Bantam Travelware, Division of Peter's Bag Corp. v. United States

11 Ct. Int'l Trade 137
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedFebruary 27, 1987
DocketConsolidated Court No. 85-11-01552 (86-01-00038)
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 137 (Bantam Travelware, Division of Peter's Bag Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bantam Travelware, Division of Peter's Bag Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 137 (cit 1987).

Opinion

Opinion and Order

TsouCALAS, Judge:

This action is presently before the Court, pursuant to USCIT R. 56, on cross-motions for summary judgment. The subject merchandise consists of various styles of luggage manufactured by plaintiff, Bantam Travelware, Division of Peter’s Bag Corporation. Each of the styles of plaintiffs product contains braided fabric, either in the core of the handles or in tie tapes (also known as tie straps) within the luggage. The dispute centers on whether the presence of this braided material compels the classification of the importations as "luggage wholly or in part of braid” pursuant to item 706.34, TSUS:

Schedule 7, Part 1, Subpart D—

Luggage and handbags, whether or not fitted with bottle, dining, drinking, manicure, sewing, traveling, or similar sets; and flat goods:
Of textile materials (except yarns, of paper), whether or not ornamented:
Wholly or in part of braid:
706.34 Of other textile materials.13.1% ad.val.

[138]*138The merchandise, luggage manufactured in Korea or Taiwan, which is composed in chief value of man-made fiber textile materials, entered the Port of Los Angeles, and was liquidated in August 1984 under item 706.41, TSUS:

Luggage and handbags, whether or not fitted with bottle, dining, drinking, manicure, sewing, traveling, or similar sets; and flat goods:
Of textile materials (except yarns, of paper), whether or not ornamented:
Wholly or in part of braid:
Other:
Other:
706.41 Other.20% ad val.

After denial of its protests, plaintiff commenced an action in this Court in November 1985. Following consolidation pursuant to US-CIT R. 42, Consolidated Court No. 85-11-01552 was designated a test case, pursuant to USCIT R. 84.

Issue Presented

As a matter of law, is the subject merchandise "in part of braid” within the meaning of General Headnote 9(f)(iv) and item 706.34, TSUS?

Discussion

The only substantive issue concerns the meaning of the words "in part of braid” in item 706.34, TSUS. In this regard, the tariff schedules explain:1

General Headnote 9. Definitions. For the purposes of the schedules, unless the context otherwise requires—
H? ífc H* % % H*
(f) the terms * * * "in part of’ and "containing”, when used between the description of an article and a material * * * have the following meanings:
H« H* H* Hs H* ‡ ‡
(iv) "in part of’ or "containing” mean that the article contains a significant quantity of the named material.
With regard to the application of the quantitative concepts specified in subparagraphs (ii) and (iv) above, it is intended that the de minimis rule apply.

Braid, pursuant to Schedule 3, Headnote 2(f), encompasses:

2. For the purposes of the tariff schedules—
[139]*139(f) The term "braids”, as used in connection with textile materials or textile articles, includes all braids in the piece, whether of flat, tubular, or other construction, with or without cores, and whether braided from fibers, filaments (including tinsel wire and lame), yarns, cordage, textile fabrics, or any combination thereof;

It is indisputable that the subject merchandise contains braid; therefore, the question is whether there is sufficient braided material to conclude, as a matter of law, that the luggage contains a "significant quantity” of braid.2

Initially, it bears reviewing that summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a, material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier-of-fact could return a verdict against the movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The movant must demonstrate the lack of a triable fact issue. Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1985). In evaluating the motion for summary judgment, a court will draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Chemical Eng’g Corp. v. Essef Indus., 795 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Amorient Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 CIT 197, 607 F. Supp. 1484, 1487 (1985). Where a genuine dispute about a material factual issue exists, summary judgment will be denied despite cross motions by the parties. United States v. F.H. Fenderson, Inc., 10 CIT 758, Slip. Op. 86-126 at 7 (Dec. 5, 1986); St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 6 CIT 213, 214 (1983).

A material is present in significant quantity if it performs a part in the principal function of the article regardless of its actual quantity relative to the whole, Northam Warren Corp. v. United States, 60 CCPA 117, 120-21, C.A.D. 1092, 475 F.2d 647, 650 (1973); United States v. Cavalier Shipping Co., 60 CCPA 152, 156, C.A.D. 1103, 478 F.2d 1256, 1259 (1973), or if it is present in a quantity which has independent commercial significance. F.W. Myers & Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 83, 86, C.D. 4876 (1980). It has also been held that less than two milligrams of gold, plated electrolytically on a watch case, is present in a significant quantity, where, inter alia, that amount of gold was recognized as necessary to produce a commercially desired yellow color. See Genender Wholesale v. United States, 1 CIT 278, 281, 520 F. Supp. 278, 281 (1981), aff’d, 69 CCPA 146, 676 F.2d 672 (1982).3 That a material is functional, however, does not inexorably dictate that it will control the classification of the dominant article. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has [140]*140stressed, albeit in the context of classifying chemical mixtures, that "we cannot reconcile the expressed intention with respect to the meaning of 'in part’ in the TSUS with the restricted concept that any purposeful addition of a benzenoid product, be it to preserve life or to enhance salability, must render the article 'in part’ of that product.” Cavalier Shipping, 60 CCPA at 157, 478 F2d at 1260.

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Related

United States v. Diebold, Inc.
369 U.S. 654 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Genender Wholesale v. United States
1 Ct. Int'l Trade 278 (Court of International Trade, 1981)
Amorient Petroleum Co. v. United States
9 Ct. Int'l Trade 197 (Court of International Trade, 1985)
Northam Warren Corp. v. United States
475 F.2d 647 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1973)
United States v. Cavalier Shipping Co.
478 F.2d 1256 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1973)
F. W. Myers & Co. v. United States
85 Cust. Ct. 83 (U.S. Customs Court, 1980)
Genender Wholesale v. United States
676 F.2d 672 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982)
Hamilton v. Smith
773 F.2d 461 (Second Circuit, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
11 Ct. Int'l Trade 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bantam-travelware-division-of-peters-bag-corp-v-united-states-cit-1987.