United States v. Brodie

268 F. Supp. 2d 408, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10702, 2002 WL 32121933
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided May 31, 2002·No. CRIM.A.00-629·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

*410 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

The Court decides here defendant Stefan Brodie’s motion for judgment of acquittal made after the close of the government’s case. The Court reserved on the motion and the jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to violate the Trading With the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACRs”). The alleged conspiracy involved sales to Cuba of ion exchange resins by Bro-Tech Corporation (“Bro-Tech”), of which the defendant is 50% owner and Chief Executive Officer. The Court will grant the motion because there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant knowingly and willfully entered into the charged conspiracy-

I. Overview of the Alleged Conspiracy

Bro-Tech, which does business as the Purolite Company, is a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania; it manufactures and sells ion exchange resins, which are used in water purification. Bro-Tech is owned in equal portions by Stefan Brodie, its president and CEO, and his brother, defendant Don Brodie, its executive vice president. 1 Bro-Tech has sales offices located around the world, including one in Canada. The Canadian office is a division of Bro-Tech. Defendant James Sabzali served as the Canadian Sales Manager for Bro-Tech, resident in the Canadian office, and then as the North American Director of Marketing, resident in Bala Cynwyd.

Bro-Tech Limited is a U.K. corporation, owned in thirds by Stefan Brodie, Don Brodie, and Bro-Tech. Bro-Tech Limited, in turn, is a ninety-five percent owner of Purolite International Limited (“Purol-ite International”), also a U.K. corporation. Purolite International has a manufacturing facility that produces ion exchange resins, located in Pontyclun, South Wales.

Count One of the seventy-seven-count indictment charges that from April 1993 to May 2000, Stefan Brodie, Don Brodie, James Sabzali, and Bro-Tech knowingly and willfully conspired to violate TWEA and the CACRs by engaging in transactions involving Cuba. Overt acts were alleged to have begun on or about June 21, 1994, and to have ended on or about July 31, 1999. Stefan Brodie is not charged in any other counts of the indictment. The other three defendants are charged in all counts. Thirty-five counts charge them with sales to Cuba from 1994 to 1996. Twenty-four counts charge them with sales to Cuba from 1997 to 1999. Sixteen counts charge them with authorizing or reimbursing payments of expenses associated with Cuban travel.

The government and the defendant agree that a reasonable jury could find that Bro-Tech made the following sales to Cuba through intermediaries. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 2-3. The Canadian sales office arranged each sale.

1. From 1992 to 1993, four sales were made by Bro-Tech through a Canadian company. The sales were booked at Bro-Tech, and the product was manufactured by and shipped from Purolite International. These sales were not charged in the indictment.

2. From 1994 to 1996, thirty-five sales were made by Bro-Tech through intermediaries in Canada and Mexico. At times the product sold was manufactured by and shipped from Bro-Tech, and at other times Purolite International.

*411 3. From 1997 to 1999, twenty-four sales were made by Bro-Tech through the intermediary San Marco. All sales in this period were booked at Purolite International, and the product was manufactured by and shipped from Purolite International.

Bro-Tech employees James Sabzali and Claude Gauthier, a Canadian citizen working as a salesman in the Canadian office, were reimbursed for their business-related travel to Cuba. The expense reports and approvals for this travel were processed in Bala Cynwyd.

Each of the defendants presented evidence during the trial. The jury convicted all of the defendants of conspiracy. Don Brodie, James Sabzali, and Bro-Tech were all acquitted of the counts involving the 1997-1999 sales, four 1996 sales, and three of the sixteen counts involving expense reimbursements. At least two defendants were convicted of each of the other forty-four counts.

II. Legal Principles

The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a), at the close of the government’s case. The Court reserved decision on the motion. It must, therefore, “decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(b).

In deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must determine whether, “upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Phifer, 400 F.Supp. 719, 724 (E.D.Pa.1975) (citation omitted), aff'd, 532 F.2d 748 (3d Cir.1976). A claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a heavy burden on a defendant. See United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998) (citation omitted); United States v. Hitchens, No. 00-CR-654-2, 2001 WL 1257167, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Oct.19, 2001). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and must sustain the verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dent, 149 F.3d at 187 (citation omitted).

There are special evidentiary concerns in conspiracy cases. Because of the “looseness and pliability” of the conspiracy doctrine, courts have been instructed to be mindful of the doctrine’s “inherent dangers.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Third Circuit has recognized that there is a tendency in conspiracy cases for finders-of-fact to believe a defendant “must have been involved in a conspiracy, once evidence has been presented of some questionable acts .... ” United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 574-75 (3d Cir.1984).

The Court recognizes that “[t]he sufficiency of the [circumstantial] evidence in a conspiracy prosecution requires close scrutiny.” United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir.1987). The existence of a conspiracy can be inferred “from a reasonable and logical inference, that the activities of the participants ... could not have been carried on except as the result of a preconceived scheme or common understanding.” United States v. Kapp,

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United States v. Brodie, 268 F. Supp. 2d 408, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10702, 2002 WL 32121933 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

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