TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the forfeiture order imposed against Chaplin’s, Inc. (“Chaplin’s”), after Chaplin’s was convicted of charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 31 U.S.C. § 5324, violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
We find that it does not, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I.
A.
The facts of this ease were extensively set out in our previous opinion that affirmed Chaplin’s convictions,
see United States v. Seher,
562 F.3d 1344, 1350-54 (11th Cir.2009)
(“Seher II”),
and we will relay only the facts essential to Chaplin’s Eighth Amendment challenge.
Chaplin’s is a jewelry store located in Atlanta, Georgia, and owned by Parsig Seher. Parsig Seher’s brother, Toros Seher (“Seher”), occasionally worked at Chaplin’s and also owned his own jewelry store in Atlanta, Chaplin’s Midtown (“Midtown”). Between 1996 and 2002, Seher sold jewelry in cash-based transactions at a third location to people he knew to be drug dealers. These sales were often structured to avoid any individual payments in excess of $10,000, which would have required Seher, as the store’s agent and recipient of the cash, to file a report with the federal government (“Form 8300”), containing information about the buyer, such as the buyer’s name and address. 31 U.S.C. § 5331(a)-(b).
Federal investigators learned of Seher’s activities and arranged a controlled-buy. During 2005 and 2006, an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) investigator met with Seher on multiple occasions at both Chaplin’s and Midtown.
Under the pretense of being a narcotics trafficker, the investigator bought expensive jewelry from Seher without completing Form 8300.
At Chaplin’s, the investigator purchased from Seher a set of wedding rings from Chaplin’s inventory. During negotiations for that purchase, the investigator intimated that he was involved in the drug trade. Seher initially suggested that the investigator pay for the rings in three separate bundles.
This payment structure would
allow Seher to avoid filing Form 8300 on Chaplin’s behalf and the IRS investigator to avoid disclosing personal information to the federal government.
Several months later, again at Chaplin’s, the investigator and Seher completed their negotiations for the rings and settled on a price. Seher communicated the price as “$220”; however, the investigator understood this quote truly to mean $22,000. The investigator handed Seher $3,000 in cash, and Seher returned a receipt, of sorts. On a yellow note, Seher had written the numbers “2200.00,” “1900.00,” and “300.00,” which the investigator understood as representing the total purchase price, $22,000, the outstanding balance, $19,000, and the investigator’s downpayment, $3,000.
The investigator returned to Chaplin’s the following day to pick up the rings and complete the transaction. Seher led the investigator to Chaplin’s back-room. There, the investigator handed Seher $19,000 in cash, which Seher immediately put into a safe. Before leaving Chaplin’s, the investigator told Seher that he did not want to complete any paperwork for the transaction; Seher assured him that there would not be any paperwork. Nobody at Chaplin’s completed and filed Form 8300 for the rings transaction.
B.
Chaplin’s was indicted on seven counts related to Seher’s sales and failure to file Form 8300. The indictment
alleged, among other things, that Chaplin’s (1) “knowingly and intentionally con-duet[ed] a financial transaction ... involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” (“money laundering”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) and (C);
and (2) “knowingly and intentionally cause[ed] a nonfinancial trade or business to fail to file a report required under [31 U.S.C.] Section 5331,” in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(b)(1) and (d)(2).
Seher’s conduct
and knowledge formed the basis of the indictment. Because Seher committed the violations during the course of his employment at Chaplin’s, Chaplin’s was vicariously liable for his actions.
The indictment also sought forfeiture of “any and all property involved in” these offenses, including all of Chaplin’s inventory. Both counts provided for forfeiture, with the money laundering count governed by 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1),
and the reporting violation governed by 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c)(1).
The case went to trial in February 2007. At the close of the evidence, but before the jury was charged, Chaplin’s pled guilty to the reporting violation. During the plea colloquy, however, Chaplin’s attempted to plead guilty to a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5331,
not to § 5324. Section 5331(a) requires any person “engaged in a trade or business” to report any transactions involving more than $10,000 in currency— i.e., to file Form 8300. Chaplin’s, as the entity selling jewelry, was under an obligation to file Form 8300. As a result, it argued that § 5324 could not apply to it because § 5324(b)(1) punishes anyone who, “for the purpose of evading the report requirements of section 5331[,] causefs] or attempts] to cause a nonfinancial trade or business to fail to file a report required under section 5331.” Because Chaplin’s was the entity required to file the report, a conviction under § 5324 would mean that Chaplin’s caused itself to fail to file the necessary report. Chaplin’s argued that the Government only prosecuted it under § 5324 because that section, unlike § 5331, provides for forfeiture.
The Government disagreed with Chaplin’s argument and insisted that it intended to prosecute Chaplin’s under § 5324, not § 5331. The district court agreed that the Government was entitled to prosecute the case as it saw fit; the court informed Chaplin’s that it could either proceed to a verdict and appeal or plead guilty to the charge as set out in the indictment. Given this choice, Chaplin’s pled guilty to the § 5324 count.
The jury was then instructed on the § 1956 count, and subsequently found Chaplin’s guilty.
After the trial, the Government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture against Chaplin’s entire inventory. According to the Government, the inventory was “involved in” the money laundering and reporting offenses because it provided Seher’s — and, vicariously, Chaplin’s — money laundering operation with an “air of legitimacy.” Chaplin’s argued that its inventory was not “involved in” the relevant offenses, and that such a forfeiture would
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines. On August 17, 2007, the district court granted the Government’s motion and entered a preliminary order of forfeiture against Chaplin’s inventory pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b), but did not address Chaplin’s Eighth Amendment argument.
United States v. Seher,
574 F.Supp.2d 1368, 1369-71 (N.D.Ga.2007)
(“Seher
I”). In addition to Chaplin’s inventory, the district court ordered Chaplin’s to forfeit $22,000 in the form of a personal money judgment, which represented “the amount of the undercover funds that were never recovered by the Government.”
Id.
at 1371.
The district court then held a sentencing hearing on August 22, 2007. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared by the United States Probation Office calculated Chaplin’s Total Offense Level to be 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines. The money laundering charge, as the “most serious” of the two counts,
see
United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual,
§ 3D1.3(a) (Nov. 1, 2006), drove the Guidelines fine range; the PSR recommended a fine from $650,000 to $1,300,000. At the sentencing hearing, the district court took into account Chaplin’s ability to pay, along with the forfeiture order, and sentenced it to pay a $100,000 fine — $50,000 for each count — and to serve five years of probation.
Chaplin’s appealed its conviction and sentence, specifically the forfeiture order. This court affirmed the conviction, but vacated the forfeiture order.
Seher II,
562 F.3d at 1373-74. Under the forfeiture statutes, Chaplin’s inventory was “involved in” the relevant offenses, and therefore was properly subject to forfeiture.
Id.
at 1369. We noted, however, that the district court did not address Chaplin’s Eighth Amendment defense, and remanded the case to the district court to rule on that issue.
Id.
at 1370-72, 1373-74.
On remand, the parties submitted briefs to the district court on the Eighth Amendment issue. Chaplin’s argued that the forfeiture order was excessive under the three factor test set out in
United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2007).
The district court disagreed and reinstated the forfeiture order against Chaplin’s inventory.
United States v. Seher,
686 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1327-33 (N.D.Ga.2010)
(“Seher III”).
Under
Browne,
the court first determined that Chaplin’s was within the class of persons at whom § 5324 and § 1956 were principally directed.
Id.
at 1328-29. It then determined that the statutory maximum sentences for these of
fenses were 20 years and 10 years imprisonment for violating § 1956 and § 5324, respectively, and a maximum statutory fine of $1,500,000.
Id.
at 1329. The court finally noted that Chaplin’s conduct was very harmful, even though the act for which it was indicted was a government-controlled-buy, as other evidence in the record suggested that Seher’s illicit transactions on Chaplin’s behalf extended beyond the indicted incident.
Id.
at 1329-30. Weighing these factors against the value of Chaplin’s forfeited property, $1,877,262, the court found that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate and therefore not violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Id.
at 1330-32. The court also noted in a footnote that its lenient sentence of $100,000 in fines was predicated on the validity of the forfeiture order.
Id.
at 1332 n. 8.
II.
On appeal, Chaplin’s contends that the order forfeiting its inventory is an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
A forfeiture order is unconstitutionally excessive when it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”
United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). This standard narrows the judicial role in assessing the excessiveness of forfeiture orders; rather than strict proportionality, we review fines only for gross disproportionality.
Id.
at 337, 118 S.Ct. at 2037. Our narrowed role acknowledges principles of institutional competence: proportionality analyses are “inherently imprecise” and best kept within the province of legislatures, not courts.
See id.
at 336, 118 S.Ct. at 2037 (“[Jjudgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature ---- [A]ny judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.”).
The parties and some decisions from this court refer to three factors, articulated in
United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2007), that guide our grossdisproportionality inquiry: “(1) whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm caused by the defendant,”
id.
at 1281.
The murkiness of these factors demonstrates the inherent difficulty of monetizing the gravity of an offense. Our cases have therefore assigned great weight to the fines approved by Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Congress, as a representative body, can distill the monetary value society places on harmful conduct; forfeitures falling below the maximum statutory fines for a given offense therefore receive a “strong presumption” of constitutionality.
United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla.,
175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.1999). The Sentencing Guidelines reflect institutional expertise and monetize culpability “with even greater precision than criminal legislation”; “a defendant would need to present a very compelling argument” to suggest that a forfeiture within the guideline range is constitutionally excessive.
Id.
at 1310.
These general principles, however, do not suggest that forfeitures above either the statutory maximum fine or the Guidelines range are presumptively invalid.
Id.
at 1309 n. 9. Instead, such forfeitures simply receive closer scrutiny, but “[a] forfeiture far in excess of the statutory fine range ... is likely to violate the Excessive Fine Clause.”
Id.; see also Bajakajian,
524 U.S. at 337-39, 118 S.Ct. at 2038 (holding that a forfeiture of $357,144 was excessive where the maximum fine under the Sentencing Guidelines was $5,000).
We begin our analysis with the first
Browne
factor — whether Chaplin’s is among the principal targets of the forfeiture-authorizing statutes. Here, those statutes are the money laundering statute, § 1956, and the reporting violation, § 5324. Chaplin’s argues that it was not the primary target of § 5324 because, as the institution required to file reports under § 5331, it could not “cause” itself to fail to file a report. While we appreciate the linguistic awkwardness of charging Chaplin’s under § 5324, Chaplin’s does not argue that it is not the principal target of the § 1956 money laundering count. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Chaplin’s “stand[s] at the dead-center of [§ 1956’s] targeted class” and therefore is the proper target of a forfeiture-authorizing statute.
The next
Browne
factor — the available sentences — suggests that Chaplin’s was convicted of very serious crimes. If Chaplin’s were a natural person, it would have faced statutory maximum incarceration terms of twenty years for violating § 1956 and ten years for violating § 5324. The statutory maximum fines for these two convictions are significant, totaling $1,500,000. The Sentencing Guidelines fine range suggests a similar maximum punishment, ranging from $650,000 to $1,300,000.
The last
Browne
factor — the harm caused by the defendant — also weighs in favor of the forfeiture order. Seher, on Chaplin’s behalf, structured the $22,000
transaction to avoid filing Form 8300 because he believed the cash at issue represented the proceeds of drug sales. Attempting to hide drug money is harmful in and of itself.
See Bajakajian,
524 U.S. at 339, 118 S.Ct. at 2039 (contemplating the harm “caused by a hypothetical drug dealer who willfully fails to report taking $12,000 out of the country in order to purchase drugs”). That the sale was the product of a government sting is irrelevant; § 1956(a)(3), for which Chaplin’s was convicted, contemplates such a eontrolledbuy. The provision punishes certain transactions “involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” and “the term ‘represented’ means any representation made by a law enforcement officer....” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3). Congress therefore contemplated the very situation here, and concluded that the conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant 20 years imprisonment, a $500,000 fine, and forfeiture of any property involved in the offense.
Chaplin’s argues that the $22,000 transaction was an isolated event and is the only conduct linking it to illegal activity. Evidence in the record contradicts this assertion, however. First, the ring-purchasing transaction between Seher and the IRS investigator spanned several months; the initial contact occurred on April 28, 2005, and the transaction concluded on August 25, 2005.
This prolonged time frame demonstrates that the transaction was not the product of one, momentary lapse in individual judgment or corporate oversight.
See United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE/Sport Van,
387 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir.2004) (considering “the extent and duration of the criminal conduct” in its Eighth Amendment analysis (quoting
United States v. Bieri,
68 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir.1995))).
Second, the IRS investigator purchased a Rolex watch from Seher with $12,800 in cash represented to be drug proceeds without completing Form 8300. Although this purchase was completed at Midtown, the IRS investigator first saw the watch during his July 21, 2005 visit to Chaplin’s and then tried it on during a visit to Chaplin’s on August 25, 2005. We may reasonably infer that Seher, or someone else, transported the watch from Chaplin’s to Midtown, where Seher and the IRS investigator conducted another cash transaction using purported drug proceeds. This transaction implicates Chaplin’s inventory in yet another drug-tainted attempt to evade federal currency reporting requirements.
Third, Seher’s comments on July 22, 2005, suggest that he was not the only Chaplin’s employee involved in the money-laundering operation. That day, the IRS investigator met with Seher in the backroom at Chaplin’s to complete the $22,000 transaction. The IRS investigator handed Seher a stack of $19,000 in cash and repeatedly stated that he did not want his name on any forms, a reference to Form 8300. During the meeting, the IRS investigator noticed another Chaplin’s employee working in the back-room — apparently fa
bricating jewelry — and expressed concern about the employee’s presence. Seher mollified the investigator’s concerns by stating, “that’s my partner, man.”
No evidence suggests that this “partner” was anything but a Chaplin’s employee; the record therefore supports an inference that Seher’s criminal conduct as a Chaplin’s employee extended beyond “the indictment’s four corners.”
Also relevant to our analysis, beyond the
Browne
factors, is the interplay between the forfeiture order and the fíne imposed by the district court. Chaplin’s was subject to a statutory maximum fine of $1,500,000 and a Sentencing Guidelines fine range of $650,000 to $1,300,000. The district court did not impose a fine anywhere near these figures; it imposed a $100,000 fine. Its decision to do so was based on the fact that it had already ordered forfeiture of Chaplin’s inventory.
Seher III,
686 F.Supp.2d at 1332 n. 8 (N.D.Ga.2010) (“[T]he Court notes that it accounted for the effects of these forfeitures when it sentenced [Chaplin’s], for despite the Guidelines’ recommend fine range, Chaplin’s sentence was mitigated to a fine that fell between .8 and 4.1 percent of the Guidelines recommendation.... ”). Had the district court believed that it could not constitutionally impose the full forfeiture, it likely would have increased the amount of the fine.
Against these factors we must weigh the value of the forfeited property. The parties agree that $1,877,262 is the accurate value of Chaplin’s inventory. Chaplin’s also argues that we should include within this calculation the $100,000 fine and the $22,000 money judgment, for a total of $1,999,262. Assuming, without deciding, that Chaplin’s is correct in this regard, we do not find the forfeiture order to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Chaplin’s crime.
This figure exceeds both the statutory maximum fine and the high-end of the
Sentencing Guidelines fine range. The “strong presumption” of constitutionality therefore does not apply. But “Congress has authorized both a fíne and forfeiture as part of the punishment for” both § 1956 and § 5324, which suggests that Congress “does not consider a punishment somewhat above the statutory fine range to be excessive.”
817 N.E. 29th Drive,
175 F.3d at 1309 n. 9. The extra $499,262 above the statutory maximum, a 33.3 percent increase, and $699,262 above the Guidelines fine, a 53.8 percent increase, fall well below the relative differences approved of in other cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Castello,
611 F.3d 116, 118, 123-24 (2d Cir.2010) (approving of $12,012,924 forfeiture where the statutory maximum sentence was $250,000, but where the defendant’s illegal scheme involved more than $600 million);
United States v. Jose,
499 F.3d 105, 112-13 (1st Cir.2007) (approving a $114,948 forfeiture where the maximum Guidelines fine was $30,000);
United States v. Ahmad,
213 F.3d 805, 817, 819 (4th Cir.2000) (approving a $101,587.42 forfeiture where the statutory maximum fine was $250,000, but the fine under the Guidelines was only $5,000).
Furthermore, Chaplin’s criminal conduct was more serious than the conduct at issue in cases where courts have found a forfeiture award excessive. In
Bajakajian,
for example, the defendant’s only crime was a reporting offense; he did not report that he was transporting more than $10,000 outside the United States. 524 U.S. at 324-25, 118 S.Ct. at 2032. The currency, however, was “unrelated to any other illegal activities”; the defendant was “not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader.”
Id.
at 338, 118 S.Ct. at 2038. A forfeiture of $357,144, where the Guideline fine was only $5,000, was therefore excessive. And, in
United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 18755 North Bay Road, Miami,
13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir.1994), the owners of the forfeited residence had hosted an illicit poker game “involving some of [the owner’s] relatives and associates.”
Id.
at 1494. We held that the forfeiture of this property — which was valued at $150,000 and served as the principal residence of at least four people — violated the Eighth Amendment. The nature of this “gambling operation” was far outside the intended scope of the federal statute that criminalized illegal gambling; the owners’ poker game was “sporadic” and “of insignificant monetary proportions.”
Id.
at 1498 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 91-1549, at 53 (1970),
reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4029).
Chaplin’s criminal conduct was not similarly benign. Unlike the
Bajakajian
defendant, Chaplin’s was a money launderer that laundered drug proceeds. Its conduct was not a mere reporting violation. And, unlike the owners in
One Single Family Residence,
Chaplin’s criminal activities fell squarely within the intended scope of the federal money laundering statute, § 1956.
III.
Taking all of these factors together, we cannot say that the forfeiture order was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Chaplin’s crime. The district court’s judgment is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.