McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Caroline Ekwunoh pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (1988) and 841(b)(l)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Judge Weinstein sentenced her to 60 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years supervised release. United States v. Ekwunoh, 813 F.Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y.1993). He refused to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years applicable to offenses involving more than one kilogram of heroin because he found that Ekwunoh reasonably believed that she possessed only 400 grams, an amount that triggers only a five-year minimum sentence. The United States appeals the sentence.
The government contends that the district court erred in its construction of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the [369]*369district court’s judgment and remand for re-sentencing.
BACKGROUND
In June 1991 Caroline Ekwunoh was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York after she met a courier from Nigeria and took from him an attaché case containing 1.013 kilograms of heroin concealed "within the lining of the case. The courier, it turns out, was a confidential informer for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ekwunoh pled guilty to the third count of an indictment, charging that she “did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute an amount in excess of one kilogram of a substance containing heroin,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(l)(A)(i). Before accepting Ekwunoh’s plea, the district court explained to her that an offense involving one kilogram or more of heroin carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years.
At a sentencing hearing on another issue, defense counsel raised the argument that the mandatory 10-year penalty should not be imposed because Ekwunoh did not know how much heroin was concealed in the attaché case, and could not have foreseen that it would contain more than a' kilogram. At the hearing, Ekwunoh testified that she became involved in the heroin smuggling when her boyfriend called her from Nigeria and told her to meet a man getting off the plane, give him $2,000, and drive him to New Jersey. She conceded, however, that she was familiar with her boyfriend’s drug importation activities, and she assumed that the man arriving at the airport would be carrying some heroin. Ekwunoh explained, however, that she did not know how much heroin the courier would have, but believed the amount would be about 400 grams because on an earlier occasion her boyfriend had smuggled heroin into New York and she watched' 'him weigh out the 400 grams. On cross-examination, Ek--wunoh admitted that she had distributed between 50 and 250 grams of heroin twice a month within the metropolitan New York area for several years and that she frequently assisted in counting and handling drug money.
Crediting Ekwunoh’s testimony, the district court found that “she didn’t expect [1.018 kilograms] and her state of mind was that there was 400 grams.” Government’s Appendix at 27; Sentencing Transcript, Jan. 5,1993, at 109. The court then imposed only a five-year sentence, the mandatory minimum term for heroin offenses involving more than 100 grams (but less than a kilogram) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
In a subsequent Memorandum and Order explaining its decision, the district court recognized that the attaché ease actually contained 1.013 kilograms of heroin. The court concluded, however, that “[biased upon her credible testimony concerning her past experience with her boyfriend’s drug operations, [Ekwunoh] could not have foreseen that the transaction would involve such a large amount”- as 1.013 kilograms of heroin, and that “[a] reasonable person in the position of this defendant ... would not necessarily have foreseen that the individual at the airport would be carrying over a kilogram of heroin.” 813 F.Supp. at 179.
In its conclusions of law, the district court declared that the “uniform practice in the courts of the Second Circuit of applying an objective rather than a- subjective test of quantity of drugs possessed .... is of doubtful constitutionality and was not intended by Congress.” Id. at 171. In its view, this “practice” of imposing mandatory minimum sentences based on the amount of narcotics actually possessed by a defendant ignores fundamental mens rea principles. Therefore, reasoned the court, the government must be required to prove that a “defendant reasonably foresaw- a certain quantity of drugs being involved in his' or her conduct ... before that quantity can be used to compute a minimum statutory or Guidelines term of imprisonment.”. Id. at 178.
DISCUSSION
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court improperly refused to impose the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of more than one kilogram of [370]*370heroin. We conclude that it did, and remand for resentencing.
We have held that when a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy to possess drugs he cannot be sentenced for the quantity of drugs possessed by a co-conspirator unless the defendant knew or could reasonably foresee that the co-conspirator would possess that quantity of drugs. See United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 923-26 (2d Cir.1993). It is by no means clear the same lenity should be extended to a defendant who is convicted of actual possession of a large quantity of drugs. Compare United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 163 (2d Cir.) (“enhanced penalty provisions [for substantive convictions] do not violate due process even if a defendant does not know the ... amount of the controlled substance”) (citing United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1244, 99 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992), with United States v. Imariagbe, 999 F.2d 706, 707 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam) (defendant convicted of substantive offense was properly sentenced for quantity he personally carried, even if he believed he had lesser quantity, where district court found it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be carrying actual quantity).
We need not decide this question today, however.. We are prepared to assume, without deciding, that even in a possession case, the defendant may be sentenced only for the quantity of drugs he knew or should reasonably have foreseen that he possessed.
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McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Caroline Ekwunoh pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (1988) and 841(b)(l)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Judge Weinstein sentenced her to 60 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years supervised release. United States v. Ekwunoh, 813 F.Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y.1993). He refused to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years applicable to offenses involving more than one kilogram of heroin because he found that Ekwunoh reasonably believed that she possessed only 400 grams, an amount that triggers only a five-year minimum sentence. The United States appeals the sentence.
The government contends that the district court erred in its construction of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the [369]*369district court’s judgment and remand for re-sentencing.
BACKGROUND
In June 1991 Caroline Ekwunoh was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York after she met a courier from Nigeria and took from him an attaché case containing 1.013 kilograms of heroin concealed "within the lining of the case. The courier, it turns out, was a confidential informer for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ekwunoh pled guilty to the third count of an indictment, charging that she “did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute an amount in excess of one kilogram of a substance containing heroin,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(l)(A)(i). Before accepting Ekwunoh’s plea, the district court explained to her that an offense involving one kilogram or more of heroin carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years.
At a sentencing hearing on another issue, defense counsel raised the argument that the mandatory 10-year penalty should not be imposed because Ekwunoh did not know how much heroin was concealed in the attaché case, and could not have foreseen that it would contain more than a' kilogram. At the hearing, Ekwunoh testified that she became involved in the heroin smuggling when her boyfriend called her from Nigeria and told her to meet a man getting off the plane, give him $2,000, and drive him to New Jersey. She conceded, however, that she was familiar with her boyfriend’s drug importation activities, and she assumed that the man arriving at the airport would be carrying some heroin. Ekwunoh explained, however, that she did not know how much heroin the courier would have, but believed the amount would be about 400 grams because on an earlier occasion her boyfriend had smuggled heroin into New York and she watched' 'him weigh out the 400 grams. On cross-examination, Ek--wunoh admitted that she had distributed between 50 and 250 grams of heroin twice a month within the metropolitan New York area for several years and that she frequently assisted in counting and handling drug money.
Crediting Ekwunoh’s testimony, the district court found that “she didn’t expect [1.018 kilograms] and her state of mind was that there was 400 grams.” Government’s Appendix at 27; Sentencing Transcript, Jan. 5,1993, at 109. The court then imposed only a five-year sentence, the mandatory minimum term for heroin offenses involving more than 100 grams (but less than a kilogram) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
In a subsequent Memorandum and Order explaining its decision, the district court recognized that the attaché ease actually contained 1.013 kilograms of heroin. The court concluded, however, that “[biased upon her credible testimony concerning her past experience with her boyfriend’s drug operations, [Ekwunoh] could not have foreseen that the transaction would involve such a large amount”- as 1.013 kilograms of heroin, and that “[a] reasonable person in the position of this defendant ... would not necessarily have foreseen that the individual at the airport would be carrying over a kilogram of heroin.” 813 F.Supp. at 179.
In its conclusions of law, the district court declared that the “uniform practice in the courts of the Second Circuit of applying an objective rather than a- subjective test of quantity of drugs possessed .... is of doubtful constitutionality and was not intended by Congress.” Id. at 171. In its view, this “practice” of imposing mandatory minimum sentences based on the amount of narcotics actually possessed by a defendant ignores fundamental mens rea principles. Therefore, reasoned the court, the government must be required to prove that a “defendant reasonably foresaw- a certain quantity of drugs being involved in his' or her conduct ... before that quantity can be used to compute a minimum statutory or Guidelines term of imprisonment.”. Id. at 178.
DISCUSSION
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court improperly refused to impose the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of more than one kilogram of [370]*370heroin. We conclude that it did, and remand for resentencing.
We have held that when a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy to possess drugs he cannot be sentenced for the quantity of drugs possessed by a co-conspirator unless the defendant knew or could reasonably foresee that the co-conspirator would possess that quantity of drugs. See United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 923-26 (2d Cir.1993). It is by no means clear the same lenity should be extended to a defendant who is convicted of actual possession of a large quantity of drugs. Compare United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 163 (2d Cir.) (“enhanced penalty provisions [for substantive convictions] do not violate due process even if a defendant does not know the ... amount of the controlled substance”) (citing United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1244, 99 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992), with United States v. Imariagbe, 999 F.2d 706, 707 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam) (defendant convicted of substantive offense was properly sentenced for quantity he personally carried, even if he believed he had lesser quantity, where district court found it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be carrying actual quantity).
We need not decide this question today, however.. We are prepared to assume, without deciding, that even in a possession case, the defendant may be sentenced only for the quantity of drugs he knew or should reasonably have foreseen that he possessed. We conclude, nonetheless, that on this record the district court’s finding that defendant Ekwunoh did not reasonably foresee that she would possess more than a kilogram of heroin cannot withstand scrutiny.
On appeal from a sentence, the reviewing court must “accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and ... give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988); see United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 892 (2d Cir.1992). Included within the “clearly erroneous” rubric is the question of reasonable foreseeability. See United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 688-89 (D.C.Cir.) (district court’s “factual findings” that defendant “knew or reasonably could have foreseen” that a certain amount of heroin was involved in a deal reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1188-89 (2d Cir.1993) (reviewing for clear error district court’s determination that “it was reasonably foreseeable” that co-conspirator “would bring a firearm to the transaction”); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1479 (5th Cir.) (“The quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to [defendant] is a question of fact....”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d 218. (1993).
A finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). Here, Ekwunoh testified at the sentencing hearing that she did not know the attaché case contained over a kilogram of heroin; rather, she suspected that the courier might be a “swallower” — i.e., carrying the heroin in his intestines. Relying on her testimony that she had observed a prior transaction where her boyfriend smuggled 400 grams of heroin as a swallower, the district court found that Ekwunoh “believed that she was to assist in smuggling only 400 grams.”' 813 F.Supp. at 180.
On the other hand, Ekwunoh also admitted that her brother, former boyfriends, and friends were involved in heroin dealing, and that she personally received up to 250 grams twice a month,' over a two-year period, to distribute in the New York metropolitan area. Thus, by her own admission, Ekwunoh trafficked in a total of more than one kilogram of heroin over a period of several months. Surely, a reasonable distributor of heroin in such quantities could not turn a blind eye to the possibility that someday she [371]*371would be handed at one time a one-kilogram cache of heroin for distribution.
The district court relied solely on Ekwun-oh’s isolated experience with her boyfriend as a swallower in making its finding on foreseeability. This reliance was misplaced. On the “entire evidence” in this record, we are left with the “definite and firm conviction” that the district court erred in finding that Ekwunoh could not have foreseen that the courier at the airport would be carrying over a kilogram of heroin. Because we detect clear error, we must remand for reconsideration of Ekwunoh’s sentencing.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of Ekwunoh’s arguments in support of the lesser sentence and have found them to be without merit. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with the foregoing.