TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
Clifton Bennett pleaded guilty to federal child pornography charges and the district court sentenced him to fifty-seven months of imprisonment to be followed by several conditions of supervised release. Bennett and the United States each contend the district court erred at sentencing.
The government argues the court should have found Bennett had a prior Colorado conviction relating to child pornography, which would trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). We agree that Bennett’s prior Colorado misdemeanor conviction for sexual exploitation of a child “relates to” child pornography, and he is therefore eligible for the mandatory minimum.
Bennett also appeals, challenging the district court’s imposition of a special condition of supervised release that requires he undergo mandatory testing for sexual attraction to minors. But we are faced with too many speculative factors, too far in the future, to make a decision sounding in constitutional principles, so we dismiss Bennett’s cross-appeal without prejudice on ripeness grounds.
I. Background
The United States Postal Inspection Service searched Clifton Bennett’s Colorado Springs apartment and discovered thousands of images of child pornography and child erotica, featuring boys ranging from toddlers through young teenagers. Bennett pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).1
[1319]*1319This was not Bennett’s first conviction for sex-related conduct involving children. In 1997, he pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child, a misdemeanor under Colorado law, and was sentenced to 140 days in jail.
Based on this prior conviction, the parties disagreed whether federal law required a ten-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). Looking at the Colorado statute, the district court concluded that because the Colorado law punished a broader range of activities than the federal crime of possession of child pornography, the prior conviction is not a child pornography offense for statutory purposes. The court sentenced Bennett to fifty-seven months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.
At sentencing, Bennett also objected to the condition of supervised release that required him to undergo a test for sexual attraction to minors using a device called a penile plethysmograph.2 The district court rejected this challenge and concluded:
I have sufficient concern for the young men — the under-age men in the community, that I think that in this particular case, to effectively supervise and treat the defendant, and to protect the community; in particular, these young boys from additional crimes by the defendant, that both the computer internet access limitation and the proposed sex offender evaluation treatment condition of supervised release, which would include, if necessary, plethysmograph examination, does comport with the statutory requirements of 18 United States Code Section 3588(d) and are appropriate in this case.
R., Vol. Ill, at 27.
II. Discussion
We first discuss whether Bennett’s prior state misdemeanor conviction triggers the mandatory minimum enhancement. We conclude it does. We then turn to the special condition requiring plethysmograph testing, and conclude that the imposition of testing is too speculative at this point for us to consider Bennett’s due process challenge. He can challenge the testing if and when it is actually imposed.
A. Mandatory Minimum Enhancement
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), the mandatory minimum applies if Bennett’s prior conviction relates to a variety of state sexual abuse and child pornography crimes:
Whoever violates ... subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but ... if such person has a prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct in[1320]*1320volving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (emphasis added).3 The district court determined whether the prior Colorado conviction counted for enhancement purposes using the so-called categorical approach.
1. Categorical Approach
The government argues that under the categorical approach Bennett’s 1997 Colorado conviction for sexual exploitation of a child qualifies as a prior conviction relating to the possession of child pornography. Under this assessment, it contends the court may only consider whether the elements of the Colorado statute categorically relate to the possession of child pornography. Bennett disagrees that the categorical approach applies. He contends that our decision United States v. McCutchen, 419 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2005), requires that we must find his prior conduct actually relates to the possession of child pornography. And because the limited record does not disclose his prior conduct, we could not make that determination.
But a careful reading of McCutchen confirms that the proper analytical framework begins with the categorical approach. In McCutchen, the defendant pleaded guilty to knowing possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)4 and (1)(4)(B). 419 F.3d at 1123. McCutchen had a prior conviction — -a guilty plea for sexual battery under Kansas law. The question was whether that prior conviction related to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor. Although sexual battery could be committed against children or adults, McCutchen had in fact abused an eight-year-old. Id. at 1124. The district court found that where the statutory language of the prior conviction was broad enough to encompass crimes that would trigger the enhancement and crimes that would not, it was allowed to look beyond the elements of the offense. United States v. McCutchen, No. 04-10140-01, at 4 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2004), aff'd, 419 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
We affirmed the district court. In doing so, we “reject[ed] the narrow categorical approach to application of § 2252(b)(2) advocated by McCutchen.” McCutchen, 419 F.3d at 1127 (emphasis added). But we did not upset the general presumption that the categorical approach applies.5 Rather, we merely rejected the notion that courts must focus “exclusively” on the elements of the prior conviction and are confined “solely” to the elements of the statute. Id. at 1126-27. We found “no basis” to require sentencing courts to “focus exclusively on the elements of a defendant’s prior state conviction in determining whether such conviction triggers application of the sentence enhancement provisions.” Id. at 1126.
[1321]*1321Thus, in applying § 2252A(b)(2) we start with the categorical approach, even if we do not end there. Consequently, we first ask whether the language of the prior conviction categorically triggers the enhancement. If not, we may proceed beyond the categorical approach if two pre-requi-sites are met. First, we must have access to court documents such as those approved of in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), that demonstrate the elements of the crime the defendant committed. Second, the statute of prior conviction must be divisible, Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2282, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), meaning the statute lists alternative ways it may be violated.
Other circuits apply a similar approach. For example, in applying § 2252(b)(2), the Ninth Circuit explained that a court may apply a modified categorical approach if (1) the statute of prior conviction criminalizes more conduct than the federal triggering offense, and (2) the statute of prior conviction is divisible. United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 26, 2016) (No. 15-7875) (applying the categorical approach in interpreting § 2252(b)(2) but clarifying that a modified categorical approach is appropriate where the prior criminal conviction language is both broad and divisible). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit starts with the categorical approach in determining whether a prior conviction relates to sexual abuse or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor. United States v. Colson, 683 F.3d 507, 509 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the categorical approach in interpreting § 2252A(b)(l) because no Shepard documents were available). While the Fourth Circuit allows the sentencing court to consider Shepard documents to “reveal the facts on which the conviction necessarily rested,” if no such documents are available, the sentencing court may look only to the statutory language of the prior conviction to determine whether that conviction was related to the triggering offenses.6
Similarly here, we have no facts beyond the guilty plea. As a result, we apply the categorical approach.
2. Relating To Child Pornography
We next examine the statutory definition of Bennett’s 1997 Colorado conviction to determine whether it categorically qualifies as an offense relating to the possession of child pornography. The relevant Colorado statute provided: [1322]*1322Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-403(3)(b.6) (1995) (footnote added). The statute thus triggers the mandatory minimum if it is a statute “relating to ... the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (emphasis added).
[1321]*1321A person commits sexual exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he knowingly ... Possesses or controls any sexually exploitative material for any purpose ....”7
[1322]*1322The Colorado child exploitation statute may punish the possession of visual depictions that'fall outside the federal definition of child pornography.8 First, the Colorado statute, unlike the federal law, may punish possession of an image of a child whose breasts, but not genitals, are exposed. Second, the Colorado statute may punish possession of an image of a child observing, but not engaged in, sexually explicit conduct. In fact, the government concedes the statutes do not completely overlap. Principal Br. for United States 29. But a conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction if it relates to the possession of child pornography.
We have held, as have the other circuits, that “relating to” has a broadening effect on § 2252A. Colson, 683 F.3d at 511-12 (“Numerous courts' of appeals agree that Congress chose the expansive term ‘relating to’ in § 2252A(b)(l) to ensure that individuals with a prior conviction bearing some relation to sexual abuse, abusive conduct involving a minor, or child pornography receive enhanced minimum and maximum sentences.” (citations omitted)); McCutchen, 419 F.3d at 1126-27.9 Therefore we have applied the Supreme Court’s ordinary interpretation of “relating to” from Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 625 F.3d 1309, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010). Under this interpretation, “the offense need only ‘stand in some relation to,’ ‘pertain to,’ or ‘have a connection’ with” the possession of child pornography. Becker, 625 F.3d at 1312 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCutchen, 419 F.3d at 1127). Bennett’s Colorado conviction meets these standards, and therefore “relates to” the possession of child pornography.
To counter, Bennett argues that the recent Supreme Court case, Mellouli v. Lynch, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 1980, 192 L.Ed.2d 60 (2015), has undermined our precedent and that of the other circuits. In Mellouli, the Court held that a Tunisian citizen was not removable for his state drug paraphernalia offense because the state offense' criminalized paraphernalia for substances beyond those contained on the federal list of controlled substances. Bennett argues Mellouli mandates the enhancement here can only be triggered by a state child pornography statute punishing images that meet the federal definition of child pornography. Bennett Supp. Br. at 1. This interpretation is incorrect for several reasons.
First, Mellouli was decided, not on the definition of “relating to,” but on the particular removal statute’s surrounding text and history. At issue in Mellouli was whether an alien’s Kansas drug parapher[1323]*1323nalia conviction triggered removal under the immigration laws, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)®. The removal statute in question provided an alien can be removed if “convicted of a violation of ... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” Id. (emphasis added). The Kansas definition of controlled substances included at least nine substances that the federal list did not.10 Id. The Supreme Court held that § 1227(a)(2)(B)® is limited to predicate convictions involving only those drugs defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Id. at 1990-91. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that “relating to” generally has a broadening effect. Id. at 1990. But, the Court explained, “relating to” cannot skew a statute beyond its breaking point. Relying on the “statute’s text and history,” it concluded that “relating to” should be read narrowly in the removal context. Id.
Here, neither the text nor the history of the enhancement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), suggest Congress intended to reference only state child pornography offenses that match the federal child pornography offense in the same way Congress intended to reference only state drug offenses involving substances defined in § 802.
First, the enhancement statute does not limit “child pornography” by linking it to the federal definition. In fact, Mellouli explicitly noted that a broad reading of “relating to” would have made sense if Congress did not insert a qualification limiting its application to federal controlled substances. Mellouli, 185 S.Ct. at 1988 n. 9 (“[T]he dissent shrinks to the vanishing point the words ‘as defined in [§ 802].’ If § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) stopped with the words ‘relating to a controlled substance,’ the dissent would make sense. But Congress did not stop there. It qualified ‘relating to a controlled substance’ by adding the limitation ‘as defined in [§ 802].’ ”).
Additionally, a broad reading of the enhancement provision does not stretch it “to the breaking point,”, as it did to the removal statute in Mellouli. 135 S.Ct. at 1990. The removal statute requires only that the state law relate to a controlled substance, but mentions no actus reus. The Court took issue that a broad reading would mean the removal statute could reach any crime “associated with the drug trade in general.” Id. at 1988 (quoting In re Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118 (BIA 2009)). This concern was especially present for Mellouli, where an ordinary piece of clothing — a sock — qualified as drug paraphernalia, triggering deportation under a broad reading. Id. at 1983. Section 2252A(b)(2), by contrast, limits the triggering offenses through a universe of actions: “production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). “Relating to” can therefore have a broadening effect without criminalizing all acts associated with child pornography in general.
Third, the structure of the removal statute emphasizes the need for complete overlap between state and federal predicate offenses in a way that § 2252A(b)(2) does not. The removal statute groups state and federal convictions together: “any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 of [1324]*1324Title 21).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Because federal law only reaches federally-defined substances, a narrow reading of “relating to” is required, or else “relating to” would have two meanings at once. In contrast, § 2252A(b)(2) does not group state and federal convictions together:
a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.
A narrow reading is therefore not required for coherence. In fact, the text points the opposite direction. If Congress had intended to reference only those state laws that punished federally-punishable conduct, it could have said so. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(2) (defining “state sex offense” as one that “consists of conduct that would be a Federal sex offense”); 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(B) (defining “prior sex offense conviction” as an offense “consisting of conduct that would have been an offense under [this chapter, chapter 109A, chapter 110, or section 1591]”). The text of § 2252A(b)(2) does not favor a narrow reading of “relating to.”11
Our reading is further supported by the comparative historical backgrounds of the statutes. Under the deportation statute, Congress and the BIA had “long required a direct link” to an exact list of federally defined drugs. Mellouli, 135 S.Ct. at 1990. Bennett points to no historical background in favor of a narrow reading of § 2252A(b)(2), because none exists. We have already cited wide agreement among the circuits that “relating to” is expansive in this context and we see no reason to depart.
The post-Mellouli decisions align with our interpretation. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have each affirmed that “relating to” remains broad in this context. See United States v. Miller, 819 F.3d 1314,-(11th Cir.2016); United States v. Sumner, 816 F.3d 1040, 1043-44 (8th Cir.2016) (affirming the broad interpretation of “relating to” from United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir. 2007)); Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 638-40 (“Because neither context nor history tugs ‘in favor of a narrower reading,’ we define the phrase ‘relating to’ in § 2251(e) and § 2252(b)(2) broadly.” (quoting Mellouli, 135 S.Ct. at 1990)); United States v. Mateen, 806 F.3d 857, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1688, 194 L.Ed.2d 790 (2016) (“While enhancing a sentence for a prior federal offense under section 2252(b)(2) requires an offender to commit a specified crime, including crimes listed in chapter 109A, a prior state conviction requires only that the defendant have been convicted of a state offense ‘relating to ... sexual abuse.’ ” (quoting [1325]*1325United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2013))).
Because neither the text nor the history of the enhancement statute limits triggering offenses to those mirroring federally-defined offenses, we apply the ordinary interpretation of “relating to.” We ask whether the statute of Bennett’s 1997 Colorado conviction stands in some relation to, pertains to, or has a connection with the possession of child pornography.12 See Becker, 625 F.3d at 1312. It undeniably does. The nature of sexual exploitation of a child, under Colorado law, is the possession of visual material depicting a child participating in explicit sexual conduct. We have little difficulty deciding that the statute relates to the possession of child pornography.13
Because Bennett’s prior conviction categorically relates to the possession of child pornography, we conclude that the district court should have applied the ten-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
B. Plethysmograph Testing
Bennett also argues the district court erred by imposing penile plethysmo-graph testing as a condition of his supervised release without sufficient findings. We must examine whether this challenge is ripe for review. Friends of Marolt Park v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 382 F.3d 1088, 1093 (10th Cir. 2004). The parties conceded ripeness, but “[a]s a jurisdictional prerequisite, ripeness may be examined by this court sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 119 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997)).
The government based its concession of ripeness on United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011). In Mike, we said “supervised release terms are directly appealable, despite the fact that they are subject to later modification, because they ‘are part of the sentencing court’s final orders.’ ” Mike, 632 F.3d at 692-93 (quoting United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010)). But ripeness doctrine has both constitutional and prudential components. United States v. Vaguera-Juanes, 638 F.3d 734, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2011). So while an appeal regarding the conditions of supervised release may satisfy the Article III component, that appeal may nonetheless be dismissed on prudential ripeness grounds.14 Id. at 738 (dismissing appeal regarding conditions of supervised release on ripeness grounds because the defendant might be deported).
We have acknowledged that plethysmo-graph testing presents different considerations than other terms of supervised release. See United States v. Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that plethysmograph testing implicates [1326]*1326significant liberty interests and requires a strong nexus to the defendant’s history and characteristics before it can be imposed). So although supervised release terms may generally be directly appealed, we must inquire whether the prudential considerations here, especially related to plethysmograph testing, counsel restraint. They do.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have dismissed immediate challenges to plethysmograph testing as unripe. United States v. Ortega, 485 Fed.Appx. 656, 660 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2007). The Lee court, for example, while recognizing that generally, “conditions of supervised release may be ripe for appellate review immediately following their imposition at sentence,” still concluded the defendant’s challenge to plethysmograph testing was not ripe because (1) the defendant would not be released for fourteen years, (2) his treatment plan was indefinite, and (3) the court was unsure whether plethysmograph testing would even be considered medically useful in 2021. Lee, 502 F.3d at 450. Similarly, the Seventh - Circuit dismissed a challenge to plethysmograph testing as unripe where the condition would not have been imposed for at least eight and one-half years. Rhodes, 552 F.3d at 624. The court gave weight to the difficulty in requiring the district court to state why plethysmograph testing is appropriate for the particular defendant when the question would be “full of contingency and abstraction.” Id. at 628.
The First Circuit, however, rejected a ripeness challenge when it struck down plethysmograph testing as a potential condition of supervised ¿release in United States v. Medina, 779 F.3d 55, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2015). As here, the sentencing court in Medina approved sex offender treatment “including” plethysmograph testing. Id. at 64 n. 7. The First Circuit rejected a ripeness challenge because the condition would be imposed within the year, unlike the fourteen-year gap in Lee. Id. at 67; Lee,' 502 F.3d at 450. Additionally, Medina did not challenge how the testing would be imposed, but rather that plethysmograph testing was per se unlawful on the record before the district court. Medina, 779 F.3d at 67.
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.’ ” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)). Our prudential ripeness doctrine requires us to balance the fitness of the issue for judicial review with the hardship to the parties from withholding review. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1124 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Turning first to whether the issue is fit for judicial review, we focus on “whether determination of the merits turns upon strictly legal issues or requires facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed.” Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995)). Bennett is not challenging the facial validity of penile plethysmograph testing, but rather its application to him. He argues that the district court did not make sufficiently particularized factual findings to impose testing. Even if we remanded, the district court would be faced with the nearly impossible task of determining how effective plethysmograph testing might be for Bennett after completing [1327]*1327his ten-year sentence. This factor weighs against review.
We next consider whether the parties face “a direct and immediate dilemma.” Stout, 519 F.3d at 1118. Of course, this consideration would counsel against adjudication for most conditions of supervised release where the defendant has a lengthy sentence. But Bennett faces additional contingencies before plethysmograph testing would be imposed. First, the treatment provider must evaluate him and find that testing is appropriate. Second, plethysmo-graph testing must be available as a treatment option, a destiny far from certain. See United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting circuit agreement that penile plethysmograph testing is deeply invasive and of questionable reliability). And Bennett can challenge the condition when he is released from his ten-year sentence if testing is still considered an appropriate treatment option at that time.
In sum, we find the challenge to plethys-mograph testing as not yet ripe. Bennett also raises issues of substantive due process, considering the invasive nature of the testing, but we need not reach that issue. Because Bennett’s cross-appeal is not yet sufficiently concrete, we dismiss without prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND with instructions to the district court to VACATE the fifty-seven-month sentence and resentence Bennett to the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. We DISMISS Bennett’s cross-appeal on ripeness grounds.