United States v. Charles McNeil
This text of 434 F.2d 502 (United States v. Charles McNeil) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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The District Court, after hearing, denied Saint Elizabeths Hospital’s application to grant appellant a conditional release in an unexplicated order. The case is before us on appellant’s motion for summary reversal.
It is elementary in this jurisdiction that, in order to provide a framework adequate for appellate review, decisions such as the one before us must be accompanied by findings of facts and conclusions of law. See Tatem v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 232, 275 F.2d 894, 896 (1960); Hough v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 195-196, 271 F.2d 458, 461-462 (1959). Moreover, it appeared upon oral argument that the court below did not have before it all of the evidence which the parties, at the present time at least, consider relevant to its decision.
We do not believe this case is an apt one for summary reversal;1 but neither do we believe that the present state of record is adequate to permit appellate review under the proper standards. Accordingly, we deny appellant’s motion for summary reversal, but vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the District Court for the taking of such additional evidence as the parties may see fit to introduce, and such further proceedings as may be appropriate. At the conclusion of the proceedings on remand, the District Court should file findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the applicable standards. See Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S. [504]*504App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968); Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 364 F.2d 657 (1966) (en banc); Hough v. United States, supra. On any remand hearing the opinion of a qualified psychologist is competent and admissible, Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 637 (1962) (era banc). This does not mean that the trier of facts is bound by such opinion. As we stated in Jenkins, “The weight to be given any expert opinion admitted in evidence by the judge is exclusively for the jury.” 113 U.S.App.D.C. at 309, 307 F.2d at 646. Here the judge was the trier of facts and the same riile applied. His remarks could be interpreted as expressing only his opinion as to the weight of the psychologist’s testimony. Since that testimony was admitted into evidence the court obviously recognized in the legal sense that the psychologist was competent to testify.
Vacated and remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
434 F.2d 502, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-charles-mcneil-cadc-1970.