United States v. Clyde A. Gatewood

60 F.3d 248, 1995 WL 449571

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: September 18, 1995
• Docket: 94-6446
• Status: Published

Opinions

GUY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOGGS, J., joined. JONES, J. (pp. 251-52), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

GUY, Circuit Judge.

The defendant, Clyde Gatewood, entered a plea of guilty to one count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Prior to pleading guilty, Gate-wood had filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant. The motion was denied after a hearing was held, and Gatewood reserved the right to challenge this denial on appeal at the time he entered his guilty plea.

The only contention made on appeal is that the officers executing the search warrant failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3109; and accordingly, the evidence seized should have been suppressed. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial judge properly denied the motion to suppress and we affirm.

I.

Officers of the Shelby County Sheriffs Department made a controlled delivery of narcotics at 580 Old Thomas, Unit 71, Memphis, Tennessee. The defendant received and signed for the package which originally contained 25 grams of cocaine base.

As soon as the controlled delivery was completed, Shelby County officers, who had surveilled the delivery, proceeded to execute a search warrant at the address where the package was received. The record does not reveal what occurred after the officers entered the premises to be searched, since the only issue raised at the suppression hearing was the officers’ manner of entry.

II.

The federal rule that regulates forced entries in connection with the execution of search warrants is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3109. This section reads in relevant part:

Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit

The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance....

Section 3109 is a codification of the common law of unannounced entry. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-58, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968).

The statute in question regulates only federal officers, however, and has no application when “state officers, acting totally without federal involvement, seize evidence that is later offered in a federal prosecution....” United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir.1992) (footnote omitted). Such is the case here. The Supreme Court, however, has now determined that the common law knoek-and-announce principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1917-18, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995).

The district judge did not engage in a reasonableness analysis, however, because he made a factual finding at the suppression hearing that the officers knocked and announced and then waited a sufficient length of time before entering. The evidence underlying this factual finding included a video tape of the actual entry, testimony from one of the officers effecting the entry, and testimony from three persons inside the house at the time entry was made.

The video clearly shows one of the officers “knocking” by kicking on the door with his foot.¹ The video also shows what appears to be shouting by the officers, although the sound track of the video is not clear enough to make out what was being shouted. The video does not show the officers making a forcible entry² and it demonstrates an interval of approximately 10 seconds between announcement and entry.

All three persons inside the house who testified heard the knock. As to the interval between knocking and entry, one witness said three to four minutes, another five seconds and the third estimated 10 to 15 seconds. The officer who testified was not asked about the time interval, but the video was shown during his testimony.

Whatever the time interval actually might have been, the district court concluded it was adequate for Fourth Amendment purposes and we agree. In fact, it is not at all clear that any forcible entry actually occurred. Quinton Campbell, who was inside the house, testified:

Q. Okay. Could you hear a knock?

A. Yes, ma’am. I didn’t consider it as a knock, I thought kids were playing at the door. The only thing I heard was boom and I seen a head fly past my window. Q. What, slow down, saw what?

A. I saw a head run past my window, I thought it was just kids outside playing, and then I heard it again. I unlocked the door, when I unlocked it came open, whoom, and came in with guns and everything and said lay down. So I laid down. Q. You said unlocked, is there a dead bolt?

A. That is what I unlocked, the dead bolt.

Officer McCoy testified in a similar vein on direct examination:

Q. Prior to you all going in there, did you all bang on the door to alert the occupants that you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that by the way of a kick on the door?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What kind of doors are those by the way?

A. They are heavy duty doors, I believe they have a steel frame. They are very heavy duty.

Q. After you alerted the occupants, did you all announce who you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q. Did they open the door eventually?

A. Yes, sir, when we were at the door and identified ourselves, and I believe Lieutenant Roberson had kicked at the door two or three times, someone, when they unlocked it, opened the door, we stormed the door yelling narcotics.

On cross-examination, Officer McCoy further testified:

Q. Are you saying somebody opened it?

A. Yes, ma’am. There is no way physically that a man could kick those doors. As a matter of fact we didn’t even bring a ram or tool, that is what we use to open those type doors, we have devices — door opening devices that we use to open those type doors.

We construe the evidence to indicate conclusively that there was no forcible entry, and thus neither § 3109 nor the Fourth Amendment is implicated. Even if we were to find that the evidence indicated that the entry was forcible, we agree with the district judge and conclude that the officers knocked and announced and then waited a reasonable length of time before entering.

AFFIRMED.³

1 . The kick clearly was not intended to force the door, but only used as a method to bang on the door.

2 . Unfortunately, someone stepped in front of the video camera during the entry and the video does not show the entirety of what occurred. It does show the door intact after entry, however, with no signs of damage and with people going in and out of the door and opening it and closing it without difficulty.

3 .We limit our holding to the facts of this case and make no effort to establish any minimum time as meeting the standard of “reasonableness.’'