United States v. Charles Sawyer, Jr.

443 F.2d 712, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10277
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided May 11, 1971·No. 23706_1·Published·Cited by 61 cases

Opinion

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether defense counsel in a criminal case, in summation to the jury, has the right to relate his factual argument to the governing principles of law.

Appellant was found in possession of a number of items that had recently been taken from a locked car. In accordance with the applicable law, the jury was instructed that it was permissible, but not necessary, to infer from the fact of possession that he had stolen the property. 1 Appellant introduced no evidence, but sought to persuade the jury to reject the inference. He was convicted of grand larceny. 2

In the course of his closing argument appellant’s counsel attempted to explain to the jury the meaning of the word “inference,” and to distinguish it from the stronger term “presumption.” The trial judge prevented him from doing so, on the ground that the function of instructing the jury on the law belongs to the court alone. 3 In our view that ruling was erroneous.

The trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument. That discretion is abused, however, if the court prevents defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.

In regulating the scope of argument, the court should be guided by criteria that are related to the function of argument, i. e., to help the jury remember and interpret the evidence. 4 The prosecutor and the defense counsel in turn must be afforded a full opportunity to advance their competing interpretations, and to emphasize the principles of law that favor their respective positions. 5 The court should exclude *714 only those statements that misrepresent the evidence or the law, 6 introduce irrelevant prejudicial matters, 7 or otherwise tend to confuse the jury. 8

It is often suggested that permitting counsel to argue questions of law tends to confuse the jury. 9 If counsel’s view of the applicable law differs from that of the court, then of course there is great danger of confusion. In that case the jury should hear a single statement of the law, from the court and not from counsel. 10 But if the applicable principles are undisputed, as in this case, then a statement by counsel might well be helpful rather than confusing. 11 Counsel may emphasize a point that would otherwise be overlooked in the context of lengthy jury instructions that are themselves often confusing. And if a single point of law is the linchpin of the defense, there is every reason to permit defense counsel to state the point as emphatically as possible.

In this case the prosecutor sought to persuade the jury that appellant had stolen the property found in his possession. Defense counsel sought to persuade the jury to reject that inference, to find that he might have acquired the property in some other way. It was critical to the defense for the jury to realize that they were free to reject the inference, despite the fact that it was reasonable and permitted by law. If appellant had been totally barred from arguing against the inference, he would have been deprived of the substance of his defense. In fact, however, he subsequently made the argument in a form that the trial court found acceptable. 12 Furthermore, the court instructed the jury fully and fairly on the point. Therefore we find no prejudice, and the judgment is

Affirmed.

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United States v. Charles Sawyer, Jr., 443 F.2d 712, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10277 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

443 F.2d 712 (United States v. Charles Sawyer, Jr.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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