United States v. Bernal Chavarria-Herrara

15 F.3d 1033, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4209, 1994 WL 50847
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMarch 9, 1994
Docket93-3186
StatusPublished
Cited by72 cases

This text of 15 F.3d 1033 (United States v. Bernal Chavarria-Herrara) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Bernal Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d 1033, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4209, 1994 WL 50847 (11th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

In this case we consider whether the district court has the authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence below the mandatory minimum where the government makes a motion for reduction of sentence based on substantial assistance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. We also consider whether the district court may rely on factors other than the substantial assistance of the defendant in determining the amount of the sentence reduction and whether the government may appeal the sentence reduction. After determining that the government may appeal the district court decision, we hold that the district court may reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum under Rule 35(b), but that the court may not rely on factors other than the substantial assistance of the defendant.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On February 12, 1991, the defendant was convicted in a non-jury trial of the following offenses: conspiring to import five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and conducting or attempting to conduct a financial transaction with the intent to promote the importation and distribution of cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A). On May 8, 1991, the district court sentenced the defendant to 240 months of incarceration. On May 8, 1992 the government filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based on the substantial assistance of the defendant. This motion set out the defendant’s assistance to the government and recommended a two level reduction of the defendant’s sentence to level 36, criminal history category I, which is a sentence of 188-235 month’s imprisonment. The defendant submitted his own version of his assistance to the government.

On July 24,1992, the district court held an in camera hearing to consider the government’s motion for substantial assistance. After hearing argument from the parties, the court granted the government’s motion and reduced the defendant’s sentence to time served, which at that point was about 26 months. The government appealed the reduction of defendant’s sentence. This court then granted an emergency stay of the release of the defendant pending this appeal. The government argues that the amount of the reduction was unreasonable and that any departure below the mandatory minimum sentence is unauthorized.

II. DISCUSSION

A Jurisdiction and the Right of the Government to Appeal

First, we determine that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 confers jurisdiction upon this court to *1035 hear this appeal, and that the government may appeal the district court ruling pursuant to § 8742(b). 1 Section 3742 establishes “a limited practice of appellate review of sentences in the Federal criminal justice system.” S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1988), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3332. We have held that § 3742 confers jurisdiction on this court to consider appeals of sentences resulting from rulings on government motions made under Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b). 2 U.S. v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1531, n. 4 (11th Cir.1991). Yesil involved a defendant’s appeal (i.e., defendant Deppe), pursuant to § 3742(a)(1), of a ruling on a Rule 35(b) motion. The symmetrical structure of § 3742 indicates that Congress intended appellate review of sentences to be available to the government on the same terms as to defendants. The legislative history confirms this symmetry. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333 (Section 3742 was enacted so that appellate review would be “available equally to the defendant and the government.”). Accordingly, we now hold that § 3742(b) allows the government to appeal a Rule 35(b) determination and confers appellate jurisdiction on this court, when' that determination results in a sentence that satisfies one of the criteria for appeal set out in § 3742.

Although finding appellate jurisdiction of a defendant’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the First Circuit, noting its disagreement with Yesil, held that rulings on Rule 35(b) motions are not appealable pursuant to § 3742. U.S. v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir.1993). The only reason given by the McAndrews panel was that an order resolving a Rule 35(b) motion “is not, properly speaking, a sentence.” Id. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. Section 3742 allows for the appeal of an “otherwise final sentence.” In ruling upon a Rule 35(b) motion, the district court will either reduce the sentence that was previously imposed or leave it undisturbed. Once that ruling is made, the remaining sanction upon the defendant falls within the common sense meaning of “an otherwise final sentence.” The government *1036 may appeal that remaining sentence if it satisfies one of the four criteria set out in § 3742(b). We have noted before that a modification of a sentence is part of the sentencing process. United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 540 (11th Cir.1985). Moreover, we believe our interpretation better comports with the Congressional intent that appeals of sentences be based on the § 3742 criteria and that there be symmetry between appeals by a defendant and appeals by the government. 3

The defendant also argues that the use of the word “imposed” in three of the four instances which trigger the right to appeal under § 3742 limits the right to appeal to the original imposition of sentence. We disagree. The sentence that is ordered by a sentencing court in ruling on a Rule 35 motion readily falls within the meaning of the concept of imposition of sentence, especially in light of the express statutory provision contemplating appeal of an “otherwise final sentence.” • Moreover, the term “imposed” is not used in the third instance which triggers a right of appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) and (b)(3).

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15 F.3d 1033, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4209, 1994 WL 50847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bernal-chavarria-herrara-ca11-1994.