Appellate Case: 24-5079 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 13, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-5079 (D.C. No. 4:24-CR-00008-GKF-1) JEREMY DANIEL CHAFIN, a/k/a Jeremy (N.D. Okla.) David Johnston,
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before McHUGH, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Jeremy Daniel Chafin was indicted for possessing a firearm despite knowing
that he was a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
Before trial, Chafin filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was placed in an
unjustified investigatory detention when he was approached and questioned by
Officer Tony Morris. The district court granted Chafin’s motion after an evidentiary
hearing. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court
denied.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-5079 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 2
On appeal, the government asserts that the encounter between Chafin and
Officer Morris began consensually, rather than as a seizure, until Officer Morris
spotted the black, metal object in Chafin’s pocket. The government then claims that
Officer Morris had reasonable suspicion that the object was a gun, sufficient to
justify seizing Chafin once the encounter evolved into an investigatory detention.
We agree with each of the government’s arguments. Therefore, we hold that
the officers’ encounter 1 with Chafin did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, we reverse.
I.
On the afternoon of June 10, 2022, Wyandotte Nation Tribal Police
Department Officer Tony Morris was on duty and responding to a complaint at a
home in a Wyandotte neighborhood. Because he was on duty, Officer Morris was in
uniform and carrying a sidearm. While responding to the call, Officer Morris heard
several distinctive “popping sounds.” App’x at 39. Officer Morris––a police officer
for twenty-five years and a life-long hunter––identified the popping sounds as .22
caliber gunshots originating from the woods to the north and west. According to
Officer Morris, two gunshots initially rang out and were followed by several
additional shots fired in rapid succession.
1 Officer Morris was accompanied by Wyandotte Nation Tribal Police Detective Tracey Reynolds and Wyandotte Tribal Police Chief Ronnie Gilmore, although Officer Morris was the only one who directly interacted with Chafin. 2 Appellate Case: 24-5079 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 3
In response, Officer Morris left the home, got into his unmarked police car,
and drove off in the direction of the shots. He notified dispatch, issued a shots-fired
alert, and requested backup. Officer Morris then drove a few blocks west and, within
a few minutes, parked in front of a fifth-wheel camper. The door of the camper was
open, and it appeared that someone lived in it; Officer Morris knocked on the open
door, but no one answered.
As Officer Morris started walking back to his patrol car, Wyandotte Nation
Tribal Police Detective Tracey Reynolds arrived, having heard Officer Morris’s call
for backup. Detective Reynolds was also armed and wearing a uniform, and his
patrol car was unmarked as well. Officer Morris explained the situation to Detective
Reynolds, including the direction from which he believed the shots originated. The
two agreed that the shots likely came from a nearby wooded area, which was north of
some railroad tracks that were adjacent to where the officers stood. The officers
began discussing whether and how to approach the woods, given that they were the
only two officers on the scene.
Just then, the officers observed a man––later identified as Jeremy Daniel
Chafin––walking alone on the railroad tracks. Officer Morris later testified that
Chafin “came walking out of the woods,” crossed the railroad tracks, and
“approached” the officers. Id. at 94, 127. According to Officer Morris, Chafin was
wearing pants but no shirt. Officer Morris did not see a gun on Chafin’s person, nor
did he see any bulges indicative of a weapon. Chafin was not making any furtive
movements, and his demeanor did not otherwise stand out.
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Officer Morris approached Chafin, while Detective Reynolds stayed back near
the patrol cars; at that point, both officers stood between Chafin and the fifth-wheel
camper. The camper was later confirmed as belonging to Chafin. Officer Morris did
not identify himself, nor did he ask Chafin for identification.
As he approached Chafin, Officer Morris asked, “Where’s the .22?” Chafin
responded that he did not have a .22. Officer Morris then asked whether Chafin
would consent to a search. Chafin did not audibly answer yes or no, but instead
responded by “going through his pockets himself.” Id. at 95. Chafin pulled a pill
bottle out of his right pants pocket, and Officer Morris noticed something black and
metal in Chafin’s pocket. Officer Morris asked Chafin what the object was. In
response, Chafin again did not audibly answer and instead pulled out the frame (i.e.,
the lower portion) of a .22 caliber handgun. Before Officer Morris could ask another
question, Chafin pulled out the top portion of the same firearm from his front left
pants pocket, showing both halves to Officer Morris.
Chafin then stated––again, before Officer Morris could ask another question––
that he had also heard shots from a .22 caliber firearm, had gone into the woods to
investigate, and had found the pistol there. He did not attempt to reconcile this story
with his initial denial that he had a .22 caliber firearm.
Neither Officer Morris nor Detective Reynolds reached into Chafin’s pockets
or otherwise physically searched him. Moreover, neither Officer Morris nor
Detective Reynolds brandished their weapons at any point during the encounter. The
district court also found that Officer Morris’s tone of voice throughout the encounter
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was not loud or threatening. However, neither Officer Morris nor Detective
Reynolds advised Chafin that he was free to go or that he did not have to answer
questions.
After discovering the .22 caliber pistol in Chafin’s pockets, Officer Morris
gave the two gun parts to Detective Reynolds. At some point, Wyandotte Tribal
Police Chief Ronnie Gilmore also arrived and reportedly recognized Chafin. Officer
Morris ran a criminal history check on Chafin and discovered that he was a
previously convicted felon. Chafin was then arrested.
A federal grand jury indicted Chafin for possessing the firearm despite
knowing that he was a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). Before trial could commence, Chafin filed a motion to suppress. He
claimed that his encounter with Officer Morris constituted an unjustified
investigatory detention. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted
Chafin’s motion. The government subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, which
the district court denied.
The government then filed this timely appeal.
II.
When reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to suppress, “we review
factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” United States v.
Daniels, 101 F.4th 770, 775 (10th Cir. 2024). In conducting our review, we evaluate
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090
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(10th Cir. 2020)). Further, we review de novo whether an encounter was consensual
under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th
Cir. 2004).
Additionally, “[w]hile the existence of reasonable suspicion is a factual
determination, the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of a search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo.” United States
v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009)).
A.
1.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people” to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. However,
“consensual encounters” between law enforcement and citizens “are not seizures
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and need not be supported by
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.
2000). Thus, “[a]n officer is free to approach people and ask questions without
violating the Fourth Amendment.” Id. But once an encounter traverses from a
consensual interaction to a more restrictive detention, it becomes a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be supported by some quantum of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968).
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There are two categories of detentions within the Fourth Amendment: an
investigative detention and an arrest. These two “categories are not static and may
escalate from one to another.” United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1312 (10th Cir.
2012) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting White, 584 F.3d at 945). An arrest, which
is “characterized by [a] highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention,” must be
supported by probable cause. Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1185 (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1984)).
Meanwhile, an investigative detention (or a Terry stop) “unlike an arrest, [ ] need not
be supported by probable cause.” Id. at 1186. Thus, although an investigative
detention is still “a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” id., “[a]n
officer may constitutionally ‘stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks probable cause.’” United
States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2012)).
But, again, an officer needs neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to
justify a consensual encounter with a citizen. To that end, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that “a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches
an individual and asks a few questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991).
To determine whether an encounter is consensual, a court “must ‘consider all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct
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would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to
decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” United States v.
Woody, 45 F.4th 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439). In
other words, “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that []he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about [his] business.” Jones, 701 F.3d at 1313 (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In United States v. Rogers, we set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to
consider when determining whether an individual has been seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes:
(1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the brandishing of a weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching by an officer; (4) aggressive language or tone of voice by an officer indicating compliance is compulsory; (5) prolonged retention of an individual’s personal effects; (6) a request to accompany an officer to the police station; (7) interaction in a small, enclosed, or non-public place; and (8) absence of other members of the public.
556 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2009).
A court may also consider “whether an officer indicated to the person that he
is free to leave.” Jones, 701 F.3d at 1313. However, it is worth noting that officers
are not required to advise suspects of their right to refuse to answer questions or that
they are free to leave; thus, the fact that an officer fails to tell a suspect that he is free
to leave, without more, is “simply not enough to turn the encounter into an
investigative detention.” Woody, 45 F.4th at 1175.
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We have previously stated that “the ‘strong presence of two or three factors’
may be sufficient to support the conclusion a seizure occurred.” United States v.
Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
443 F.3d 1280, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2006)). Still, “no single factor is dispositive,”
and the ultimate determination is based on the totality of the circumstances. Jones,
701 F.3d at 1313 (citing Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1138).
2.
In this appeal, the government argues that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the encounter between Chafin and Officer Morris “was consensual at
least until Officer [Morris] saw the black, metal object in Chafin’s pocket.” Aplt. Br.
at 21. Put differently, the government claims that Officer Morris had not seized
Chafin at all when he first approached Chafin—nor had Officer Morris seized Chafin
when he asked if Chafin had the .22 caliber firearm and would consent to a search.
And so, the government asserts, Officer Morris did not need any degree of reasonable
suspicion to justify asking those two questions.
We agree. After examining the Rogers factors, we hold that the totality of the
circumstances indicates that the initial encounter between Chafin and Officer Morris
was consensual. We discuss each of the eight factors in turn.
First, we consider whether there was a threatening presence of several officers.
See Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1137. Here, only two officers were present during the initial
encounter with Chafin, and only one of these officers—Officer Morris—approached
Chafin and asked him questions. Previously, we established that two officers’ mere
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presence, without more, is not enough to indicate that the encounter began as a
nonconsensual seizure. For example, in Woody, we noted that “[the defendant] does
not contend that two officers were so many as to give a reasonable person the
impression that he would be unable to decline their request to speak with them. Nor
could he make such a contention, without more.” 45 F.4th at 1175. Furthermore, in
Jones, we concluded that the presence of “three officers on the scene” did not
indicate that the defendant was seized, especially because “the officers’ presence was
non-threatening.” 701 F.3d at 1314.
It is true, as Chafin observes, that we have previously deemed an encounter to
be a seizure even when only two officers were present. See Hernandez, 847 F.3d at
1265–66. But we only did so because, in Hernandez, the two officers’ conduct was
particularly coercive, given that the defendant “was alone at night being closely
followed by a police car with two uniformed and armed officers who asked him to
stop walking even though he was answering their questions.” Id. at 1267. Here, by
contrast, only Officer Morris actually approached Chafin; as the district court itself
noted, Detective Reynolds “was standing ‘aways back’ of Officer Morris” while the
encounter took place. App’x at 40. Therefore, the first Rogers factor weighs in favor
of the conclusion that the initial encounter between Chafin and Officer Morris began
consensually.
Second, we ask whether the officers brandished a firearm. See Rogers, 556
F.3d at 1137–38. Although both Officer Morris and Detective Reynolds were in
uniform and carrying firearms, the district court found that neither brandished his
10 Appellate Case: 24-5079 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 11
weapon. We have noted that “the mere ‘presence of a holstered firearm . . . is
unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing
of the weapon.’” United States v. Tafuna, 5 F.4th 1197, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204–05 (2002)). Chafin does not
contest that neither officer brandished their weapon. Therefore, the second Rogers
factor also indicates that Chafin and Officer Morris’s initial encounter began
Third, we consider whether there was physical touching by an officer. See
Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1138. The district court found that the officers did not physically
touch or restrain Chafin at all during the encounter. Chafin does not dispute this. As
a result, the third Rogers factor also weighs in favor of the conclusion that Chafin
and Officer Morris’s initial encounter began consensually.
Fourth, we ask if there was “aggressive language or tone of voice by an officer
indicating compliance is compulsory.” Id. Here, although the district court expressly
found that Officer Morris did not act aggressively during his encounter with Chafin,
it nevertheless found that he had an “authoritative” presence, based only on Officer
Morris’s “general tone and demeanor.” App’x at 77. Likewise, because of Officer
Morris’s generally authoritative demeanor, the district court concluded that his initial
questions were overly “accusatory, persistent, and intrusive.” Id. Therefore, the
district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of the conclusion that the
encounter between Chafin and Officer Morris began as an investigative detention.
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This is incorrect. To be sure, we have acknowledged that “‘[a]ccusatory,
persistent, and intrusive’ questioning can turn an otherwise voluntary encounter into
a coercive one.” United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437). However, we have also made clear that a “single
statement”––even an accusatory one––is not sufficient to transform a consensual
encounter into a Fourth Amendment seizure. Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314. That is
especially true when the questioning is “not part of a series of accusatory remarks,”
id., and when an otherwise-accusatory question is “spoken in an ordinary tone of
voice,” United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 2006).
Here, consistent with the district court’s factual findings, Officer Morris asked
two brief questions––only one of which was arguably accusatory, which concerned
whether Chafin had a .22 firearm––and Officer Morris did so in an ordinary tone of
voice, without an aggressive demeanor. Accordingly, even if Officer Morris had an
authoritative demeanor in general, the record does not support the conclusion that he
used an aggressive tone of voice during the encounter that compelled Chafin’s
compliance. See United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 386 F.3d 953, 959 (10th Cir.
2004) (focusing on whether an officer “exhibited an intimidating or coercive
demeanor” during the encounter itself). Therefore, the fourth Rogers factor also
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weighs in favor of the conclusion that Officer Morris’s encounter with Chafin began
consensually. 2
Fifth, we consider whether there was prolonged retention of an individual’s
personal effects. See Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1138. The district court found that Officer
Morris did not take or retain any of Chafin’s personal effects until the end of the
encounter. As a result, the fifth Rogers factor also indicates that Chafin and Officer
Morris’s encounter began consensually.
Sixth, we ask whether there was a request to accompany an officer to the
police station. See id. The government notes that Officer Morris did not ask Chafin
to go to the police station at any point. Therefore, the sixth Rogers factor also
supports the conclusion that Officer Morris’s encounter with Chafin began
Seventh, we consider whether the interaction took place in a small, enclosed,
or non-public place. See id. In this case, the district court never found that the
location of the encounter was non-public or that it was somehow enclosed, but it
described the area as “isolated.” App’x at 78. Here, we note that the encounter did
not occur in the type of enclosed, private location where courts have generally found
seizures to occur; for instance, the encounter did not take place in a police station or
an interrogation room, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983), or in a private
2 Judge Federico would afford more deference to the district court’s findings and observations of Officer Morris during his testimony and weigh this factor in favor of Chafin.
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location like a home, see Woody, 45 F.4th at 1174. Instead, the entire encounter
occurred outside, in the open, public space between the officers’ vehicles, Chafin’s
camper, the railroad tracks, and the woods. Thus, the setting of the encounter
supports the conclusion that the encounter between Officer Morris and Chafin began
Eighth, we ask whether the interaction took place without other members of
the public present. See Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1138. No member of the public ever
passed by, so this is the only Rogers factor that weighs in favor of the conclusion that
the encounter between Officer Morris and Chafin began as an investigatory detention.
However, Chafin argues that there are several other reasons that his encounter
with Officer Morris did not begin consensually. First, the officers never informed
him “that he was free to go or [could] decline to speak to them.” Aple. Br. at 12–13.
But the mere fact that the officers failed to tell Chafin that he was free to terminate
the encounter, on its own, is “simply not enough to turn the encounter into an
Second, Chafin stresses that the officers stood in between him and his home,
the fifth-wheel trailer, and he suggests that the officers’ act of “[i]mpeding [his]
ability to go home” amounted to a restraint on his freedom of movement. Aple. Br.
at 17. Thus, according to Chafin, the fact that he was unable “to reasonably get to his
home except through armed officers” indicates that the encounter was a
nonconsensual seizure. Id. The district court agreed with Chafin and, citing our
decision in United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003),
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concluded that because Chafin’s path to his home was impeded, he would not have
felt free to terminate his encounter with the officers.
We disagree. In Ringold, a group of officers approached a suspect at a gas
station, positioning themselves “in such a way that [the defendant] was encircled
between them, the gas pump and his vehicle.” 335 F.3d at 1173. Even so, we
concluded that fact did not transform the encounter into a seizure because,
notwithstanding that the defendant would have to go through the officers, “nothing
[actually] prevented [him] from simply entering his vehicle and driving away.” Id.
Here, to be sure, Officer Morris and Detective Reynolds did impede Chafin’s path
home to some degree; for example, Officer Morris testified that he “suppose[d]” that
the only way Chafin would have been able to “get from where [h]e was on the
railroad tracks back to his camper was to go through” or “around” the two officers.
App’x at 114. But, as in Ringold, that fact does not mean the encounter necessarily
became coercive enough to constitute a seizure. At no point did Officer Morris
indicate that Chafin could only continue walking or return to his camper if he agreed
to answer questions or consent to a search. Nor did Chafin even attempt to keep
walking toward his camper. Thus, all considered, the officers’ positioning between
Chafin and his home has little bearing on whether the encounter was a seizure.
Taken together, the Rogers factors strongly indicate that the encounter
between Officer Morris and Chafin began consensually—and remained consensual at
least while Officer Morris asked Chafin his first two questions. Even accepting all of
the district court’s factual findings, we cannot conclude that Officer Morris seized
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Chafin at any point before he observed the black, metal object in Chafin’s pocket.
Because the encounter began consensually, Officer Morris did not need reasonable
suspicion to ask his first two questions. The district court therefore erred in
concluding otherwise.
Thus, we next turn to whether Officer Morris had reasonable suspicion that
Chafin had a gun, sufficient to justify seizing Chafin once the encounter evolved into
an investigatory detention.
B.
The Supreme Court has held that “a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. In other words, the Fourth Amendment
permits temporary detentions of individuals—so long as “the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate[.]” Id. at 21–22.
To be “reasonable,” a police officer’s investigatory stop must be “justified at
its inception,” and the “officer’s actions must be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United States v.
Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). This appeal concerns only the first prong––that is, whether
Officer Morris’s detention of Chafin was justified at its inception.
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“An investigatory detention is justified at its inception if the specific and
articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a
reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States v.
McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir 2009.)). Importantly, “the
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause.”
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). But officers cannot rely on
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or hunch[es],” because “the Fourth
Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification.” United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (cleaned up). Notably, reasonable suspicion does not
require suspicion of a particular criminal offense. See United States v. Guardado,
699 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Direct evidence of a specific, particular
crime is unnecessary [for reasonable suspicion to be present].”).
To determine whether a detaining officer had the required “particularized and
objective basis for suspecting [a] particular person stopped of criminal activity,” we
consider the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). And, when making that determination, “a
court may not evaluate and reject each factor in isolation.” Madrid, 713 F.3d at 1256
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gandara-Salinas, 327 F.3d 1127,
1130 (10th Cir. 2003)). Indeed, “[c]onduct that may be wholly innocent may
nonetheless support a finding of reasonable suspicion in certain circumstances.”
United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2004). All factors,
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“mitigating and aggravating,” must be considered in the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 1193.
In this appeal, the government claims that Officer Morris had reasonable
suspicion that Chafin had a gun, sufficient to justify seizing Chafin once the
encounter evolved into an investigatory detention.
The government is correct. Despite Chafin’s claim to the contrary, there are
several reasons that support the conclusion that Officer Morris had a reasonable basis
to believe that the black, metal object in Chafin’s pocket was a firearm.
First, the totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion “allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them.” Arvizu,
534 U.S. at 273. Here, Officer Morris could infer that the object was a firearm based
on his own experience as a longtime police officer and lifelong hunter.
Second, Officer Morris had good reason to suspect that it was Chafin, in
particular, who had fired the shots. Officer Morris and Detective Reynolds observed
Chafin emerge out of the wooded area where the shots had been fired, and although
Officer Morris testified that he did not actually witness Chafin “exit the woods,” he
did see that Chafin had “come up from [the woods] onto the tracks.” App’x at 111.
In other words, although Officer Morris may not have seen Chafin walking out of the
woods, Officer Morris could still have logically deduced that Chafin was leaving the
woods based on the direction from which Chafin walked onto the railroad tracks.
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Additionally, no one else was in the area at the time, making it more likely that
Chafin was the one who had fired the shots. Thus, Officer Morris’s observation of
Chafin walking alone onto the railroad track, from the direction of the wooded area
where the shots had been fired, gave Officer Morris reason to connect Chafin to the
suspected criminal activity.
Third, Officer Morris had reason to suspect “in light of his experience[,] that
criminal activity may [have been] afoot” and that Chafin was “armed and presently
dangerous.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. As we have already established, Officer Morris
observed Chafin emerge alone from the direction of the shots. Additionally, Chafin
initially denied having a gun in response to Officer Morris’s first question––“where’s
the .22?”––and Officer Morris almost immediately thereafter saw an object
resembling a .22. App’x at 40. The district court declined to consider Chafin’s
initial denial, concluding that it could not support reasonable suspicion because
Chafin only denied having a gun “after the initiation of the investigatory stop.”
App’x at 82. But that position rests on the faulty premise that the encounter began as
an investigatory stop; as explained above, the encounter began consensually and did
not evolve into an investigatory stop until the moment Officer Morris saw the metal
object in Chafin’s pocket.
Moreover, the district court’s position overlooks the fact that Officer Morris
suspected Chafin not only of carrying the firearm, but discharging it as well––
conduct that itself could have been unlawful under the laws of whichever locality
actually controlled the wooded area. Reasonable suspicion generally does not require
19 Appellate Case: 24-5079 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 20
suspicion of a particular crime or violation, so long as there is a particularized basis
to suspect an individual of criminal activity more generally. Likewise, any particular
fact to which the government points in establishing reasonable suspicion need not
“by itself [be] proof of any illegal conduct.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9. Even a fact or
circumstance that by itself is “consistent with innocent” conduct may still contribute
to reasonable suspicion when “taken together” with other facts. Id. With that in
mind, the fact that Chafin initially denied having a .22 caliber pistol, but then
revealed the weapon in his pocket, gave Officer Morris reason to suspect not only
that “criminal activity may [have been] afoot,” but also that Chafin was “armed and
presently dangerous.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
As a result, the record demonstrates that Officer Morris developed reasonable
suspicion at the moment that the encounter evolved from a consensual one into an
investigatory detention. Officer Morris’s seizure of Chafin therefore did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of
Chafin’s motion to suppress.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge