United States v. Biaggi

705 F. Supp. 830, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6334, 1988 WL 147275
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in United States v. Biaggi. Read the opinion of the Court — 675 F. Supp. 790
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 27, 1988·No. 87 Cr. 265 (CBM)·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MOTLEY, District Judge.

The court hereby makes its finding pursuant to United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir.1969), as to each defendant in the above-captioned case.

In making its Geaney findings, the court begins by observing that two elements of a RICO conspiracy apply generally to these defendants: the existence of an enterprise, as defined by the RICO statute, and the effect of that enterprise on interstate or foreign commerce. The court finds that the Government has introduced a fair preponderance of evidence, excluding hearsay statements admissible only under the coconspirator exception, that both of these elements are satisfied. The Wedtech Corporation, as a corporation, comes under the statutory definition of an “enterprise,” and there is sufficient evidence to show that, through its dealings with the SBA and the Department of Defense as a Section 8(a) company, in competition with Section 8(a) companies operating in other states, the Wedtech Corporation affected interstate commerce. There was, moreover, undisputed testimony from a number of the cooperating witnesses that the Wed-tech Corporation affected foreign commerce, as through its ownership of its Israeli subsidiary Carmo Industries, and as through the trip through England and Italy to arrange kickbacks from companies in those countries testified to by Mario Moreno.

The remaining elements of a RICO conspiracy count — association with the enterprise and agreement to conduct the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting in the commission of at least two of the racketeering acts alleged in the indictment — require specific application to the individual defendants, to which this court now proceeds.

CONGRESSMAN MARIO BIAGGI

The court finds proof of the third element of Count Two — association with the enterprise — in the following evidence. There was considerable testimony that congressman Biaggi assisted Wedtech in many ways. Senator Alphonse D’Amato testified that Congressman Biaggi had contacted him to help obtain contracts for Wedtech. There was other testimony that Congressman Biaggi contacted the late Congressman Joseph Addabbo on Wedtech matters, and helped to set up meetings between [833]*833Wedtech officers and both Congressman Addabbo and Senator D’Amato. There was testimony that Congressman Biaggi helped persuade the Economic Development Administration (EDA) to accept the subordination arrangement with Bank Leu-mi that enabled Wedtech to arrange financing for the most lucrative defense contract it obtained, the so-called pontoon contract. The Congressman’s help with EDA matters extended even to the relatively trivial example of permitting Messrs. Ehrlich and Moreno to use a helicopter in his name to deliver documents on a rush basis to the EDA in Philadelphia.

The testimony is that when Wedtech had difficulty meeting its deadline on the $500,-000 loan it allegedly obtained from Pat Simone, the Congressman was instrumental in negotiating an extension of the deadline. The Government has introduced evidence that the Congressman was also instrumental in Wedtech’s efforts to secure the parking lot at One Loop Drive: that he was in touch with Susan Frank, that Comptroller Harrison Goldin changed his position on One Loop after talking to Congressman Biaggi, that the Congressman expended considerable effort to placate Queens Borough President Donald Manes for the loss of jobs in Queens the One Loop package would entail, and that he put pressure on Bronx Borough President Simon to act as a strong advocate of the One Loop deal rather than a passive supporter. Further, the cooperator Mario Moreno testified that when he told the Congressman of Congressman Parren Mitchell’s investigation of Wedtech, Congressman Biaggi replied that he and Congressman Mitchell were friends of long standing and that he would “see what he could do.” Finally, Moreno also testified that in Wedtech’s waning days Congressman Biaggi tried to arrange credit for Wedtech through his personal contacts with Teamsters President Jackie Presser, the limousine entrepeneur Bill Fu-gazy, and Chrysler Board Chairman Lee Iaccocca.

The court finds that these efforts to help Wedtech, particularly in conjunction with other evidence to be recounted below, are sufficient to show Congressman Biaggi’s association with the enterprise.

There is a fair preponderance of evidence, excluding hearsay admissible only under the coconspirator exception, to show that Congressman Biaggi agreed to violate § 1962(c) by committing at least two racketeering acts.

First, there is a fair preponderance of evidence that Congressman Biaggi agreed with at least Richard Biaggi, Ehrlich, Moreno, Guariglia, Shorten, and Neuberger to defraud the Department of Defense by executing the sham stock purchase agreements. This fair preponderance includes hearsay statements that are admissible under an exception other than Rule 801(d)(2)(E). This is, however, perfectly legitimate for Geaney purposes. United States v. DeJesus, 806 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090, 107 S.Ct. 1299, 94 L.Ed.2d 155 (1987). Here, as in DeJesus, “Under [Rule 803(3) ], hearsay statements reflecting a declarant’s intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts.” DeJesus, 806 F.2d at 35. Here, Mario Moreno testified to such a statement of future plan by Congressman Biaggi. Moreno testified that Congressman Biaggi said he would approve the stock purchase agreement — that is, that he would allow stock purchase agreements to be executed between Richard Biaggi and Ehrlich and John Mariotta, but only under certain conditions. Those conditions were an accelerated due date for the first installment and a one-year payout instead of a ten-year payout. Under DeJesus these statements are admissible to prove a subsequent act — Congressman Biaggi’s participation in a fraudulent scheme. Moreover, the various stock purchase agreements are in evidence, and the agreements executed by Richard Biaggi and Ehrlich indeed differ from the cooperators’ in essentially the respects Congressman Biaggi is supposed to have specified. The difference is that the payout is to occur in two installments, not all at once, and Moreno testified that the Congressman was induced to agree to this change. Thus documentary evidence, in the form of the differ[834]*834ing stock purchase agreements, along with admissible hearsay, allow the inference that Congressman Biaggi agreed to the stock purchase fraud.

Second, there is a fair preponderance of evidence that Congressman Biaggi agreed with at least Moreno, Mariotta, Guariglia, Shorten, and Neuberger to accept $50,000 in the guise of a payment to Biaggi & Ehrlich for legal services. The documentary evidence, consisting of the Biaggi & Ehrlich invoice and the Wedtech check, is significant: the invoice is dated June 19, 1984, after Ehrlich’s and Carlos Cuevas Jr.’s marathon June 4 workday that resulted in Susan Frank’s June 5 letter of intent, and the check is dated July 13, 1984, the day after the Board of Estimate meeting at which Wedtech’s application for the One Loop variance was approved. There was nonhearsay testimony that Wedtech did not owe Biaggi & Ehrlich anything at the time on its retainer. There was nonhearsay testimony from Carlos Cuevas, Jr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 830, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6334, 1988 WL 147275 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

705 F. Supp. 830 (United States v. Biaggi) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related