BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
I.
Defendant Texas Brine Company, LLC (Texas Brine) operates brine wells on land owned by Co-Defendant Occidental Chemical Corporation (Oxy) in Louisiana. In August 2012, a sinkhole appeared near one of these wells. After the sinkhole appeared, Texas Brine began clean-up efforts. To manage this crisis, Texas Brine consulted with others. In December 2012, Texas Brine retained Frontier International Group, LLC (Frontier), an Oklahoma-based consulting firm, for “emergency management, state and local government relations, community relations, litigation settlement strategy, and media communications.” Some time later, Texas Brine retained Brooks Altshuler, an attorney and Frontier’s owner, in his individual capacity to advise the company on response and remediation efforts and to negotiate with government agencies. Later, Texas Brine retained Frontier as a consulting expert for trial preparation.
Litigation began soon after the sinkhole appeared, with multiple plaintiffs suing Texas Brine and Oxy in the Eastern District of Louisiana. In that suit, the plaintiffs alleged the negligent operation of a brine well resulted in the sinkhole and caused damage to the plaintiffs’ properties. In this underlying litigation, Texas Brine filed a cross-claim against Oxy seeking indemnity for $100 million spent responding to the sinkhole crisis, $6.5 million of which Texas Brine claims is for the work Frontier performed. To verify the work Frontier performed and the cost of such work, Oxy issued a subpoena duces tecum to nonparty Frontier, requesting production of eight categories of documents related to services Frontier provided Texas Brine.
In response, Texas Brine filed a motion to quash the subpoena in the Western District of Oklahoma, the district where compliance is required. See Fed. R. Civ, P. 45(d)(3)(A). Proceeding under the uncontested assumption that Louisiana law applied, Texas Brine first claimed the attorney-client. privilege protected the subpoenaed communications.
In a written order, the district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, Leblanc v. Texas Brine Co., No. 16-1026, 2017 WL 913801, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2017). In its order, the court noted that Texas Brine failed to comply with Fed. R, Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A), which requires a person moving to quash a subpoena under the claim of privilege to “describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” Instead, Texas Brine asserted a “blanket claim of privilege.” Leblanc, 2017 WL 913801, at *4. Only in the context of Texas Brine’s claim of a blanket privilege did the court address whether Louisiana’s attorney-client privilege statute extends the privilege to a public relations firm and its agents.
As Louisiana courts have not. addressed this exact issue, the court looked to Wigmore’s definition of attorney-client privilege, which protects “legal advice.” Id. (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292, at 564 (J, McNaughton rev, ed. 1961)), Without a privilege .log before it, the court concluded that much of the work Frontier performed for Texas Brine did not constitute “legal advice” and, thus, was not protected by the attornéy-client privilege.' The court finished its discussion on attorney-client privilege by stating: “the Court denies Texas Brine’s Motion as to attorney-client privilege, absent a specific showing of the legal nature of each withheld communication.” Id. (emphasis added).
Texas Brine also argu.ed the work product doctrine governed the subpoenaed communications. The court reached a similar conclusion regarding this argument, stating the work product doctrine does not protect a public relations firm’s written materials regarding business advice or an attorney’s non-litigation activity. Again, the court emphasized much of the communications were not protected, “absent a specific showing of the legal nature of each withheld communication, and that it was specifically created in anticipation of litigation.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
The district court concluded its order by again emphasizing “Texas Brine’s conclu-sory, blanket assertions of privilege are insufficient to quash the subpoena.” Id. (emphasis added). The court required Texas Brine to produce a privilege log for any communications that it believed were protected. With respect to the eight categories of subpoenaed documents, the court ruled as follows: Frontier need not produce category (1) because the request was over-broad; Frontier must produce the documents requested in categories (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) “subject to privilege screening and production of a log consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)”-, and Frontier must produce the documents requested in categories (6) and (8).
Id. (emphasis added).
Texas Brine filed a timely notice of appeal.
Texas Brine then filed a motion to stay the district court’s order pending these proceedings, which the district court denied. Frontier complied with the district court’s order and has,- at this point, produced around 20,000 documents and a privilege log regarding the confidentiality of the withheld documents.
II.
At the outset, Oxy claims this dispute is not ripe for adjudication because the district court did not actually order production of any allegedly privileged material. Instead, the court ordered production of non-privileged material to Oxy subject to a privilege log. Until the district court orders production of privileged material, Oxy forcibly argues, there is no dispute to resolve. In response, Texas Brine asserts the court erred in defining the scope of the privilege too narrowly and “ordering] production of documents that are arguably privileged communications.” Appellant Reply Brief, 2. In other words, Texas Brine argues in a vacuum that the court construed Louisiana law too narrowly.
But the court has yet to apply Louisiana law to any contested document. We will not resolve a dispute “if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.”’ United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1326 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998)), This principle—the ripeness doctrine—derives from both constitutional and prudential concerns. Id. at 1325. The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the premature adjudication of abstract claims. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995). To determine whether a dispute is prudentially ripe, this Court “balance[s] the fitness of the issue for judicial review with the hardship to the parties from withholding review.” Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1326.
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BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
I.
Defendant Texas Brine Company, LLC (Texas Brine) operates brine wells on land owned by Co-Defendant Occidental Chemical Corporation (Oxy) in Louisiana. In August 2012, a sinkhole appeared near one of these wells. After the sinkhole appeared, Texas Brine began clean-up efforts. To manage this crisis, Texas Brine consulted with others. In December 2012, Texas Brine retained Frontier International Group, LLC (Frontier), an Oklahoma-based consulting firm, for “emergency management, state and local government relations, community relations, litigation settlement strategy, and media communications.” Some time later, Texas Brine retained Brooks Altshuler, an attorney and Frontier’s owner, in his individual capacity to advise the company on response and remediation efforts and to negotiate with government agencies. Later, Texas Brine retained Frontier as a consulting expert for trial preparation.
Litigation began soon after the sinkhole appeared, with multiple plaintiffs suing Texas Brine and Oxy in the Eastern District of Louisiana. In that suit, the plaintiffs alleged the negligent operation of a brine well resulted in the sinkhole and caused damage to the plaintiffs’ properties. In this underlying litigation, Texas Brine filed a cross-claim against Oxy seeking indemnity for $100 million spent responding to the sinkhole crisis, $6.5 million of which Texas Brine claims is for the work Frontier performed. To verify the work Frontier performed and the cost of such work, Oxy issued a subpoena duces tecum to nonparty Frontier, requesting production of eight categories of documents related to services Frontier provided Texas Brine.
In response, Texas Brine filed a motion to quash the subpoena in the Western District of Oklahoma, the district where compliance is required. See Fed. R. Civ, P. 45(d)(3)(A). Proceeding under the uncontested assumption that Louisiana law applied, Texas Brine first claimed the attorney-client. privilege protected the subpoenaed communications.
In a written order, the district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, Leblanc v. Texas Brine Co., No. 16-1026, 2017 WL 913801, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2017). In its order, the court noted that Texas Brine failed to comply with Fed. R, Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A), which requires a person moving to quash a subpoena under the claim of privilege to “describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” Instead, Texas Brine asserted a “blanket claim of privilege.” Leblanc, 2017 WL 913801, at *4. Only in the context of Texas Brine’s claim of a blanket privilege did the court address whether Louisiana’s attorney-client privilege statute extends the privilege to a public relations firm and its agents.
As Louisiana courts have not. addressed this exact issue, the court looked to Wigmore’s definition of attorney-client privilege, which protects “legal advice.” Id. (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292, at 564 (J, McNaughton rev, ed. 1961)), Without a privilege .log before it, the court concluded that much of the work Frontier performed for Texas Brine did not constitute “legal advice” and, thus, was not protected by the attornéy-client privilege.' The court finished its discussion on attorney-client privilege by stating: “the Court denies Texas Brine’s Motion as to attorney-client privilege, absent a specific showing of the legal nature of each withheld communication.” Id. (emphasis added).
Texas Brine also argu.ed the work product doctrine governed the subpoenaed communications. The court reached a similar conclusion regarding this argument, stating the work product doctrine does not protect a public relations firm’s written materials regarding business advice or an attorney’s non-litigation activity. Again, the court emphasized much of the communications were not protected, “absent a specific showing of the legal nature of each withheld communication, and that it was specifically created in anticipation of litigation.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
The district court concluded its order by again emphasizing “Texas Brine’s conclu-sory, blanket assertions of privilege are insufficient to quash the subpoena.” Id. (emphasis added). The court required Texas Brine to produce a privilege log for any communications that it believed were protected. With respect to the eight categories of subpoenaed documents, the court ruled as follows: Frontier need not produce category (1) because the request was over-broad; Frontier must produce the documents requested in categories (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) “subject to privilege screening and production of a log consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)”-, and Frontier must produce the documents requested in categories (6) and (8).
Id. (emphasis added).
Texas Brine filed a timely notice of appeal.
Texas Brine then filed a motion to stay the district court’s order pending these proceedings, which the district court denied. Frontier complied with the district court’s order and has,- at this point, produced around 20,000 documents and a privilege log regarding the confidentiality of the withheld documents.
II.
At the outset, Oxy claims this dispute is not ripe for adjudication because the district court did not actually order production of any allegedly privileged material. Instead, the court ordered production of non-privileged material to Oxy subject to a privilege log. Until the district court orders production of privileged material, Oxy forcibly argues, there is no dispute to resolve. In response, Texas Brine asserts the court erred in defining the scope of the privilege too narrowly and “ordering] production of documents that are arguably privileged communications.” Appellant Reply Brief, 2. In other words, Texas Brine argues in a vacuum that the court construed Louisiana law too narrowly.
But the court has yet to apply Louisiana law to any contested document. We will not resolve a dispute “if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.”’ United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1326 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998)), This principle—the ripeness doctrine—derives from both constitutional and prudential concerns. Id. at 1325. The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the premature adjudication of abstract claims. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995). To determine whether a dispute is prudentially ripe, this Court “balance[s] the fitness of the issue for judicial review with the hardship to the parties from withholding review.” Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1326.
First, in determining the fitness of the issue for review, this Court considers “whether determination of the merits turns upon strictly legal issues or requires facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008)). Texas Brine characterizes the issue before us as a legal one, arguing the district court interpreted Louisiana’s attorney-client privilege statute too narrowly. Assessing a claim of attorney-client privilege, or even a claim of work product doctrine, when a person withholds subpoenaed information, however, necessarily requires a sufficient factual record. “Only when the district court has been exposed to the contested documents and the specific facts ... can it make a principled determination as to whether the attorney-client privilege in fact applies. Any attempt to make this type of determination without this factual foundation amounts to nothing more than a waste of judicial time and resources.” Holifield v. United States, 909 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This is why Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A) requires a person or entity withholding information under a claim of privilege or work product to “describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” Without knowing the nature of the documents, neither the requesting party nor the court can possibly assess the claim. In this case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A) required the production of a privilege log. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 575-76 (1st Cir. 2001). Prior to appealing, Texas Brine did not produce a privilege log regarding the documents Frontier withheld.
While the district court could have ruled otherwise, the court gratuitously allowed Texas Brine a second chance to produce a privilege log regarding the withheld documents.
Texas Brine instead appealed, effectively arguing it should not have to produce any documents or a privilege log. Why Texas Brine believes it can assert a blanket claim of privilege over its communications with Frontier without complying with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A) is beyond us.
The panel pressed Texas Brine on this subject at oral argument. Texas Brine, responded that other courts have granted a blanket privilege over communications between a client and public relations firm without the benefit of a privilege log or viewing the documents in camera. See In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March. 24, 2003, 265 F.Supp.2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Besides the fact that neither In .re Copper Market or In re Grand Jury Subpoenas are binding on this Court, the courts in those cases did in fact either have a privilege log or inspect the documents in camera. See In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. at 215 (“Plaintiffs ,.. move to compel the production of documents listed on the privilege log (the ‘Privilege Log’) produced by non-party ,.. in response to a subpoena....” (emphasis added)); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F.Supp.2d at 323 (“The Court initially required submission of the documents withheld by Firm on grounds of privilege for in camera inspection.”).
Without the benefit of a privilege log or inspection of documents, we are left with an insufficient factual record—the exact problem Fed. R. Civ. P, 45(e)(2)(A)'aims to prevent. Texas Brine has only itself to blame for the predicament in which it finds itself. Without the facts necessary to assess Texas Brine’s claims of attorney-client privilege and work product, this dispute is not fit for appellate review.
While a lack of fitness in itself might not render an appeal unripe, we also must consider the hardship to the parties. In determining .the hardship to the parties, this Court considers whether withholding review will place the parties in “a direct and immediate dilemma.” Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Stout, 519 F.3d at 1118). Withholding’ review of the district court’s order in this case will do no such thing. Texas Brine contends the court’s order required it to produce “arguably privileged communications.” The order simply did not. It required production of materials in (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) “subject to privilege screening and production of a log consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).” Leblanc v. Texas Brine Co., No. 16-1026, 2017 WL 913801, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2017) (emphasis added). In other words, the district court allowed Texas Brine to screen the requested documents, withhold the “arguably privileged communications,” and produce a privilege log describing the nature of the withheld documents “in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). This is no hardship. As explained above, this is exactly what every “person withholding subpoenaed information under a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material” must do. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A). Texas Brine’s hardship at this point is that, in response to Frontier’s production of a privilege log, Oxy might file a motion to compel production of documents that Frontier has withheld. If this happens, the district court might rule in Oxy’s favor on the motion. This possibility is far from “a direct and immediate dilemma.” See Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1327 (holding multiple contingencies rendered an appellant’s potential injury “a destiny far from certain” and, thus, the claim was not ripe for adjudication).
Because both the factual record is insufficient and the court did not require production of protected documents, Texas Brine’s appeal is not ripe for our review. Accordingly, Frontier’s "appeal, No. 17-6075, is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction, as Frontier did. not properly become involved in this litigation at the district court level; Texas Brine’s appeal, No. 17-6076, is DISMISSED for lack of ripeness.