United States v. Biaggi

705 F. Supp. 790, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6251, 1988 WL 147274
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 27, 1988·No. 87 Cr. 265 (CBM)·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

OPINION

MOTLEY, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This case brought under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987) came on for trial on March 11, 1988. On June 21, 1988, the Government rested its case and the defendants moved for judgments of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). The court denied all such motions with the exception of defendant Ronald Betso’s motions for judgments of acquittal on Counts One, Two, and Forty-Nine of the Indictment, on which it reserved decision, and herewith denies, defendant John Mariotta’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Thirty-Two, which it granted, and files the following opinion in explanation of its decision. The court notes that since resting its case the Government has withdrawn Counts Thirty-Nine, Forty-Five, and Forty-Six.

This court set out the facts alleged by the Government in the then-current indictments in United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (omnibus opinion on pretrial motions), and United States v. Biaggi, 672 F.Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (denial of defendant Stanley Simon’s severance motion), familiarity with which is assumed. 1

In order to resist motions for a judgment of acquittal the Government must have introduced evidence “upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir.1984), as to each element of the count against a particular defendant that the court is considering. The court now sets out the Government’s evidence developed at trial. After a discussion of the common elements of Count One, the substantive RICO count, this opinion proceeds to discuss each defendant in turn.

COUNT ONE: GENERAL

Count One of the Indictment charges the defendants with substantive RICO violations, alleging that they committed, in various combinations, nineteen acts of racketeering. Two elements of a substantive RICO offense apply generally to these defendants: the existence of an enterprise, as defined by the RICO statute, and the effect of that enterprise on interstate or foreign commerce. The court finds that the Government has introduced evidence sufficient to resist a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to both of these elements. The Wedtech Corporation, as a corporation, comes under the statutory definition of an “enterprise,” and the Government introduced evidence that Wedtech participated in the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) program, through which it obtained contracts with the Department of Defense. The Government also introduced evidence that Wed-tech competed for defense contracts with Section 8(a) companies operating in other states. This was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Wedtech affected interstate commerce.

The remaining elements of Count One— association with the enterprise, engagement in a pattern of racketeering activity by the commission of at least two of the racketeering acts alleged in the indictment, *799 and conduct or participation in the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering activity — require specific application to the individual defendants. When, as occurs frequently in this Indictment, a racketeering act is also charged against an individual defendant as a substantive count, the court shall discuss the evidence for the substantive count along with the racketeering act here in Count One, and not repeat the discussion later.

MARIO BIAGGI — COUNT ONE: RICO

Third Element: Association with the Enterprise

The court finds that the Government has introduced sufficient evidence of Congressman Mario Biaggi’s association with the Wedtech Corporation to resist a judgment of acquittal. There was considerable testimony that Congressman Biaggi assisted Wedtech in many ways. Senator Alphonse D’Amato testified that Congressman Biaggi had contacted him to help obtain contracts for Wedtech. There was other testimony that Congressman Biaggi contacted the late Congressman Joseph Addabbo on Wedtech matters, and helped to set up meetings between Wedtech officers and both Congressman Addabbo and Senator D’Amato. There was testimony that Congressman Biaggi helped persuade the Economic Development Administration (EDA) to accept the subordination arrangement with Bank Leumi that enabled Wed-tech to arrange financing for the most lucrative defense contract it obtained, the so-called pontoon contract. The Congressman’s help with EDA matters extended even to the relatively trivial example of permitting Messrs. Ehrlich and Moreno to use a helicopter in his name to deliver documents on a rush basis to the EDA in Philadelphia.

The testimony is that when Wedtech had difficulty meeting its deadline on the $500,-000 loan it allegedly obtained from Pat Simone, the Congressman was instrumental in negotiating an extension of the deadline. The Government has introduced evidence that the Congressman was also instrumental in Wedtech’s efforts to secure the parking lot at One Loop Drive: that he was in touch with Susan Frank, that Harrison Goldin changed his position on One Loop after talking to Congressman Biaggi, that the Congressman expended considerable effort to placate Queens Borough President Donald Manes for the loss of jobs in Queens the One Loop package would entail, and that he put pressure on Bronx Borough President Simon to act as a strong advocate of the One Loop deal rather than a passive supporter. Further, the cooperator Mario Moreno testified that when he told the Congressman of Congressman Parren Mitchell’s investigation of Wedtech, Congressman Biaggi replied that he and Congressman Mitchell were friends of long standing and that he would “see what he could do.” Finally, Moreno also testified that in Wedtech’s waning days Congressman Biaggi tried to arrange credit for Wedtech through his personal contacts with Teamsters President Jackie Presser, the limousine entrepreneur Bill Fugazy, and Chrysler Board Chairman Lee Iacocca.

The court finds that these efforts to help Wedtech, particularly in conjunction with other evidence to be recounted below, are sufficient to show Congressman Biaggi’s association with the enterprise.

Fourth and Fifth Elements: Pattern of Racketeering Activity/Conduct of Enterprise

The court will now discuss the racketeering acts alleged against Congressman Biaggi in the indictment.

Act l(a)/Count Three: Extortion

Racketeering Act 1(a), which is also Count Three, charges the Congressman with extortion of 5% of Wedtech stock for himself and his designees.

The Government has introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the first element of these charges — an attempt to receive property from another with their consent, induced by the wrongful use of fear or under color of official right.

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United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 790, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6251, 1988 WL 147274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

705 F. Supp. 790 (United States v. Biaggi) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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