Rhodia, Inc. v. United States

441 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1091, 30 C.I.T. 1091, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2221, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJuly 28, 2006
DocketSlip Op. 06-118; Court 00-00174
StatusPublished

This text of 441 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (Rhodia, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rhodia, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1091, 30 C.I.T. 1091, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2221, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118 (cit 2006).

Opinion

OPINION

STANCEU, Judge.

Plaintiff Rhodia, Inc. (“Rhodia”) challenges the determination of tariff classification that the United States Customs Service (“Customs”) 1 applied in 1999 to two entries of an imported product identified by plaintiff as “rare earth carbonate mixture” and moves for summary judgment. Defendant United States cross-moves for summary judgment. The court, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000), grants summary judgment to plaintiff because there are no genuine issues of fact material to the tariff classification issue presented by this case and because the classification claimed by plaintiff before the court is correct.

I. Background

Customs, upon liquidating the two entries, classified the imported product as a cerium compound in subheading 2846.10.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (1999) (“Compounds, inorganic or organic, of rare-earth metals, of yttrium or of scandium, or of mixtures of these metals: Cerium compounds”), subject to duty at 5.5 percent ad valorem. In a separate protest filed on each of the two liquidations, plaintiff asserted that the imported good is not described by the term “cerium compounds” as used in subheading 2846. 10.00 and claimed classification in a “basket” subheading of heading 2846, subheading 2846.90.80, HTSUS (1999). Although Customs denied the protests, defendant United States now claims in its cross-motion for summary judgment that subheading 2846.90.80, HTSUS is the correct classification for the good. At the time of entry in 1999, that tariff provision read in pertinent part as follows:

2846 Compounds, inorganic or organic, of rare-earth metals, of yttrium or of scandium, or of mixtures of these metals:
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ $ ‡
2846.90.80 Other......3.7%.

Before the court, Rhodia claims classification in subheading 3824.90.39, HTSUS (1999). In pertinent part, that tariff provision, as of the date of entry, was as follows:

3824 ... chemical products and preparations of the chemical or allied industries (including those consisting of mixtures of natural products), not elsewhere specified or included ... 3824.90 Other:
* * * # * *
*1371 Mixtures of two or more inorganic compounds:
3824.90.39 Other: Free.

II. Discussion

The court proceeds de novo in actions brought to contest the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the parties’ submissions “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). Where tariff classification is at issue, “summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to the underlying factual issue of exactly what the merchandise is.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998).

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the government’s classification of the product was incorrect but does not bear the burden of establishing the correct tariff classification; instead, the correct tariff classification is to be determined by the court. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984). In determining the correct tariff classification, the court first must “ascertain[ ] the proper meaning of specific terms in the tariff provision.” David W. Shenk & Co. v. United States, 21 CIT 284, 286, 960 F.Supp. 363, 365 (1997). That meaning is a question of law. See Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 23 CIT 1036, 1037-38, 83 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1358 (1999), aff'd, 242 F.3d 1044 (Fed.Cir.2001). Second, the court is to determine the tariff provision under which the subject merchandise is properly classified. See Bausch & Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1365-66. This determination also is a question of law. Id. at 1366. The statutory presumption of correctness given Customs classification decisions by 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) does not apply if the court is presented with a question of law by a proper motion for summary judgment. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997).

The General Rules of Interpretation of the HTSUS govern the determination of tariff classification. N. Am. Processing Co. v. United States, 236 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed.Cir.2001). General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 1, HTSUS, initially requires that tariff classification “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. GRIs 2 through 4 then apply “provided such headings or notes do not otherwise require.” Id.

For guidance as to the scope and meaning of tariff terms, the court may resort to the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“Explanatory Notes”), which, although not part of U.S. law, are “indicative of proper interpretation” of the tariff schedule. Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed.Cir.1992) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A Absence of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact

The court finds that there is no genuine issue of fact material to the tariff classification of the imported merchandise. The good, a product of the People’s Republic of China, is a mixture that consists principally of various rare earth carbonates, which collectively comprise by weight *1372 62 percent of the product. Pl.’s R. 56 Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute ¶ 9. In addition to the rare earth carbonates, the product contains rare earth ammonium double sulfates, bound water, and impurities. 2 Id.

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441 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1091, 30 C.I.T. 1091, 28 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2221, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rhodia-inc-v-united-states-cit-2006.