Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 30, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 20-2159 (D.C. No. 1:16-CR-02917-JAP-1) YUSEF CASANOVA, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
A federal jury convicted Yusef Casanova of possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a prior felon, and possession of
a sawed-off rifle. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison.
Casanova appeals his convictions and sentence, claiming: (1) he was arrested
because of race-based selective enforcement; (2) his trial attorney rendered
ineffective assistance by (A) operating under a conflict of interest, and (B) pursuing
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 2
the selective-enforcement claim and an entrapment defense; and (3) he was entitled
to a two-level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
A. Factual Background
In 2016, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
conducted a “surge” operation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. R., vol. 4 at 267. The
operation was part of an on-going nationwide initiative to reduce violent crime by
targeting gun and drug trafficking. In a typical surge operation, undercover ATF
agents move into a city and focus on a single high-crime area for 120 days. They
work with confidential informants (CIs) to identify potential suspects from whom
ATF agents attempt to buy guns and/or drugs. Transactions are recorded on video,
but sellers are not arrested until the end of the operation to maintain its secrecy.
In the Albuquerque operation, local law enforcement directed the ATF to a
high crime area in the southeast part of the city known as the International District.
ATF agents moved into that area using five male CIs from other states; three CIs
were Black, two were Hispanic. During the operation, one of the CIs learned that
someone named “Casanova” could get both firearms and methamphetamine. Id.
at 689. The CI obtained Casanova’s phone number from which the lead ATF agent
determined Casanova had multiple prior felony convictions, making him “a good
target,” id. at 690. The lead ATF agent instructed the CI to contact Casanova, who
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said that for a $50 “finder’s fee” he could sell the CI a sawed-off rifle for $100 and
two ounces of methamphetamine for $1,200. Id. at 695. They agreed to meet.
Casanova met the CI and the lead ATF agent in a parking lot, where he told
them someone else would bring the methamphetamine and he could get only one
ounce. Casanova retrieved a white plastic bag from the back seat of his car. Inside
the bag was what appeared to be the stock of a firearm. The lead ATF agent
motioned for Casanova to get into his truck, and as they walked, Casanova handed
him a loaded magazine. Inside the truck, Casanova removed a rifle from the plastic
bag and handed it to the lead ATF agent, who noticed it was shorter than 26 inches as
required by federal law. The lead ATF agent asked, “Hey, did you cut this?” Id.
at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted). Casanova replied, “No, it got cut.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The lead ATF agent paid Casanova with a
$100 bill for the rifle and the loaded magazine.
Casanova returned to his car, and another vehicle entered the parking lot. A
white male exited the vehicle holding a bag of methamphetamine. He got into
Casanova’s car, and afterwards, Casanova approached the lead ATF agent with the
bag of methamphetamine. The lead ATF agent weighed the methamphetamine and
determined it weighed one-half gram less than one ounce. Casanova “said that he
would make up the difference . . . on a later transaction.” Id. at 353. The lead ATF
agent paid Casanova $600 for the methamphetamine and $50 for the finder’s fee, and
Casanova left. Later that night, Casanova called the lead ATF agent to say he had
obtained a second ounce of methamphetamine, but they did not conduct another buy.
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Casanova was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), being a felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered, sawed-off
rifle, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871. The ATF attempted to identify Casanova’s
methamphetamine supplier, but they were unable to do so. Neither could they locate
Casanova because he had been taken into state custody on other drug charges. When
the ATF eventually arrested Casanova, agents sought to question him to determine
the identity of his supplier, but they could not conduct an interview because he was
represented by counsel.
B. Procedural History
Before trial, Casanova moved for discovery about the Albuquerque operation,
alleging he was arrested because of racially discriminatory selective-enforcement
practices. The district court held a hearing and granted discovery. Casanova then
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the ATF acted with discriminatory intent
in conducting the operation, which had the discriminatory effect of arresting a
disproportionate percentage of African-Americans. The district court held another
hearing and denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that Casanova failed to demonstrate
either a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect. See Suppl. R., vol. 1
at 82-88.
At trial, Casanova put on an entrapment defense based on the theory that he
was suffering from drug addiction and was lured into selling the drugs and rifle. He
testified in his own defense and identified the white male who supplied the
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methamphetamine as John Bowker. The jury rejected his defense and convicted him
on all three counts.
After the trial, the government confirmed Bowker was Casanova’s supplier.
Consequently, Bowker was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute. The government also learned that Casanova’s trial attorney, Brian Pori,
had concurrently represented Bowker on unrelated charges for conspiracy, bank
fraud, aggravated identity theft, and possession of stolen mail. See Indictment,
United States v. Bowker, No. 1:18-cr-2664-JCH (D.N.M. Aug. 15, 2018), ECF No. 2.
The government notified the district court of the potential conflict, and after another
hearing the district court concluded there was no conflict of interest.
Before sentencing, Pori withdrew from the case, and Casanova moved for a
new trial based on the alleged conflict of interest. The district court held another
hearing, at which Pori denied that there was a conflict of interest, although he
believed he had rendered ineffective assistance by pursuing the selective-enforcement
and entrapment theories. Given Pori’s testimony, Casanova added a claim alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court rejected his claims and denied
the motion for a new trial.
At sentencing, the district court denied a two-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.)
§ 3E1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2018). Based on a total offense level of 28
and a criminal history category of VI, the district court determined Casanova’s
advisory guideline range was 140 to 175 months in prison on the methamphetamine-
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dealing count and 120 months on each of the two firearm counts. The district court
sentenced Casanova to concurrent terms of 120 months on all three counts.
II
On appeal, Casanova contends: (1) he was arrested due to race-based selective
enforcement of the law; (2) his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by
(A) operating under a conflict of interest, and (B) pursuing selective-enforcement and
entrapment theories; and (3) he was entitled to a two-level downward adjustment
under § 3E1.1. We consider these issues in turn.1
A. Selective Enforcement
“The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race.” United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1263
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A selective-prosecution claim,
which has essentially the same elements as a selective-enforcement claim, see id. at
1264, “is not a defense on the merits to a criminal charge itself, but an independent
assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution,” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). “The
requirements for a claim of racially selective law enforcement draw on . . . ordinary
equal protection standards.” Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157,
1 Casanova also argued in his opening brief that his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) should be vacated pursuant to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). In his reply brief, however, Casanova concedes that after he filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court foreclosed his Rehaif claim in Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021). 6 Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 7
1168 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant “must
demonstrate that the [government’s] actions had a discriminatory effect and were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Id. To show a discriminatory purpose, the
defendant must show “that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the
decision to enforce the criminal law against the defendant.” Alcaraz-Arellano,
441 F.3d at 1264 (internal quotation marks omitted). To show a discriminatory
effect, he “must make a credible showing that a similarly-situated individual of
another race could have been, but was not, . . . arrested for the offense for which the
defendant was . . . arrested.” Id. (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted).
Absent evidence of overt discrimination, most selective-enforcement claims
are “based on statistical comparisons between the number of black or other minority
Americans . . . arrested and their percentage in some measure of the relevant
population.” Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1168. Statistical evidence must provide “a
reliable measure of the demographics of the relevant population, a means of telling
whether the data represent similarly situated individuals, and a point of comparison
to the actual incidence of crime among different racial or ethnic segments of the
population.” Id. (citations omitted). But statistical evidence alone rarely suffices to
show discriminatory purpose because “to prevail . . . , [a claimant] must prove that
the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 & n.12 (1987). The standard of proof is “demanding.”
Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1264 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we
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review the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment only for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1265.
Casanova relies primarily on statistical evidence to show a discriminatory
purpose. He cites a report from the United States Sentencing Commission indicating
that in the District of New Mexico, African-Americans comprise approximately
5.4% of defendants in drug-trafficking cases and 5.9% of defendants in firearms
cases. See R., vol. 1 at 98. He also relies on Census Bureau statistics indicating that
only 3.4% of the population in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, is African-American,
see id. at 251-52, but argues that approximately 25.9% of those charged in the
Albuquerque operation were African-American. Additionally, he notes that most of
the CIs in the Albuquerque operation were African-American, and he points out that
the ATF has a history of targeting minority neighborhoods. Finally, he contends that
despite being aware of concepts like implicit racial bias, the ATF failed to develop
any policies or training to counter the effects of implicit bias.
Casanova fails to show a discriminatory purpose. The ATF’s awareness of
implicit bias or the potential for adverse consequences for African-Americans is not
enough to show a discriminatory purpose. “Discriminatory purpose implies more
than intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in
spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Further, Casanova’s statistical evidence expands the geographic area too
broadly. While Casanova relies on data from Bernalillo County and the entire state
of New Mexico, the Albuquerque operation focused on particular high-crime areas of
the city. And the Bernalillo County demographics say nothing about the incidence of
crime there among racial groups. Moreover, the statistical evidence must show a
“stark” pattern of discrimination. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12
(explaining that “a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact [has] demonstrated a
constitutional violation” only in “rare cases,” such as where “395 of 400 black
voters” were excluded “without excluding a single white voter” or where permits
were granted to “all but one of the white applicants . . . but none of the over 200
Chinese applicants”). Casanova’s evidence does not show such a stark pattern.
Neither does Casanova’s other evidence satisfy the standard of proof. Three of
the five CIs were Black, but the record confirms that they were selected because they
had performed well in previous operations, not because they were intended to have a
racial impact. See R., vol. 4 at 282. Casanova also faults the ATF for targeting a
predominately minority neighborhood, but again, the evidence confirms that the ATF
targeted the International District not because of a discriminatory purpose but
because the ATF was directed to that area due its high crime by numerous local law
enforcement agencies, including the Albuquerque Police Department, the local
sheriff’s office, the district attorney’s office, the state police, the United States
Attorney’s Office, the U.S. Marshals Service, the local ATF division, and the Drug
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Enforcement Administration. See id. at 106, 283-84. This area was known as the
“War Zone,” id. at 283, 622, and the lead ATF agent specifically testified that racial
considerations played no part in the decision to target that area, id. at 107. This
evidence fails to show a discriminatory purpose, and thus, Casanova cannot prevail
on his selective-enforcement claim. We therefore need not consider whether he can
establish a discriminatory effect. See Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1266. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.2
B. Ineffective Assistance
“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Crowe, 735 F.3d 1229, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013). “A
district court abuses its discretion if its adjudication of a claim is based upon an error
of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id.
“Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in
collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.” United States v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d
2 Because we do not consider whether Casanova can establish a discriminatory effect, we need not evaluate his argument that Bowker was a similarly situated individual of a different race who could have been, but was not, arrested. However, to the extent Casanova infers a discriminatory purpose because Bowker was “not pursued with all reasonable means,” Aplt. Br. at 28, the record refutes his contention. The lead ATF agent described the efforts to identify Bowker, including running the license plate of the vehicle he was driving, which was registered to someone else, and investigating the registered owner. The lead ATF agent explained he did not immediately arrest Bowker for the same reason he did not immediately arrest Casanova or interview the registered owner of the vehicle: doing so would have compromised the secrecy of the operation. But once the operation ended and Casanova identified Bowker as his supplier, Bowker was indicted and later pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See United States v. Bowker, No. 1:19-cr-01988-JCH (D.N.M. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF. No. 30. 10 Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 11
1272, 1279 (10th Cir. 1997). “Such claims brought on direct appeal are
presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.” United States v.
Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995). In rare cases, however, “we have
considered ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal where such
claims were adequately developed by the district court prior to appeal.” Gallegos,
108 F.3d 1280; see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1216
(10th Cir. 2008) (considering ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal
where the claim was raised and ruled upon by the district court). The district court
held evidentiary hearings and issued a thorough decision, and therefore, we consider
the claims.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a “defendant must
show that his counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’ and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice.”
Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688 (1984)). “[W]e accept the district court’s underlying factual findings unless
clearly erroneous, and we review de novo whether counsel’s performance was legally
deficient and whether any deficiencies prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1. Defense Counsel Did Not Operate Under a Conflict of Interest
“Effective assistance of counsel includes the right to representation that is free
from conflicts of interest.” Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 1999).
But to constitute an actual conflict of interest, the conflict must have “affected
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counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.”
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (italics omitted). “An actual conflict of
interest exists only if counsel was forced to make choices advancing interests to the
detriment of his client.” Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003)
(ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted).
Casanova asserts there was an actual conflict because Pori concurrently
represented Bowker for a four-month period between August 15 and December 27,
2018. The district court concluded there was no actual conflict. We agree.
At an evidentiary hearing on July 10, 2019—which was after the trial but
before sentencing—Pori and Casanova both denied there was any conflict. Pori
testified that he did not know Bowker was Casanova’s supplier when he represented
Bowker, and Casanova did not identify Bowker as his supplier until sometime within
two weeks before trial. Casanova corroborated that testimony and confirmed he did
not tell Pori that Bowker was his supplier until about a week before the trial. Based
on their representations, the district court found that there was no conflict.
After Pori withdrew from the case, however, Casanova sought a new trial
based on the alleged conflict. At a second hearing on July 20, 2020, Pori insisted
there was no actual conflict and “[t]here was no chance [he] was going to call
Mr. Bowker [to testify].” R., vol. 4 at 1255. Pori acknowledged that Bowker might
have offered some favorable testimony, including that Casanova did not set the price
for the drugs or exercise control over them, but he explained those facts would have
been apparent to the jury from audio recordings of telephone calls played to the jury.
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He also emphasized that “[a]t no point . . . did I have to choose between helping one
client at the expense of another. That did not happen.” Id. at 1270.
The district court continued the hearing until August 12, 2020, at which time
Stephanie Porter testified that she worked as a paralegal on Casanova’s motion to
dismiss and in preparation for sentencing. She acknowledged that she did not know
when Casanova told Pori that Bowker was his supplier. But she explained that she
met with Casanova after the first evidentiary hearing and that during their meeting he
indicated to her that he told Pori about Bowker months before the trial. She testified:
Mr. Casanova told me that, in fact, they had . . . a discussion months prior at the jail, where Mr. Casanova had said something to Mr. Pori to the effect of, I think you know John. Because John—John Bowker was in [jail] with Yusef Casanova. They were inmates together. And I assume that they started talking and realized they had the same attorney.
And so Yusef expressed to me that months prior to trial, [Pori] had gone to visit him and Yusef had said, I think you know—I think you know John.
And that Mr. Pori had expressed agreement with that. Like, yeah, I knew this was the same guy.
R., vol. 4 at 1467-68.
After hearing Porter’s testimony, the district court determined again that there
was no actual conflict of interest. Although the court acknowledged that Porter’s
testimony tended to contradict Pori’s testimony, the district court observed that
Porter conceded she did not know when Casanova revealed Bowker’s identity to Pori.
By contrast, the district court noted that Pori had consistently maintained that he did
not know Bowker was Casanova’s supplier until shortly before trial, and both Pori
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and Casanova had previously testified that Casanova did not reveal Bowker’s identity
until within two weeks before the trial. Consequently, the district court credited Pori
and Casanova’s testimony over Porter’s and concluded there was no actual conflict.
On appeal, Casanova urges us to reweigh the evidence, asserting that “Pori’s
testimony about when he learned of Mr. Bowker’s identity is questionable,” Aplt. Br.
at 12. But he offers nothing to suggest the district court clearly erred in finding that
Casanova did not disclose Bowker’s identity until just before the trial. And we
decline to reweigh the evidence or second-guess the district court’s credibility
assessments. See United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given evidence, and the reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence fall within the province of the district court.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Casanova also contends that Pori could have pursued alternative defense
strategies. See United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990)
(“[D]efense counsel’s performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of
interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was
available to defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others
or to his own personal interests.”). Yet nothing in the record suggests Pori
abandoned valid alternative strategies because he was torn between divergent
interests. Regarding Bowker, Pori specifically testified that “[a]t no point in this case
did I have to choose between helping one client at the expense of another.” R., vol. 4
at 1270. Casanova asserts that Pori might have called Bowker to testify that
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“Casanova had no proprietary interest in the drugs, did not set the price for the drugs,
did not weigh the drugs and did not have dominion or control over the drugs.” Aplt.
Br. at 33. But Pori testified that “[t]here was no chance” he would have called
Bowker because such testimony would have incriminated Bowker as Casanova’s
supplier, and thus, Bowker would have invoked his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. R., vol. 4 at 1337. Pori also explained that this information was
already available and apparent to the jury from other evidence, including audio
recordings. And he recognized that Bowker might have denied any involvement,
which would have put Casanova “in a considerably disadvantaged state.” Id. at 1282.
Still, Casanova argues that Pori could have cooperated with the government
for a more lenient plea deal. He asserts Pori might have offered to divulge Bowker’s
identity rather than pursue the selective-enforcement claim and proceed to trial. But
the district court found that Pori did not know Bowker’s identity until just before the
trial, so he could not have divulged it to the government earlier in lieu of pursuing
the selective-enforcement claim. As Pori explained, he did not recognize Bowker
from any of the video or audio recordings and he did not know the identity of
Casanova’s supplier at the time he pursued the motion for selective enforcement. Id.
at 1264-65. He also explained that Casanova was determined to go to trial, and it
was not Pori’s practice to offer to cooperate with the government. He emphasized
that he saw no strategic benefit in that approach, and he added that he had no
indications from the government that they would have offered Casanova any
concessions even if Casanova had divulged that Bowker was his supplier, see id. at
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1297. The district court credited Pori’s testimony, and although Casanova argues
that Pori conceded his concurrent representation of Bowker might have created the
appearance of impropriety, that does not show it affected his performance.
Casanova also asserts Pori was conflicted by his own personal self-interests.
He cites Pori’s professed anger with the Albuquerque operation and argues that rather
than speak to the media about the selective-enforcement claim, Pori should have
cooperated with the government for a plea deal. But Casanova did not want a plea
deal, and Pori sincerely believed there was selective enforcement of the laws.
Casanova also contends that Pori’s own history of drug addiction worked to his
detriment, apparently because Pori pursued the entrapment defense on the theory that
Casanova was lured into crime because he was suffering from drug addiction. Again,
however, Casanova insisted on going to trial, and Pori testified that he thought
entrapment was the only valid, available defense they had. These circumstances do
not demonstrate an actual conflict of interest.
2. Defense Counsel’s Performance Was Not Objectively Unreasonable
Casanova also contends Pori rendered ineffective assistance by pursuing the
selective-enforcement and entrapment theories. During the July 20, 2020,
evidentiary hearing, Pori testified that he thought he rendered ineffective assistance
by pursuing the selective-enforcement claim; he acknowledged he had been driven by
his personal feelings about the Albuquerque operation and his belief that the ATF’s
selective enforcement of the law led to Casanova’s arrest. He also testified that he
was ineffective in putting on the entrapment defense because it required the jury to
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assume Casanova was not predisposed to criminality despite his multiple prior felony
convictions.
The district court concluded that Pori lamented pursuing the
selective-enforcement and entrapment theories in hindsight, but he had sound reasons
for pursuing them when he did, and his performance in doing so was not objectively
unreasonable. We agree.
“It is all too tempting for a defendant to second guess counsel’s assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or
omission was unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To help “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight,” we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. We
presume that counsel “acted in an objectively reasonable manner and that his
challenged conduct might have been part of a sound trial strategy.” Bullock v.
Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2002). If counsel’s decision was “an
adequately informed strategic choice, the presumption that the attorney’s decision
was objectively reasonable becomes virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). But these presumptions “should not obscure the
overriding, and ultimately determinative, inquiry courts must make under
Strickland’s deficient performance prong: whether, after considering all the
circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 1047 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Pori testified that he pursued the selective-enforcement claim because he held
a bona fide belief that Casanova was arrested due to selective enforcement of the law.
He explained that, in his experience, there are racial inequities in criminal sentencing
and he felt compelled to challenge what he perceived as the ATF’s unconstitutional
law enforcement action. See R., vol. 4 at 1311-14. He testified that the standard for
proving a selective-enforcement claim is virtually “insurmountable,” and he thought
this case might be a vehicle for changing the standard. Id. at 1310. Pori’s testimony
demonstrates that his decision to bring the selective-enforcement claim was an
informed strategic choice. Although Casanova complains that Pori was ineffective in
giving media interviews while pursuing the selective-enforcement claim rather than
seeking to cooperate with the government, we have already explained that
cooperating with the government was not a viable option because Pori did not know
Bowker’s identity at the time he litigated the selective-enforcement claim and
Casanova was determined to go to trial. These circumstances do not suggest that
bringing the selective-enforcement claim, which Casanova’s new counsel continues
to pursue on appeal, was objectively unreasonable.
As for the entrapment defense, Pori explained that Casanova “wanted a trial”
and “would not plead to anything,” so he presented the only defense he thought was
available—entrapment. Id. at 1291-92. Pori explained that he was also sensitive to
drug addiction because of his own history with addiction and he “felt confident that
at least one juror would find that offering a drug addict drugs to broker a drug deal
would be a form of entrapment.” Id. at 1267. Although in hindsight Pori regretted
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his decision after it proved unsuccessful, the entrapment defense was an informed
strategic choice. We cannot say pursuing it was objectively unreasonable. Casanova
was not entitled to a new trial based on his ineffective-assistance claims.
C. Downward Adjustment
At sentencing, the district court denied Casanova’s request for a downward
adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. That section provides for a two-level reduction
to a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” Id. § 3E1.1(a). Casanova contends he was entitled to
the reduction because he never denied his factual guilt for his offenses. “Whether a
defendant is entitled to a reduction in offense level under § 3E1.1(a) is a question of
fact that we review for clear error.” United States v. Collins, 511 F.3d 1276, 1279
(10th Cir. 2008). It is Casanova’s burden to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was entitled to the reduction. See id.
The commentary to § 3E1.1 states:
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Conviction by trial, however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make . . . a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2.
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Casanova contends his is a “rare” case because he went to trial to assert an
entrapment defense, not deny guilt. He contends that his pre-trial participation in
drug treatment, coupled with his trial testimony admitting his conduct, clearly
demonstrates that he accepted responsibility.
Casanova is partly correct. “[A] sentencing court may apply an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to a defendant who asserts the entrapment
defense.” United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999). However,
“that does not mean that the simple assertion of the entrapment defense coupled with
acknowledgement of the underlying criminal activity automatically entitles a
defendant to a two-point acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction.” Id. “A
defendant will [still] need to evidence acceptance of responsibility, primarily through
pre-trial statements and conduct, before an acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction
would be warranted.” Id. at 1174. When evaluating the propriety of a reduction,
courts may consider such factors as a defendant’s “voluntary termination or
withdrawal from criminal conduct,” “voluntary surrender to authorities promptly
after commission of the offense,” “voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery
of the fruits or instrumentalities of the offense,” “post-offense rehabilitative efforts,”
and “the timeliness of the defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of
responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.
Casanova’s participation in drug treatment weighs in favor of granting the
reduction. But the balance of his conduct does not. There is no evidence he sought
to withdraw from the drug and firearm transaction underlying this case; rather, after
20 Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 21
selling the rifle and less than one full ounce of methamphetamine to the lead ATF
agent, Casanova said he would make up the difference on a later transaction. That
same night he called the lead ATF agent and said he had obtained a second ounce of
methamphetamine. Casanova also did not voluntarily surrender to the authorities;
rather, he was arrested by local police on additional drug charges. And when the
ATF attempted to interview him to learn the identity of his methamphetamine
supplier, he did not assist authorities by identifying Bowker; rather, he waited until
trial to disclose Bowker’s identity to authorities. Thus, while Casanova contends that
he accepted responsibility for his criminality, his pre-trial conduct suggests
otherwise. On this record, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in denying
the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
III
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge