of distinguishing the
applicability of that subsection from the next subsection, § 3582(c)(2), which
applies to a more limited subset of cases—namely those in which the defendant
was sentenced based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission.
10 For the above reasons, § 3582(c)(1), as originally enacted, does not apply to
Coonan’s sentence.
II. First Step Act of 2018
The next question is whether the First Step Act of 2018 changed that. We
think not. The express terms of the FSA do not extend the applicability of § 3582
to Coonan, and we reject his contention that we should conclude otherwise based
on Congress’s intent in enacting the FSA. Nor do we see ambiguity in the statute
that would allow us to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance. Below, we
elaborate.
A. Statutory Text
The FSA amended § 3582(c)(1) to allow defendants to request sentence
reductions themselves rather than relying on the BOP to file sentence reduction
motions on their behalf. See FSA, Pub. L. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239
(2018). In particular, the FSA amended the relevant portion of § 3582(c)(1) as
follows:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—(1) in any case—(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant [after exhausting administrative remedies], may reduce the term of imprisonment . . .
Id. (FSA addition in italics).
11 That amendment “made the first major changes to compassionate release
since its beginnings in 1984” by removing “the BOP as the sole arbiter of
compassionate release motions” and allowing individuals who are incarcerated to
bring their own sentence reduction motions. United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228,
233 (2d Cir. 2020). Before the FSA, the BOP held the exclusive power to file
sentence reduction motions, and it “used this power sparingly, to say the least.”
Id. at 231. By giving inmates the procedural right to bring their own sentence
reduction motions, the FSA has had “significant substantive consequences”—
namely, a sharp increase in the number of sentence reduction motions brought by
inmates and granted by federal courts. Id. at 233.
But nothing in the FSA amends SRA § 235(a)(1) or suggests that the SRA, as
amended by the FSA, now applies to sentences for offenses committed before
November 1, 1987. We interpret the statute’s silence on this question to mean
that Congress intended to leave § 235(a)(1) as it was, because “it can be strongly
presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books
that it wishes to change.” Panjiva, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 975
F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Maine Community Health Options v. United States,
590 U.S. 296, 315 (2020) (holding that a statute had continued effect “[b]ecause
Congress did not expressly repeal” it when legislating on a related topic); Epic
12 Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (“Congress will specifically
address preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later
statute.”). So the text of the FSA doesn’t support Coonan’s view that we can
ignore § 235(a)(1), the effective date specified in the SRA.
We are not alone in this reasoning. Several other Courts of Appeals have
reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Rogge, --- F.4th ----, No. 24-1678,
2025 WL 1718222, at *3 (8th Cir. June 20, 2025) (“We agree with our sister circuits
that the FSA only amended the SRA as modified and thus did not alter its
exclusion of offenses predating November 1, 1987.”); United States v. King, 24 F.4th
1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he FSA did not modify the transition language from
1984 and 1987 that limits the scope of § 3582(c)(1) to inmates who committed their
crimes on or after November 1, 1987.”); United States v. Jackson, 991 F.3d 851, 853
(7th Cir. 2021) (“Doubtless the Congress that enacted the [First Step] Act wanted
to make compassionate release easier. But it did not modify the transition
language from 1984 and 1987.”). 4
4 Several circuits, including this Court, have also reached the same conclusion in unpublished opinions or nonprecedential orders. See United States v. Toney, No. 24-2636, 2024 WL 4648075, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) (holding post-FSA that “pre-SRA defendants . . . are governed not by
13 B. Legislative Intent and History
“Generally speaking, we need proceed no further than the statute’s text and
context in the broader statutory scheme.” United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154,
162 (2d Cir. 2016). Thus, our assessment of the text of the SRA and FSA is
dispositive. Nevertheless, we briefly explain why we are not persuaded by
Coonan’s contention that our reading of the statute is inconsistent with Congress’s
intent in passing the FSA.
Coonan says that “Congress’s intent in passing the First Step Act was to
permit inmates to directly move for compassionate release,” and that it would
frustrate Congress’s intent for us to “discriminate” against inmates whose offenses
occurred before November 1, 1987. Coonan Br. at 16; see also id. at 15–20. Even
if Coonan were right that allowing him relief under § 3582(c)(1) would be
consistent with a broad policy goal of making sentence reduction motions more
accessible to federal inmates, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987). “Deciding what competing
§ 3582(c), but rather by former 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g)”); United States v. Borelli, No. 21-1506, 2022 WL 6831650, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2022) (holding that “Section 3582(c)(1)(A) . . . applies only to persons whose offenses occurred on or after November 1, 1987”); United States v. Rivera-Rios, No. 21-1773, 2022 WL 14206094, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2022) (holding that the FSA “did not expand eligibility for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief to inmates serving sentences for offenses predating November 1, 1987”); United States v. Erwin, No. 20-10795, 2021 WL 4805507, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021) (affirming a district court that “observed that § 3582(c) does not apply to Erwin, who committed his offenses before the statute’s effective date”).
14 values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is
the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law.” Id. at 526.
As described more fully below, Congress chose to leave in place the
sentencing system that applied before the SRA, giving that Act only prospective
application, except for limited explicit exceptions. Thus, we are not persuaded
by Coonan’s claim that Congress’s general purpose of ameliorating sentences
should be read in a way that would frustrate the careful sentencing-reduction
structure Congress has established over several decades. And in any event, the
Supreme Court has cautioned us that such “policy arguments cannot supersede
the clear statutory text.” Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S.
176, 192 (2016). Because we can’t reconcile Coonan’s view of congressional intent
with the words of the laws that Congress has actually passed, we decline to adopt
Coonan’s view here.
In a similar vein, Coonan points to proposed legislation that would “clarify[]
that federal prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987[,] are eligible for
compassionate release” as evidence of Congress’s intent to extend the benefits of
the FSA’s amendment to the SRA to all incarcerated individuals. Coonan Br. at
15 17 (citing a news release from Senator Grassley regarding S. 1248, 118th Congress
(2023)). We reject Coonan’s argument for three reasons.
First, Coonan’s argument would turn our approach to statutory
interpretation on its head. Courts focus on the text of Congress’s enactments
because “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.” Grajales v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2022). “[C]lear evidence
of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text,” but we should not
“allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”
Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011).
Second, we have no way to determine whether the proposed legislation
enjoys majority support in Congress, or whether it hasn’t passed because a
majority of members of Congress don’t support it. That’s why “[s]ubsequent
legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
Congress,” especially “where, as here, the proposals do not become law.” State
of New York v. Department of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 110 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,
169–70 (2001) (“Failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground
on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”).
16 And third, Coonan does not grapple with evidence that Congress has tacitly
and repeatedly approved distinguishing cases based on conduct that occurred
before November 1, 1987, from those based on conduct that occurred on or after
that date.
This point requires some historical background. When it enacted the SRA,
Congress also repealed the then-effective Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act (“PCRA”) with the intent of eventually abolishing the United States Parole
Commission. SRA § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. at 2027 (repealing PCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-
233, ch. 311, 90 Stat. 219 (1976), formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218).
In the SRA, Congress kept the PCRA alive for inmates already sentenced
under the prior system for five years, while applying the SRA to new cases that
arose after the SRA’s effective date, thereby creating a two-track scheme. See
SRA, § 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 2032, as amended by § 2(b)(1), 101 Stat. at 1266 (providing
that the PCRA “shall remain in effect for five years after the effective date as to an
individual who committed an offense . . . before the effective date”); see also King,
24 F.4th at 1229 (“The literal language of the pertinent statutes’ text left this dual-
regime structure in place for five years.”). Congress has extended the five-year
delay period repeatedly (and as recently as this year), effectively keeping the
PCRA alive indefinitely. See, e.g., Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-
17 650, tit. III, § 316, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990) (extending the delayed repeal of the
parole statutes to ten years after the date of enactment); Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations and Extensions Act, Pub. L. 119-4, § 1115, 139 Stat. 9, 15 (2025)
(extending the delayed repeal of the parole statutes to thirty-seven years and 355
days—or, in other words, to October 22, 2025); see also King, 24 F.4th at 1229
(“[T]his structure by renewals has since acquired a state of permanent
impermanence.”).
By periodically extending the PCRA’s effect, Congress has maintained and
implicitly endorsed the two-track sentencing system that distinguishes sentences
for crimes committed before November 1, 1987, from sentences for those
committed thereafter. It’s necessary to keep the PCRA and the Parole
Commission alive for offenses committed before November 1, 1987, precisely
because the SRA “shall apply only to offenses committed after” the SRA took effect
on November 1, 1987. SRA § 235(a)(1), as amended by § 4, 99 Stat. at 1728 and § 2(a),
101 Stat. at 1266 (emphasis added). In the face of this history, we cannot infer an
unspoken congressional intent to expand the reach of the SRA. Congress has
kept in place the opportunity to seek parole from the Parole Commission for
individuals in Coonan’s position.
18 C. Constitutional Avoidance
Finally, Coonan argues on appeal that interpreting the FSA to apply only to
inmates convicted of conduct occurring on or after November 1, 1987, would
violate equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment by discriminating
against inmates on the basis of age. He invokes the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, under which we consider the constitutional implications of our
decisions “when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to
adopt.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005). That is, “[i]f one
[interpretation] would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other
should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the
particular litigant before the Court.” Id. at 380–81.
We don’t consider constitutional avoidance here because there is only one
plausible interpretation of the SRA: that it applies “only to offenses committed
after [November 1, 1987].” SRA § 235(a)(1), as amended by § 4, 99 Stat. at 1728 and
§ 2(a), 101 Stat. at 1266. “The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play
only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found
to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a
means of choosing between them.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 385 (emphasis omitted).
An interpretive canon like constitutional avoidance has “no application where, as
19 in this case, traditional rules of construction permit us to conclude that there is no
ambiguity in the statute.” Spina v. Department of Homeland Security, 470 F.3d 116,
130 (2d Cir. 2006).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.