USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4541
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CALEB THARON JEFFERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00179-FDW-DCK-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2025 Decided: September 30, 2025
Before RUSHING, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Margaret Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Calen Tharon Jefferson pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to four
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1);
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and possession with intent
to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). The district court
sentenced Jefferson to a total of 220 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years
of supervised release. On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether Jefferson’s criminal history category was miscalculated considering a
subsequent, retroactive Sentencing Guidelines amendment. 1 Although notified of his right
to do so, Jefferson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
After reviewing pursuant to Anders, we directed the parties to file supplemental
briefs addressing whether the district court committed reversible error pursuant to United
States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), when imposing the reporting condition of
supervised release and whether the district court provided appropriate reasoning for
imposing a special condition of supervised release. In response to the order, Jefferson’s
counsel has filed a supplemental opening brief, and the Government moves to dismiss the
1 We decline to address this claim as it is more appropriately raised in a motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
appeal based on the appeal waiver in Jefferson’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and
dismiss in part.
“[W]e review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is
enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue[s] being appealed
fall[] within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th
Cir. 2021) (citation modified). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant enters it
“knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the totality of
the circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record
indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is
valid.” McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). Our review of the
record, including the plea agreement and the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing, confirms
that Jefferson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his convictions and
sentence, with limited exceptions not applicable here. Thus, the waiver is valid and
enforceable.
Turning to the waiver’s scope, Jefferson’s challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of the district court’s reasoning for imposing a special condition of
supervised release falls squarely within the scope of the appeal waiver. See United States
v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 225 (4th Cir. 2023) (concluding that “reasonableness challenge . . .
falls squarely within the waiver’s scope”). Jefferson also challenges on appeal the
inconsistency between the oral pronouncement of the reporting condition and how that
condition appears in the written judgment. Jefferson’s appeal waiver does not bar our
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consideration of his Rogers claim regarding the reporting condition of supervised release. 2
United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).
Rogers obligates district courts to pronounce all discretionary conditions of
supervised release at sentencing. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296-99. “The heart of a Rogers claim
is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first time in a written judgment in fact
have not been imposed on the defendant.” Singletary, 984 F.3d at 345 (citation modified).
“We review the consistency of [Jefferson’s] oral sentence and the written judgment de
novo, comparing the sentencing transcript with the written judgment to determine whether
an error occurred as a matter of law.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296 (citation modified).
Jefferson argues that the district court committed Rogers error because the first
standard condition in the judgment materially differs from the court’s oral pronouncement
of that condition at sentencing. Specifically, at sentencing, the district court ordered that,
upon his release from custody, Jefferson would be required to report to the probation office
in the federal judicial district to which he is released. The judgment, however, required
Jefferson to report to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside.
Jefferson asserts that this facial discrepancy constitutes Rogers error.
However, Jefferson fails to demonstrate a reversible inconsistency under Rogers.
The district court at the sentencing hearing orally pronounced through incorporation the
standard conditions as adopted in the Western District of North Carolina, which included
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4541
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CALEB THARON JEFFERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00179-FDW-DCK-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2025 Decided: September 30, 2025
Before RUSHING, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Margaret Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Calen Tharon Jefferson pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to four
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1);
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and possession with intent
to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). The district court
sentenced Jefferson to a total of 220 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years
of supervised release. On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether Jefferson’s criminal history category was miscalculated considering a
subsequent, retroactive Sentencing Guidelines amendment. 1 Although notified of his right
to do so, Jefferson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
After reviewing pursuant to Anders, we directed the parties to file supplemental
briefs addressing whether the district court committed reversible error pursuant to United
States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), when imposing the reporting condition of
supervised release and whether the district court provided appropriate reasoning for
imposing a special condition of supervised release. In response to the order, Jefferson’s
counsel has filed a supplemental opening brief, and the Government moves to dismiss the
1 We decline to address this claim as it is more appropriately raised in a motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4541 Doc: 55 Filed: 09/30/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
appeal based on the appeal waiver in Jefferson’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and
dismiss in part.
“[W]e review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is
enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue[s] being appealed
fall[] within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th
Cir. 2021) (citation modified). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant enters it
“knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the totality of
the circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record
indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is
valid.” McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). Our review of the
record, including the plea agreement and the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing, confirms
that Jefferson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his convictions and
sentence, with limited exceptions not applicable here. Thus, the waiver is valid and
enforceable.
Turning to the waiver’s scope, Jefferson’s challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of the district court’s reasoning for imposing a special condition of
supervised release falls squarely within the scope of the appeal waiver. See United States
v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 225 (4th Cir. 2023) (concluding that “reasonableness challenge . . .
falls squarely within the waiver’s scope”). Jefferson also challenges on appeal the
inconsistency between the oral pronouncement of the reporting condition and how that
condition appears in the written judgment. Jefferson’s appeal waiver does not bar our
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consideration of his Rogers claim regarding the reporting condition of supervised release. 2
United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).
Rogers obligates district courts to pronounce all discretionary conditions of
supervised release at sentencing. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296-99. “The heart of a Rogers claim
is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first time in a written judgment in fact
have not been imposed on the defendant.” Singletary, 984 F.3d at 345 (citation modified).
“We review the consistency of [Jefferson’s] oral sentence and the written judgment de
novo, comparing the sentencing transcript with the written judgment to determine whether
an error occurred as a matter of law.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296 (citation modified).
Jefferson argues that the district court committed Rogers error because the first
standard condition in the judgment materially differs from the court’s oral pronouncement
of that condition at sentencing. Specifically, at sentencing, the district court ordered that,
upon his release from custody, Jefferson would be required to report to the probation office
in the federal judicial district to which he is released. The judgment, however, required
Jefferson to report to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside.
Jefferson asserts that this facial discrepancy constitutes Rogers error.
However, Jefferson fails to demonstrate a reversible inconsistency under Rogers.
The district court at the sentencing hearing orally pronounced through incorporation the
standard conditions as adopted in the Western District of North Carolina, which included
2 Although Jefferson’s counsel suggests that the district court did not incorporate the discretionary supervised release conditions adopted by the Western District of North Carolina, the record belies counsel’s claim.
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the condition requiring Jefferson to report to the probation office in the district where he is
authorized to reside, but the court also orally ordered Jefferson to report in the district to
which he is released. Thus, the district court’s oral pronouncement itself was inconsistent,
as it left ambiguous where Jefferson must report upon his release from custody. “Where
the precise contours of an oral sentence are ambiguous, we may look to the written
judgment to clarify the district court's intent.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299 (citation modified).
We are satisfied that the written judgment’s inclusion of the standard reporting condition,
as set forth in the conditions adopted by the district court, dispels the ambiguity in the
district court’s oral pronouncement and confirms the court’s intent to require Jefferson to
report to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and identified no
potentially meritorious grounds for appeal that fall outside the scope of Jefferson’s valid
appeal waiver. See McCoy, 895 F.3d at 363-64 (discussing nonwaivable issues); United
States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (same). Accordingly, we deny in part
the Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm as to any issue not encompassed by the
valid appeal waiver, and we grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss
the appeal as to the issues that fall within the waiver’s scope. This court requires that
counsel inform Jefferson, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Jefferson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jefferson.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART