Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 28, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6125 (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00065-D-1) JOHNNIE RAY BRAGG, JR., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Johnnie Ray Bragg, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Bragg appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 2
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Mr. Bragg was indicted in a multi-defendant, 47-count indictment
involving drug and money laundering activity. He pled guilty in August 2012 to two
counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute controlled
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(b)(1)(B), and (2) money
laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (h).
In February 2013, Mr. Bragg was indicted for attempted witness tampering in
the drug case in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). He pled guilty.
In July 2013, the district court held a combined sentencing hearing in the two
cases. In the drug case, it varied downward from the advisory United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range and sentenced Mr. Bragg to 480 months
in prison on the drug count and 240 months on the money laundering count, to be
served concurrently. In the witness-tampering case, it imposed a 46-month prison
term, to run consecutively to the 480-month sentence.
When Mr. Bragg appealed, we dismissed based on the appeal waivers
contained in his plea agreements. United States v. Bragg, 554 F. App’x 781, 784
(10th Cir. 2014). The district court denied his subsequent motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We later denied his request to file a
second-or-successive § 2255 motion.
In 2021, Mr. Bragg filed a motion for compassionate release or sentence
reduction. The district court denied the motion, relying on the sentencing factors
described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in light of the new facts he presented that allegedly
2 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 3
established extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief. The court concluded that
reducing Mr. Bragg’s 40-year prison sentence was not warranted under the § 3553(a)
factors. It also denied his motion for reconsideration. We affirmed. United States v.
Bragg, No. 22-6164, 2023 WL 5126855, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2023).
The district court also dismissed two other motions Mr. Bragg filed to reduce
his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive amendments to the Guidelines,
concluding that he was ineligible for relief.
In 2024, Mr. Bragg filed the motion for compassionate release at issue here.
The district court again proceeded directly to the § 3553(a) factors and again
concluded they weighed heavily against reducing Mr. Bragg’s sentence. The court
cited the seriousness of his criminal conduct and the original reasons it had imposed
his existing sentence. It said intervening legal developments did not affect the
sentence, and it denied the motion.
On appeal, Mr. Bragg claims the district court abused its discretion by (1)
failing to recalculate his advisory Guideline range in light of a Guideline amendment
relating to converted drug weight; (2) addressing the § 3553(a) factors without
considering other steps in the compassionate-release analysis; and (3) failing to
address dangerousness.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir.
2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes “an incorrect conclusion of
3 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 4
law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313,
1317 (10th Cir. 2013).
A. Compassionate Release
With a few “narrow exceptions,” federal courts lack authority to modify a term
of imprisonment once imposed. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1029. A compassionate
release motion under § 3582(c)(1) is one of those exceptions. See id. A district court
may grant compassionate release if it finds that:
(1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a reduced sentence;
(2) a “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements” from the
Sentencing Commission; and
(3) a reduction is warranted after considering the applicable sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; accord United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831
(10th Cir. 2021). A court may deny compassionate release if it finds that any of these
requirements is lacking. See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 n.4; United States v. McGee,
992 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir. 2021) The district court denied Mr. Bragg’s motion
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Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 28, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6125 (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00065-D-1) JOHNNIE RAY BRAGG, JR., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Johnnie Ray Bragg, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Bragg appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 2
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Mr. Bragg was indicted in a multi-defendant, 47-count indictment
involving drug and money laundering activity. He pled guilty in August 2012 to two
counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute controlled
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(b)(1)(B), and (2) money
laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (h).
In February 2013, Mr. Bragg was indicted for attempted witness tampering in
the drug case in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). He pled guilty.
In July 2013, the district court held a combined sentencing hearing in the two
cases. In the drug case, it varied downward from the advisory United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range and sentenced Mr. Bragg to 480 months
in prison on the drug count and 240 months on the money laundering count, to be
served concurrently. In the witness-tampering case, it imposed a 46-month prison
term, to run consecutively to the 480-month sentence.
When Mr. Bragg appealed, we dismissed based on the appeal waivers
contained in his plea agreements. United States v. Bragg, 554 F. App’x 781, 784
(10th Cir. 2014). The district court denied his subsequent motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We later denied his request to file a
second-or-successive § 2255 motion.
In 2021, Mr. Bragg filed a motion for compassionate release or sentence
reduction. The district court denied the motion, relying on the sentencing factors
described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in light of the new facts he presented that allegedly
2 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 3
established extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief. The court concluded that
reducing Mr. Bragg’s 40-year prison sentence was not warranted under the § 3553(a)
factors. It also denied his motion for reconsideration. We affirmed. United States v.
Bragg, No. 22-6164, 2023 WL 5126855, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2023).
The district court also dismissed two other motions Mr. Bragg filed to reduce
his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive amendments to the Guidelines,
concluding that he was ineligible for relief.
In 2024, Mr. Bragg filed the motion for compassionate release at issue here.
The district court again proceeded directly to the § 3553(a) factors and again
concluded they weighed heavily against reducing Mr. Bragg’s sentence. The court
cited the seriousness of his criminal conduct and the original reasons it had imposed
his existing sentence. It said intervening legal developments did not affect the
sentence, and it denied the motion.
On appeal, Mr. Bragg claims the district court abused its discretion by (1)
failing to recalculate his advisory Guideline range in light of a Guideline amendment
relating to converted drug weight; (2) addressing the § 3553(a) factors without
considering other steps in the compassionate-release analysis; and (3) failing to
address dangerousness.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir.
2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes “an incorrect conclusion of
3 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 4
law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313,
1317 (10th Cir. 2013).
A. Compassionate Release
With a few “narrow exceptions,” federal courts lack authority to modify a term
of imprisonment once imposed. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1029. A compassionate
release motion under § 3582(c)(1) is one of those exceptions. See id. A district court
may grant compassionate release if it finds that:
(1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a reduced sentence;
(2) a “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements” from the
Sentencing Commission; and
(3) a reduction is warranted after considering the applicable sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; accord United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831
(10th Cir. 2021). A court may deny compassionate release if it finds that any of these
requirements is lacking. See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 n.4; United States v. McGee,
992 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir. 2021) The district court denied Mr. Bragg’s motion
based on the third requirement.
B. Mr. Bragg’s Arguments
Amendment 808
Mr. Bragg argues the district court abused its discretion by filing to recalculate
his sentence in light of Guideline Amendment 808, which replaced the term
“marihuana equivalency” with the term “converted drug weight.” U.S. Sent’g
4 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 5
Guidelines Manual, Supp. App. C, amend. 808 (Reason for Amendment) (eff. Nov. 1,
2018). But that amendment was “not intended as a substantive change in policy.” Id.
Instead, it merely changed the terminology used in the Guidelines, a change that did
not result in any potential Guideline adjustments. Amendment 808 therefore did not
require the district court to recalculate Mr. Bragg’s Guideline range.
Reliance on the § 3553(a) Factors
Mr. Bragg contends the district court erred in denying his motion based on the
applicable § 3553(a) factors without making findings on the other two compassionate
release factors. But the district court is permitted to deny a compassionate release
motion based on any of the three factors without reaching the other two. See McGee,
992 F.3d at 1043. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in resolving
the motion based on the third requirement.2
Dangerousness and the 18 U.S.C. § 3142
The second factor in the compassionate release analysis calls for the district
court to consider “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831. The Guideline policy statement applicable
to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions provides that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment
if, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, it determines that (1) extraordinary and
2 Mr. Bragg also states the district court abused its discretion in failing to review his motion on an “[i]ndividualized case by case basis.” Aplt. Br. at 2. This language appears in McGee as part of its discussion of the first factor, see McGee, 992 F.3d at 1047, and does not require a district court to discuss all three factors.
5 Appellate Case: 24-6125 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025 Page: 6
compelling reasons warrant the reduction (or that the defendant meets certain
age- and incarceration-related criteria); (2) “the defendant is not a danger to the
safety of any other person or the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)”;
and (3) “the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)
(2023). Because the district court resolved Mr. Bragg’s motion by applying the third
factor, it was not required to consider this policy statement. The court was therefore
not required to consider dangerousness under § 3142(g).3
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Bragg has not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for compassionate release, through its reliance on the § 3553(a) factors. We
therefore affirm the district court’s order.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge
3 Mr. Bragg also argues the district court failed to consider his rehabilitation. Aplt. Br. at 3-4. To the extent his argument refers to the § 3553(a) analysis, the court stated it had considered § 3553(a) factors in light of his alleged change in circumstances, and that his sentence remained appropriate. It quoted verbatim much of its analysis from its order denying Mr. Bragg’s 2021 compassionate release motion, which stated that the sentencing factors, including the need to protect the public, remained unchanged from the time of sentencing. In that previous order, the district court referred specifically to Mr. Bragg’s evidence of rehabilitation, stating that, although commendable, “his rehabilitation thus far does not warrant relief from an appropriate sentence.” R., vol. 1 at 283. Mr. Bragg thus fails to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to expressly discuss his evidence of rehabilitation in the order now on appeal.