WIENER, Circuit Judge:
In this direct criminal appeal, defendant-appellant Raymond Castaneda challenges his conviction of RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), alleging errors at both the indictment and trial stages of his case. Concluding that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Castaneda’s indictment on the ba
sis of the government’s unwarranted revocation of its transactional immunity agreement, we reverse Castaneda’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Castaneda owned an auto repair shop and towing service in Brownsville, Texas. From 1990 to 1994, William Weaver worked as an investigator in the Cameron County Attorney’s Office in Brownsville. During these years, Castaneda and Weaver conspired to solicit bribes from individuals accused of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in exchange for getting the charges dismissed or sentences reduced. Castaneda’s role in this conspiracy was that of middleman, referring “clients” to Weaver, arranging meetings, receiving payments, and suggesting strategies for accomplishing fixes. Weaver’s role on the other hand was that of principal, making the necessary arrangements within the County Attorney’s Office to have the charges reduced or disappear.
Suspecting corruption, the FBI began an investigation of the County Attorney’s Office. As part of this activity, Special Agent Jose Louis Cisneros sought Castaneda’s cooperation. This, in turn, led AUSA Mervyn Milton Mosbacker and Castaneda to enter into an informal, written proffer agreement on January 24, 1995, pursuant to which Castaneda was granted
use
immunity.
Sometime later, AUSA Mosbacker and Castaneda entered into another agreement
— this one oral — in which Castaneda was granted
transactional
immunity in exchange for his obligation to “tell everything he knew” about Weaver’s criminal activity.
On January 24, 1995 and again on November 17, 1995, Castaneda was questioned by Agent Cisneros and AUSA Mosbacker. In those interviews, Castaneda acknowledged that he had participated as Weaver’s intermediary in several acts of bribery and extortion connected to the “fixing” of criminal prosecutions brought by the County Attorney’s Office. Castaneda identified a number of individuals who had knowledge of, or had been involved in, the scheme. These included (1) Jose Luis Reyes,
(2) Julio Gonzalez,
(3) Jeff Lewis,
(4) Chuy Hinojosa,
(5) Guadalupe Barajas,
(6) Federico Morales,
(7)
Alejandro Cano,
and (8) Mario Meliton Garcia.
On October 22, 1996 — almost one year after the November, 1995 interview with Castaneda, and at the end of the grand jury’s deliberations — the government wrote to Castaneda advising that, because he had “failed to provide ... relevant and material information concerning criminal activities of which he was well aware,” he had violated the transactional immunity agreement, so the government was revoking its promise not to prosecute. The very next day, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
against Castaneda and Weaver.
Castaneda filed two motions to dismiss the indictment, in one of which he argued that the government had breached its agreement not to prosecute.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Castaneda’s motion without reasons.
Thereafter, Castaneda was convicted by a jury of RICO conspiracy.
The district court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict, and sentenced Castaneda to 33 months in prison, to be followed by a three year period of supervised release, and a fine of $7,500.00. Castaneda appeals his conviction.
II
ANALYSIS
Castaneda argues that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because the government breached its oral agreement not to prosecute. Implicit in this claim is the charge that the government failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Castaneda materially breached the immunity agreement, without which the government could not repudiate the contract and prosecute him. We agree.
Nonproseeution agreements, like plea bargains, are contractual in nature, and are therefore interpreted in accordance with general principles of contract law.
Under these principles, if a defendant lives up to his end of the bargain, the government is bound
to perform its promises.
If a defendant “materially breaches” his commitments under the agreement, however, the government can be released from its reciprocal obligations.
When the government believes that a defendant has breached the terms of a nonprosecution agreement and wishes to be relieved of performing its part of the bargain — here, refraining from prosecuting the defendant — due process prevents the government from making this determination and nullifying the agreement unilaterally.
Instead, the government must prove to the court by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) the defendant breached the agreement, and (2) the breach is sufficiently material to warrant rescission.
If the pleadings show no factual dispute, however, the court may determine breach as a matter of law.
Because the district court issued no factual findings in this case, we review Castaneda’s claim of breach of a nonproseeution agreement
de novo.
In the instant case, the government promised not to prosecute Castaneda for his role in the bribery scheme in exchange for his full and truthful disclosure of information implicating Weaver. After dealing with Castaneda for more than a year, the government rescinded this agreement at the eleventh hour, and Castaneda was indicted by the grand jury one day later.
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WIENER, Circuit Judge:
In this direct criminal appeal, defendant-appellant Raymond Castaneda challenges his conviction of RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), alleging errors at both the indictment and trial stages of his case. Concluding that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Castaneda’s indictment on the ba
sis of the government’s unwarranted revocation of its transactional immunity agreement, we reverse Castaneda’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Castaneda owned an auto repair shop and towing service in Brownsville, Texas. From 1990 to 1994, William Weaver worked as an investigator in the Cameron County Attorney’s Office in Brownsville. During these years, Castaneda and Weaver conspired to solicit bribes from individuals accused of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in exchange for getting the charges dismissed or sentences reduced. Castaneda’s role in this conspiracy was that of middleman, referring “clients” to Weaver, arranging meetings, receiving payments, and suggesting strategies for accomplishing fixes. Weaver’s role on the other hand was that of principal, making the necessary arrangements within the County Attorney’s Office to have the charges reduced or disappear.
Suspecting corruption, the FBI began an investigation of the County Attorney’s Office. As part of this activity, Special Agent Jose Louis Cisneros sought Castaneda’s cooperation. This, in turn, led AUSA Mervyn Milton Mosbacker and Castaneda to enter into an informal, written proffer agreement on January 24, 1995, pursuant to which Castaneda was granted
use
immunity.
Sometime later, AUSA Mosbacker and Castaneda entered into another agreement
— this one oral — in which Castaneda was granted
transactional
immunity in exchange for his obligation to “tell everything he knew” about Weaver’s criminal activity.
On January 24, 1995 and again on November 17, 1995, Castaneda was questioned by Agent Cisneros and AUSA Mosbacker. In those interviews, Castaneda acknowledged that he had participated as Weaver’s intermediary in several acts of bribery and extortion connected to the “fixing” of criminal prosecutions brought by the County Attorney’s Office. Castaneda identified a number of individuals who had knowledge of, or had been involved in, the scheme. These included (1) Jose Luis Reyes,
(2) Julio Gonzalez,
(3) Jeff Lewis,
(4) Chuy Hinojosa,
(5) Guadalupe Barajas,
(6) Federico Morales,
(7)
Alejandro Cano,
and (8) Mario Meliton Garcia.
On October 22, 1996 — almost one year after the November, 1995 interview with Castaneda, and at the end of the grand jury’s deliberations — the government wrote to Castaneda advising that, because he had “failed to provide ... relevant and material information concerning criminal activities of which he was well aware,” he had violated the transactional immunity agreement, so the government was revoking its promise not to prosecute. The very next day, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment
against Castaneda and Weaver.
Castaneda filed two motions to dismiss the indictment, in one of which he argued that the government had breached its agreement not to prosecute.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Castaneda’s motion without reasons.
Thereafter, Castaneda was convicted by a jury of RICO conspiracy.
The district court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict, and sentenced Castaneda to 33 months in prison, to be followed by a three year period of supervised release, and a fine of $7,500.00. Castaneda appeals his conviction.
II
ANALYSIS
Castaneda argues that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because the government breached its oral agreement not to prosecute. Implicit in this claim is the charge that the government failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Castaneda materially breached the immunity agreement, without which the government could not repudiate the contract and prosecute him. We agree.
Nonproseeution agreements, like plea bargains, are contractual in nature, and are therefore interpreted in accordance with general principles of contract law.
Under these principles, if a defendant lives up to his end of the bargain, the government is bound
to perform its promises.
If a defendant “materially breaches” his commitments under the agreement, however, the government can be released from its reciprocal obligations.
When the government believes that a defendant has breached the terms of a nonprosecution agreement and wishes to be relieved of performing its part of the bargain — here, refraining from prosecuting the defendant — due process prevents the government from making this determination and nullifying the agreement unilaterally.
Instead, the government must prove to the court by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) the defendant breached the agreement, and (2) the breach is sufficiently material to warrant rescission.
If the pleadings show no factual dispute, however, the court may determine breach as a matter of law.
Because the district court issued no factual findings in this case, we review Castaneda’s claim of breach of a nonproseeution agreement
de novo.
In the instant case, the government promised not to prosecute Castaneda for his role in the bribery scheme in exchange for his full and truthful disclosure of information implicating Weaver. After dealing with Castaneda for more than a year, the government rescinded this agreement at the eleventh hour, and Castaneda was indicted by the grand jury one day later. At a pretrial hearing on Castaneda’s motion to dismiss his indictment,
the government presented evidence purporting to show that Castaneda had
breached his end of the bargain by failing to reveal “relevant and material information ... of which he was well aware.”
Because
of
these alleged omissions, contended the government, it was entitled to rescind the agreement and be relieved of its obligation not to prosecute. Castaneda countered that he gave the government considerable, accurate, and incriminating information about Weaver, and that any omissions Castaneda made were essentially inadvertent or duplicative and thus did not amount to a material breach of the agreement.
In so many words, he argued substantial performance.
There is no clear Fifth Circuit law on the issue of what constitutes a “material breach” of a nonprosecution agreement.
In the context of general contract law, however, we have recognized that a breach is not material unless the non-breaching party is deprived of the benefit of the bargain.
The less the non-breaching party is deprived of the expected benefits, the less material the breach.
Courts within this Circuit have clarified the concept of material breach by comparing it with the converse concept of sub
stantial performance.
Using this approach, if a party’s “nonperformance ... is innocent, does not thwart the purpose of the bargain, and is wholly dwarfed by that party’s performance,” the breaching party has substantially performed under the contract, and the non-breaching party is not entitled to rescission.
We think that this approach is equally applicable in determining the materiality of a breach in the context of nonprosecution agreements.
Given the government’s burden of proof, our de novo application of this test demonstrates that the relatively insignificant omissions by Castaneda did nothing to frustrate the government’s prosecution of Weaver. Moreover, these omissions pale by comparison to the plethora of information delivered by Castaneda.
The government argues that Castaneda committed a material breach of the agreement by failing to reveal Weaver’s involvement in the dismissal of DWIs for Meliton Garcia, Maurice Middleton and Rafael Gonzalez, as well as the dismissal of a gun charge for Jose Galvan.
Although it is clear that Castaneda omitted some information during his interviews with the government, it is anything but clear that, when viewed in the context of what the government already knew or learned derivatively from other sources, these omissions rise to the level of a material breach, even collectively.
Castaneda provided the government with substantial, detailed accounts of bribery involving Weaver and seven other individuals— Julio Gonzalez, Jeff Lewis, Chuy Hinojosa, Guadalupe Barajas, Federico Morales, Alejandro Cano, and Meliton Garcia. Weaver’s illegal activities with three of these individuals eventually formed the basis for predicate racketeering acts and Hobbs Act counts in the indictment.
Even the government’s examples of omissions cut both ways. With regard to Meliton Garcia, Castaneda did provide the government with information about the dismissal of an assault charge; he merely failed to mention the dismissal of a DWI charge as well. Thus, Castaneda led the government to the right source, even if his tip was not complete.
Likewise, although Castaneda did not disclose information about Weaver’s dismissal of Maurice Middleton’s DWI,
Castaneda did provide accurate information about his own involvement as a go-between for Weaver and Julio Gonzalez — and, thereafter, Gonzalez confessed to the government that he had contacted Castaneda for help getting DWIs
dismissed both for himself and Middleton, as well as for Jeff Lewis. Thus, Castaneda did indirectly that about which the government faults him for not doing directly.
Finally, with regard to Rafael Gonzalez
, Agent Cisneros and AUSA Mosbaeker were inconsistent about the extent of information Castaneda provided. In the pretrial motion hearing, Agent Cisneros repeatedly testified that Castaneda had discussed Rafael’s DWI, only to recant this assertion on further questioning. AUSA Mosbaeker admitted that he thought Castaneda had discussed illegalities in which Weaver and Rafael were involved, but maintained that Castaneda did not mention the DWI. Even if Castaneda failed to reveal any direct information about Rafael, though, it is undisputed that he did provide substantial information about Jose Reyes — a source intimately connected with Rafael Gonzalez. Thus, it appears that the only Weaver-related individual about whom Castaneda failed entirely to provide information was Jose Galvan — for dismissal of a gun charge that did not serve as the basis for any count in the indictment.
Having reviewed the briefs of the parties, heard oral argument, and thoroughly reviewed the record, we are now satisfied that, despite Castaneda’s relatively insignificant omissions, the government got the benefit of its bargain and has failed to carry its burden of proving a material breach by Castaneda. The government granted Castaneda transactional immunity with the intention of receiving in return leads and information pertinent to its investigation of Weaver and corruption in the Cameron County Attorney’s Office. Castaneda provided both direct and indirect leads, and volumes of such information as well. In fact, Castaneda gave the government significant quantities of detailed information -about Weaver’s involvement in at least seven illegal transactions conducted through the County Attorney’s Office.
Although it appears that Castaneda’s performance was not perfect — that he did not literally “tell everything he knew,” as he was technically required to do under the agreement — the government has failed to show that
these
omissions were intentional or, more importantly, that the government was prejudiced. Much of the relatively little that Castaneda omitted was already known to the government before interrogating Castaneda, or was discovered from other sources. When viewed in light of the overwhelming quantity of information he furnished about numerous individuals and incidents involving Weaver, much that Castaneda omitted must be classified either as cumulative or surplusage. In the absence of proof of substantial or intentional omissions by Castaneda constituting prejudice to the government, the district court erred in permitting the government to revoke the nonprosecution agreement with Castaneda and prosecute him in this ease.
Ill
CONCLUSION
It ill behooves government agents and prosecutors to enter into agreements of transactional immunity with mid-level co-conspirators, milk them of substantial leads and information that literally make the government’s case against the “big fish” while coincidentally giving the government a lay-down
winning hand against the cooperating co-conspirator; then, at the last moment, rely on some technical or relatively minor deficiency in performance to pull the rug from under the cooperating informant -by claiming a breach and proceed to prosecute him in a slam-dunk case based largely on his own revelations. Yet, this is precisely what we perceive to have happened here, and due process cannot abide such behavior. For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the district court erred in failing to grant Castaneda’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which was obtained in violation of a transactional immunity agreement, that the government failed to prove was materially breached. Castaneda’s conviction of RICO conspiracy is reversed, the sentence imposed in accordance with that conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
REVERSED; sentence VACATED; and REMANDED with instructions.