United States v. Cavalier Shipping Co.

478 F.2d 1256, 60 C.C.P.A. 152
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 7, 1973
DocketNo. 5502, C.A.D. 1103
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 478 F.2d 1256 (United States v. Cavalier Shipping Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cavalier Shipping Co., 478 F.2d 1256, 60 C.C.P.A. 152 (ccpa 1973).

Opinion

MaRket, Chief Judge.

This appeal is from the decision and judgment of the United States Customs Court, First Div., 67 Cust. Ct. 440, C.D. 4317, 337 F. Supp. 447 (1971), sustaining eight consolidated protests against the classification of certain importations from Israel of methyl bromide containing 2% chloropicrin under item 405.15 of the TSUS as pesticides “obtained, derived, or manufactured * * * in part” from a benzenoid product provided for by subpart A or B of Part 1 of Schedule 4. The merchandise was held properly classifiable as other halogenated hydrocarbons under item 429.48, the claimed classification. We affirm.

The following stipulation sets forth the salient facts:

1. The imported merchandise is a liquid under pressure composed of methyl bromide (68.6%), petroleum hydrocarbons (30.0%) and chloropicrin (1.4%) except in those instances where the merchandise is entered in small cans in which case they were composed of methyl bromide (98%) and chloropicrin (2%).
2. Its uses are those comprised within the term “pesticide,” as defined in TSUS schedule 4, part 1, subpart O, headnote 2.
3. The petroleum hydrocarbons serve only as a diluent and/or propellant, are not an active pesticidal ingredient.
[154]*1544. In these impoi’tations, the chloropierin is used, in this formulation as a warning agent to alert people by its pervasive, unpleasant aroma, in the event of leakage of the methyl bromide, which is poisonous.
5. # * *
6. Methyl bromide is a halogenated hydrocarbon, but not one described in any of the TSUS items 429.2CM29.47, inclusive.

Stipulation 5 relating to the origin of the chloropierin was stricken at trial. But the presumption that the chloropierin involved was of benze-noid origin has not been disputed, appellee having offered no proof as to the actual derivation. Thus the chloropierin falls within the scope of subpart A or B of Schedule 4, Part 1. The record also establishes that chloropierin is capable in itself of serving as a pesticide but not in concentrations as low as 1 or 2%.

Appellant’s basic contention is that the presence of the chloropierin cannot be ignored in the classification of the methyl bromide products. It is urged that the Customs Court committed reversible error in treating the merchandise as if it were a single compound. Proper recognition of the presence of the benzenoid component in tlie mixtures is said to require classification under the original classification, item 405.15 or,' alternatively, under 409.00 as “mixture * * * in part of” a benzenoid pesticide product provided for in subpart C of Schedule 4, Part 1.

The Customs Court agreed that minute quantities of a substance could have a bearing on classification, but added that “this should only be the case when these substances are playing a ‘substantial’ part.” A two-sided test encompassing both a quantitative and a functional approach was set forth as the guide for determining whether the presence of a particular component makes the importation “in part” of that material. Adapting the test to this case, the court took the position that

* * * the provision for products in part of benzenoid origin will govern an article which contains any amount of a beneznoid [sic] ingredient which plays a part in the article’s principal function or an article containing a benzenoid ingredient which does not play a part in the article’s principal function but is nevertheless present in commercially meaningful quantities.

The court went on to point out that the principal function of the importation was as a pesticide while the chloropierin in the small quantities employed herein served only as a warning agent. Accordingly it concluded:

The chloropierin in the importation does not serve as a pesticidal purpose nor is it present in quantities which would warrant considering it a meaningful importation of material of benzenoid origin. It follows that neither the functional test nor the quantitative test justifiies the classification of the importation on the basis of the chloropierin being of benzenoid origin.

[155]*155The alternative classification was dismissed under analogous reasoning, the court stating:

An ingredient of benzenoid origin, which does not play a part in the principal function of the mixture and is not present in commercially meaningful quantities, does not make the mixture one which is within the intended scope of the above provision for mixtures.

Cases wherein an ingredient added solely for safety of transportation or as a preservative or binder was disregarded for tariff purposes were also cited as support for ignoring the chloropicrin component of the mixtures.

Appellant contends that the Customs Court should have recognized that a statutory definition exists for the language “in part of,” rendering the functional-quantitative test based on case law improper and unnecessary. We agree that General Headnote 9(f) (iv) defines “in part of” as containing “a significant quantity of the named material,” with the de minimus rule being applicable. The interpretation, however, of “significant” and the determination of the corresponding scope of the de minimus exception remain open.

Appellant urges that headnotes 2 and 3 to Schedule 41 are sufficient to make clear the meaning of de minimus with regard to the specific area of chemical compounds and mixtures. It is true that only impurities are positively excluded in headnote 2(a). But we cannot agree that such impurities represent the full extent of the de minimus exception insofar as “mixtures” defined in Headnote 3 are concerned and that the general statutory plan permits no further qualifications as to “significant”. quantities of a mixture component. Although a basic Congressional intent to assess mixtures at the highest rate applicable to any component material is evident from a review of Schedule 4, this does not nullify the requirement that ■a component be present in a “significant quantity” to render the mixture “in part of” that component. Such a limitation is in full accord with the statement in the Tarvjf Glassification Study, Submitting Report, November 15, 1960, Vol. I at 14, that where the term “in part of” is used in the new schedule the “intention is that the component material be present in commercially significant amount.”

[156]*156Tlie real issue, therefore, lies in whether the chloropicrin component of the present importations was in fact present in “commercially significant amount.” Appellant strongly contends that this intentionally admixed ingredient, which serves a useful purpose, cannot properly be disregarded.

We find no error in the dual test employed by the Customs Court to determine whether the methyl bromide mixtures were to be considered “in part of” chloropicrin for tariff purposes. The quantitative approach was set forth in E. Fougera & Co. v. United States, 49 Treas. Dec. 986, C.D. 41632 (1926), wherein “in part” was equated with “a substantial part in a commercial sense.” The factual distinction drawn by the Customs Court in Northam Warren Corp. v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 584, C.D. 4142 (1970), that the minute quantity of coal tar derivative in Fougera

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Bluebook (online)
478 F.2d 1256, 60 C.C.P.A. 152, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cavalier-shipping-co-ccpa-1973.