PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge.
Billy Deon Butler was indicted on August 7, 1991 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Butler, who had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, was charged in the single count indictment with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to trial, Butler moved to suppress the firearm. The district court denied the motion on September 10, 1991. On October 15, 1991, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Butler was subsequently sentenced to a term of 21 months, which was set to run concurrently with his earlier sentence. Butler was also sentenced to three years supervision after his release from custody.
Butler now appeals the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress, contending that the seizure of the firearm represents a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
On April 30, 1991, two Deputy United States Marshals and two Pushmataha County sheriff’s officers arrived at Butler’s rural home near Nashoba, Oklahoma to serve a warrant for his arrest. The Butler home was a trailer with a lean-to structure attached. The grounds were strewn with litter, including broken glass, several hundred beer cans, and the parts from various motor vehicles which also stood on the property.
The officers were met outside the trailer by Willis Bruce, who also lived in the trailer. Marshal Carroll Allberry told Bruce that the officers had a warrant for Butler’s arrest, and asked if he knew where Butler was. Bruce indicated that Butler was inside the house. Butler then appeared, and Allberry directed him to come outside, where he was placed under arrest.
Marshal Allberry then had Butler place his hands behind his back, and searched him for weapons. While he handcuffed Butler, Allberry noticed that Butler had no shoes, and noticed broken glass on the ground near Butler’s feet. Given the state of the ground, there was no route by which Butler might have been conveyed safely to the officers’ vehicles.
Allberry asked Butler if he had any shoes. Butler said that he did, but that they were in the trailer. Bruce asked his girlfriend, who also was present, if she would get Butler’s shoes. Allberry told Butler, “Well, let’s go on in and get them.” Allberry helped Butler inside the trailer, where Butler led him into a bedroom. All-berry noticed two .22 caliber long rifles in the trailer: one at the entrance to the trailer, and another in a gun rack in Butler’s bedroom. Both weapons appeared to be inoperable. However, Allberry also noticed a shotgun which was inside Butler’s bedroom and next to his bed.
[621]*621After giving Butler his Miranda warnings, Allberry asked if this was Butler’s bedroom, and Butler said that it was. All-berry told Butler that, as a convicted felon, it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. Butler said that he was not a convicted felon, that he was a probation violator. The gun was always there, Butler stated, and he used it to shoot hogs. The shotgun was seized and found to be loaded.
In denying Butler’s motion to suppress, the district court noted in particular the decision of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982). In Chrisman, a campus police officer had stopped, outside his dormitory room, a university student who had a bottle of gin and appeared to be underage. The officer asked the student for identification. The student said that his identification was in his dormitory room, and asked to retrieve it. The police officer accompanied the student to the room, and there noticed indications of the possession of narcotics. In the subsequent prosecution for possession, the Supreme Court held that seizure of the evidence of narcotics was justified, since the officer was legally in the dorm room and the evidence of narcotics was in plain view.
Butler argues that Chrisman is distinguishable, since in that case the suspect invited the officer into the residence. Here, however, it was the law enforcement officer who, noticing that Butler was barefoot, initiated the entry into the trailer by telling Butler that he would have to go inside to put some shoes on.
This distinction is not persuasive. The evidence is uncontradicted that there was broken glass on the ground in the area where Butler was arrested. And the district court explicitly found that there was no evidence that the concern for Butler’s welfare, as manifested by the police instruction for him to put on some shoes, was a pretext by which the police sought to enter the mobile home. That is, there is no evidence that the police action was done in bad faith.
Several courts have indicated that, even without an express invitation as in Chris-man, police may conduct a limited entry into an area for the purpose of protecting the health or safety of an arrestee. In United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 323, 30 L.Ed.2d 274 (1971), for example, the defendant was naked when he was arrested in his home by FBI agents. While getting clothing for the defendant, the agents discovered evidence connecting the defendant with a recent bank robbery. The admissibility of this evidence was upheld on appeal, the Second Circuit finding that the evidence was in plain view during the search for clothing for the defendant. The search for clothing was proper, the court held, since the agents “were bound to find some clothing for Titus rather than take him nude to FBI headquarters on a December night, ...” 445 F.2d at 579.
A similar situation arose in United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1977). In that case, when the defendant was arrested outside her house, she was wearing only a nightgown and bathrobe. The police requested that the defendant get dressed, and she was accompanied into her house by a female police officer. While the defendant was dressing, the officer noted evidence connecting the defendant with a bank robbery. Citing Titus, the court upheld the seizure of this evidence. The court stated that “[t]he officers had a duty to find clothing for Sally to wear and to permit her to do so.” 555 F.2d at 1101. See also United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1005 (9th Cir.1991) (noting general rule that an arrest of a person outside a residence does not authorize a warrantless entry of the residence, but identifying as an exception “when an officer accompanies an arrestee into a residence or room in order to allow the arres-tee to obtain clothing or identification.”).
This in no way creates a blank check for intrusion upon the privacy of the sloppily dressed. In United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164, 102 S.Ct.
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PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge.
Billy Deon Butler was indicted on August 7, 1991 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Butler, who had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, was charged in the single count indictment with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to trial, Butler moved to suppress the firearm. The district court denied the motion on September 10, 1991. On October 15, 1991, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Butler was subsequently sentenced to a term of 21 months, which was set to run concurrently with his earlier sentence. Butler was also sentenced to three years supervision after his release from custody.
Butler now appeals the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress, contending that the seizure of the firearm represents a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
On April 30, 1991, two Deputy United States Marshals and two Pushmataha County sheriff’s officers arrived at Butler’s rural home near Nashoba, Oklahoma to serve a warrant for his arrest. The Butler home was a trailer with a lean-to structure attached. The grounds were strewn with litter, including broken glass, several hundred beer cans, and the parts from various motor vehicles which also stood on the property.
The officers were met outside the trailer by Willis Bruce, who also lived in the trailer. Marshal Carroll Allberry told Bruce that the officers had a warrant for Butler’s arrest, and asked if he knew where Butler was. Bruce indicated that Butler was inside the house. Butler then appeared, and Allberry directed him to come outside, where he was placed under arrest.
Marshal Allberry then had Butler place his hands behind his back, and searched him for weapons. While he handcuffed Butler, Allberry noticed that Butler had no shoes, and noticed broken glass on the ground near Butler’s feet. Given the state of the ground, there was no route by which Butler might have been conveyed safely to the officers’ vehicles.
Allberry asked Butler if he had any shoes. Butler said that he did, but that they were in the trailer. Bruce asked his girlfriend, who also was present, if she would get Butler’s shoes. Allberry told Butler, “Well, let’s go on in and get them.” Allberry helped Butler inside the trailer, where Butler led him into a bedroom. All-berry noticed two .22 caliber long rifles in the trailer: one at the entrance to the trailer, and another in a gun rack in Butler’s bedroom. Both weapons appeared to be inoperable. However, Allberry also noticed a shotgun which was inside Butler’s bedroom and next to his bed.
[621]*621After giving Butler his Miranda warnings, Allberry asked if this was Butler’s bedroom, and Butler said that it was. All-berry told Butler that, as a convicted felon, it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. Butler said that he was not a convicted felon, that he was a probation violator. The gun was always there, Butler stated, and he used it to shoot hogs. The shotgun was seized and found to be loaded.
In denying Butler’s motion to suppress, the district court noted in particular the decision of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982). In Chrisman, a campus police officer had stopped, outside his dormitory room, a university student who had a bottle of gin and appeared to be underage. The officer asked the student for identification. The student said that his identification was in his dormitory room, and asked to retrieve it. The police officer accompanied the student to the room, and there noticed indications of the possession of narcotics. In the subsequent prosecution for possession, the Supreme Court held that seizure of the evidence of narcotics was justified, since the officer was legally in the dorm room and the evidence of narcotics was in plain view.
Butler argues that Chrisman is distinguishable, since in that case the suspect invited the officer into the residence. Here, however, it was the law enforcement officer who, noticing that Butler was barefoot, initiated the entry into the trailer by telling Butler that he would have to go inside to put some shoes on.
This distinction is not persuasive. The evidence is uncontradicted that there was broken glass on the ground in the area where Butler was arrested. And the district court explicitly found that there was no evidence that the concern for Butler’s welfare, as manifested by the police instruction for him to put on some shoes, was a pretext by which the police sought to enter the mobile home. That is, there is no evidence that the police action was done in bad faith.
Several courts have indicated that, even without an express invitation as in Chris-man, police may conduct a limited entry into an area for the purpose of protecting the health or safety of an arrestee. In United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 323, 30 L.Ed.2d 274 (1971), for example, the defendant was naked when he was arrested in his home by FBI agents. While getting clothing for the defendant, the agents discovered evidence connecting the defendant with a recent bank robbery. The admissibility of this evidence was upheld on appeal, the Second Circuit finding that the evidence was in plain view during the search for clothing for the defendant. The search for clothing was proper, the court held, since the agents “were bound to find some clothing for Titus rather than take him nude to FBI headquarters on a December night, ...” 445 F.2d at 579.
A similar situation arose in United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1977). In that case, when the defendant was arrested outside her house, she was wearing only a nightgown and bathrobe. The police requested that the defendant get dressed, and she was accompanied into her house by a female police officer. While the defendant was dressing, the officer noted evidence connecting the defendant with a bank robbery. Citing Titus, the court upheld the seizure of this evidence. The court stated that “[t]he officers had a duty to find clothing for Sally to wear and to permit her to do so.” 555 F.2d at 1101. See also United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1005 (9th Cir.1991) (noting general rule that an arrest of a person outside a residence does not authorize a warrantless entry of the residence, but identifying as an exception “when an officer accompanies an arrestee into a residence or room in order to allow the arres-tee to obtain clothing or identification.”).
This in no way creates a blank check for intrusion upon the privacy of the sloppily dressed. In United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164, 102 S.Ct. 1039, 71 L.Ed.2d 320 (1982), we held that entry into the defendant’s residence cannot be effected, in the absence of consent or exigent circum[622]*622stances, solely upon the desire of law enforcement officers to complete the arres-tee’s wardrobe. In that case, the defendant, who had been arrested in a hotel hallway after he had left his room, was clad only in his swimming trunks. After informing Anthon of his rights, he was taken back into his hotel room where he was allowed to change clothes and gather his personal effects. Anthon was then questioned in the hotel room for a period of 30 to 40 minutes. During the questioning, the officers discovered a vial of cocaine and a marijuana cigarette.
On appeal, the court found that the seizure of the narcotics was inconsistent with the principles of the Fourth Amendment and must be suppressed. There was no evidence that the defendant had asked to be allowed to retrieve his clothes or had consented to the entry of law enforcement officers into his hotel room. Moreover, the court noted, the facts failed to contain any suggestion of exigent circumstances dictating entry into the hotel room.
What separates the present case from the impermissible seizure in Anthon is the presence of a legitimate and significant threat to the health and safety of the arres-tee. There is no evidence in the present record that the concern for the arrestee’s health and safety was pretextual. To the contrary, the record is clear that taking Butler to the officers’ vehicles would have posed a serious risk to his health.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.